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Glossary 
 
 
  abaya (Arabic ه׌ابع)       outer garment that covers the whole body 
  adat (Arabic ةداع)      derived from the Arabic word ada meaning  
customary law. Locally is might also refer to a  
“share” which is given, for example, at  
weddings.  
  adimat         amulet/charm 
  agama         community or social unit, usually clustered  
around a mosque 
  agong          gong 
  al az'l (Arabic لزعلا)       coitus interruptus 
  alim (Arabic م׌لع)      male Muslim religious scholar 
  alima (Arabic ةم׌لع)      female Muslim religious scholar, plural: alimat 
  apo          lineage ancestor 
  aurat (Arabic ةروع)      intimate parts of the body 
  awid          support 
  ayonen         title for ruler in Bumbaran 
   
bai/bae         female counterpart to datu  
Bai a Labi        Highest female title. Some would translate it as  
Queen.  
  bayok          traditional song said to be derived from  
Bumbaran 
  bangon         lot of land 
  bangsa         descent 
  banka          small boat  
  barangay        smallest administrative unit in the Philippines; 
before it was called barrio 
  batal          touch that makes the bride belong to the groom 
  bebendir        small gong 
  betang         bride price 
  bisaya          slave  
  bolo          Filipino machete 
  bono          murder 
  boring a maratabat      spoiled maratabat 
  Bumbaran        mythical town in the Darangen 
   
carabao        water buffalo 
 
dagamot        sorceress 
  da-i-bangenda       people who do not have a claim on titles 
  damm          penalty 
  dar ul-Islam (Arabic ملاسلاا راد)  House of Islam The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Darangen        Maranao epic poem 
  datu/dato        chieftain; some would translate it as king 
  da'wah (Arabic ةوعد)      call to faith 
  debakan        drum 
  diat (Arabic  ׌دلا ه )      blood money 
  djinn (Arabic نجلا)      supernatural beings 
  dowry         is locally used to connote bride price 
  Dwapolo ago Walo  
  a Mbabaya ko Taritib      28 Law Makers 
   
Eid al-Adha (Arabic یحضلاا د׌ع)  Festival of Sacrifice  
  Eid al-Fitr (Arabic رطفلا د׌ع)    Festival marking the end of Ramadan 
   
ganta          Philippine dry or liquid measure holding about  
three quarts 
gapa          Land on which a community lays claim; is  
subdivided into two categories: kakola, which  
is the communal land, such as a forest, owned  
in common; and mianggapa, which is  
classified under private ownership 
gibbon  a bedroom for the daughter of the Sultan that is  
close to the sleeping place of the Sultan and his  
lady 
  grar          title  
  guro          teacher 
   
haram (Arabic مارح)      forbidden 
  Higa-onon        Indigenous ethnic group in Mindanao 
   
idal          alternate 
  igma (Arabic عامجا)      agreement/consensus 
  imam (Arabic ماما)      head of religious affairs 
  inged          township arranged around supported descent line 
  inikadowa        twin spirit of a person  
   
juramentados  a person, woman or man, who has taken an oath,  
describing ritualized suicide or suicide  
attackers who have taken an oath to die  
defending Muslim territory 
   
kadi (Arabic یضاق)      judge  
  kafir (Arabic رفاك)      infidel 
  kaga ba’an        curse of the ancestral spirits 
  kakasi          love charm  
  kakinikini        to walk gracefully 
  kalaawi        gift to the bride about one year after the wedding 
  kalilang        feast 
  kalipa          caliph, head of a caliphate (Arabic ةف׌لخ  ) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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kalipongan        small unit 
  kambilang atao      decorum 
  kandadaonga        session where verses are exchanged between  
girls and boys in which their feelings are  
indirectly expressed 
  kandidiyaga        crying, sometimes rhythmic, over the dead 
  kandori        thanksgiving celebration 
  kapaka alampas sa di ta rk    robbery or stealing 
  kapakasbo/kasebo      adultery (applicable to married man or woman –  
at least one of them has to be married) 
kapakasina/kasina  derived from the Arabic word zina (fornication) 
(applicable to unmarried man or woman) 
  kapalagoy sa babay      abduction 
  kapamagongoai      mutual consideration 
  kapamagawida      mutual support 
  kapananadem/kapangangaloy   reminisce 
  kapangangalek/kapangalap    threatening 
  kapedi-pedi na kalimo-limo    pleading 
  kapelolobed        rape 
  kaperaraneg        mauling 
  kaphasada ko rido      resolution ceremony of a rido 
  kaphoparoai        mutual glorification 
  kapmokalid/mimortad     one who leaves the Islamic religion for another  
religion 
  kapugad        a gift to the bride 
kapuphunuda        mutual paying deference 
kasipa                                                  game in which teams have to kick and hold a sipa, a  
ball-like contraption made of rattan 
  katengaga        elopement 
  kathatabanga/katatabanga    mutual help 
  katongkir sa di benar      false accusation 
  kazisiapa        mutual protection 
  kazuzulai        mutual magnification  
  khalifah/khilafah (Arabic ةف׌لخ)  God's vice-regents 
kitab (Arabic باتک)  rgulations which are based on the Qur'an and the  
hadith 
  kitakhesen ko makambabala    commitment for the resolution of a conflict 
  kitegelen ko lalag      wisdom 
  kokoman a kambhatabata'a    law of kinsmen 
  kolintang        set of 8 gongs 
  kopia           cap 
kota          fort 
  kumbung        local veil 
  kuruj          notion used in relation to Tabligh. Trip from  
place to place to re-Islamize Muslims whose 
observance of Islam is weak 
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lamin          lady's dormitory tower, built to stand out from  
the torogan 
lawiin  the visit of the wife of a sultan or datu to his  
home for the first time after marriage,  
welcomed with a celebration by the  
family and clan of the husband 
let a igaan  gift to the bride 
  lokes          elder 
  Lumad         indigenous people in Mindanao 
  lumba          paragon 
  luwaran        selection; refers to a code of laws which are  
based on a selection of Arabic books mostly  
originating from the Hadramaut (cf. Hooker  
1983: 163)  
   
mababa-i bangsa      low bangsa (blood status) 
  mabeba-a tao        low people 
  madaris (Arabic سرادم)    plural of madrasah  
  madrasah (Arabic ةسردم)    educational institution  
  mahr (Arabic رهم  )      obligatory bridal-money given by the husband to  
his wife at the time of marriage 
Malacañang        Office of the President of the Philippines 
mala-i bangsa        big bangsa 
  malong        tube skirt 
  mapia-a tao        good people 
  maratabat (from Arabic.  
martaba  بترم ة )        rank, status-honor  
  maratabat sa bangsa      honour of descent  
  maratabat sa kandatu ago agama  honour of title and domain 
  maratabat sa warisan      honour of women (female kin) 
  maswarah        community meeting 
  Mbabaya ko Taritib      Lawmakers 
  mbota' mbota'a/mbatabataa    clansip 
  montiya        precious stone 
  moriatao        offspring 
  mota'a/mbataa       three generational group traced down from one’s  
grandparents. It includes the two sets of  
grandparents and their descendants, but does  
not include the siblings of the grandparents  
and their descendants.  
   
nafaqa (Arabic ةقفن)      something given as maintenance 
  nati          carabao calf 
  niqab (Arabic باقن)      face-covering veil 
  noni          full-blooded 
   
olol          enslavement for women convicted of high crimes 
  omerta         code of honor which can be found among the  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
16 
Italian Mafia 
  pagagamot        person who is using poison for treatment 
  pagawid        supporter 
  pagawidan        supported 
  pamamantak        sorcerer 
  pamomolong        a person who can heal, also called medicine man  
or spiritual healer, who can be a man or a woman 
  pananalsila        specialists on genealogy 
  pandita         schools which offer second-level education in  
Islamic subjects 
  panoroganan        Royal House 
  panta          wig of long hair 
  Pat a Inged a  
  Kiyasosoludaan o  
  Bangsa o Pat a  
  Pangampong sa Ranao    Areas of demarcation or intersection of the  
Four Principalities of the Lake 
  Pat a Pangampong sa Ranao    Four Principalities/Encampments of the Lake  
  Pelokelokesen       council of elders 
  pendarpaan        spirit medium  
  Pamagsopa sa Marawi    Alliance of Marawi 
  poona          source 
  purdah (from Persian هدرپ)    segregation of the sexes and seclusion of women 
   
  qisas (Arabic صاصق)      death penalty 
   
rabai          pillage 
  radiam (Arabic مجرلا)      stoning of convicts in adultery and incest crimes 
  raga          unmarried woman 
  raja          monarch (derived from Sanskrit)  
ranao          lake 
  rawaten        role model  
  rido          clan or family disputes 
  rido-or-sesalakawa- 
  a-tawo a miakaolika      Serious conflict which occurs between  
Maranao who are not directly related 
  rila          forgiveness 
  ruma bichara        ruling council 
   
sakeena (Arabic ةن׌كس)     tranquility or enduring peace 
  sakop          freeman/followers/commoners 
  salsila  (Arabic ةلسلس بسنلا)    genealogy 
  sandil          concubines 
  sa'op          relatilate 
  sari sari store        convenience store 
sayat          gift to the bride 
  sebangan        east  
  sedepan        west The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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sela sa adat        which is was part of the dowry but which is not 
demanded by the wife except in times of  
trouble between the couple 
  shaitan (Arabic ناط׌ش  )     devil or evil djinn 
sharia (Arabic ةع׌رش)      “path”; refers to laws which are based on the  
Qur'an and the hadith  
  shia (Arabic ةع׌ش)      Derived from Shī‘atu ‘Alī; the followers of Ali 
  sukodan        neutral relative 
  suku          district 
   
  taalik          waiting period until a resolution ceremony of a  
rido 
Tablighi Jamaat   a transnational movement to spread and revive the  
Islamic faith 
taritib  (Arabic ب׌ترت)     order/arrangement 
  tonong         spirit 
  toril          live-in schools where children from three years  
old and above are confined in one place and  
taught Islamic religion and the Qur'an 
  torogan        palace 
  tonganai'i/tonganaya’i     clan, which consists of persons related to  
each other within the fourth degree of  
consanguinity 
   
ulama (Arabic املع)      male Muslim religious scholars; singular: alim,  
female: alima, female plural: alimat 
  ummah (Arabic ةمأ  )      community 
  ustad (Arabic داتسا)      teacher in Arabic; plural: ustadz/ustads; female:  
ustazah  
   
vinta          native boat 
   
wali (Arabic یلو)      marriage guardian 
  warisan        female clan member  
   
zukudan/sukodan      neutral relative 
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Zusammenfassung 
Zwischen Re-Traditionalisierung und Re-Islamisierung. Der Einfluss der Nationalen Frage 
und  der  Wiederkehr  der  Tradition  auf  Genderfragen  bei  Maranaos  in  den  südlichen 
Philippinen 
Die  Re-Traditionalisierungbewegung  auf  den  südlichen  Philippinen  ist  mehr  als  nur  eine 
Reaktion auf die Moderne (Appadurai 1998; Kohl 2006). Sie muss in ihrem lokalen Kontext 
verstanden werden. Auf den südlichen Philippinen ist sie eng mit der nationalen Frage verwoben, 
gestellt  von  einer  rebellierenden  muslimischen  Minderheit  in  Mindanao.  Die  Re-
Traditionalisierungsbewegung verläuft teilweise Hand in Hand mit der Rebellion, aber auch in 
Opposition  zu  dieser.  In  jedem  Fall  haben  beide  Bewegungen  Auswirkungen  auf  lokale 
Machtstrukturen. Frauen sind von diesen Prozessen nicht ausgeschlossen, genauso wenig wie 
deren  repräsentative  Organisationen.  Dies  lässt  die  Frage  aufkommen,  welche  Rolle  das 
islamisch-synkretistische adat (Gewohnheitsrecht) im Kampf um Frauenrechte spielt. Und im 
Besonderen, ob eine Frauenbewegung basierend auf adat-Rechten sich als potentielle Alternative 
zu  dem  die  Debatte  um  Frauenfragen  monopolisierenden  islamischem  oder  westlichem 
Feminismus etabliert. 
Betrachtet  man  die  jüngsten  Entwicklungen  in  Mindanao  und  ignoriert  dabei  die 
Geschichte  der  Region,  resultiert  dies  in  unzeitgemäßen  Antworten  auf  Fragen,  deren 
Beantwortung sich noch im Prozess befindet. Kein Phänomen existiert für sich allein, sondern 
muss in seinem Kontext betrachtet werden. Die Einbeziehung historischer Fakten reflektiert nicht 
nur  die  Komplexität  der  nationalen  Frage  in  Mindanao.  Sie  sind  auch  nützlich  bei  der 
Entwicklung einer generellen Analyse der Faktoren, die muslimische Frauenorganisationen dazu 
bringen,  eine  Rolle  in  der  Beantwortung  sozialer  und  politischer  Fragen  zu  spielen.  Die 
vorliegende Arbeit  hat  einen  breitgefächerten  Fokus  auf  die  Entstehung  und  sozio-kulturelle 
Konsequenzen  der  Rebellion.  Außerdem  werden  das  die  Region  prägende  synkretistisch-
traditionelle System und deren Auswirkungen auf Genderfragen untersucht. Sie legt somit das 
Fundament  für  ein  besseres  Verständnis  der  sozio-kulturellen  Prozesse,  in  die  muslimische 
Frauenorganisationen auf den Philippinen verwickelt sind. 
Auf den Philippinen ist die Frage der Beziehung zwischen Re-Traditionalisierungs- und 
Islamisierungsbewegungen von speziellem Interesse, da die nationale Regierung eine „Divide et 
Impera“-Strategie  im  Angesicht  der  Rebellion  der  muslimischen  Minderheit  in  Mindanao The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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anwendet. Das anfängliche Ziel der größten Rebellengruppe, der Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF), in den 1970er Jahren war es einen säkularen Staat zu errichten. Erst in den 1980er 
Jahren wurde der Einfluss des Islams wichtiger. Zu dieser Zeit trat die MNLF-Splittergruppe, die 
Moro  Islamic  Liberation  Front  (MILF),  an  die  Öffentlichkeit.  Diese  wollte  nicht  nur  die 
Unabhängigkeit der muslimischen Gebiete, sondern auch einen islamischen Staat. Die da’wah 
Bewegung
4 war jedoch nicht auf die Rebellenorganisation begrenzt, sondern verbreitete sich auf 
den gesamten Philippinen. Nach dem Sturz der Marcos -Diktatur und der damit einhergehenden 
Demokratisierungswelle wurden mehrere islamische Parteien gegründet. Die Provinz Lanao del 
Sur,  der  For schungsschwerpunkt  dieser  Dissertation,  ist  in  diesem  Zusammenhang  von 
speziellem Interesse. Denn dort hat sich eine der größten islamischen Parteien gebildet, die 
OMPIA Partei,
5 die in der Provinz in den 1990ern mehr als ein Jahrzehnt an der Regierung 
beteiligt war. Die politische Landschaft veränderte sich in den 2000ern mit der Rückkehr der 
traditionellen politischen Elite. Der Machtverlust der islamischen Parteien hatte jedoch keinen 
Bedeutungsverlust  des  islamischen  Bezugsrahmens  zur  Folge.  Im  Rahmen  d er  anhaltenden 
Rebellion und der daraus resultierenden „no war, no peace“-Umgebung
6 wurde der Islam zu 
einem Politikum und der Quelle wichtiger Rechtfertigungsnarrativen  (Forst and Günther 2009). 
Diese werden von konkurrierenden Parteien referiert, um eine n Machtvorteil zu erlangen. Die 
Definition der Narrative variiert jedoch, nicht nur zwischen Traditionalisten und Islamisten, 
sondern auch innerhalb dieser Gruppen. Wie Judith Butler schreibt, kann eine Narrative multiple 
Definitionen  enthalten,  die  in  ein en  jeweils  anderen  Kontext  gesetzt  werden,  um  als 
Rechtfertigungen zu dienen (2008: 14). 
  Frauenrechte  positionieren  sich  in  diesem  Zusammenhang  zwischen  Re -
Traditionalisierung und Re-Islamisierung. Aufgrund der „no war, no peace“-Umgebung, durch 
die der Islam eine kritische Wichtigkeit erlangte, kann keine klare Unterscheidung zwischen den 
beiden  Bewegungen  gemacht  werden.  Interessanterweise  fordern  Frauen  von  der  Re-
Traditionalisierungs- und der Re-Islamisierungsbewegung ihre Rechte in den meisten Fällen in 
                                                 
4  Das  arabische  da’wah  “Ruf  (zum  Glauben)”  beinhaltet  eine  Missionierungsbewegung,  um  den  islamischen 
Glauben zu verbreiten.  
5 Ompongan o Muslim sa Philippinas a Iphuthagompia a Ranao (Politische Partei der Muslime auf den Philippinen 
für Reform in Lanao). 
6 Eine Umgebung, in der positiver Frieden und Krieg abwesend sind. Sie ist durch Strukturen charakterisiert, die man 
auch im Krieg vorfinden kann, so zum Beispiel gegenseitiges Misstrauen der verfeindeten Parteien oder die Pr￤senz 
von  Milit￤r.  Weiterhin  beinhaltet  diese  Umgebung  die  Möglichkeit,  dass  ein  bewaffneter  Konflikt  jeder  Zeit 
ausbrechen kann.  
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einem  islamischen  Rahmen,  auch  wenn  die  Machtfelder  (Lenz  1997)  der  Bewegungen  sich 
voneinander unterscheiden. Islamisten berufen sich vor allem auf den Koran und die Gleichheit 
aller  Menschen  vor  Gott,  während  Traditionalisten  ihre  Macht  auf  der  Basis  hierarchischer 
Strukturen ausspielen.  Die Frauenbewegung kann in  Bezug zur Re-Traditionalisierung nur in 
ihrer  historischen  Entwicklung  verstanden  werden.  Hierdurch  wird  die  Basis  geliefert,  um 
Rekonstruktionen und Neotraditionen zu lokalisieren (Kohl 2006), aber auch Möglichkeiten zu 
erkennen, die das  Gewohnheitsrecht  Frauen bieten kann. Die Rolle, die der  Islam  in  diesem 
Zusammenhang spielt, ist wegen seines Einflusses und seiner Vorrangstellung gegenüber adat 
zentral. Weiterhin machen die speziellen Umstände der Rebellion Genderfragen zum Politikum. 
Die Region ist dominiert durch die „no war, no peace“-Umgebung; diese führt dazu, dass sich die 
muslimische Minderheit bewusst von der christlichen Mehrheit absetzt, um somit ihren Anspruch 
auf  Selbstbestimmung  zu  untermauern.  Eine  Strategie,  die  eine  verstärkte  koranische 
Argumentation in Bezug auf Genderfragen beinhaltet. Dies bedeutet, dass Genderfragen an die 
nationale Frage in Mindanao gebunden sind, diese wiederum steht in jedem Fall mit Ethnizität in 
Verbindung,  die  als  religiös  definiert  wird.  In  diesem  speziellen  Kontext  ist  der  Re-
Traditionalisierungsprozess  nicht  essentiell  in  Opposition  zur  Re-Islamisierung  zu  verstehen. 
Beide Bewegungen folgen anderen Zielen, erstere kann sich eine Lösung der nationalen Frage im 
Rahmen der nationalen Regierung vorstellen und letztere fordert eine solche außerhalb dieser. 
Beide sind sich jedoch in der Frage einig, dass die ethnische und somit die religiöse Identität 
gewahrt  werden  muss.  Die  Vorstellungen  der  die  Region  weitgehend  dominierenden 
Traditionalisten basieren auf dem Islam, es werden jedoch hierarchische Strukturen favorisiert, 
die hauptsächlich Frauen der lokalen Elite fördern. Der sogenannte westliche Feminismus ist in 
der  Region  nicht  anerkannt,  wenn  er  nicht  in  einen  ethnischen  Rahmen  eingebunden  wird. 
Frauenbewegungen  mit  Bezug  auf  den  Islam  können,  trotz  des  großen  Einflusses  der  Re-
Islamisierung,  traditionelle  Strukturen  nicht  ersetzten,  die  weithin  dominant  bleiben. 
Schlussfolgernd kann behauptet werden, dass aufgrund der „no war, no peace“-Umgebung der 
muslimische Feminismus in Mindanao in all seinen Variationen, hauptsächlich auf traditionellen 
Machtstrukturen basiert und auf islamische Argumente begrenzt ist und dass dessen Zukunft eng 
mit der Lösung der nationalen Frage verwoben ist.  
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Introduction 
A revival of traditions is by no means merely a reaction to modernity (Appadurai 1998; 
Kohl 2006). It has to be understood in its local context. Thus, in the southern Philippines, it is 
largely bound to the national question posed by an ongoing rebellion by a Muslim minority in 
Mindanao.  The  re-traditionalization  movement  developed  partly  alongside  and  partly  in 
opposition  to  the  rebellion,  and  in  any  case  local  power  relations  were  affected  by  both 
movements.  Women  were  not  excluded  from  this  process,  nor  were  their  representative 
organizations.  This  raises  the  questions  of  the  role  and  possible  functions  of  the  Islamic-
syncretistic adat (customary law) in women’s  rights struggles and whether  a women’s rights 
movement based on adat can establish itself as a potential alternative to both Islamization and 
Western feminism, which monopolize the current debates on women’s questions.  
Studying  the  processes  in  Mindanao  by  ignoring  their  historical  developments  would 
result  in  untimely  responses  on  issues  that  are  still  unresolved  in  the  region.  Each  specific 
phenomenon does not exist for itself but has to be incorporated in its context. Considerations of 
historical facts do not only reflect the complexities of the national question in Mindanao. They 
are  also  useful  for  developing  a  global  analysis  of  the  factors  that  led  Muslim  women’s 
organizations to play a part in social and political issues. Indeed, the present work with its wide-
ranging  focus  on  the  development  and  socio-cultural  consequences  of  the  rebellion  and  the 
syncretistic-traditional systems characterizing the region and their consequences on gender issues 
is partly meant to lay the foundation for a better understanding of the socio-cultural process in 
which Muslim women’s movements in the Philippines are involved.  
In the Philippines the question of the relations between re-traditionalization movements 
and the ongoing Islamic resurgence is of particular interest since the national government has 
used a divide-and-rule policy when faced with the rebellion of the Muslim minority in Mindanao. 
The  initial  goal  of  the  Moro  National  Liberation  Front  (MNLF)  in  the  1970s  was  secular 
nationalism; it was only in the 1980s that Islam became more important in the framework of the 
MNLF’s splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF not only called for 
self-determination,  but  also  included  the  promotion  of  Islam  in  its  agenda.  This  da’wah
7 
movement was, however, not limited to rebel organizations, but spread all over the Philippines. 
Many Islamic parties emerged after the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos which resulted in a spread 
                                                 
7 Literally da’wah means “call to faith” and signifies a missionary movement to spread the Islamic creed. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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of a democratic wave. The province of Lanao del Sur is of particular interest in this regard, 
because one of the biggest Islamic parties in the Philippines, the OMPIA Party,
8 ruled there for 
almost a decade in th e 1990s. The political landscape changed in the 2000s when traditional 
political elites returned to positions of power.  Although the Islamic parties have declined over 
time, this does not mean that the Islamic frame of reference has vanished. In the contex t of the 
ongoing rebellion and the resulting “no war, no peace” environment , Islam became a political 
issue and provided an important narrative of justification (Forst and Günther 2009) that is utilized 
by competing parties in order to claim power in the r egion. The definition of this narrative, 
however, varies, not only between traditionalists and Islamists, but also within these groups. As 
Judith Butler says, a narrative can contain multiple definitions of itself, which are set into context 
to serve as justifications (2008: 14). 
  Women’s  rights  in  this  context  became  an  issue  that  was  positioned  between  re-
traditionalization and Islamic resurgence. However, because of the current “no war, no peace” 
environment, where Islamic narratives of justification are of critical importance, no clear division 
between the two types of movements can be drawn. Most interestingly, women from the re-
traditionalization and Islamic resurgence movements claim their rights in most cases within an 
Islamic  framework,  even  though  the  basis  of  their  fields  of  power  (Lenz  1997)  is  different. 
Islamists mainly refer to the Qur’an and the equality of all human beings before God, whereas 
traditionalists  base  their  power  on  hierarchical  structures.  Taking  a  general  approach  to  the 
subject  into  consideration  is  important  also  because  the  women’s  struggle,  in  relation  to  re-
traditionalization,  can  only  be  understood  in  its  historical  development,  providing  a  basis  to 
detect  re-constructions  and neo-traditions  (Kohl 2006), especially  concerning the possibilities 
adat can provide. The role of Islam in this context is central because of its influence and primacy 
over adat. Further, the special features created by the “no war, no peace” environment
9, in which 
the Muslim minority forms a conscious opposition to the Christian majority to underline  the 
claim to self-determination, make the gender issue a political issue and consequently reinforce 
the  Qur’anic  argumentation.  This  means  that  the  gender  issue  is  connected  to  the  national 
question and sovereignty in Mindanao, which is in any case related to ethnic identity, being 
                                                 
8 Ompongan o Muslim sa Philippinas a Iphuthagompia a Ranao which means Political Party of the Muslims in the 
Philippines for Reform in Lanao. 
9 A “no war, no peace” environment is an environment in which positive peace and war are absent. It is characterized 
by war-characteristics like mistrust between the conflicting parties or the presence of military. Further, it holds the 
possibility that violent conflict can break out at any time.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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basically defined as religious. In this particular context, the re-traditionalization process is not 
opposed  in  essence  to  Islamic  resurgence  and  cannot  be  introduced  as  a  conscious 
countermovement to it since it follows its own agenda. The former sees the possibility of their 
claims being met within the framework of the Republic of the Philippines, while the second 
claims  that  the  solution  to  the  national  question  lies  outside  the  state.  The  agenda  of  the 
traditionalists is still based on Islam but is in favor of hierarchical structures that mainly support 
women from the elite. Likewise, so-called Western feminism is not widely appreciated without 
being “repackaged” in an ethnic framework. Women’s movements in relation to Islamization, 
despite the strong influence of the latter, cannot replace traditional structures that are dominant. It 
can be concluded that, because of the “no war, no peace” environment, Muslim feminism in 
Mindanao, in all its variety, relies mainly on traditional power structures and is limited to Islamic 
argumentations. Its future depends on political issues and to a great extent on the solving of the 
national question.  
I. Research Circumstances   
During my research in Lanao del Sur, I was puzzled not to find the expected conflict 
environment, which is the way the place is often defined. Instead, I came to know an area in 
which there was neither peace nor war, meaning an area where characteristics of a war can be 
found, such as a general mistrust toward non-Muslims (expecting them to be potential spies), a 
particular fear of non-Muslims to visit Marawi City, and military checkpoints along the road. The 
mistrust,  however,  was  in  many  cases  overshadowed  by  politeness  and  hospitality,  and  the 
checkpoints were only occupied on certain occasions such as a red alert by the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP), expecting another outbreak of violent conflict, which occurred shortly 
after my one-year stay in Lanao. Even though my fieldwork was vastly limited, since I was not 
allowed to roam around freely or be on my own in Marawi City, due to the danger of being 
kidnapped, the city was not at war. How then could I describe Lanao del Sur, which for several 
years has been characertized by regular outbreaks of violent conflict, resulting most of the time in 
a high number of refugees, either because of the national conflict or because of local clan feuds 
(ridos)?  During  my  research  I  became  acquainted  with  the  notion  of  a  “no  war,  no  peace” 
environment (Lucman 2000). This seemed to appropriately describe the local situation with its 
outbreaks of conflict; peace projects; the permanent existence of violent conflicts in local life 
stories; the high state of tension even though there is no official war; and an everyday life in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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which people work and study, campaign for elections, go to the mosque, or go shopping. In this 
situation peace and war are decided and institutionalized by the various groups involved, the 
main players being the government of the Philippines and the MILF, and both war and peace 
remain outcomes of this environment of “in-between.” It thus seemed crucial for me to describe 
and define the evolution and characteristics of this special situation in Lanao del Sur, not only to 
better understand the actual conflict and peace efforts, but also because it seemed to be the basis 
for gender norms and re-traditionalizations.  
I first arrived in Lanao del Sur in order to do research on gender issues. After some initial 
interviews with Muslim women from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), I met mistrust 
and ignorance when I wanted to go beyond this rather limited circle. It was only when I changed 
my subject to focus on traditional bai a labis (female titleholders in the sultanate system), an 
issue that was defined as “uncritical,” that I was welcomed more openly. When inquiring about 
the sultanate system as a whole, however, I was mainly referred to men as experts, who advised 
me to talk with women on the issue of bai a labis. Consequently,  I learned more about the 
sultanate system and the roles of men and women within it. Roughly, it can be said that every 
barangay
10  has  a  sultan  and  his  female  counterpart,  a  bai  a  labi,  and  several  other  royal 
titleholders. Considering that Lanao del Sur has more than 1,000 barangays and corresponding 
sultanates, it occurred to me that studying royalty could lead to a broader understanding of the 
gender situation. By dealing with the sultanates, I further learned about the importance not only 
of  the  bilateral  salsila  (genealogy),  but  also  about  underlying  clan  structures  on  which  the 
sultanate  system  was  superimposed  and  which  remained  strongly  intact,  even  though  the 
importance of royalty has declined in the face of state authority. During my research, a certain re-
traditionalization movement became obvious. I had to define it in the context of the “no war, no 
peace”  environment  in  which  the  national  government  sees  the  chance  of  supporting  re-
traditionalization  in  the  framework  of  counter-revolution  and  peacekeeping.  Additionally, 
international  NGOs,  focused  increasingly  on  small-scale  conflicts  since  the  1990s,  support 
traditional systems as providing proper solutions to local conflicts. The role of women in these 
processes  is  not  always  a  point  of  debate.  Even  though  it  might  be  included  in  the  re-
structuralizations of sultanates and peacekeeping, there is so far no organized women’s group 
demanding empowerment based on adat (customary law).  
The extent to which women can actually rely on adat rights for their empowerment and 
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why these claims are recognized not in women’s groups but in an Islamic framework, can again 
be explained by referring to the “no war, no peace” environment, in which gender became a 
political issue connected to Islam and nationality. Spaces of power for women already existed in 
several  traditionally  symmetrically  organized  fields,  like  those  of  bilateral  kinship  and 
inheritance. In this context, gender norms become frequently less important than lineage and the 
power of the family and clan, providing a gender-blind reward system, which can elevate women 
into political and social leadership positions, despite criticism from fundamentalists. Islam, in its 
various interpretations, however, provides one of the most important frameworks of legitimation 
used to define social norms in Lanao del Sur. Thus, women’s groups are organized around it, 
relying on the authority this narrative can provide concerning gender issues. Of special interest is 
how these groups define and apply Islamic norms.  
II. Approach 
Doing research in a conflict area is risky and provides many challenges to the security of 
the researcher. In addition, methodological approaches must be reconsidered in this context. Thus 
methods like participant observation might pose a problem when the researcher is not allowed to 
leave the house and roam around freely on her own or can only do so with a local companion. 
Mistrust and the supposition that one is a spy may hinder conversation. Questionnaires might not 
be answered, with a statement such as “people are not guinea pigs.” Proper learning of the local 
language (I took an intensive course in Maranao for three months) is also hampered by these 
barriers. After a number of approaches, the most appropriate method – in addition to living in 
Lanao for one year (2007-2008) and thus being part of informal and formal discussions and 
events, which were further debated and explained by several key informants – turned out to be 
semi-structured interviews with representatives. Interviews, particularly with royal titleholders, 
were conducted either in English (one of the two official languages of the Philippines, the other 
being Filipino) or in Maranao and were translated as needed by a research assistant. Titleholders 
proved  to  be  appropriate  interviewees,  not  only  because  they  are  in  charge  of  publicly 
representing their own lineage, but also because they are generally more open to governmental 
and (Western) foreign approaches to establishing social, economic, or political relations. The role 
of people in positions of authority and key informants was crucial for my entrance into a rather 
closed society. Through Professor Jamail Kamlian, my host in Iligan, I had the opportunity to 
become  acquainted  with  the  chancellor  of  Mindanao  State  University-Iligan  Institute  of The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Technology  (MSU-IIT).  Professor  Marcelo  Salazar,  who  accepted  me  as  a  research  fellow, 
provided me with transportation and access to the library and, most importantly, referred me to 
MSU President Ricardo de Leon in Marawi City. He promised security on the campus during my 
stay. Monalinda Doro, a Maranao student of Anthropology and Sociology and a language teacher 
for foreign NGOs, turned out to be my entrance ticket into a society which is in large part based 
on family relationships. Monalinda’s genealogy was traced as a way of finding common relatives 
of the interview partners, which then facilitated interaction. With her help I came to know some 
of the MSU Royalties and specifically its women’s sector. The MSU Royalties president invited 
me to stay with the group, which initiated a small conference on the sultanate, followed by a 
focused group discussion on the role of the bai a labi. Monalinda also introduced me to Abdul 
Hamidullah Atar, head of the NGO Rido, Inc., who invited me frequently to events, provided me 
with information concerning clan structures, and introduced me to interview partners from the 
Marawi sultanate. Finally, accidental meetings with other persons, including the key informants 
Amer  Rashid  Mindalano  and  Datu  Norodin  Alonto  Lucman  (author  and  historian  from  the 
influential Alonto family), opened doors to local clan arrangements and brought access not only 
to female politicians, but also to the religious sector.  
During my first, two-month, stay in Mindanao in 2005, I mainly conducted interviews 
with local women’s NGOs such as Maradeca and Al-Mujadilah. During my second stay, from 
2007-2008  in  Lanao,  I  undertook  73  semi-structured  interviews,  averaging  about  two  hours, 
mainly with male and female titleholders. I spoke with some of the interviewees more than once. 
Additionally, I interviewed female politicians and religious and non-religious women leaders. 
Another  important  source  of  information  was  the  library  at  MSU  Marawi  and  the  Dansalan 
Research  Center,  which  are  stocked  with  books  that  are  locally  published  and  not  usually 
available in German libraries. Finally, newspaper articles about the Mindanao conflict, mainly 
from  MindaNews,  which  were  in  large  part  written  by  Carolyn  Arguillas,  a  journalist  and 
women’s activist having observer status at the peace negotiations, were collected for one year 
(2008-2009), providing, besides general background on the issue, the basis for an analysis of this 
specific outbreak of violence.  
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Chapter One: Between War and Peace 
Introduction 
This chapter follows the idea that, like conflict and war, peace should be viewed as a 
process and not as “the norm” (see Richards 2005: 12). Cultural descriptions tend to ignore or 
downplay violence as a non-normative situation. However, recent anthropological studies of war 
focus  on a  conflicting environment  (Avruch 2001;  Elwert 1999, 2004; Klute 2004;  Richards 
2005; Schmidt 1999; Schmidt/Schröder 2001)
11 in order to understand violence and conflict as 
part of  social and cultural dynamic. In this thesis this approach is theoretically framed in the 
context of a “no war, no peace” environment. In the case of the Min danao situation, this 
framework of analysis is preferable to the definition of Mindanao as a “conflict area” in the 
context of a general description focusing primarily on the national conflict. Likewise, in this 
thesis I argue against the more specific but limited and biased concept of ethno-religious conflict. 
The approach used here encompasses the development of war and peace alike, reaching a more 
precise picture of how both are constructed. Times of non-war have predominated in the area for 
several years without, however, positive peace having been attained; it is this environment that is 
defined as one of “no war, no peace.” 
The “no war, no peace” concept has been applied in several peace and conflict studies to 
describe a specific environment. For Dijkzeul (2008), it indicates a society in which an outbreak 
of violent conflict, fostered by public and private institutions, is possible at any time. MacGinty 
(2006, 2007) refers to a situation following a peace agreement, like in Northern Ireland, or during 
peace negotiations, such as have been held frequently since the 1970s in Mindanao. There are 
situations in which a ceasefire or official peace is implemented following an (unsatisfying) peace 
agreement,  while  structures  of  conflict,  such  as  mistrust  between  specific  groups  remain. 
Richards (2005) applies the concept of conflict situations in the framework of an anthropological 
approach. He defines war and peace as interwoven processes carried out by social agents. These 
agents can nurture conflict in a non-violent framework, for example by pursuing political ends. 
Violence and war are hence not to be treated as separated entities, as non-violent environments 
are not  necessarily  connected with  peace. Richards nevertheless does  not  provide a concrete 
                                                 
11 Avruch (2001) argues that the human rights movement played a helpful role in the formulation of an agenda for 
new ethnographies of violence and conflict in anthropology.  However, the human rights  movement  changed its 
approach after the Cold War, focusing more on small-scale conflicts and local, traditional approaches to resolving 
these conflicts (Klute 2004).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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definition of a “no war, no peace” environment, but rather blurs the concepts of peace and war in 
order to focus on social actors and the development of war situations out of specific contexts.  
  While using an analysis of the “no war, no peace” environment that follows Dijkzeul and 
MacGinty, I have at the same time applied an anthropological framework in focusing on social 
actors and their involvement into the creation of war and peace. In the Mindanao context, I use 
the concept to refer to periods of ceasefire and non-war that are not exactly ones of non-violence. 
I consider the formation of peace and war in this situation of “in between,” taking into account 
local, national, and international settings and their interconnections.  
  Following an introduction to the area with a special focus on Lanao del Sur and its capital 
Marawi City, the development of the Mindanao conflict and the “no war, no peace” environment 
are described. The latter is considered in detail with regard to zones of peace and markets of 
violence
12 (see Elwert 2004) and also in connection to the outbreak of war in 2008. Peace talks, I 
argue, stabilize a situation of “in between” war and peace through being institutionalized in 
specific panels and places, involving selected individuals in order to f ind a solution to the 
conflict. They have been held for several years now without being able to provide a positive 
peace or prevent war, and they can prolong the situation of in between.  
  Whereas on the national level violent conflicts in the framework of the rebellion have had 
a destabilizing effect on Philippine society, they have the opposite effect in the form of family 
feuds (ridos) on the local level. In their frequency, the latter constitute a local example of a “no 
war, no peace” environment among different families, that strengthen family and clan solidarity 
and the datu system. Ridos are exacerbated by “criminal  governance” (Kreuzer 2009) in the 
Philippines, and the Mindanao conflict. The resolution of family feuds  came to  national and 
international  attention  with  the  supposition  that  this  would  be  a  key  to  peace  and  order  in 
Mindanao. Against this supposition, this dissertation argues that family feuds are a traditional 
form of local conflict-solving and that merely solving them allows the persistence of the national 
conflict,  as  well  as  the  Mafia-like  Filipino  political  structures  which  are  the  most  important 
causes of the devastation in the region.  
 
                                                 
12 Markets of  violence can develop in areas of conflict. They  involve efforts to derive profit from  the conflict 
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I. Mindanaoan Society and the History of the Conflict 
A. Political Divisions and Social Framework 
1. Mindanao 
Mindanao,
13 with 120,800 km², is the second largest island in the Philippines, home to 
about one-fourth of the Filipino Population. The area is divided into six administrative regions: 
Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX), Northern Mindanao (Region X), Davao (Region XI), South 
Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and General Santos City (SOCCSKSARGEN or 
Region XII), Caraga and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The regions 
were reorganized on 19 September 2001 by the Arroyo  government after a plebiscite on the 
inclusion of provinces and cities into the ARMM. The autonomous region consists of a land area 
of 12,288 km², which constitutes about 10% of the total Mindanao land area (PRB 2008). It 
includes three provinces in the Sulu Archipelago, namely Basilan (except Isabela City), Sulu, and 
Tawi-Tawi,  and  two  provinces  on  the  Mindanao  island,  namely  Lanao  del  Sur  and 
Maguindanao.
14  Its  capital  is  Cotabato  City,  which belo ngs  not  to  the ARMM  but  to  the 
SOCCSKSARGEN Region. Populationwise the autonomous region is home to 15% of t he 
Mindanao population (NSO 2008).  
The Muslim autonomous region was created under the government of President Corazon 
“Cory” Aquino. A  new  constitution  was  ratified  in  1987  that  included  under Article  10  the 
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. In accordance with 
Section 18 of the Constitution, Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 provided for the basic structures of 
the autonomous government and required that a plebiscite be held in thirteen provinces and nine
15 
cities in the Muslim region based on the area-demands of the Tripoli Agreement. Aquino signed it 
                                                 
13 Mindanao derives from the root word danao which means “inundation by a river, lake or sea. The derivative 
mindanao means inundation or that which is inundated” (Saleeby 1976: 4). 
14  There  was  an  additional  province  belonging  to  the  ARMM,  Shariff  Kabunsuan,  which  was  carved  out  of 
Maguindanao  on  28 August  2006  (Art.  6,  Sec.  19  of  RA  (Republic Act)  No.  9054)  by  the  ARMM  Regional 
Assembly, on the basis of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201. On 29 October 2006 the province's creation 
was ratified in a plebiscite held in Maguindanao. But on 17 July 2008 the Supreme Court declared Article 6, Section 
19 of RA No. 9054 unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the ARMM “the power to create 
provinces  and  cities”  Consequently,  it  “declare[d]  void  Muslim  Mindanao Autonomy Act  No.  201  creating  the 
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan” (Supreme Court, 16 July 2008). 
15 In the Tripoli Agreement, signed by the Marcos government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 
1976, the following areas were chosen for possible inclusion in a Muslim homeland: Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del 
Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, 
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, 
Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga. In 1992, Sarangani split from South Cotabato and became an 
independent province.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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into  law  on  1 August  1989. After  the  plebiscite  only  four  provinces  (Lanao  del  Sur,  except 
Marawi City; Maguindanao, except Cotabato City; Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu) joined the ARMM. In a 
new plebiscite in 2001, the province of Basilan (except Isabela City) and Marawi City joined the 
ARMM. 
 
 
Map 1: Map of Mindanao Regions 
 Showing the reorganization of the Administrative Regions following Executive Order 36, Issued 19 September, 
2001. The six regions in Mindanao were rearranged as a consequence of a plebiscite on the inclusion of areas into the 
ARMM. Handmade map by the author. Proportions do not entirely correspond with reality. 
 
Today the region is home to two cities, Marawi City
 (Lanao del Sur) and Lamitan City 
(Basilan),  113  municipalities  and  2,470  barangays  (villages  or  communities,  the  smallest 
administrative units in the Philippines). Even though it has only the second largest population in 
the ARMM after Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur is the province with the most municipalities (39), 
followed by Maguindanao (33), Sulu (19), Baslian, and Tawi-Tawi (11). The local media see the 
creation of municipalities as one strategy of strengthening the political influence of clans. In 
Maguindanao, for example, 15 new municipalities were created between 2001 and 2009, under 
the rule of patriarch and former provincial Governor Andal Ampatuan Senior. Mayors belonging 
to  the Ampatuan  family ruled six of the new  municipalities (Tiongson-Mayrina  2010b). The The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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addition of municipalities can thus serve to accommodate relatives but also to solve disputes 
among rival politicians. Similar reasons might be found for the creation of barangays, in which 
Lanao del Sur again ranks first, with 1,158. It is followed by Maguindanao (489), Sulu (410), 
Basilan (210), and Tawi-Tawi (203) (NSCB 2007). 
  The  autonomous  region  is  headed  by  a  governor  and  a  vice-governor  as  well  as 
assemblymen and women, who are elected in special ARMM elections every three years (the last 
elections took place in 2008). The provincial and municipal elections on the other hand are held 
as part of the national elections, similarly following a three-year rhythm (the last elections were 
held  in  2010). After  the  Maguindanao  or Ampatuan  Massacre
16  on 23 November 2009 the 
ARMM governor, Maguindanao Muslim Zaldy Ampatuan, was expelled from the Lakas-Kampi-
CMD  (Kabalikat  ng  Malayang  Pilipino-Christian  Muslim  Democrats)  political  party  for  his 
alleged role in it and arrested on charges of rebellion. The Vice-Governor and Maranao Muslim 
Ansaruddin-Abdulmalik  “Hooky”  Alonto  Adiong  became  ARMM  Acting  Governor  on  14 
December 2009. On 7 July 2010 Reggie Sahali-Generale, the daughter of Tawi-Tawi Governor 
Sadikul Sahali, became the first ARMM female (acting) Vice-Governor. 
Lanao del Sur was carved out of Lanao province in 1959, dividing the former province 
roughly  along  ethnic  and  religious  lines. The  province  has  a  total  land  area  of  13,574  km
2. 
Geographically, Lake Sultan Alonto (more commonly known as Lake Lanao)
17, lies on a plateau 
in  North  Central  Mindanao.  The  plateau  is  surrounded  by  the  Pulangi  Lowlands  in  the 
neighboring province of Bukidnon in the east and by the Butig Mountain Rang e and Mount 
Piapayungan in the southeast, providing a natural barrier to the provinces of Maguindanao and 
Cotabato. The plateau loses elevation towards the southwest and north where it meets with the 
sea at Iliana Bay (Lanao del Sur) and Iligan Bay (Lanao del Norte).  
Lake Lanao lies about 734 m above sea level (other sources write 702) and is of tectonic-
volcanic origin. With 375 m², it is the second largest and with a depth of 112 m the deepest lake 
in the Philippines (Frey 1969). It is fed by four bigger rivers coming from the east and several 
smaller ones around the lake but it has only one outlet, the Agus River to the north of the lake 
(Wahl 1976). It flows into  Iligan Bay in Lanao del Norte through two waterfalls, the Maria 
                                                 
16 The  Maguindanao  Massacre  involved  the  murder  of  about  58  people.  Members  of  the Ampatuan  family  are 
accused of masterminding the killings as part of a conflict over political positions in Maguindanao with a rival clan, 
the Magundadatus. The massacre is discussed fully in the following section. 
17 Though the lake was renamed Lake Sultan Alonto, this name is not often used. The name Lanao derives from the 
Maranao word ranao, which means lake. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Cristina Falls and the Linamon Falls. Four provinces surround Lanao del Sur: Lanao del Norte in 
the northwest, Bukidnon in the east, Maguindanao and Cotabato in the south. It is bordered by 
Illana Bay to the southwest. Rolling hills and volcanoes mark the landscape. Its land area is 
mainly classified as forest and is further divided into production forest and agricultural land 
(2,540 km²), and alienable and disposable land, which include production areas, protection areas, 
and built-up areas (1,331 km²). 
The climate of Lanao del Sur  changes with the altitude. The mean temperature is 21 
degrees  Celsius. The hottest  time is  from  March to June and the coldest  from  November to 
January (Madale 1997: 10). The Islamic City of Marawi, lying on the northern shores of the lake, 
is famous for its cool temperatures, since it is located about 700 m above sea level. The lowest 
temperature recorded is 12 degrees Celsius. Marawi lies outside the typhoon belt area and its 
annual rainfall is 2,826 mm (City Planning and Development Office 2002).  
 
Map 2: Map of Lanao del Sur 
Handmade map by the author based on City Planning and Development Office, City Hall Building, Pada-o, Iligan 
City. Proportions do not entirely correspond with reality. 
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The current Lanao del Sur governor (2007-2013) is Mamintal “Bombit” Alonto Adiong, 
Jr., the elder brother of “Hooky” Alonto Adiong. Both are descendants of the Sultan of Ramain, 
among the royal houses dominating the Lanao area before the arrival of American colonial forces 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Lanao del Sur’s capital and only city is the Islamic City of 
Marawi.
18 Marawi is known as the cultural, administrational, and political heart of the province. 
Before Marawi was named as such, it was called Dansalan (meaning place of destination). 
Dansalan was officially created as a municipality on 27 May 1907 under the Moro  Province 
Administration, with the American citizen Jesse Gaston as its first President. On 19 August 1940, 
Dansalan became a city and the capital of the Lanao Province. Its inauguration as capital took 
place on 30 September 1950. On 16 June 1956, Senator Ahmad “Domocao” Alonto changed the 
name Dansalan to Marawi. The change was in honor of the Marawi Sultanate Confederation
19. 
On 5 April 1980, the city was renamed the Islamic City of Marawi
20. The addition of a religious 
identity to the name of the city was justified by the fact that at least 92% of its population was 
Muslim (City Planning and Development Office 2002). Some Marawi residents remarked that the 
re-naming of Marawi City as the Islamic City of Marawi was part of a campaign of President 
Ferdinand Marcos to appease local Muslims. The Islamic Brotherhood
21 complained that the city 
did not deserve this name since corruption, kidnapping, slavery, and drug dealing dominated it.  
Marawi’s land area consists of about 87 km
2. The municipalities of Bubong, Ditsaan-
Ramain, and Kapai surround the capital of Lanao del Sur. The concrete highway surrounding 
Lake Lanao connects Marawi City with major places in Lanao del Sur as well as with other 
Mindanao provinces. A 78 km national highway goes from Marawi south to Malabang. From 
there, it is 35 km further to Poloc Harbor in Maguindanao and 22 km to Cotabato City, likewise 
in Maguindanao. The highly urbanized and predominantly Christian Iligan City in Lanao del 
Norte is the closest town to Marawi, accessible through a 36 km national highway. Finally, the 
nearest airport in Cagayan de Oro (Misamis Oriental) is located 137 km from Iligan City, easily 
connected by a concrete highway (City Planning and Development Office 2002). 
                                                 
18 Its name comes from the word rawi, which refers to the reclining lilies in the Agus River, around whose source at 
Lake Lanao Marawi is built. 
19 Those are all sultanates belonging to Marawi. Today they claim to be one of the biggest and best organized in 
Lanao del Sur.  
20 The change was initiated through City Council Resolution No. 19-A during the mayoralty of attorney Sultan Omar 
Dianalan. 
21 A Muslim alliance in Lanao of about 1,000 people, which among other things campaigns for the restoration of 
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Map 3: Map of Marawi 
Source: GIC, City Planning and Development Office, City Hall Building, Pada-o, Iligan City. 
 
  Marawi City has the smallest population among the 16 “highly urbanized” cities in the 
Philippines.
22  Its population is young, with a median age of 18. Most households classified 
themselves  as  Maranaos  (96%)
23  in  the  2000  census,  making  12%  of  the  total  Maranao 
                                                 
22 It had a population of 177,391 in 2007.  
23 Other ethnic groups are non-Muslims, including the Bisaya/Binisaya (1.3%), Cebuano (1%), Tagalog (0.3%), and The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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population in the Philippines. The Maranao population in Marawi City grew more than seven 
times between 1948 and 2000, from about 17,000 to 130,000. The Christian population increased 
in number but decreased in percentage of the population in the same period. In 1948, it was about 
16%, growing in the 1950s to about 18% due to migration from the north of the Philippines, but it 
declined after the outbreak of the Mindanao conflict to 3% in 2000.
24 
  Marawi City has 96 barangays; some of them comprise former agamas. An agama is a 
community settlement originally composed of relatives/clan(s) living around a mosque. When it 
has a mosque, it might constitute a sultanate. The barangay system was superimposed on the 
agama system but did not entirely dissolve the former, agama-organization. Calls to prayer can 
be heard in Marawi City five times a day. Since almost every agama has its own mosque and 
muezzin, which do not call in unison, the calling takes a relative long time; when one has finished 
another one is still calling. The local radio station stops its program, which includes heavy metal 
music, local music, and inspirational talk, religious and otherwise (for example, by supporters of 
the  rebellion  during  the  “all-out  war”)  for  the  muezzin.  The  Friday  prayers  are  sometimes 
transmitted via loudspeakers, and thus can be heard outside of the mosque.  
  The karaoke bars otherwise very common in the Philippines cannot be found in Marawi – 
only in some restaurants can one sing karaoke –, nor are there discos or movie theaters. Serving 
of alcohol in public has been forbidden since the Islamic resurgence movement. Aside from the 
huge number of stray dogs, the nights are usually quiet except in times of red alert or the threat of 
a  new  outbreak  of  the  conflict,  when  gunshots  can  be  heard.  Sometimes  private  karaoke 
afternoons take place. These events can be mixed in gender. Gender-segregated or mixed groups 
meet to dance, talk, or celebrate a certain event. Men are advised not to stay after sunset at the 
house of a woman or family unless they are related or were specifically invited. Women are 
advised not to roam around, especially without a chaperon.  
  The colorful jeepneys,
25 many of which display Islamic inspirational messages, are not 
necessarily gender segregated, nor are government offices or the public schools. Some meetings 
and celebrations, like weddings, are gender segregated, as are the  madrasah  schools  at  the 
secondary level. Most women wear a colorful or white kumbung (veil). Young women mainly 
                                                                                                                                                              
Hiligaynon/Ilonggo (0.1%).  
24 There were 2,643 Christians in Marawi City in 1948. In 1958 Marawi City had 22,913 inhabitants, of which 
18,716 were Muslim (81%) and 4,177 were Christian (18%). There were approximately 3,712 Christians in 2000 
(3%) (cf. Saber and Tamano 1985/6: 30, 101; NSO 2002d).  
25 Jeepneys are small buses. Originating as jeeps that were left behind by the U.S. Army, they were transformed by 
Filipinos into colorful vehicles of public transportation.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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wear a simple piece of textile on the head. It is sometimes tucked behind the ears, or the ends 
might  hang loosely to  the ground, which renders the hair partly visible. The use of a white 
kumbung can already be seen in pictures from the 1950s, when it was mainly worn by women 
who had made the hadj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Traditionally, women would braid their hair 
artistically but would not necessarily cover it. 
In the 1970s, the hijab was widely introduced in Lanao del Sur. Today young girls might 
carry their kumbung on their shoulders, wearing it only when needed, matching it with tight jeans 
and t-shirts; some also do not wear a veil at all, even though veiling is required in Marawi City. 
Other women wear a veil that covers their hair, together with a rather loose blouse, and loose 
pants, or, for elder women, a colorful malong (a textile formed like a tube that can be worn by 
men and women to cover their whole body or only the lower part as a skirt). The veil sometimes 
consists of colorful textiles bound like a turban, which can particularly be seen on royal women, 
and it is sometimes white or black. Both young and older women, some of whom belong to the 
Tabligh
26  movement, sometimes wear  cloth to observe  purdah  rules  (the  segregation  of  the 
sexes), thus a garment covering both face and body. 
Before the arrival of the Americans, men from the nobility sometimes used a tobaw, an 
artistically  folded  textile,  to  cover  their  heads,  along  with  a  malong  (Amairadia  1980:  46). 
Pictures from the early twentieth century show that the fez was popular. Today different forms of 
the Indonesian kopia (cap) are worn, especially by those connected to the sultanate. When one 
has done the hadj, is a member of the Tabligh, or considers himself pious, headgear signifying 
religious belonging may be worn. Some religious men and members of the Tabligh prefer the 
Pakistani dress with loose pants and a long-sleeved shirt that extends to one's knees, and they 
sometimes wear a white skullcap or the sahal (scarf) used by Arabs (Madale 1997: 107). Some 
traditional men still wear the malong at home but the majority cannot be distinguished by their 
dress from the larger Filipino population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The Tablighi Jamaat is a transnational movement to spread and revive the Islamic faith.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 1: Man Courting Maranao Girls 
From about 1930. The women wear the malong and the traditional Maranao hair-style. In the background a man 
wearing a fez can be seen. Photo provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman. 
 
 
Picture 2: Royal Women at a Pagana Maranao 
Royal women clothed in the malong and colorful blouses and veils at a pagana Maranao, a traditional celebration to 
welcome or entertain guests. Photo taken by the author, 2007. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 3: Everyday Life at the Market   
Maranao women and men selling goods in Marawi. Photo taken by the author, Marawi City, 2007. 
 
In the market, women as well as men buy and sell products. Along the lake, children swim 
or people do laundry. In remote areas around the lake, people have to row to the middle of the 
lake to fetch water
 (Zurk 2007).
27 Since most women cannot swim, this can be a dangerous task. 
During the day, the streets of Marawi are filled with   cars, jeepneys, tricycles, and men and 
women alike. Women usually do not drive cars but have drivers or use public transportation. It 
can happen that certain streets are blocked by checkpoints held by a family or clan in order to 
control the entrance of people into a certain quarter of the city because of an ongoing family feud. 
During elections, or when there is a coronation, a caravan of cars cruises the streets. Since cars 
are status symbols they can be fancy and some of them employ a special horn -signal that sounds 
like an alarm in order to be able to drive faster. In the neighboring Christian city of Iligan, drivers 
using  fancy  sound  and  driving  fast  are  pointed  out  as  Maranao.  Everywhere  in  Marawi  are 
streamers  that praise a kinship  member or a politician for his  or her personal  achievements. 
Locals say that these streamers replace the newspapers since everything of importance is written 
on them. In a status- and kinship-oriented lineage society, the appreciation of relatives in public, 
of either gender, is thus institutionalized.  
                                                 
27 In the ARMM for the year 2000, only 34% of the families had access to potable water and 47% had access to 
sanitary toilet facilities. One-third of the households in ARMM used open pit toilet facilities (NSO 2003). There is no 
information available on Marawi City.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  According to its City Planning Office, Marawi City holds only small-scale industry, the 
majority  of  it  wholesale,  retail,  transportation,  communication,  and  storage.  There  are  also 
community, social, and personal services – as well as manufacturing (like brassware ornaments). 
A small percentage of the ARMM population works abroad.
28 The majority of Maranaos (75%) 
are farmers (Bamgbose 2003: 57). More of the area belonging to Marawi City is used for 
agriculture (3,383 ha, or 39 %) than for commercial (4%) or institutional (7%) purposes (City 
Planning and Development Office. 2002). Corn and palay  (rice plant) are the two main crops 
grown in the Marawi City area. Others are coffee, ginger, and various fruits. Poultry production is 
limited to small-scale and local consumption. Fish farming is not developed, which the City 
Planning Office explains as due to lack of experience and know-how. Tourism became more 
important for the local government when the peace and order situation “improved dramatically” 
after the 2000 “all-out war”. An Information Sheet on Marawi City from 2002 promotes Marawi 
City as the summer capital of Lanao del Sur, and remarks that it is “generally a very peaceful 
place to visit”. 
  One major state employer is Mindanao State University (MSU), located in the west of the 
city. Its complex comprises student dormitories where Muslim and non-Muslim students live 
together.  Christian  religious  gatherings  can  be  seen  on  campus  during  the  weekend  and  the 
campus holds several mosques. It also has various restaurants, a bank, and a hostel. The Marawi 
Resort Hotel is just beside the campus and hosts major events and guests. The MSU and the 
Basman Sports complexes are the two major sports centers in Marawi City. MSU has a nine-hole 
golf course, swimming pools, and tennis and pelota courts. Muslim and Christian women as well 
as men practice golf, badminton, and jogging, and can be seen walking around the sports field in 
the morning before sunrise. In addition, traditional sports are sometimes played, for example, 
kasipa, where teams kick and hold a sipa, a ball-like contraption made of rattan (Madale 1996: 
21).  
  There are jeepneys, buses, and taxis going back and forth from Marawi City to Iligan 
City. They have to pass several checkpoints,
29 most of the time vacant but operated when there is 
an alert. They have to master sloping serpentine curves on Amai Pakpak Avenue, from Iligan City 
on the shore of Iligan Bay to Marawi City, lying on a plateau on the shore of Lake Lanao. Non -
                                                 
28 In the ARMM in 2009, about 2.4% of the population were Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), the majority of 
them women (NSO 2009). 
29 In Marawi City, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Camp Ranao can be found in barangay Datu Saber. 
Under the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)-Balikatan U.S. military facility is also part of this camp.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Muslim students and faculty at MSU Marawi use these transports frequently. Although there are 
few non-Muslim citizens in Marawi City, MSU employs a high number of non-Muslims and has 
slightly  more  non-Muslim  than  Muslim  students. There  are  limited  economic  possibilities  in 
Marawi City. Additionally, there is much prejudice against and mistrust of the people of Marawi 
City  on  the  part  of  Christian  inhabitants  of  Iligan  City;  one  of  the  major  fears  is  of  being 
kidnapped. The official homepage of the ARMM even warns those who would like to visit the 
city, “It might be advisable for the foreign traveler to get help from a Maranao friend or from the 
Provincial  Information  Office.”  A  2002  survey  showed  that  the  mutual  mistrust  between 
Christians and Muslims “lies largely on the Christian side” (Rood 2005: 23). The author points 
out that Muslims in the Philippines, due to their minority situation, initiate interactions with 
Christians more frequently than Christians with Muslims.  
  Saber and Tamano (1985-86) write that in 1948 roughly equal numbers of Muslims and 
Christians cross-penetrated into each other’s communities, and thus the number of Maranaos 
living in Iligan City and of Christians living in Marawi City were relatively the same (p. 30). But 
while the Christian population in Marawi shrank after the Mindanao conflict, the number of 
Maranaos  in  Iligan  City  grew  eightfold,  from  2,338  in  1948  to  18,757  in  2000  constituting 
approximately 7% of the population (NSO 2002e). Some Maranaos challenge these numbers, 
arguing that the count of Maranao residents in Iligan City was based on the number of registered 
voters. Since many Maranaos live in Iligan City but vote in the ARMM, they are not included as 
Iligan City residents. The population of Maranaos in  Iligan is thus even higher. Marawi and 
Lanao del Sur remain relative ethnically isolated, with a predominantly Maranao population. The 
Mindanao conflict caused the ethnic distribution to revert to that of pre-American times, with an 
almost total domination of the lake area by Maranaos.  
The Maranao language, which is predominantly used among Maranaos, derives from the 
Austronesian, Malayo-Polynesian, southern Philippines, Danao, Maranao-Iranon language family 
(Gordon 2005). It has some influences from Sanskrit, Arabic, English and local languages, which 
include influences from Spanish. For example, some Maranaos, like their Cebuano neighbors, 
give  the  time  in  Spanish.  Maranao  is  closely  related  to  the  Maguindanao  dialect;  both  are 
versions  of  the  Iranon  group  of  languages.  Today,  not  every  Maranao
30  speaks the native 
language. Some children in Iligan City grow up learning Cebuano, English, and Tagalog instead. 
The exact number of those using the dialect is unknown. The latest official number concerning 
                                                 
30 Maranao derives from the expression taw sa ranaw, which means “people of the lake.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the whole Philippines dates back to 1995, when 1.27% of the population (871,430) used the 
Maranao dialect (Gonzalez 1998). Besides Maranao, those having a general education also speak 
English and Tagalog since these are the official languages of instruction at public schools. There 
are  also  Arabic  speaking  and  writing  people.  Approximately  14%  of  the  Mindanao  student 
population  attend  the  madrasah,  the  Islamic  school  (International  Religious  Freedom  Report 
2008). Furthermore, a certain number of scholars study in Arab countries.  
  Before  the  introduction  of  the  national  school  system,  Maranaos  learned  the  Arabic 
instead of the Latin alphabet. The old versions of the salsila (genealogy) were written in the 
Maranao language spelled with Arabic letters, or in “old Malay” referring to the Jawi script, 
Arabic  letters  that  are  used  to  write  the  Malay  language  (Che  Man  1990:  15).  Since  public 
schools teach in English and Tagalog, the Maranao language is rarely used for writing. Very little 
literature exists in this language and there is no consensus about how words are written. Taking 
the word Maranao, for instance, one can find several spellings. “Maranao” is mainly used by 
English speaking scholars who are not used to the pronunciation of the guttural sound /e/ in 
“Meranao.” Some local authors prefer writing “Meranao,” “Mәranaw,” or “M'ranao” (Disoma 
1999), which come closer to the pronunciation. In some local writings, the /o/ at the end of the 
word is replaced by a /w/ (Maranaw), which probably goes back to a transcription of the Arabic 
alphabet.  Howard  P.  McKaughan  and  Batua Al-Macaraya,  authors  of  A  Maranao  Dictionary 
(1996),  suggest  that  for  the  sake  of  uniformity  of  spelling,  “Meranao”  should  be  used;  this 
version is also popular in local Maranao newspapers.
31 In conformity with most of the academic 
literature, “Maranao” is used in this dissertation. 
a. Religious and Ethnic Distribution 
Islam came to the Philippines via merchants and later on missionaries from the tenth 
century  onwards.  Four  centuries  later,  the  religion  was  widely  accepted  among  Maranaos. 
Sultanates were established in Sulu, Maguindanao and Lanao in the southern Philippines as well 
as in today’s Manila region (see Majul 1999: 76). Whereas Spanish colonial forces overthrew the 
rajas (derived from a Sanskrit word meaning monarch) in Luzon, they never entirely subdued 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Only the American colonial forces did so at the beginning of 
the  twentieth  century  (see  Yegar  2002).  According  to  the  census  of  1903,  the  Mindanao 
population was about 327,741, 250,000 (76%) of whom were Muslims (Yegar 2002: 246). Other 
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numbers have been reported for this period, varying but generally stating a Muslim majority 
(Rasul  2003a:  127).  In  1975,  the  Muslim  population  had  grown  to  about  1,798,911,  but 
constituting only 20% of the total population of Mindanao (Rasul 2003a: 127; Yegar 2002: 249). 
The  Christian  population  had  increased  considerably  through  the  introduction  of  a  land  title 
system and settlement programs that were initiated by American colonial administrations and 
continued up to  the Marcos  government  (1965-1986) (Kreuzer 2003; Werning 1983:  47, 56; 
Yegar 2002: 224, 232). Muslims and Christians filed several court cases in land conflicts in the 
1960s, the former relying on their ancient rights and the latter on legal documents. The cases 
were generally decided in favor of the settlers, who were “more adept in bribing corrupt officials” 
(Yegar 2002: 249). Consequently, the government was seen as being in complicity with “land 
grabbing  settlers,”  leading  to  conflicts  between  Muslim  and  Christian  private  armies  in  the 
Mindanao region. The looming dissension later led, along with other factors, to the Mindanao 
conflict (Abubacar 1985; Lucman 2000; Yegar 2002). 
  The  Mindanao  rebellion  unified  different  Muslim  ethnic  groups  in  the  southern 
Philippines under the general term “Moros.” Spanish colonial forces originally used this term to 
denote  Filipino  Muslims.  It  derived  from  the  Spanish  term,  Moro,  for  Muslim  Moors  from 
northern Africa who took part in conquering the Iberian peninsula in the eighth century. The 
common goal of a homeland for the Moros, Bangsamoro, that is pursued by the secular and 
nationalist rebel group Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) resulted after several years of 
combat and peace talks, in the creation of the ARMM. However, this did not end the importance 
of ethnic belonging (Horvatich 2003). Most Moros would define themselves as Muslims, which, 
among Maranaos  is  often connected with  their  ethnicity, thus  being Maranao.  Intermarriages 
between Muslims from different ethnic groups and between Muslims and Christians are possible. 
Nevertheless,  the  normative  marriage  partner  among  Maranaos  is  a  Maranao,  especially  for 
women. In Lanao del Sur, the Maranao ethnic group dominates the whole province, ruled by 
several family dynasties. Many in the ruling elite can trace back their lineage to ancient sultanates 
in specific places in Lanao del Sur, and marriages, some arranged, often take into account the 
lineage of the future partner. Marriage outside the ethnic group may thus be connected to a loss of 
status for the children in case the partner has no equivalent source of status apart from his or her 
birth. Whereas the importance of ethnic identity is frequently stressed in Muslim groups, rebels 
criticize the over-emphasis on ethnicity as carrying the risk of division among Moros.    
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Table 1: Religious Affiliation in the Philippines According to NSO (2002) 
 
Religion  Believers  %  Religion  Believers  % 
Roman Catholic  61,862,898  81  Seventh Day Adventist  609,570  1 
Muslim  3,862,409  5  United Church  
of Christ in the Philippines  416,681  1 
Evangelical  2,152,786  3 
Iglesia ni Cristo  1,762,845  2  Jehovah's Witnesses  380,059  x 
Aglipayan  1,508,662  2  Others  3,776,560  5 
 
The total number of members of Muslim ethnic groups in the Philippines in 2000 was 
approximately 4 million, about 5% of the predominantly Christian population. In the Philippines 
there are numerous converts to Islam (Luis Lacar writes that there are about 200,000), having in 
most  cases  changed  their  religion  while  working  in  the  Middle  East  or  married  a  Muslim 
(Angeles 2005; Lacar 2001). The percentage of the population which consists of mumbers of 
Muslim ethnic groups and that of those following Islam have nonetheless roughly the same. This 
may be the result either of a strong connection between ethnicity and the Muslim religion or of 
inaccurate statistics.  
  In Mindanao, the majority of the household population classifies itself as Cebuano (26%), 
Bisayan (18%), or Hiligaynon/Ilonggo (8%). These three ethnic groups originate from the Visaya 
area, having settler ancestry and a non-Muslim background. The largest Mindanao native groups 
are the Muslim Maguindanaos (6%) and Maranaos (5%). The remaining 37% belong to other 
ethnic  groups.  Rodil  (2003)  writes  that  there  are  about  30  indigenous  groups,  the  so-called 
Lumads,  and  ten  Muslim  ethnic  groups  in  Mindanao  and  the  Sulu  Archipelago  (2003). 
Additionally, there are two Muslim ethnic groups in Palawan (the Palawanis and the Molbogs) 
and the seafaring Badjao, whose people are mostly not Muslim but are still classified as Moros 
because they live among Moros and what is seen as part of the Sulu sultanate in the Sulu sea 
(ibid.:  1).  Muslim  ethnic  groups  are  concentrated  in  certain  areas,  partly  dominating  whole 
provinces in the ARMM: thus, Lanao del Sur is largely dominated by Maranaos; Maguindanao by 
Iranons and Maguindanaos; Basilan by Badjaos, Sama Abaknons, Tausugs, and Yakans; Sulu by 
Sama Abaknons, Sama Dilauts/Badjaos and Tausugs; and Tawi-Tawi by Jama Mapuns, Sama 
Abaknons, Sama Dilauts/Badjaos, Sama Dilayas, and Tausugs.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 1: Muslim Ethnic Groups in the Philippines in 2000 
Source: National Statistics Office. 
 
Whereas the majority (61%) in Mindanao are Christians, the opposite is true for the ARMM, 
where  nine  out  of  ten  inhabitants  are  Muslims,  followed  by  Roman  Catholics  (5%)  and  the 
Philippine Episcopal Church (around 1%). The remainder are mostly Evangelicals or members of 
the indigenous Philippine Christian organization Iglesia ni Cristo (NSO 2003; 2003a).  
  Apart from Cotabato City, Muslim ethnic groups form a minority in the provinces and 
cities outside the ARMM. Smaller ethnic groups outside the region include the Kalibugans in 
Zamboanga del Norte (2% of the whole regional population), the Sangils in Davao del Sur (no 
data  available),  the  partly  Islamized  Kalagans  in  Davao  Oriental  (3%  of  the  whole  regional 
population),  and  the  partly  Islamized  Palawanis  (8%  of  the  whole  regional  population)  and 
Molbogs (no data available) in Palawan. More than one-third of the population in Lanao del 
Norte (36%) are Maranaos; 50% in Cotabato City, 18% in Cotabato, 6% in Sarangani, 4% in 
South Cotabato, and 2% in Zamboanga del Sur are Maguindanaos; 1% in Zamboanga del Norte 
are Sama Aboknons or Tausugs; 3% in Zamboanga del Sur are Tausugs; and 7% in Cotabato City 
are Iranons (NSO 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002f, 2002g). Of the total Mindanao population, 8% of 
the population are Muslim and do not live in the ARMM, while 12% live in the autonomous 
region.  One  of  the  Moro  Islamic  Liberation  Front’s  (MILF)  aspirations  is  to  include 
predominantly Muslim villages lying outside the autonomous region in the Bangsamoro Juridical 
Entity, the area which it seeks to subject to its control.  
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Map 4: Map of the Highest Concentrations of Muslim Ethnic Groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago 
Handmade  map  by  the  author.  Proportions  do  not  entirely  correspond  to  reality.  Based  on  NSO  2000  census; 
McFarland (1980); Rodil (1993); Wurm and Hattori (1981-1983). 
 
 
Apart from the numbers provided by the National Statistics Office, it is rather difficult to 
determine  the  exact  number  of  persons  belonging  to  Muslim  ethnic  groups.  The  Office  on 
Muslim Affairs (OMA), now the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF),
32 does not 
have the ability to conduct a census and the NSO did not differentiate in the recent census (NSO 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c) according to religion or ethnic group. This leaves room for speculation on 
how many Muslims live in the Philippines. Official numbers stick to 5%, referring to the 2000 
census (NSO 2003a). Maranao employees of the OMA in Manila estimated in 2008  the number 
of Muslims in the Philippines to be 12 million. This estimation was based on the argument that 
the growth rate of the ARMM, at over 5% for 2000 -2007, is the highest in the country and 
furthermore that the  census  of 2000 under-counted Muslims  because  of security  concerns in 
conflict regions of the ARMM (Religious Freedom Report 2003). It might be difficult to conduct 
a  census  in  areas  where  ridos  dominate  whole  villages,  or  where  there  are  military  clashes 
between rebel groups and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).  
                                                 
32 On 18 February 2010, the NCMF Act of 2009, RA No. 9997 approved the creation of the NCMF, which replaced 
the OMA. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) claimed that the NCMF was one example of “an antidote to 
the growing consciousness among Moros that they are indeed Moro by nationality” (MILF Central Committee on 
Information Official Website: luwaran.net). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Table 2: Muslim Population in the Philippines Based on the 2000 Census
33 
 
Area 
Total 
population in 
2000 
Total number 
of Muslims
34 
Muslims as 
percentage 
Total number 
of Roman 
Catholics 
Household 
population of 
Roman 
Catholics (%) 
Philippines  76,504,077  3,871,106  5  61,998,904  81 
Mindanao  18,133,864  3,706,561  20  11,043,523  60 
ARMM  2,412,159  2,182,245  90  124,390  5 
Note: “Household population” means the de jure population (persons who usually live in household);  
“Total population” consists of persons who spent the night before the interview in the household. 
Source: 2000 Census of Population and Housing. Volume 1 Demographic and Housing Characteristic, Report N. 2. NSO 
2005. In this census, Mindanao comprised about 24% of the Philippines’ total population.  
 
  According to the 2000 Household Population by Ethnicity, Sex, and Province Census, 
Maranaos comprise 1.3% (1,035,966) of Filipinos
35 with a small female majority. Constituting 
over a quarter of the population ( 636,463), Maranaos are the dominant ethnic group in the 
ARMM (NSO  2003). In Mindanao, they are the second largest Muslim ethnic group, with 
979,228 defining themselves as Maranaos. Most are located in Lanao del Sur, where they form 
91% of the total population. They also comprise a significant portion of the population in Lanao 
del Norte where they form the largest ethnic group.
36 Of the Maranao population in this province, 
11% are located in Iligan City, its capital. 
  Regarding demographic data on Muslims in the Philippines, one has to keep in mind that 
the proportion of the population which is Muslim is a political issue. Some Muslim sources thus 
have a tendency to state the number of Muslims in the country as higher, to underline their 
demands, whereas the government has a tendency to keep the numbers low to “weaken political 
demands based on such demographics” (Yegar 2002: 191). Esmael “Toto” Magundadatu, the 
recently  elected  Governor  of  Maguindanao,  demanded  that  the  census  be  done  more 
“professionally,” meaning that its enumerators should go directly to the households and not rely 
on  what  barangay  officials  say,  since  the  data  of  the  2000-2007  census  are  “suspicious.” 
                                                 
33 National Statistics Office, 2005.  
34 No official data is available. 
35 The three largest Muslim ethnic groups in the Philippines are the Maranaos, the Maguindanaos (1,008,424), and 
the  Tausugs  (918,069).  Of  the  total  Filipino  population,  Maranaos  and  Maguindanaos  comprise  about  1.3% 
respectively and Tausugs about 1.2%. All the others comprise less than one percent.  
36 A third of the population in Lanao del Norte is Cebuano and 27% are Bisayas/Binisayas. Other ethnic groups 
include the Boholanos (1.4%), Kankanais/Kankaneys/Kankanaeys (0.15%), and Ilocanos (0.12%). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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(Notably, the birth rate has declined everywhere in the Philippines except in the ARMM.) Further, 
NSO officials have claimed that powerful local leaders are keen to see the population soar in 
order to seek bigger revenue allotments. The chief of the NSO office admitted that numbers in the 
ARMM were subject  to internal  evaluations by the NSO. Mentioned  were cases  where data 
included a growth rate of 10% each year since 2000. The head of the NSO commented: “The 
initial results were much worse but we had no way of going back and verifying for ourselves 
because of security concerns” (Arguillas 2010b). One suggested solution to this problem would 
be the introduction of a national identity card, so that national censuses would not be necessary 
anymore (Lucman 2008). Until then problems with statistics have to be taken into considerations 
and numbers not taken for granted. They nevertheless can serve to provide a rough orientation.  
b. Economy 
In 2002, Mindanao had about 33% of the country’s total agriculture, fishery, and forestry 
(AFF), making it one of the top producers in the Philippines (NSCB 2003, 2005).
37 The island 
provides 90% of the country’s timber, 63% of its nickel, and 48% of its gold. It also dominates 
the production of rubber. Mindanao is the   Philippines’  main  producer  of  coffee,  coconuts, 
balinghoy, cassava, and corn. In the Muslim regions (including Lanao del Sur) top producers of 
balinghoy, cassava, and corn are found (NSCB 2005). Mindanao is frequently referred to as the 
rice bowl of the Philippines, since it is rich in natural resources, the Muslim regions included.
38 
Despite its wealth in natural resources,  the Muslim area has the hig hest rate of poverty in the 
country (NSCB 2008, 2008a, 2006). Besides the negative effects of the conflict on the economic 
development of the region, the high poverty rate can also be explained by the “transfer of wealth 
from the southern regions to the nucleus of economic and political power”, which means Manila 
(Tadem 1992: 8). 
  The  hydroelectric  power  plants  in  Lanao  del  Sur  were  built  by  the  National  Power 
Corporation  (NPC)  and  constitute  a  significant  example  of  the  transfer  of  wealth  from  the 
province to Manila and of its consequences for the local population. NPC established six of them 
                                                 
37 About 99% of the country’s durian, mangosteen and marang, 90% of its lanzones, 87% of its pineapple, 76% of its 
bananas, 54% of its papayas, 52% of its pomelo, 51% of its langka is produced in Mindanao. 
38 The autonomous region has rich natural resources and several international enterprises, such as Unifrutti Chiquita, 
which is 50% US-owned operate there. In 1997, Ultrex and Chiquita Unifrutti signed a 20-year contract with La 
Frutera Inc., the largest banana plantation in the ARMM. Chiquita Unifrutti buys La Frutera’s bananas and exports 
them  abroad,  marketing  them  under  the  Chiquita  and  Unifrutti  brands.  Recently  Unifrutti-Chiquita  made  a 
multimillion-peso investment in Wao, Lanao del Sur exporting pineapples from a 1,000 ha plantation to Japan, Korea 
and the Middle East. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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along the Agus River, where they provide 80% of Mindanao's energy. Two of them are located in 
Lanao del Sur. In 2006, the NPC had a net income of PHP 90 billion (NPC 2006). The income of 
the NPC from the power plants in Lanao del Sur can be counted in the billions. Insider sources 
who want to remain anonymous say it is about PHP 12 billion a year. The NPC Annual Report 
2006  states  that  one  centavo  per  kilowatt-hour  from  electricity  sales  must  be  given  to  local 
government units (LGUs) (NPC 2006).
39 In the year 2007 about PHP 4 million
40 was accordingly 
given to Lanao del Sur. Civil society organizations complain that they do not know what had 
been done with the money (Gut oc: 2007). In addition, one centavo for the host community is 
perceived as a very limited share. In 2008 Lanao del Sur Governor Mamintal “Bombit ” Alonto 
Adiong  demanded  at  least  1%  “of  the  gross  income  of  the  po wer  plants  generating 
hydroelectricity from Lake Lanao to fund local socio -economic and infrastructure programs” 
(Macabalang 2008). This request was underlined by the argument that the province suffers from 
the effects of the power plants on the lake. The NPC had been obliged to keep the water level of 
the lake at a maximum elevation of 702 m (Supreme Court, 8 March 2005). However, the dam 
made the river stable but the lake unstable (Naga 2001), affecting the ecosystem of the lake and 
lake and river dwellers. The natural flow of the river changed and residents were displaced. 
Consequently, some communities no longer have access to river water and instead have to rely on 
faucets
41 that might not run the whole day. Sometimes they are limited to one faucet for a whole 
community. Many residents did not receive compensation from the NPC and some of them 
retaliated by attacking NPC facilities and personnel physically in the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., 
Fianza 2004: 8; Supreme Court 8 March 2005). 
  As a government enterprise, the NPC does not have to pay real estate taxes. This is based 
on a law that goes back to Commonwealth Act No. 120, which became effective on 3 November 
1936. The purpose of the law is to promote development through government institutions. Former 
Lanao del  Sur Governor Saidamen Pangarungan (1988-1992) and Provincial Treasurer Hadji 
Macmod Dalidig filed a case against the NPC in 1996. It demanded that the corporation be 
required to pay real estate taxes on its properties in Lanao del Sur in the amount of about PHP 
                                                 
39 The money received is divided as follows: (1) Electrification Fund, at one-half of one centavo per kWh; (2) 
Development and Livelihood Fund (DLF), at one-quarter of one centavo per kWh; and (3) Reforestation, Watershed 
Management, Health, and Environment Enhancement Fund (RWMHEEF) at one-quarter of one centavo per kWh 
(Department of Energy, Benefits to Host Communities). 
40 PHP 3,455,593 were given to Lanao del Sur for DLF and PHP 703,996 for RWMHEE. 
41 In 2002, 70% of the population in Marawi City had access to safe running drinking water. In 2000, the majority of 
the population in Lanao del Sur drew water for drinking and cooking from springs, lakes, rivers, or rainfall. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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150 million covering the period from 14 June 1984 to 31 December 1989. Pangarungan and 
Daliding argued that the exemption from real estate taxes had been withdrawn during this time. 
The governor and his treasurer put up the company’s property for auction when the NPC refused 
to pay. “The auction sale was . . . held as scheduled with the Province of Lanao del Sur as the sole 
bidder. A certificate of sale was immediately issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of 
the province . . .” (Supreme Court, 19 November 1996) The court ruled that the exemption had 
remained  in  place  and  that  the  governor  had  no  right  to  sell  the  property.  The  possible 
privatization of the NPC, nevertheless, remains an issue. The Electric Power Industry Reform Act 
of  2001  set  forth  a  plan  to  privatize  the Agus  and  Pulangi  power  complexes  by  2011. The 
President  of  the  Lanao  Power  Consumers  Federation  warned  in  July  2010  that  this  might 
jeopardize the peace negotiations since the area is part of the MILF-claimed ancestral domain 
under the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).
42 According to this 
memorandum, 75% of the revenues from the power supply generated by Lake Lanao would go to 
the BJE and 25% to the national government. 
Other factors often mentioned as causes of poverty in the region are mismanagement and 
corruption. Compared to other regions in the ARMM, Lanao del Sur in 2000 had the highest 
number  of  households  using  electricity  for  lighting  (NSO  2003).  Nevertheless,  the 
mismanagement of the Lanao del Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LASURECO) a cooperative run 
by the NPC ended, according to anonymous insider sources, with it owing PHP 3 billion to the 
NPC. This misconduct led to the so-called “disco light” in Marawi City.
43 Despite the fact that 
Lanao Lake and the Agus River provide hydroelectric power for 80% of Mindanao,  the local 
residents  were  “hit  by  frequent  brownouts  due  to  the  alleged  mismanagement  of  the 
LASURECO” (Pimentel 2004). This is a problem that according to the NPC’s Vice-President of 
Mindanao Generation can be traced back to  a high degree of corruption (Interview with Dr. 
Pasayud Macarambon, 2008). 
  A 2001 study found that 20% of the Philippine government’s budget is lost to graft and 
corruption (Senate Economic Planning Office: 9). The organization Transparency International 
(TI)  has  published  a  study  on  the  perception  of  corruption  worldwide,  summarizing  in  its 
“Corruption Perceptions Index.” In general, TI found a basic difference between first world and 
third  world  countries.  Third  world  countries  are  more  corrupt  but  first  world  multinational 
                                                 
42 The MOA-AD is one proposed agreement between the government of the Philippines and the MILF to settle the 
question of ancestral domains. It is discussed more thoroughly in the following section.  
43 Disco light is the local name for blackouts or brownouts, which happen frequently in Marawi City. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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companies accept blackmailing in their export deals. The corruption list is topped by countries 
like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, conflict-ridden areas in which officials can use public funds 
for their own good, because public institutions have only a rudimentary existence (Lambsdorff 
2007). In this context the ARMM can be seen as a conflict-ridden area, where “[g]iving way to 
family, cronies [and] personal considerations is more pronounced” than in “other parts of the 
country” (Gutierrez and Vitug 2000: 195).  
  Gutierrez and Vitug (2000) reported that “each province in ARMM receives more than 
PHP 1 billion in revenues yearly from the national government” (p. 196). This sum is in addition 
to  the  revenues  raised  by  the  local  governments  and  that  earmarked  for  projects  funded  by 
senators and the President’s Social Fund. However, the money is not spent for badly needed 
social services like education, primary health care, water supply, nutrition, and family planning. 
Maguindanao, for example, spend about PHP 2 per person per year on social services and Lanao 
del Norte about PHP 60. Instead, the major part of national government subsidies have been spent 
on infrastructure. Many of these infrastructure projects cannot be inspected because of the peace 
and order situation. In addition, politicians, lawyers, journalists, and police officers risk triggering 
a rido if they accuse a high-ranking clan member of fraud. Political clans
44 are generally very 
well-armed  and  well-connected;  thus,  law-enforcement  mechanisms  are  easily  set  aside. 
Consequently, even though their actions are disapproved of by the majority of the people, they 
tend to escape public criticism since this might result in a rido (Lucman 2008). An MSU historian 
states that the concept of state is not much developed in the ARMM: 
That is why people find more security in their clan or in their datus [chieftains]. 
Thus, government becomes an alien structure imposed by Manila. Using public 
funds and equipment for private use may be seen not as criminal acts, but as the 
normal and logical exercise of the authority of the datu or politician in dealing 
with an alien authority . . . Give the instability in the region, these local leaders, 
whatever limitations they have, provide the only visible semblance of governance 
in an impoverished and volatile region. (Gutierrez and Vitug 2000: 203-4) 
That the members of the clan and other clients are cared for can be seen in the organization of the 
ARMM government. It is one of the biggest employers in the region, often hiring people who are 
“unqualified for their jobs, lacking experience, education, and professional competence” (ibid: 
79). Some members of local NGOs in Marawi City have complained that the creation of the 
ARMM increased local corruption. A Maranao Managing Director of an NGO in Marawi City 
explains:  
                                                 
44 A political clan is an extended family whose members have been involved in politics for several generations.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Before  it’s  [the ARMM’s]  creation  people  [belonging  to  an  NGO]  would  go 
directly to the central government and then have their projects implemented. But 
with the new system in which projects like this, livelihood projects, have to be 
brought  through  the  ARMM  government  −−  unfortunately  there  are  a  lot  of 
anomalies going on in that institution. This is why many NGOs −− some of them 
stopped doing work for the poor, because the system within the ARMM is so 
different from the central government that −− it is so inefficient . . . Unfortunately 
if there [is] funding from Australia or the German government for example, it has 
to be channeled through the ARMM before getting to the NGO. There are a lot of 
opportunities  [to  get  financed]  but  our  problem  is  how  to  tap  the  funds  for 
development because once it goes through ARMM then it will take us a lot of 
[“patron-client”] requirements, in addition to the national requirements. Secondly, 
one of the observations that we have had is that they prepare to channel the funds 
to LGUs, not to NGOs. And it is a given fact, if you channel it to NGOs, the 
tendency is it will be fully implemented. Because as an NGO we will be in hot 
water when we [do] not implement it. Unlike when it is channeled through [an] 
LGU, wherein the one giving the fund is also from the LGU, no check and balance 
is there. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
  According to Walden Bello (2004), since corruption can be found all over the Philippines 
and indeed all over the world, in rich as well as in poor countries, it cannot be the main cause for 
poverty in the Philippines as a whole or in its Muslim regions. Bello explains: “A more adequate 
explanation  [of  why  the  Philippines  remain  poor]  lies  in  the  state  being  subjugated  by  a 
succession  of  ruling  elite  factions  to  serve  narrow  interests  instead  of  the  larger  goals  of 
sustainable  development  and  social  justice”  (p.  224). Whereas  in  South  Korea,  which  Bello 
compares  to  the  Philippines,  the  ruling  elites  are  “in  a  constant  position  of  equilibrium,” 
permanently being “disciplined by the state . . . one faction enjoying sizeable advantage over 
others at any given time . . . [In] the Philippines, in contrast, the elites were locked in a permanent 
state of rivalry and whoever was winning at a certain moment also got to control the state” (ibid.: 
284). The state thus becomes a “prize for momentarily winning chronic inter-elite rivalry” (ibid.). 
According  to  Hutchcroft  (1998:  24ff.),  the  absence  of  any  attempt  to  consolidate  the  state 
throughout the history of the Philippines is one possible explanation for this power structure. The 
Spanish failed to build an effective bureaucracy and American colonial politics were actually 
“oligarchic-building,  not  state  building”  (Bello  2004:  285).  Nor  did  the  modern  Philippines 
succeed in building an effective bureaucracy.  
While the state and its bureaucracy remained stunted, landowning families and 
other powerful local forces became entrenched in their localities. Because of the 
central  government's  failure  to  penetrate  distant  provinces,  the  local  elites  −− 
organized  primarily  in  terms  of  families  −−  strengthened  their  economic  and 
political  foothold.  Even  after  independence,  the  government  could  not  pursue The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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strategies that would act against these families' interests because the President and 
most other national politicians depended on them to deliver votes come election 
time  .  .  .  In  sum,  the  Philippines'  relative  stagnation  can  be  more  adequately 
explained by the state's inability to control elite factions −− dominated as it is by 
one  of  them  at  a  given  time  −−  and  to  harness  them  and  their  resources  for 
development. (ibid.: 285-286) 
Corruption exists in huge dimensions and is especially exercised by elite factions to maintain 
patron-client  relationships  (Land￩  1966).  However,  the  underlying  cause  of  poverty  in  the 
Philippines is not corruption per se but rather the oligarchic structures for which the state is a 
“prize” in which the winner takes all.  
  The Muslim areas are not poorer than the rest of the Philippines because of corruption or 
patron-client relationships, both of which are prevalent in the country as a whole. Both, however, 
are reinforced by the conflict, as can be seen in the Ampatuan case. The conflict has further 
consequences,  among  which  is  the  damage  to  the  economy.  In  the  “no  war,  no  peace” 
environment corruption prospers more easily because of the existing markets of violence, and the 
absence of law enforcement mechanisms. Some elites see the office they occupy as theirs and 
thus fight for it with arms or take with them the office equipment, including computers, tables, 
and vehicles, when there is a change of staff (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 79).  
  Poverty  in  the  Muslim  areas  is  exacerbated  by  discrimination  against  Moros. 
Representative Mujiv Hataman and Senator Faisah Dumarpa therefore introduced House Bill No. 
3012, titled: “An Act Prohibiting Discrimination against Persons on Account of Ethnic Origin 
and/or  Religious  Belief.”  It  has  already  passed  the  House  of  Representatives  and  has  been 
forwarded  to  the  Senate.  Both  Moro  and  non-Moro  researchers  and  activists  have  reported 
discrimination against Moros (Kamlian 1998), and Santos (2004) concludes that there is a “need 
to  address  the  longstanding  and  documented  pattern  of  more  Christian  Filipino  intolerance 
toward Muslim Filipinos rather than the other way around. In other words, more peace education 
work has to be done with Christian Filipinos” (p. 141).  
c. Education 
During American colonial times, Maranao children were not sent to public schools at all, 
since they were seen as a medium of Christianization and declared haram, religiously forbidden 
(Saber 1981-1982: 199). Instead, it was the children of slaves who were brought, by the datus, to 
the schools. When it became obvious that “teaching was not confined  to religion” (Gowing: 
1977: 63) Muslim boys entered school, but girls were still kept at home because it was feared that The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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they could marry an “infidel” (kafir). Indeed, many slave girls “married soldiers and Christian 
government employees” (Saber 1981-1982: 200). Among Maranao groups in Ramain, it is said 
that Princess Tarhata Alonto  Lucman, the daughter of the Sultan sa Ramain, Alauya Adiong 
Alonto, was the first Maranao woman to attend a public school. At age five, Tarhata demanded to 
have a secular education and, when she promised also to study the Qur’an, her relatives agreed. 
She became a model for other Maranao families in the Ramain area, who followed the example 
of her parents and sent their female children to school. With time, education became very much 
appreciated,  having  an  augmenting  effect  on  the  bride  price  of  women.  Families  from  the 
countryside even sent their children to better schools or to universities in Marawi City and those 
who had the means would buy a house there in order to be close to their children (Usodan-
Sumagayan 1988). Today women are better educated than men, as the 2000 census for Marawi 
City and the 2007 census for Lanao del Sur show. 
  By 2002, there were 94 private and public schools in Marawi City, the vast majority of 
them elementary schools.
45 In the school years 2000-01 and 2001-02, about 60,000 students were 
enrolled, 50% in elementary school, 30% in secondary school, and 20% in tertiary educational 
institutions. In the year 2000, of the total population of Marawi City five years old and over, 29% 
had attended or finished elementary education, 21% had either reached or completed high school 
education. Those who had attained higher education comprised 29%. This includes both domestic 
and  international  institutions. Among  those  with  only  an  elementary  education,  men  slightly 
outnumber women (51% to 49%), while those who have finished a secondary or tertiary degree 
are  predominantly  female  (NSO  2002d).  The  gender  distribution  in  the  ARMM  of  the 
functionally literate, as well as of children participating in school is relatively balanced, with a 
decrease of participation in school for both sexes after elementary school.  
  Nationwide surveys show that the Muslim areas have poor results in education. This can 
partly  be traced back to the conflict situation.  In 2006, at  MSU the only state university in 
Marawi  City,  which  is  one  of  the  major  employers  in  Marawi  City  only  48%  of  university 
employees were Muslim. In the academic year 2007-08, during the interim presidency of the 
Christian  General  Ricardo  De  Leon,  this  number  decreased  to  42%.  Muslim  employees  are 
mainly found among the high school faculty (69%), non-teaching academic personnel (79%), and 
the administrative personnel (73%) (MSU Annual Report, 2006). A similar situation can be found 
                                                 
45 Five were pre-schools, 67 elementary, and ten tertiary, including one public school in the MSU system. About 
29,600 students were enrolled in 32 government schools in the city. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
55 
in the college enrollment rates: the number of Christian students was slightly higher than that of 
Muslims in the year 2007-08, despite the region’s population being predominantly Muslim.
46 
Besides the high dropout rate, this distribution can be considered partly the outcome of lower 
standards in the basic levels of education in the ARMM. 
  About 39% of the Mindanao population five  years old  and over had reached at least 
secondary  education.  Northern  Mindanao  had  the  highest  proportion  (44%),  followed  by  the 
Davao region (43%), SOCCSKSARGEN (41%), and Caraga (40%). The ARMM had the lowest 
proportion, with only 30% (NSO 2003b). On the recently conducted National Achievement Test
47 
for Grade 6, the ARMM was at the bottom of the list.  Newsbreak reports: “Some 30,396 public 
schools participated in the March 2008 examinations. Of this number, 366 schools obtained a 
mean percentage score of 34 and below. And of these schools, more than half (195) are located in 
the ARMM” (Bagayaua 2008). Similar results are found in the Functional Literacy, Education, 
and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS)
48 in 2003. In statistics for the year 2003 published by the 
Department of Education on the Functional Literacy Rate in each province, the ARMM is way 
behind the leading National Capital Region (63% to 94%) (NSCB 2008b). 
   Several circumstances have led to a lower standard of education in the ARMM. A study 
in 2008 documented the lack of facilities like chairs and classrooms as one factor. The same study 
describes Marawi City as one of the locations having a “severe shortage” in classrooms, with a 
ratio in the elementary and secondary levels of more than 56 pupils to one classroom and a ratio 
of more than three pupils to one chair (Bagayaua 2008).  
Beside the poor conditions of the schools themselves, some people in the ARMM cannot 
afford  an  education  at  all.  State  schools  do  not  demand  fees,  but  the  school  uniform, 
transportation, and books, papers, and pens still have to be paid for. Only the better off families 
can afford the better education offered by private schools. Additionally, the conflict situation has 
a negative influence on the dropout rate. Children often cannot go to school because of the tense 
security situation or massive evacuations which last several weeks or even months. Sometimes 
                                                 
46 The five fields with the highest enrollments in 2007-08 were: (1) Agriculture, (2) Business Administration, (3) 
Engineering, (4) Public Affairs, and (5) Education. 
47 The National Achievement Test includes the National Elementary Achievement Test (NEAT) and the National 
Secondary Achievement Test. The former “is a test designed to assess abilities and skills of Grade VI pupils in all 
public  and  private  elementary  schools  in  five  (5)  subject  areas:  English,  Filipino,  Science,  HEKASI  and 
Mathematics.” The latter “aims to assess the abilities and skills of graduating fourth year students to determine their 
knowledge and capabilities in five (5) subject areas: English, Filipino, Science, Mathematics and Araling Panlipunan 
(Social Studies),” (Department of Education 2008). 
48 FLEMMS tests the ability of a person to read and write, with understanding, a simple message in any language or 
dialect. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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schools are occupied by the army for years, and infrastructure is damaged, making it difficult or 
even impossible for students to attend school or teachers to go to work (ibid. 2003). According to 
the Mindanao Examiner, the Council for the Welfare of Children’s Sub-Committee on Children 
Affected by Armed Conflict and Displacement expressed the concern that if the “conflict and 
displacement continue, the distress and anxiety experienced by children may worsen . . . [The] 
impact of suspended schooling will force students to drop out of the system for good, affecting 
their future chances to find jobs and livelihoods” (Gamolo 2008). In November 2008, about 550 
students in North Cotabato alone dropped out of school because of the hostilities that had broken 
out in August 2008 (Cadelina 2008). According to the NGO E-Net Philippines, four out of ten 
children and youths in Region XII (North and South Cotabato, Sarangani, and Sultan Kudarat) 
are missing school due to the armed conflict. The dropout rate there is three times higher than the 
national  average.  Besides  the  occasional  conflicts  between  the  rebel  movement  and  the 
government  forces,  the  ARMM  region  is  also  suffering  from  ridos.  Ridos  can  lead  to  the 
instability of whole areas, since normally not just two persons are involved in the violence but 
whole families and clans. Streets can be blockaded for months; whole families have to hide or are 
not allowed to cross a certain area. Children are taken out of school or have to change schools; 
adults do not go to work because they would risk being shot.  
Another  reason  for  the  low  educational  standard  is  nepotism.  In  2003,  the  Regional 
Education Secretary of the ARMM, Dr. Mahid Mutilan, said that “[m]any provisional teachers 
are not qualified to teach and were most likely hired because of their connections” (Bagayaua 
2003). The article elaborated that in “public schools in Lanao del Sur, it is normal to see teachers 
not doing anything . . . Often, some do not even report for work. The children's education thus 
suffers. It is difficult to discipline lazy teachers . . . because often they are connected to local 
politicians.”  Because  of  nepotism  and  corruption,  there  is  a  widespread  problem  of  ghost 
teachers, teachers only appearing on the payroll but not in person, in the ARMM. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 4: Street Blockage in Marawi City 
Because of a family feud, a street has been blocked. Thus one of the families involved in the feud can control the 
entrance to the area. Photo taken by author, 2008. 
 
  In  education,  Lanao  del  Sur  is,  in  most  cases,  slightly  better  off  than  its  ARMM 
neighbors. The percentage of the population of Marawi City, for instance, having a secondary 
education is relatively large. This can partly be attributed to the fact that education is seen as an 
achievement that the whole family and clan can support financially and morally. There used to be 
special kandoris [thanksgiving celebrations] for those achieving higher education (Disoma 1999). 
This practice lessened with the increase in the number of Maranaos being highly educated. Today 
this  only  happens  when  one  receives  a  PhD  or  succeeds  on  special  exams.  Nevertheless, 
Maranaos are usually proud of their educational achievements and see theirs as the most educated 
Muslim ethnic group in the Philippines (Madale 1997: 29).  
  Besides public education, there are also a number of madaris (singular madrasah) Islamic 
elementary and secondary schools, in the Philippines. The Kamilol Islam Society, an association 
that was founded by local Muslims, introduced the first madrasah in Marawi City in 1938
49. Its 
                                                 
49 Before the introduction of public schools there were gurus (teachers), who were usually the local religious leaders 
and who “taught a small group of children the fundamental facts of Islam.” This was followed by the development of 
pandita (schools which offer second-level education in Islamic subjects), which were larger organized in Mindanao, 
mainly during and by the American administration “in an effort to maintain some control” over the Moros (McKenna The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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first teacher was the Guro sa Marawi. In 1952, through the efforts of Maranao Congressman 
“Domocao” Alonto the madrasah was converted into a bilingual school, offering both a public 
school and education in the madrasah curriculum. Because of a conflict between the two heads of 
departments, the school was split in two, a regular private school under “Domocao” Alonto and a 
madrasah under the Guro sa Marawi. The founding of other madrasah schools followed, initially 
by local leaders who sponsored the school and, after World War II, mainly by Maranaos who had 
been educated in the Middle East (Milligan 2001: 439; Rodriguez 1992: 93ff.). Milligan writes 
that before the 1970s there had only been few  madaris in the Muslim regions, but “[a]s the 
secessionist  movement  gained  momentum  in  the  early  1970s  the  numbers  of  madaris  grew 
rapidly to well over 1,000 in the western provinces of Mindanao”. One crucial reason for this 
rapid  growth  was  that  many  Muslim  Filipinos  wanted  to  “emphasize  their  Islamic  cultural 
identity”  (Boransing,  Magdalena  and  Lacar  1987;  Milligan  2001:  439;  2004).  McKenna  and 
Abdula (2009) connect the increase in the number of madaris with the peace agreement in 1976 
that  led  to  new  funding  of  religious  institutions  in  Mindanao  from  Libya  and  Saudi Arabia. 
Because  of  an  economic  boom  in  the  Muslim  Philippines  due  to American  reparations  and 
because of scholarships given by Middle Eastern countries, there were numerous Moros getting 
an education in  the Middle East. The religious funding then provided them with  the needed 
money “to open madrasas without relying on the patronage of traditional leaders” (p. 210).  
In 2000, there were approximately about 2,000 madaris in Muslim Mindanao “with more 
than 900 in the province of Lanao del Sur alone” (Milligan 2001: 439). A report submitted in 
2008 to the Institute on Training and Development and sponsored by the Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs of the US Department of State stated: “There are 1,569
50 Islamic schools 
(Madrasahs) across the country. Of these, 53% are located in the ARMM.” In 2008, 1,140 
madaris  seeking  financial  assistance  from  local  and  foreign  donors  were  registered  with  the 
Office of Muslim Affairs, while the Department of Education filed only 35 applications. This 
situation is due primarily to the inability of the madaris to meet the Department’s accreditation 
standards for curricula and adequate facilities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Abdula 2009: 208). After World War II, madari schools mostly developed with sophisticated teachers of Islam 
(Rodriguez 1992: 92; see also Isidro 1976).  
50 In 1981-82, 850 madari schools were located in Region XII (Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, 
North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat) The majority of these schools (435) were located in Lanao del Sur (Rodriguez 
1992: 94). The majority of the pupils in Region XII were enrolled in public schools.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Summarizing several studies on madaris in Mindanao in the 1980s, Rodriguez (1992) 
stated that most madaris were in a rather pitiable condition, lacking facilities and well-educated 
teachers. A study from 1982 on the patterns of enrollment in madrasah schools in the Philippines 
found that parents with low educational attainment tended to prefer that their children attend a 
madrasah school, while those with high educational attainment preferred governmental schools. 
Job opportunities in the Middle East were a motivation for enrollment as was the desire to have 
Islam and Arabic as subjects (pp. 70, 72). Girls as well as boys attend madaris. At the elementary 
level, they are co-educated. Starting from the secondary level, the sexes are segregated. At the 
tertiary level women outnumber men. Some may be encouraged by the prospect of becoming 
Arabic teachers in government schools. Those attending the Arabic classes in public schools, 
again a majority of them female, are mainly children who are interested in working as Overseas 
Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the Middle East (McKenna and Abdulla 2009: 226f.). 
 
 
Picture 5: Islamic School for Orphans 
The institution is sponsored by Saudi Arabia. Photo taken by the author, Marawi City, 2008. 
 
  Some children attending a madrasah go exclusively to this school, but it is difficult to 
obtain employment with a degree from a madrasah, apart from being a religious teacher. Thus, 
most attend public schools and madaris at the same time. They have to go to school seven days a 
week. Milligan explains that parents send their children to weekend madaris to overcome the lack The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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of Islamic education in public schools. Being Muslim is seen as a part of Maranao identity that in 
mainstream education has to be subordinated under a general “Filipino” identity that is largely 
defined by the Christian majority (Milligan 2005: 140-1; see also McKenna and Abdula for an 
analysis of Filipino textbooks). This double burden is not seen as the ideal solution and most 
Maranaos would prefer integrated schools (ibid.: 146). In the 1990s, some private madaris started 
to integrate government-authorized curricula (Milligan 2004). In 2001, as part of the carrot-and-
stick-strategy  applied  by  President  Gloria  Macapagal-Arroyo  to  Muslim  minorities  after  11 
September, madaris began to be integrated into the country’s national education system. During 
the school year 2002-03, the government began to implement a program called Education for 
Peace and Progress in Mindanao. The goal was to integrate madaris into the country’s national 
education system and “to foster religious understanding between the country’s Muslim minority 
and the Christian majority” (Sabutan 2008). The five-point program agenda included information 
and  communications  technology,  madrasah  education,  peace  education,  the  teaching  of 
Mindanao culture and history, and teacher training. The program initially involved madaris in the 
ARMM, with the expectation that is would eventually expand to all Mindanao provinces. Some 
opposition critics, however, have stated that the government program violates the prohibition 
against state-funded promotion of religion. 
  In 2004, a standard curriculum for public elementary schools and private madaris was 
approved by the Department of Education (Dept. of Education Order No. 51) and the ARMM 
adopted it in the same year (ARMM RG Executive Order (EO) No. 13-A). On this basis, the 
madrasah system became part of the national educational system, similar to the Christian and 
Chinese  school  systems  (Frank  X.  Lynch,  S.J.  Resource  Center  2006). Thus,  public  schools, 
having more than 25 Muslim students, are, since 2004, obliged to offer the Arabic language and 
classes on Islamic values.  In 2007, there were 459 public schools nationwide, excluding the 
ARMM, that were implementing the  madrasah program  (Esplanada 2007). According to  the 
Religious Freedom Report (2007), all public schools in the ARMM offer this program.  
  At the end of 2007, there were about 50 (out of over 2000) madaris “in the process of 
accreditation with the Department of Education” (Religious Freedom Report 2007). The other 
madaris  still  did  not  meet  “the  DepEd’s  accreditation  standards  for  curricula  and  adequate 
facilities” (ibid.). Thus, integrated madaris, which offer “the public school curriculum and Arabic 
literacy, as well as Islamic religious subjects” (Legarda 2007), are relatively few. The traditional 
or weekend madaris still constitute the major form of madrasah education in the Philippines. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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This means that not only is the curriculum different, but so is the funding. A majority of the 
madaris are either internationally sponsored, for example by Middle Eastern states, or locally 
funded  by  the  communities  themselves  (Milligan  2004).  However,  even  the  education  of 
madrasah teachers as well as the books for integrated madaris are mainly funded internationally 
by other states like Australia, Libya, the UK or the US, or by organizations like UNICEF and the 
World Bank (Frank X. Lynch, S.J. Resource Center 2006). The government cut funding in 2007, 
ignoring the fact that “the Madrasah education program could contribute to peace-building efforts 
of  the  government,  especially  in  Mindanao”  (Sun  Star  Manila,  27 August  2007).  Thus,  the 
madrasah issue became, like so many other issues concerning Muslims in the Philippines, the 
object  of  political  contention  between  Muslims  and  the  government.  Non-Muslim  Filipino 
politicians feared that non-integrated madaris might be breeding cells for terrorism (Religious 
Freedom Report 2003), and this fueled the suspicion of Muslims that the government only wants 
to integrate the madaris to be able to control them. As the Maranao politician Mutilan explained 
in 2003, some segments of the Muslim society “still look at the Philippine government as a 
colonial government . . . some Muslims may view mainstreaming [of madaris as] part of an effort 
to colonize them and to eliminate their culture and their religion” (Bagayaua 2003). McKenna 
and Abdula (2009), based on research in south and central Mindanao, write that most parents of 
children going to madrasah schools “agree that the central issue in  Islamic education in the 
Philippines is resources, not reform” (p. 224). The new Benigno “P-Noy” or “Noynoy” Aquino 
government  has  promised  to  put  more  effort  into  the  integration  of  madrasah  schools  into 
mainstream education.  
B. Historical Overview: the Region Prior to Independence 
1. Spanish Colonial Period 
The  conflict  in  today's  Muslim  regions,  which  has  lasted  for  about  40  years,  is  the 
consequence of a complex situation, having one of its root causes in Spanish colonial times. At 
the Second International Bangsamoro Development Conference, at El Manuel Convention and 
Entertainment Center, Cotabato City on 19-21 June 2007, the source of the conflict was identified 
by the MILF as the “unjust annexation or inclusion of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in the sale by 
Spain to the United States of the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The major Sultanates of Buayan,
51 Maguindanao,
52 Sulu
53, and the  Pat a Pangampong (Four 
Principalities) in Lanao
54 had never been entirely part of the Spanish colony and thus Spain sold 
them without entirely possessing them. The Spaniards, entering the Philippines in the sixteenth 
century,  started  several  attempts  to  subdue  the  southern  sultanates  but  were  not  entirely 
successful. This was partly because of the local resistance in Muslim Mindanao, which had been 
politically and economically the largest organized community in the Philippines. It was also due 
to the fact that the Spanish  forces concentrated their energies on the northern Philippines to 
intensify their trade with China rather than on the southern Philippines, which would have been a 
bridge to the spice trade with the Moluccas (Cushner 1971: 65).  
  According to Majul (1999), the resistance of the Philippine sultanates against the Spanish 
intruders was not “an isolated or insignificant phenomenon but an essential part of the general 
resistance of all Muslim peoples . . . against Western Imperialism, colonialism and Christianity” 
(p.  410).  The  author  suggests  the  common  resistance  of  an  established  Islamic  ummah 
(community), strengthened via marriages, trade relations, and tribute systems. On this basis, the 
sultanates could keep their relative independence from Spain in the sixteenth century. The support 
of Borneans and Makassars from Sulawesi to the Sulus, and Ternatans from the Moluccas to 
Buayan and Maguindanao helped the local resistance. After Spain’s temporary invasion of Brunei 
in 1578 and its victory over the Sultan of Ternate in 1606, the Dutch and the British supported the 
sultanates in order to weaken the Spanish trade competition (ibid). McKenna (1998) nevertheless 
argues that the conception of a common Muslim identity at this time is a myth created by Muslim 
scholars and nationalists (p. 80ff.). He defines the Moro wars during the Spanish period a “cold 
war.” Long periods of peace and co-existence were interrupted by short times of war between 
sultanates and the Spanish (ibid: 82ff.). They were characterized by contracts and trade relations 
between the Spanish and datus, especially after the Spanish monopolized the trade in the region. 
                                                 
51 The Buayaan Rajanate included the upper part of Pulangi River, covering the “watershed of the Cagayn Valley on 
the north and the inaccessible slopes of Mount Apo on the east” (Saleeby 1976: 51).  
52 The Maguindanao sultanate included “the whole southern coast of Mindanao from Point Tugubum, east of Mati, to 
Zamboanga, and beyond this latter point to the outskirts of Dapitan. All the pagan tribes living around the Gulf of 
Davao and in the Sarangani country, all the Subanons west to Tukurun and Dapitan submitted to his power and paid 
him tribute” (Saleeby 1976: 50). It thus covered the whole of Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Misamis, and 
Zamboanga at its height in 1619 under Sultan Qudarat. It also had tributary regions in Basilan and parts of the 
Visayas, over which the sultanate fought with the Spaniards in the seventeenth century (Majul 1999). 
53 At the height of its power around 1450, the Sulu sultanate included the Sulu Archipelago, southern Palawan and 
Sabah. It also had tributary regions in the Visayas, for example in Cebu (Majul 1999).  
54 According to Saleeby (1976), the Maranaos at the height of their influence controlled the whole area “and the 
seacoast west of Cagayan de Misamis and north of the Illana Bay” (p. 51).This area roughly comprises today’s Lanao 
del Norte and Lanao del Sur.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
63 
  At  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  Spanish  had  improved  their  war  and  naval 
technology by using gun steamships and other inventions like the telegraph, and later on the 
telephone,  which  gave  them  an  advantage  over  the  Muslims  (Yegar  2002:  207).  Several 
sultanates and datus signed peace treaties with the Spanish forces. The last treaty, between the 
Spaniards and the Sulu sultan, Jamal ul-Azam, was ratified in 1878. In the eyes of the Spaniards, 
it made the sultan accept their sovereignty. The Sultan of Jolo, on the other hand, understood his 
treaty with the Spanish as making his sultanate “a sort of protectorate of Spain while retaining a 
great deal of autonomy” (Majul 1999: 354). In any case, autonomy was restricted to those parts 
of the sultanate that were not occupied by the Spaniards, who already had a foothold in the old 
capital of Jolo and a fort in Basilan. Whereas Jamal ul-Azam accepted a treaty, there were still 
Sulu datus who disagreed, attacking Spanish soldiers or trying to recapture the capital. According 
to a British report, Jolo in 1890 was in a “state of siege and . . . no European ventured to go 
outside the walls of the town” (ibid.: 358, 362). While Spain’s authority was in fact extremely 
limited, Germany and Great Britain nevertheless had recognized Spain's sovereignty over the 
Sulu archipelago five years earlier. Germany accepted under the condition that “the freedom of 
commerce allowed in Sulu be also extended to the North Borneo Territory” (ibid.: 359). Britain 
posed the condition that Spain gives up its claim over “territories tributary to the Sultan of Sulu 
on the mainland of Borneo” (ibid.: 358).  
Around 1860, the Spaniards established a “politico-military government” over the area 
they held in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. They divided the area into five districts.
55 In 
1871, Cotabato
56  became the capital of the new government (ibid.: 342). However, after an 
earthquake the Spanish reinstated Zamboanga as the capital. During the Philippine Revolution in 
1898, the Spaniards evacuated their garrisons in the interior of Mindanao
57  shortly after the 
                                                 
55 Namely: Cotabato, Davao, Misamis, Surigao, and Zamboanga (Lucman 2000: 206). 
56 The Spanish acquired a strong-hold in Maguindanao only in 1851 in Pollok (Pollok Port is near Parang, in today’s 
Maguindanao Province), which was near the seat of the Sultan of Maguindanao at Simuay Crossing (today not far 
from Camp Darapanan, the main headquarters of the MILF, which is 15 km from Cotabato City). The Spaniards’ 
victorious attack intimidated the Maguindanao sultan, who gave away to them ancient realms along the Pulangi. In 
1861,  based  on  dynastic  rivalry  with  the  Sultanate  of  Buayan,  the  Maguindanao  Sultan  Muhammad  Makakwa 
allowed the Spaniards to settle in Cotabato in exchange for their protection. The sultan later on received a salary 
from the Spanish government, lost his economic independence, and became quite poor since the Spaniards had 
increasingly occupied his tributary areas. Thus, the protection turned into a form of protectorate, to the advantage of 
the colonial forces. While the Maguindanao sultanate declined, the datus of the Pulangi River looked to the Buayan 
Datu  Utto,  who  attempted  to  unify  the  datus  and  smaller  sultans  of  the  Pulangi  under  his  rule. The  Spaniards 
prevented this maneuver but could not defeat Datu Utto himself, who finally sent a letter reaffirming his and his 
wife’s, the daughter of the famous Sultan Qudarat, loyalty to the Spanish (Majul 1999: 367). 
57 This gave the Buayan under Datu Piang, a former minister of Datu Utto and Chinese mestizo, the chance to attack 
remaining garrisons like Cotabato, an attempt which ended with the arrival of the Americans.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Americans arrived. In 1899 Zamboanga, Cotabato, and later on other Spanish strongholds in 
Mindanao were occupied by the new colonial power. 
  The Maranaos had their first encounters with the Spaniards in 1639 when an expedition 
under Captain Francisco de Atienza and Fray Augustin de San Pedro brought the first Spaniards 
to Lake Lanao to explore the region. The local Maranao datus offered them allegiance, promised 
tribute, and accepted the missionaries (ibid.: 156). Nevertheless, the construction of a garrison in 
1640 encountered resistance by the local chiefs. Their opposition originated with the intervention 
of Sultan Qudarat from the Maguindanao area,
58 who gave a speech to the Maranao  datus to 
explain the negative consequences of cooperation with the Spaniards. Qudarat encouraged the 
Maranao datus to resist and the Spaniards were driven back to Iligan Bay (Saber 1986: 25). 
Members of the royal houses in Lanao today claim that Qudarat was the descendant of Sharief 
Kabungsoan, a Muslim missionary and descendant of Prophet Mohammad in Maguindanao and 
his  Maranao  wife.  Qudarat  is  thus  a  half-Maranao  whose  name  appears  in  several  royal 
genealogies.  
  Spanish forces did not return to the lake region for the next two and a half centuries. One 
of the reasons why Maranaos were left in peace for such a long time is that their domain, high on 
a plateau, was relatively impenetrable for a large army of invaders (Lucman 2000). However, the 
Spaniards did not conquer the Maranaos with military force alone but also by blocking their trade 
with the seacoast regions. This situation encouraged the Maranaos to initiate several raids against 
Spanish-controlled areas.  
  At  the  very  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  General  Valeriano  Weyler,  the  Spanish 
Governor-General from 1888-1891, built a “chain of fortifications” from Iligan to the lake region 
(Saber 1986: 50). Moreover, in 1891 he decided to conquer the Lake Lanao area. He started his 
mission from the same two spots as the former attackers did, from the already Christianized 
Iligan in today’s Lanao del Norte and from the recently occupied Malabang in today’s Lanao del 
Sur. The focus of the attack was “Fort Marahui” or Camp Amai Pakpak, the strongest native fort 
(kota) in the region. The fort, which lies within today’s Marawi City, was led by Datu Akadir, or 
Amai Pakpak, as he was known to the Spaniards, and equipped with “ancient cannons, captured 
European  guns,  and  an  assortment  of  bladed  weapons  of  hundreds  of  warriors  who  could 
instantly be assembled through the sound of gongs and cannons during emergencies” (ibid.: 7). In 
                                                 
58 The Maguindanao area along the lower Pulangi
 River reached its climax of influence in Mindanao under Sultan 
Qudarat (1619-16771) (McKenna 1998: 77). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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spite of their military victory, the Spanish had to return to their base because their forces were not 
strong enough to hold their position against further attacks from the Maranaos, who later took 
revenge by attacking settlements in Iligan and southern Misamis Oriental. 
  The new Governor-General Ramon Blanco (1893-1896) gave the instruction to build steel 
steamships in order to conquer the Maranaos, because this would prevent their escaping on vintas 
(native boats) from kotas that were about to be demolished and regrouping in other kotas across 
the  lake.  The  Spanish  again  attacked  Fort  Marahui,  which  had  been  reconstructed  and  was 
manned with Maranao warriors who came to “join in jihad.”
59 Eventually, in 1895, the superior 
forces of General Blanco succeeded in overcoming the fort. They established a garrison in 
Marawi and sent four gunboats
60 into the lake to hinder the Maranaos from using their  vintas. 
Some  chiefs  were  intimidated  by  this  military  power  and  signed  peace  agreements;  others 
retreated to the hinterlands and continued their resistance from there. The Spanish withdrawal in 
1898  to  make  way  for  the  Americans  (Saber  1986)  rendered  the  question  of  a  successful 
colonization academic. Nevertheless, this “departure was regarded . . . as a complete victory” by 
Maranaos (Lucman 2000: 23).  
  The Spaniards limited the economic power of the sultanates by monopolizing the trade in 
the area. Majul (1999) notes that the Spanish destroyed plantations and Muslim trading vessels 
(p. 408). McKenna considers that, with their monopoly of trade, the Spanish became the biggest 
trading partners of Maguindanao (1998: 84). Furthermore, occupation — including sometimes 
the  Christianization  of  the  population  —  and  the  fact  that  some  Muslim  datus  accepted  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Spanish  limited  the  sultanates’  political  influence.  Finally,  the  Spaniards 
influenced the election of certain sultans in order to restrict the political independence of the 
sultanates. Again, McKenna emphasizes that there was not a common Moro or even ethnic group 
identity under one sultan. There were raids of Maguindanaos by Christian communities but in 
cases of increased rivalry among datus or sultans among the Maguindanaos, some of them would 
fraternize with the Spanish in order to get help in conquering their rival (ibid.: 83). 
  Islam in the southern Philippines is often said to have developed in the framework of the 
defense of territory. The Spaniards came not only to conquer the southern islands, but also to 
convert  the  Muslims  to  Christianity.  Majul  argues  that  this  triggered  a  strong  resistance, 
sometimes taking the desperate form  of what Admiral  Jose Malcampo, the acting Governor-
                                                 
59 According to Saber, jihad in the Maranao language is called prang sabir (fighting for an Islamic cause). Prang is 
derived from the Malay word perang, which means war (information supplied by Prof. Vivienne Angeles). 
60 The boats were the S.S. Almonte, S.S. Corcuera, S.S. General Blanco, and S.S. Lanao. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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General of the Philippines (1874-1877), called “juramentados”. This term describes suicides or 
suicide attackers, women or men, who took an oath to die defending Muslim territory (Majul 
1999; Yeager 2002: 206). McKenna (1998) on the other hand questions the development of a 
stronger Islamic identity due to the resistance. The datu-ship structures of the Muslim ethnic 
groups  had  a  fractionalized  character  and  a  common  identity  as  Moros  or  ummah was  non-
existent. This does not mean that there was no consciousness of being Muslim. At present, in 
Lanao, for example, there are many cases where being Maranao is equated with being Muslim.  
  The Moro wars, even though the Moros were not unified under one identity and the wars 
were  not  religious  in  nature,  still  had  consequences  for  Christian-Muslim  relations.  Spanish 
forces occupied regions in the Visayas that had previously been tributary to Muslim sultanates. 
Additionally, they recruited Christianized Indios, among others from former tributary regions, to 
fight alongside the colonial forces against Muslims. Finally, they blocked the Muslim sea-trade, 
which accelerated Muslim raids against Christian settlements, taking Indio slaves and Spanish 
captives. The so-called pirates kept the slaves or sold them to the Dutch. While the captives were 
given back to the Spaniards in return for ransom (Majul 1999). This created a gap between Moros 
and Christianized Indios; the former thought of the latter as slaves, and as their enemies, as they 
fought side-by-side with the Spanish intruders against them (Yegar 2002: 208); the Indios thought 
of the Moros as pirates (McKenna 1998: 81).  
2. The American Colonial Period 
Spain claimed to have sovereignty over Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu Archipelago, 
even though it had not conquered the whole area. Based on this claim, the Spanish sold the 
Muslim regions to the Americans. After buying the Philippines for USD 20 million under the 
Treaty of Paris in 1898, the Americans concentrated their forces in Luzon and the Visayas to put 
down the Philippine Insurrection. Instead of involving the Muslims in the American-Philippine 
war, they initially preferred dealing with them diplomatically. In 1899, Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of 
Sulu signed the Bates Treaty with the American negotiator General John Bates. The agreement 
was based on the 1878 treaty the Sultan of Sulu had signed with the Spaniards. It accepted the 
sovereignty of the Americans over the sultanate; the sultan had to hand over criminals who had 
acted against non-Muslims,  and help  in the suppression of piracy  and slavery.  In return, the 
Americans guaranteed religious freedom, gave autonomy to the sultan in internal affairs of the 
sultanate, and provided monthly payments to the royal datus. Verbal assurances of America's The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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peaceful intentions also neutralized Muslim leaders in Mindanao. 
  After  the  Americans  succeeded  in  ending  the  Philippine  Insurrection  in  1901,  they 
established a civil  government  under US Army General William Taft. In Mindanao, General 
George Davis became the first Proconsul (1901-1902). In his report of 1902, he compared the 
Muslim areas to Indian reservations in the USA and the Moros to Native Americans; like them, 
they had to be civilized (Gowing 1981-1982: 12). Davis wanted to stop slavery, polygamy, and 
piracy, “as well as to weaken the rule of the Dato over their subjects” (Yegar 2002: 214). The 
initial American policy toward the Muslims was peaceful. General Davis ordered his men to be 
kind to the natives and not to interfere with their religious or cultural practices. At the same time 
in the Lake Lanao region, the Americans built wagon roads between Iligan and Marahui to the 
north of Lake Lanao and on the “Ganassi trail” (from Malabang to Ganassi) to the south of the 
lake Lanao. These infrastructures were described by Magdalena (2002) as “a key to the military 
campaign and successful governance of the Moro region” (p. 39; see also Gowing 1981-1982: 
13). Those plans were disturbed by several violent incidents, which provoked the Americans to 
send out a punishment expedition.
61 
  One of these incidents happened in March 1902. An American private was killed by some 
Maranaos near Parang-Parang, close to Cotabato, and the killers were identified as followers of 
the Sultan of Bayang. In response, a detachment of soldiers was sent on the trail from Parang-
Parang to Lake Lanao to “open the trail to the divide” (Magdalena 2002: 9).
62 Some Maranaos 
attacked them and forced the detachment to leave their horses and equipment behind; one soldier 
was killed. Shortly after this incident another soldier was “cut to pieces by a bolo” at Malabang. 
The reaction of Colonel Frank Baldwin, who lat er on led a punishment expedition against 
Bayang, represented a change in American policy toward Maranaos: 
As soon as this occurrence was reported I was so convinced that there was an 
element that would carry on a warfare of this character that I presented again to 
the department that I did not believe anything of a lasting and satisfactory solution 
of this question, and establishing the supremacy of the United States  over the 
island and the people, could be accomplished in any other way than to advance the 
                                                 
61 One incident was described by Gowing (1983). About 1900 Maranaos from Malabang under Datu Udasan raided 
the town Callalanuan, “looting property and carrying away slaves” (p. 83). The commanding officer Brett in nearby 
Parang-Parang went to investigate the datu, accompanied by 25 soldiers. With him came 100 Moros who were 
followers of Datu Udasan’s rival Datu Piang of Cotabato. While the talks were going on, fighting between Datu 
Udasan’s and Datu Piang’s followers broke out and 14 people were killed. Datu Dacula, whose son died in the 
fighting, wrote a letter to General William Kobb￩ in Zamboanga, asking him how the Americans could have tolerated 
such an attack, accusing them of having supported Datu Piang (ibid.: 83).  
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troops  to  the  lake,  peaceably  if  possible,  otherwise  if  necessary;  and  that  this 
would be the only way to stop this assassination of soldiers or American citizens 
and insure peace . . . by adopting only peaceful measures we would soon have our 
little garrisons along the seashore menaced by the lake Moros if we did not force 
our way to the lake. (ibid.: 9-10) 
Soon after the bolo incident, a message was sent to leading Maranaos to surrender the assassins 
and to provide compensation for the stolen goods (Magdalena 2002: 3; Saber 1986: 12). The 
chiefs  refused  to  hand  over  their  kinsmen  and  the  Sultan  of  Bayang  wrote  that  he  would 
“recognize nobody but the Sultan of Turkey” (Magdalena 2002: 3). The colonial rulers departed 
from  their policy  of diplomacy  and sent  1,800 American and  Filipino soldiers from  Parang-
Parang  to  Malabang  and  then  against  the  Maranaos  in  the  southern  lake  region.  They  first 
attacked several smaller kotas like Pualas and Binidayan, and finally arrived at Fort Pandapatann 
—  Padang  Karbala  to  Maranaos  —  in  Unayan,  where  600  Bayang  warriors  and  their  allies 
defended themselves. The Americans won the battle, due to superior numbers and weapons. They 
established  Camp  Vicars  to  maintain  their  victory.  Since  Baldwin  had  been  promoted,  John 
Joseph “Black Jack” Pershing became the new Commander-in-Chief. Under his administration, 
military operations as well as diplomacy were employed. He adopted “some Maranao as his 
brothers, sons, daughters, etc.,” and he was even given a honorary title of Datu (Saber 1986: 13). 
However, there were other areas near the lake like Bacolod Grade, Butig, Calahui, Masiu, and 
Taraka, where the people were still hostile toward the Americans. Saber explains: 
During that time, most nativistic Maranao, outwardly or inwardly, discriminated 
against  both  Spaniards  and  Americans  whom  they  considered  as  kapir  or 
“infidels”, and whom they challenged for coming to their land. Such was the built-
in attitude towards strangers created by their war experiences and the long period 
of isolation from other peoples. (ibid.: 14) 
Saber quotes a letter of the Sultan of Bacolod, whose sultanate lay to the east of the lake, that was 
sent to Pershing containing the following challenge: “You get out of Ranao because you are not 
fit to live among civilized Moros since you are uncircumcised. If you do not come, we will come 
to fight you” (Saber 1986: 14). The American Press criticized the repression by the colonial 
government of the kotas in the hostile areas as a massacre. Captain Pershing made a tour around 
the lake, pacifying one rebellious chief after the other, either with diplomacy or with force of 
arms. He was promoted from Captain to Brigadier General; later on, he became the Military 
Governor of Moro Province (Magdalena 2002: 29; Saber 1986: 14).  
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Moro Province was established in 1903, containing the Muslim areas in Mindanao and the 
Sulu Archipelago and excluding the northeastern parts of Mindanao, which were Christianized. It 
became the only province that was ruled by the military; civilian Filipino governors headed the 
others.  The  province  was  divided  into  five  districts:  Cotabato,  Davao,  Lanao,  Sulu,  and 
Zamboanga, each of which had an Army officer as  District Governor. According to Gowing 
(1981-82), the main purpose of the province was “to provide a framework wherein traditional 
Moro  political  and  social  structures  could  be  gradually  changed  into  the  structures  adopted 
generally in the other provinces of the Archipelago” (p. 17). Infrastructure, telecommunications, 
schools, and hospitals were established and taxes collected. The Bates Treaty was abandoned in 
1904, thus removing the authority the Sultan of Sulu still had over the internal affairs of his 
sultanate as well as the subsidies the sultan and the datus received. Further, anti-slavery measures 
were undertaken and the Americans rejected the Muslim legal code, except sharia laws regarding 
personal status and inheritance (Yegar 2002: 215, 217). To enforce these rules, General Leonard 
Wood, Governor of Moro Province from 1903 to 1906, undertook punitive attacks “to teach the 
Moros some [sic] lesson for not renouncing slavery, slave-catching, theft and other ‘uncivilized’ 
practices”  (Magdalena  2002:  29).  Under  Wood's  administration,  3,000  Muslims  were  killed, 
“while the number of Americans killed was less than seventy” (Gowing 1981-1982: 18).  
  The next governor, Tasker Bliss (1906-1909), installed at a time when most Muslims had 
already  submitted  to American  rule,  focused  on  education  in  order  to  “civilize”  them.  This 
involved  the  institution  of  compulsory  education.  Scholarships  were  given  to  Muslims,  and 
scholarship recipients were sent to Manila or the United States. The Muslim elites were pressured 
to send their children to school. However, only the children of slaves went to the school, while 
the elite kept its children at home or sent them to traditional religious schools. Consequently, 
Brigadier General Bliss also started to support the education of local teachers, the use of the local 
language as a medium of education, and even the traditional Islamic schools, to which he sent 
books, and whose curriculum was limited to the “reading and writing of Arabic and the Arabic 
rendering of Moro languages.” His goal was to initiate a transition from the traditional school to 
public  school  (Gowing  1981-1982:  22; Yegar  2002:  218).  Generally,  it  can  be  said  that  the 
American policy was quite friendly toward Islam under a constitution of secularism and religious 
freedom. The schools the Americans supported were not confessional, but they sponsored trips to 
Mecca in 1911 (Gowing 1977: 65; Saber 1981-1982: 200). Gowing summarizes the American 
policy toward the Muslims in the Philippines:  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The  Americans  came  to  Moroland  with  a  “holy  mission,”  the  mandate.  The 
Americans wished to Americanize and Christianize the Moros. “To develop, to 
civilize,  to  educate,  to  train  in  the  science  of  self-government”  meant  to 
accomplish these changes in terms of American values. In short, they sought to 
impose a western civilization suffused by the Judeo-Christian ideology upon an 
Asian (Filipino) society suffused by Islam . . . While setting aside Moro legal 
codes  and  judicial  procedures,  the American  government  scrupulously  avoided 
any  interference  with  the  freedom  of  the  Moros  to  worship  and  practice  their 
religious  customs.  Americans  believed  that  they  were  respecting  the  religious 
liberty  of  the  Moros. Again,  it  must  be  emphasized  that  the Americans  were 
unaware [of] or indifferent to the fact that religion and culture were intermingled 
in Moro society. (Gowing 1977: 329-330) 
  In 1911, Governor John J. Pershing (1909-1913) ordered the disarmament of the Muslims, 
which led to resistance in Cotabato, Lanao, and Sulu. In Sulu, there were reports of mujahida 
(female  Islamic  warriors)  being  in  the  battle  of  Mount  Langkuasan  in  1912,  where  Muslim 
women fought under the lead of Princess Asda Shariful Hashim against American soldiers. They 
rolled  down  logs  to  crush  the American  attackers,  and  thereby,  before  the  male  and  female 
fighters were overrun, killed twenty American soldiers (Lucman 2000: 282). The battle of Bud 
Bagsak in Sulu in 1913 was the last large-scale battle between American soldiers and Muslims in 
the  Philippines.  Its  consequence  was  the  Carpenter Agreement  in  1915,  signed  by  Governor 
Frank Carpenter and Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu. The Sulu sultanate had to recognize the 
American colonial government; the sultan lost his major prerogatives, except his religious duties, 
and was awarded an annual pension of USD 6,000.  
  Even though the Muslims had officially been defeated and disarmed, military clashes 
between Muslims and American soldiers continued. In 1914, the Department of Mindanao and 
Sulu (1914-1920), which had a civilian government under Frank Carpenter (Gowing 1981-1982: 
26, Lucman 2000: 284), replaced the Moro Province. In 1916, the Jones Law (Act No. 240) gave 
the  Philippine  Legislature  control  over  Mindanao  and  Sulu  and  Muslims  the  right  to 
representation. As an immediate outcome, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison appointed 
two  senators  and  five  assemblymen.  In  1917,  the  Bureau  of  Non-Christian  Tribes  was 
established,  aiming  to  “bring  the  non-Christian  communities  into  the  national  process”  (Tan 
1981-1982: 61). Under the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, based on the conclusion that elite 
Moro women were an influence in their society a boarding school for girls was established in 
Sulu in 1916 and financed by women from New York. Its goal was to educate the girls to be 
future leaders among their people (Angeles 1998: 213). Carpenter even sent one Muslim woman, 
Tarhata Kiram from Sulu, to the USA to be educated there. Conversion of these Muslim women The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
71 
to Christianity was not part of the program since this would have destroyed their status and value 
among their people (ibid.: 213).  
American rule had special consequences for the distribution of land in the Philippines. In 
1902, the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) was introduced, instituting the Torrens system
63 of 
land ownership. The next year, Act 718 passed; it “made void land grants from  Moro Sultans or 
Datus, or Chiefs or non-Christian tribes, when made without government authority or consent” 
(Lucman 2000: 272). Act No. 926, in the same year, declared as belonging in the public domain 
and open for homesteading all land to which no title according to the new registration system had 
been  claimed.  Magdalena  describes  the  consequences  for  the  traditional  system  of  land 
ownership: 
the natives were dispossessed of their rights to the land, which were defined by 
customary laws based on kinship membership. Traditional and suspicious as they 
were,  the  Moros  did  not  realize  the  value  of  the  modern  concept  of  legal 
ownership of lands, and naturally did not bother themselves to have their lands 
surveyed, classified and covered by Torrens title. To them, it was enough that they 
lived by their own rules, which later ran inconsistent with modern law. (2002: 49) 
Many Muslims lost their land because their traditional rights were not recognized. On the other 
hand, some Muslim leaders profited from this situation by claiming vast tracks of land as their 
own, sometimes selling parts of them to the government, settlers, or others (Yegar 2002: 226). 
Land to which no title was claimed was mainly sold or leased to plantation owners, foreign 
enterprises like Goodyear, or immigrants who came from Luzon, the Visayas, America, or Japan 
(Kreuzer 2003: 10). It was easy for influential people to possess lands that before had belonged to 
Muslims. This situation eventually led to countless land conflicts and can be seen as one of the 
root problems of today’s conflict situation (Yegar 2002: 226). In 1919, as a result of Act No. 
2874, non-Christians were prohibited from possessing more than 10 hectares of land for each 
male family member over 18. Other citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the USA over the age 
of 18 years, however, could possess a homestead not exceeding 24 hectares (Che Man 1990: 24). 
  In  the  framework  of  relocation  programs  from  1913  to  1917,  several  agricultural 
colonies
64  were  formed  in  the  Muslim  areas.  During  this  time,  about  8,000  settlers  arrived. 
Officially, the purpose of these colonies was to increase agricultural production, to balance the 
population distribution in the Philippines, to begin the cultivation of fallow land and to enable 
                                                 
63 The Torres system is based on a register of land holdings maintained by the state which and guarantees a title to 
those included in the register.  
64 The colonies were created in Glan, Pagalungan, Paidu Pulangi, Pikit, Silik, and Talitay in the Maguindanao area, 
and Momungan in today’s Lanao del Norte province (Cagoco-Guiam 1996).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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poor farmers to become landowners (Yegar 2002: 223). According to Werning (1983), at this time 
there was no overpopulation in Luzon or the Visayas, but areas that were controlled by oppressive 
landlords were defined as overpopulated. In order to ease the growing social problems in these 
regions,  the  US  government  started  a  re-settlement  program  for  the  poor,  granting  them 
advantages in order to up-grade their social and economic standing, mainly on the backs of the 
Moros in Mindanao (p. 47). Rodil (2003) writes that in Cotabato it was Datu Piang — the most 
respected Muslim leader in Buayan at the time — who was responsible for the coming of the first 
Christian colonies to the province (there were eight in Cotabato). Two of his sons served in the 
management of these colonies (p. 185). Christians as well as Muslims were among the colonists, 
which was intended so as to facilitate the assimilation of the Moros (see also Eder and McKenna 
2004). The religiously mixed colonies were not very successful because of the threat of malaria 
and a lack of services. In 1918, the government decided to support only those that had their own 
means, a plan that also failed. 
  In 1935, 30,000 to 35,000 people lived in government agricultural colonies in Mindanao 
(Yegar 2002: 224). In 1939, the National  Land Settlement Administration was established; it 
aimed to  include  army  veterans.  It  bought  land from  the  government  and private sources  to 
organize settlements. In some cases, Muslim ancestral land was declared to be public domain and 
sold (ibid.: 232). Even though there had been warnings by Muslims that the land issue might lead 
to violence, these programs were enforced. Yegar reports that between 1936 and 1941, especially 
in Lanao, there were numerous minor military clashes between armed forces of the Philippine 
government and local Muslims (ibid.: 232). 
  Some business elites in Mindanao were interested in a territorial break away from the 
Philippine entity. In 1910, the Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce requested of the American 
President that the southern islands be separated from the rest of the Philippines and become 
American territory,  referring to  their  rich natural  resources  (ibid: 223).
65 In the 1920s, some 
American businessmen, plantation owners, and government officials supported Moro petitions to 
the US President and Congress warning that Philippine independence, bringing with it the rule by 
Christian Filipinos over Muslims,   might  result in violence (Magdalena 2002). The petitions 
resulted in 1926 in the Bacon Bill (HB 12772), proposing the annexation of Mindanao and Sulu 
by the Americans instead of giving independence to the whole Philippines (Magdalena 2002: 
                                                 
65 The number of Americans settlers in Mindanao had been about 5,000 during the time of the Moro Province, most 
of them connected to the army. Majority left already after a few years. In 1907 there were only 100 American 
plantation owners in Mindanao, part of them left when the army withdraw in 1913 (Yegar 2002: 223). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
73 
51ff.). The Bill was neglected and in 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Bill established an autonomous 
Commonwealth  under  which  the  Philippines  was  granted  full  rights  in  internal  matters.
66  In 
reaction, the Dansalan Declaration was signed in 1935 by 121  datus from Lanao and sent to 
President  Franklin  Roosevelt  and  Congress.  It  demanded  that  the  Muslims  remain  under 
American administration until they were able to govern themselves. It warned that, in the event of 
the inclusion of the region in the Philippines, there would be “troubles between [the Muslims] 
and  the  Christian  Filipinos  because  from  time  immemorial  these  people  have  not  lived 
harmoniously together” (Lucman 2000: 291, quoting the Dansalan Declaration).  
In  1920  the  Department  of  Mindanao  and  Sulu  was  closed  down.  Direct  rule  by  the 
American Mindanao and Sulu ended. Instead, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes was in charge 
while Christian Filipinos took over control of the administration and legal matters in the Muslim 
areas.  “The  majority  of  officeholders  in  public  service  in  the  southern  Philippines  were 
Christians;  giving  rise  to  Muslim  complaints  that  the  real  meaning  of  ‘Philippinization’  was 
‘Christian Philippinization’.” (Yegar 2002: 220). The Muslims were not treated as a separate 
group anymore but as a minority in a predominantly Christian state. This attitude resulted in riots 
and resistance to inclusion in a future independent Philippine state. In Lanao, people revolted 
against  taxes  they  had  to  pay,  against  the  registration  of  their  land,  and  especially  against 
compulsory education in public schools (ibid.: 227). Even though the civil administration was 
less violent than the initial American regime, American rule was better tolerated by the Muslims 
than Filipino Christian rule “since the latter was considered as a greater threat to their religious 
and cultural identity” (ibid.: 234).  
  In 1936, the Sultan of Sulu died. In its attempt to uproot traditional power systems in 
order to attain social equality, the Commonwealth government refused to recognize his successor. 
Two years later, President Manuel Quezon declared in a memorandum that “the ranks of sultan[s] 
and datus were canceled according to the principle that all Filipinos [are] equal before the law 
and  in  their  treatment  by  government  agencies”  (ibid.:  231).  The  decision  was  met  with 
condemnation by the royal clans in Sulu and Mindanao (Lucman 2000). The Commonwealth 
government furthermore tried to diminish the special status of the Moros, for example by closing 
down the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in 1936 and replacing it with the Commissioner for 
Mindanao and Sulu, who was a Christian Filipino (Yegar 2002: 230). The right of suffrage was 
granted to Muslims in 1938, enabling them to elect local officials. However, the governors of the 
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provinces of Bukidnon, Cotabato, Lanao and Sulu were still appointed by the President (Madale 
1997: 134).  
  The process of the Philippinization of the Moros was interrupted by the invasion of the 
Japanese, which led initially to a guerrilla war in Lanao where Maranaos fought alongside both 
American and Japanese Forces. Whereas the American government had prohibited the possession 
of  firearms, World War  II  resulted in  a rearmament of the Moros (Lucman 2000:  297). The 
Maranao Ahmad “Domocao” Alonto, a member of an influential clan in Lanao — his father, 
Alauya Adiong Alonto, the Sultan of Ramain, had been a Senator under the Commonwealth 
government — was installed in 1942 by the Japanese as head of the Lanao government. Some 
months  later,  he  surrendered  to  Marcelo  Paiso  whom  the  Philippine Army  supported  (ibid.: 
294ff.). A year after the Japanese capitulation, the Philippines was declared independent by the 
Americans; this included the Muslim areas. 
  During the American occupation the Muslims in the Philippines were disarmed and, apart 
from frequent minor military clashes, largely submitted to American authority. Their leaders, as 
long as they cooperated, were as far as possible integrated into the new system by the American 
administration. At this time new Muslim elites developed, cherished by the Americans as counter-
authorities  who  opposed  the  rebellious  traditional  elites.  Education  was  used  as  a  tool  of 
integration and of forming new Muslim elites, who defined themselves as “Muslim Filipinos” 
(McKenna 1998:  112). This  approach was  continued by the  young republic, which added to 
education an emphasis on Filipino nationalism, which was then colored by the religious beliefs of 
the  majority  (McKenna  and  Abdula  2009:  207-8).  On  the  other  hand,  under  the  American 
Constitution guaranteeing religious freedom, Islam was accepted as a private religion in a secular 
state.  The  general  goal  nevertheless  was,  as  Governor  Frank  Carpenter  stated  in  1917,  to 
“civilize” the Muslims, in order to integrate them as Muslim Filipinos (McKenna 1998: 115). 
  Ancestral land was integrated into the Torrens System of land title registration. Muslims 
lost land because of their unfamiliarity with the system of registration while some of their elites 
profited  from  this  situation  by  claiming  land  that  had  belonged  to  their  clan.  Under  the 
Commonwealth, settlement programs were initiated. These brought large numbers of Christian 
settlers  from  Luzon  and  the  Visayas  to  Mindanao.  This  policy  was  later  continued  by  the 
independent  Philippines  government  and made  the Moros  a minority  in Mindanao. With the 
creation of the Commonwealth, the idea of an American annexation of Mindanao and Sulu was 
dropped, and Muslims came under the governance of Christian Filipinos. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
75 
3. The Republic of the Philippines 
a. Peacetime and the MNLF Rebellion 
Under the Republic, the legislative body was changed. Muslim Filipinos were able to vote 
for representatives in general elections, where they lost their senate representatives but gained 
three  seats  in  the  lower  house  in  the  persons  of  Alauya  Adiong  Alonto  of  Lanao,  Ombra 
Amilbangsa of Sulu and Salipada Pendatun of Cotabato (Madale 1997: 134).  
  According to Datu Norodin Alonto Lucman, author of Islam: War on Terror (2008) and 
grandchild of Alauya Adiong Alonto, Moro nationalism was in full bloom after World War II. The 
symbolic high point according to Lucman was the Bandung Conference in 1955, a milestone of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Several independent Asian and African nations met in Indonesia for 
the  first  large  scale African-Asian  conference,  deliberately  not  inviting  representatives  from 
Europe, the US, or the USSR. The aims of the conference were to promote Asian and African 
economic and cultural relations and to oppose colonialism. The conference adopted certain main 
principles  from  the  UN  Charter  that,  for  example,  granted  the  right  of  every  nation  to  self-
determination. Among other things, the participants “pledged to support Muslim aspirations for 
self-determination  in  Mindanao”  (Lucman  2000:  300).  At  this  time,  the  Egyptian  President 
Gamal  Abdel  Nasser  invited  Senator  Ahmad  “Domocao”  Alonto  and  Congressman  Rashid 
Lucman to Egypt. Between 1958 and 1978, 200 scholarships were granted to Filipino Muslims to 
study in Egypt (Majul 1979) in order to bridge the gap created by the Philippine educational 
institutions, which did not provide Islamic education (Lucman 2000). In the 1950s Alonto had 
developed an interest in strengthening the Islamic religion and had founded several religious 
institutions not only in Mindanao but also all over the Philippines. Under the Marcos regime 
(1965-1986), he founded the religious organization Ansar ul-Islam, which campaigned for self-
determination and meaningful autonomy for Filipino Muslims. This idea was, according to Alam, 
later on realized in the creation of the ARMM (Alam 2005).  
  The first group of young Moro students educated in Egypt included the Maguindanao 
Hashim Salamat
 and the Maranao Mahid Mutilan, who studied Islamic theology at Al-Azhar 
University.  Salamat  was  the  nephew  of  Senator  Salipada  Pendatun  and  a  relative  of  Udtog 
Matalam,  although  “his  family  was  neither  wealthy  nor  prominent”  (McKenna  1990:  247). 
McKenna describes him and other Al-Azhar students as frustrated in their attempts at political 
participation since the traditional and political elite would not even allow them to come near The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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them. Mahid Mutilan, who spent years as a missionary outside of the Philippines, founded the 
Islamic OMPIA Party after Marco’s downfall. Salamat joined the MNLF and later on founded the 
MILF. 
  Others students who went to Egypt chose to take up sciences like engineering and medical 
courses. Fifteen Moro students enrolled in the Cairo Military Academy to become soldiers, later 
to be known as the Nasserian Fifteen (Lucman 2000). They were indoctrinated into Nasserist 
philosophy, which was incarnated in a program called “Islamic socialism”. This aimed not only to 
promote peace but also to oppose the political Islam favored by the Muslim Brotherhood (Aburis 
2004: 92). After their studies, the military students were integrated into the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) as commissioned officers. It  is doubtful  whether Nasserism influenced the 
Moro  students  at  Al-Azhar  University,  although  Gamal  Abdel  Nasser  used  the  leading 
educational institution to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid: 88). Hashim Salamat later on 
stated  that Abu Ala  Maududi,  founder  of  the  Jamaat-e-Islami  (JI)  (Islamic  Congregation)  in 
today’s Pakistan, had influenced him (Hassan 2003). Maududi was also credited with laying the 
foundation  of  Islamic  philosophy  that  influenced  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  Ikhwan  Al-
Muslimeen. It advanced the cause of political Islam in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East.  
  Egypt  was  not  the  only  country  to  support  Islamic  development  for  Muslims  in  the 
Philippines. Other Muslim countries gave large grants to finance religious buildings, schools, 
teachers  and  books  in  the  southern  Philippines.  Preachers  from  Egypt,  Indonesia,  Libya, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia came to Mindanao and Sulu after World War II. 
They reformed the local religious customs in order to bring them “closer to the accepted norms of 
orthodox Islam in the observance of  precepts and adherence to customs and dress that were 
unknown in the Philippines before World War II” (Yegar 2002: 242). This development brought 
about a new affinity of young Moro students with the Islamic ummah, fostering adherence to 
sharia law and the observance of Islamic principles with regard to leadership issues. The students 
became more critical toward their traditional leaders, especially those holding important political 
positions,  whom  they  blamed  “for  inadequate  efforts  in  improving  the  social  and  economic 
situation of the Muslim community”. The traditional leadership was accused of “maintaining a 
feudal economic regime in which Muslims were exploited by fellow Muslims” (ibid: 243). An 
accusation which, according to Yegar, was never previously articulated. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  In 1951, Hadji Kamlun led a popular revolt in Sulu.
67 The Philippine Congress appointed 
a committee of three Muslim congressmen, headed by Ahmad “Domocao” Alonto, to investigate 
the problem of the Muslims and the situation in the south. The committee found that the Moros 
defined themselves not as Filipinos but as Muslims. It also revealed that their major loyalty was 
with their ethnic group. Only members of the Muslim intelligentsia saw themselves as Musl im 
Filipinos and only in academic circles was the word Moro used (Eder and McKenna 2004). The 
committee recommended accelerating educational and economic development. The Commission 
on National Integration law was created in 1957 to foster the  economic development and full 
integration of the Muslims. On this   basis, MSU was founded and several scholarships were 
awarded to Muslims. The Mindanao Development Authority, operative since 1963, and in 1975 
replaced  by  the  Southern  Philippines  Development  Administra tion,  was  put  in  charge  of 
economic  projects.  However,  the  projects  seldom  worked  out  because  of  “inefficient 
administration, corruption, inadequate budgets, and because it met with a cool reception by 
Muslims who suspected that the real goal of the declared integration was to blur Muslim identity” 
(Yegar 2002: 245). In 1963, the Commission on National Integration stated that the integration of 
the Muslims had not been achieved; that the economic, social, and educational gap had not been 
bridged;  and  that  a s  a  result  the  Muslim  areas  continue  to  be  among   the  poorest  in  the 
Philippines. In 1961, a congressman from Sulu, Ombra Amilbangsa, introduced a bill asking for 
the independence of his province (Kamlian 2004: 110).  
  Muslims in the Philippines felt they were treated as second class-citizens. The immigrant-
settlers dominated the agricultural land in Mindanao and the modern sectors of the economy and 
the administration, of which Muslims made up only about 2-3% of the leadership. In politics, the 
percentage of Muslims was relatively high in the 1950s (Kreuzer 2003). Since the American 
occupation, supporting those Muslim elites who were willing to collaborate had been a strategy 
of domination: divide and rule. These Muslim leaders were able to monopolize resources like 
land  titles,  education,  production  facilities,  and  political  relations  with  Manila.  Nevertheless, 
Muslim political participation declined in the next decade (ibid.). Many traditional Muslim elites 
during this time belonged to the Liberal Party, not Marcos's Nacionalista Party. Marcos supported 
the opponents of the traditional elites, the former were in some cases Christians who had gained 
victory using violent means (Hunt 1955; Kreuzer 2003: 11, 18). Marcos oiled patronage politics 
                                                 
67 The rebellion was connected to a land conflict in which Kamlun was supported by his followers. According to 
Prof. Vivienne Angeles(personal communication). Kamlun was imprisoned in 1955 until 11 December 1968, shortly 
after the Jabidah-Massacre on 18 March 1968, when he was pardoned by President Marcos. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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and “[s]pecialized budgets, pork-barrel funds, and even department budgetary allocations . . . for 
what was called the most expensive election in the Philippines,” the election of 1969 (Celoza 
1997: 25). During the Marcos administration, it was possible for what Kreuzer (2003) calls the 
Muslim counter-elites to prosper. Families like the Dimaporos in Lanao and the Ampatuans in the 
Maguindanao  area
68  gained influence by cooperating with the  American  colonial forces and 
finally through the help of Marcos (p. 19).  
  Meanwhile,  the fear of  some Americans, already  pronounced  in  the 1920s, that there 
would be a conflict between Christian and Muslim Filipinos in an independent Philippine state 
became realized. This was the case especially in the 1950s and 1960s, with the conflict reaching 
its high point in the middle of the 1960s under Marcos (Werning 1983: 56), when the government 
restarted  the  settlement  programs,
69  which had been  abandoned  during World War II. The 
increasing number of Christian migrants led to Muslims  becoming a minority  in Mindanao. 
Gonzales (2000) reports that by this time Muslims owned only 17% of the territory they once had 
(p. 108).  
  In  1968,  the  Jabidah  Massacre
70  was  revealed  internationally,  which upset  Malaysian 
officials when they learned about President Marcos’s attempts to retake the island of Sabah.
71 The 
government was accused of having secretly recruited Tausug-speaking Muslims as well as non-
Muslims, mainly from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi with the goal of encouraging them to infiltrate into 
Sabah in order to destabilize the region and “take over the resource-rich island” (Vitug and Gloria 
2000:  4). The  massacre  of  over  25  recruits  exposed  this  attempt.
72 Anti-Marcos  rallies  were 
                                                 
68 Whereas the Ampatuans in Maguindanao did not belong to the traditional royal elite, the Dimaporos belong to the 
Royal House of Masiu.  
69 Mainly in Cotabato, where it is said that most land conflicts between Muslims and Christian settlers developed and 
in Agusan, Bukidnon, Davao and Zamboanga del Sur. 
70 In March 1968, 87 Tausug trainees on the island of Corregidor complained in a letter to President Marcos about 
lack of payment and the quality and amount of food (Arguillas 2009f). The letter reached the head of the operation 
Major Eduardo Martelino, a convert to Islam. The four authors of the petition, after talking to Martelino, left the 
island; three of them remain unaccounted for (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 13). The rest of the petitioners were disarmed 
and 58 of them had to resign. About 70 trainees who did not sign the petition were transferred away from Corregidor. 
Another 24 were brought back to Sulu on 16 March. Two days later, 12 trainees were told to return home; they left 
the camp and remain unaccounted for. The same day another 12 left the camp, with them Jibin Arula, the only 
survivor of this group. While his colleges were lined up to be shot, Arula escaped and was rescued by fishermen on 
Caballo  island  (ibid.:  14).  Jibin  Arula  reported  the  incident  to  several  politicians,  including  the  Maranao 
Congressman Rashid Lucman and Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino.  
71 The operation under which Sabah was to have been infiltrated was called “Project Merdeka”; the commando group 
was called “Jabidah.” Merdeka (Bahasa Melayu) means freedom and jabidah denotes a beautiful woman in Muslim 
lore (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 4). 
72 Sabah had been part of the Sulu sultanate from the second half of the seventeenth century on. In 1878, the British 
North Borneo Company is believed to have bought Sabah from the Sultan of Sulu (Kershaw 2001: 30). The Sultan 
on the other hand, persisted in saying that the contract was a lease and that he had never sold Sabah (Majul 1999: The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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organized, among others by the Sama Muslim Nur Hadji Misuari, who was a political science 
instructor at the University of the Philippines (UP) (1966-68).
73  
  The  1960s  saw  the  beginning  of  a  mass  movement  involving  several  Muslim 
organizations demanding self-determination. One of the first to emerge was the Muslim (later 
Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) under the Maguindanao Governor of Cotabato, Datu 
Udtog Matalam. McKenna (1990) calls this a “paper movement,” since Datu Udtog’s motivation 
was to regain his own reputation, which had been lost due to political intrigues, rather than to 
start  a  rebellion.  Udtog  signed  his  name  to  manifestos,  appropriating  the  anger  of  Muslims 
generated by the Jabidah massacre, “and spent the rest of his life, until his death in 1983 at age 
84, farming his land” (pp. 239-244). MIM was taken more seriously by Cotabato Christians and 
the national media than was intended by Datu Udtog. According to Lucman (2000) and Che Man 
(1990),  around  the  same  time  Congressman  Rashid  Lucman  organized  the  Union  of  Islamic 
Forces  and  Organizations  (UIFO),  which  later  on  become  the  Bangsa  Moro  Liberation 
Organization (BMLO).  
  In 1968, “Malaysia took its revenge” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 22): the Malaysian Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sabah’s chief minister Tun Mustapha secretly invited Rashid 
Lucman to Malaysia, where they made him a promise to train Muslims from the Philippines and 
give them 10,000 arms and all needed logistical support. In exchange, the Muslim leaders in the 
Philippines would not claim Sabah. In the same year the UIFO and the MIM sent 92 Muslims 
from different prominent clans (64 from Lanao, 15 from the Sulu region, 11 from the Cotabato 
region) to be trained in guerrilla warfare on Pangkor island under the supervision of the Royal 
Malaysian Special Forces. This group was later called “the Blackshirts,”
74 owing to their black 
tiger uniforms, which were provided by the Malaysians. 
  In Malaysia in 1969, a group of secular Moro intellectuals organized themselves as the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) without the knowledge of Rashid Lucman, with Nur 
                                                                                                                                                              
352). In 1945 Sabah became part of the British Crown Colony and since 1963, through a UN Referendum it has been 
part of the Federation of Malaysia. The Philippines claimed Sabah unsuccessfully in 1922, 1950, 1962, and 1963 
(Lucman 2000: 302). Even after Sabah became part of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur paid annually (and still pays) about 
5,300 ringit to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. Whereas Malaysia defines their payments as “cession-payments,” the 
heirs of the Sultan of Sulu consider the payments as rent.  
73 Che Man (1990) writes that Misuari was an officer of the Ka-bataang Makabayan (Patriot Youth) in the 1960s. 
This  was  a  radical  student  group  in  Manila  “which  applied  a  Marxist  analysis  to  the  Philippine  situation  and 
advocated a revolutionary struggle against feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism” (p. 77). McKenna writes that the 
government later on tried to label the MNLF as a Communist movement and Misuari as a member of the Communist 
Party in order to discourage other Muslims from joining it (1990: 289).  
74 Other authors defined the Blackshirts primarily as the private army of a political clan, similar to the Barracudas 
under Ali Dimaporo (Gonzales 2000: 112).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Misuari as chairman and Abul Khayr Alonto, the son of the Lanao del Sur Governor Abdul Gafur 
Madki Alonto, as vice-chairman. In 1970 after the return of the recruits, the BMLO was formed. 
It had a religious, political, and military wing. Rashid Lucman was the chairman of the Bangsa 
Moro Army (BMA). Senator Salipada Pendatun (1946-1951, 1969-1872) led the political wing 
and Senator “Domocao” Alonto (1955-1961) assumed the chairmanship of religious affairs. He 
co-founded and became the Director of the religious organization Ansar ul-Islam in 1969, mainly 
composed of ulama (religious scholars), which was organized to preserve and develop Islam in 
the  country  (Alam  2005:  360). The  BMLO  considered  itself  an  umbrella  organization  of  all 
liberation forces (Che Man 1990: 78). Misuari was part of BMLO Military Affairs, as head of 
Moro Youth  Power  (Lucman  2000).  However,  the  MNLF  established  its  own  independence 
movement without the elders, political clans, and royalties. Rashid Lucman later complained that 
this was only possible by using the logistics of the BMLO.  
  The motives of the young Muslim intellectuals who received a formal education in Manila
 
and Egypt
75 and constituted the core of the MNLF, and those of the traditional elites
76, were 
different. The former sought revolutionary change that would make the society more egalitarian 
(Kreuzer 2003: 27). The latter favored the traditional hierarchical system and wanted to keep 
their positions of power. Rashid Lucman (a congressman from 1962-1969) as well as Pendatun 
had been members of the Liberal Party and thus their positions under the presidency of Marcos 
(1965-1986), who shifted from the Liberal Party (1946-1965) to the Nacionalista Party (1965-
1978), were threatened (ibid: 26).  
  According to Che Man (1990), in 1970 Rashid Lucman met with King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia, who agreed to support the Moro movement for self-determination. In the same year he 
also met again with President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who introduced him to President al-Gaddafi 
of Libya. The latter promised Lucman, Alonto, and Pendatun that he “would provide all forms of 
assistance to the liberation movement” (p. 78). The Muslims who had been trained in Malaysia 
came back and the BMLO under Chairman Rashid Lucman encouraged them to organize training 
camps in Mindanao and Sulu. Norodin Alonto Lucman claims that by 1971 “an estimated 30,000 
Muslim men and women in Mindanao were trained by the Blackshirts (later the BMA) in basic 
                                                 
75 Among others: Ibrahim Abdulrahman, Abdulbaki Abubakar, Mahid Mutilan, Khalifa Nando, and Hashim Salamat 
(Kreuzer 2003: 25). 
76 Represented by Congressman Rashid Lucman (Maranao), Governor Sheikh Abdul Hamid Kamlian (Tausug), and 
Senator  Salipada  Pendatun,  the  brother-in-law  of  Governor  Udtog  Matalam,  the  founder  of  the  Mindanao 
Independence Movement (MIM) (Maguindanao). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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weapon-handling and guerrilla warfare” (Lucman 2000: 304). At the beginning of the 1970s, the 
violence in Mindanao escalated because of the formation of Christian and Muslim private armies 
plus the involvement of the AFP and the police in land and political conflicts. Senator Mamintal 
Tamano claimed that “anarchy” ruled in Cotabato at this time, schools closed, people fled the 
area,  and  hundreds  were  killed.  In  June  1971, a  Christian  militia,  the Ilaga,  killed  about  68 
Muslim civilians in a mosque in North Cotabato. According to some eyewitness accounts, they 
were helped and protected by the AFP. The tragic event became known as the “Manili Massacre” 
since the incident took place in barangay Manili in Carmen, Cotabato. 
  The  election  season  did  not  help  matters  in  Mindanao,  as  more  and  more  Christian 
politicians took over political positions under Marcos (Kreuzer 2007). Muslim leaders, during an 
election campaign in Lanao del Norte, declared jihad against the Ilaga — who were seen as a 
threat to the Moros’ existence — and killed 22 policemen in October 1971 (Yegar 2002: 256). 
The Tacub Massacre followed in November 1971, when AFP soldiers killed 38 Maranaos on their 
way home after voting. Around this time, the famous private army of Congressman Mohamad Ali 
Dimaporo, the Barracudas,  came into being  after  Ilagas  killed relatives of  him  in  Lanao del 
Norte. Dimaporo among others blamed Governor Arsenio Quibranza of anti-Muslim activities in 
the  province.  Imelda  “Angging,”  Quibranza’s  daughter,  later  became  the  wife  of  Abdullah 
Dimaporo,  the  son  of  Ali  Dimaporo,  ostensibly  to  pacify  their  rido.  Conflicts  between  the 
Barracudas, Ilagas, and military outposts led to the occupation of Maranao ancestral domains by 
Ilagas in Lanao del Norte, giving rise to liquidations and about 50,000 refugees (Gonzales 2000: 
113).  
  In the same year the governments of Kuwait, Libya, and Malaysia, and the Secretariat of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), with its Malaysian Secretary-General Tunku 
Abdul  Rahman  (1971-1973),  “which  was  still  angry  with  Manila  for  plotting  to  destabilize 
Sabah” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 61), blamed the Philippine government of genocide against the 
Muslims  in  the  Philippines,  appealing  for  UN  intervention  (Yegar  2002:  257).  Libya  sent 
monetary help to the Muslims via Rashid Lucman. To defuse the international tensions, Marcos 
invited  ambassadors  from  several  Muslim  countries  and  conducted  a  tour  with  them  of  the 
southern Philippines to demonstrate that the conflict was a land conflict and not religious at the 
core; the ambassadors agreed.  
  In September 1972, Marcos, under pressure from the opposition, and facing an economic 
crisis  and the upcoming elections,  utilized the  conflict  in  Mindanao as an excuse to  declare The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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martial  law,  which  had  been  secretly planned since 1965 (Celoza 1997: 46, 32).  Opposition 
leaders like Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino were imprisoned. Rashid Lucman fled to Sabah, 
where he enjoyed the protection of the Malaysian government. 
  Earlier in 1971, Misuari held a conference in Zamboanga with some of the Malaysian 
trainees, members of the youth wing of the MIM, and many ulama in leadership positions. The 
conference  demanded  an  Islamic  Republic  under  sharia  law  and  denied  that  the  traditional 
leaders were spokesmen for the Bangsamoro (Yegar 2002: 268). Misuari thus planned a “coup 
d’￩tat” supported by Malaysians headed by Tun Mustapha, “who claimed his paternal lineage 
from the Sultans of Sulu” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 22) and with whom Misuari talked about a 
“Republic of Sabah.” In 1972, Misuari went to Libya to “follow up the promises of the Libyan 
government”  (Che  Man  1990:  78);  later  on,  Rashid  Lucman  complained  that  he  never  sent 
Misuari as his representative. Instead of promoting the BMLO, Misuari introduced the MNLF 
and found support for it on the part of the Libyan government. Che Man speculates that the 
Libyan government preferred the MNLF to the traditional elites and further “would not want their 
funds to be used ineffectively by some politicians whose reputation for probity was poor” (ibid.: 
79). Members of the BMLO accused Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treki and Nur 
Misuari of having diverted money and weapons that were intended for the organization. They 
also claimed that Misuari could only have declared himself chairman of the MNLF with the 
money intended for the BMA and the help of his partners from Libya and Malaysia (Lucman 
2000). The temporary “[u]nity of Moro leaders” under the leadership of the BMLO was thus 
diverted.  Some  datus  joined  the  revolution  under  Misuari,  while  some  of  the  political  clans 
returned to the outstretched arms of Marcos, accepting government positions, bribes, and favors 
showered by a beleaguered regime. The BMLO leaders started to cooperate with the government, 
arguing that they would “lay the basis of the legitimacy of the Bangsa Moro Struggle” in national 
politics (Che Man 1990: 79). 
  In October 1972, seven Maranao groups formed the Mindanao Revolutionary Council for 
Independence. Under the leadership of several ulama, they launched their first major attack by 
occupying MSU in Marawi City; 74 people were killed and many Christian families fled. The 
AFP later on defeated the organization (Yegar 2002: 259). After this incident most, but not all, 
guerrilla groups unified under the loosely and relatively un-hierarchically structured MNLF,
77 
                                                 
77 Basically, the MNLF was divided into a political and a military part. The politics were handled by a Central 
Committee with 13 members and Nur Misuari as Chairman, operating from Sabah and later on Tripoli in Libya. The The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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which, supported by Libya and Tun Mustapha, appeared to be one of the strongest of several 
Muslim organizations (Abreu 2002: 4; Kreuzer 2003: 29; Yegar 2002: 341).  
  In 1973, Marcos started to lure Muslims away from the rebellion. He announced that he 
would pardon rebels and support them economically when they surrendered. He also applied 
several suggestions made by Senator Mamintal Tamano in order to appease the Muslims. Thus 
the Islamic Amanah Bank was established, the prohibition on the historic barter-trade between 
Philippine Muslims and Borneo canceled, infrastructure and electricity projects funded, aid for 
refugees provided and the Institute for Islamic Studies at UP founded. Muslims were appointed to 
government positions, Muslim holidays were recognized, and finally the Muslim Personal Law 
and the implementation of sharia courts were codified in 1977 (Angeles 2001: 191; Yegar 2002: 
279).  
  In 1974, the Sultans of Buayan, Maguindanao, Sulu, and the Pat a Pangampong, forming 
the 19 Royal Houses of Mindanao and Sulu, elected Rashid Lucman to be the second Paramount 
Sultan (Sultan Qudarat was the first) to represent them and Marcos recognized him as such. 
Brunei,  Malaysia,  and  Saudi Arabia  saw  this  as  a  positive  step  toward  peace  in  Mindanao 
(Lucman 2000; Yegar 2002: 280). However, the wish to have more autonomy for the sultanates, 
which replaced the demand for independence made by the MNLF, was not granted by the Marcos 
government. Sultan Rashid Lucman, Macapanton Abbas, and Salipada Pendatun left for Saudi 
Arabia  under  the  invitation  of  Prince  Sultan  bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud,  Minister  of  National 
Defense and now Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. The wife of Rashid Lucman, Princess Tarhata 
Alonto Lucman, was forced to resign as Lanao del Sur Governor by President Marcos on charges 
of aiding the rebellion. In Saudi Arabia Lucman and Pendatun tried to re-unite with the MNLF 
but were not successful. Sultan Rashid Lucman died in Riyadh in 1984.  
  Afraid of an Arab oil embargo (Santos 1999), President Marcos agreed in 1975 to the 
demand of the OIC to engage in peace talks with the MNLF in order to find a political solution. 
The year before, Marcos was assured by the Fifth Conference of Muslim Foreign Ministers that 
“the territorial integrity of the Philippines was a nonnegotiable principle” (Yegar 2002). Under 
                                                                                                                                                              
BMA was the military arm, which reported to the Central Committee; it was divided into three divisions, according 
to the main Muslim ethnic groups, the Maguindanaos, Maranaos, and Tausugs. The loose structure led to the strong 
role of regional commanders, sometimes acting according to their personal wishes. Sometimes also independent 
units carried out tasks for the MNLF. Fighters came and went. Estimates of the MNLF's size vary from 5,000 to 
30,000. Women were engaged, mainly for recruitment propaganda, communication, supplies, medication, and arms. 
They also cared for the widows and orphans of MNLF fighters, collected donations and did clerical work (Yegar 
2002: 269ff.). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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pressure from Indonesia and Malaysia, both countries having problems with their own minorities, 
the OIC rejected the claim to  independence formulated by the MNLF.  In 1975, Abul Khayr 
Alonto
78  emphasized  in  an  interview  that  the  MNLF  had  abandoned  its  goal  of  obtaining 
independence and now wished to establish a federative autonomous state under the Philippine 
government (Yegar 2002: 286, 302). Two years later, at the Eighth Islamic Conference in Tripoli, 
the OIC granted observer status to the MNLF “as the legitimate representative of the Muslim 
movement in the Philippines” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 63).  
  The  negotiations  between  the  Marcos  government  and  the  MNLF  started  in  1975  in 
Jeddah,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  ended  in  1977  in  Tripoli,  Libya.  The  Tripoli  Agreement  of  23 
December  1976,  provided  for  autonomy.  Mercado  writes  that  with  this  agreement,  “[t]he 
environment  of  war  was  transformed  into  a  hope-filled  expectation  for  an  enduring  peace 
settlement in the southern Philippines” (Mercado 2008: 233ff.). The MNLF’s demand had been to 
include all of Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu (23 provinces and 17 cities) into the agreement. 
Instead  of  this,  Marcos  sent  his  wife  Imelda  to  Libya  where  she  succeeded  in  convincing 
Muammar al-Gaddafi, the representative of the OIC and a principal supporter of the MNLF,
79 to 
sign an alternative agreement (Proclamation No. 1628). This new  agreement reduced the actual 
demand of the MNLF to 13 provinces
80 and 9 cities, based on the agreed ceasefire in those 
regions between the MNLF and the government (Abreu 2002: 4). The MNLF backed out  of the 
agreement when Marcos declared that the implementation  would be dependent on a plebiscite 
(Presidential Decree No. 1092, 1977). Marcos, nevertheless, based on Presidential Decree 1618, 
created in 1979 the Regional Autonomous Government in Western and Central Mindanao
81. The 
                                                 
78 He was the Vice-Mayor of Marawi in 1971 until he joined the MNLF and became a Deputy Commander. Abul 
Khayr Alonto joined Misuari during the time Tarhata Alonto Lucman was Governor, with the aim of replacing the 
traditional political leadership and freeing the Bangsamoro people. Abul Alonto, himself a son of Abdul Gafur Madki 
Alonto, the brother of Tarhata, was later accused by the Lucman-Alonto family in the downfall of Tarhata Alonto 
Lucman, who had quit her post after Marcos accused her of aiding the rebellion, and the provincial government. 
After Tarhata resigned, a military governor was placed in the post. Abul Khayr Alonto surrendered in 1978, under 
Marcos, and was appointed speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the autonomous districts, which by then had been 
created. Under Ramos he became Ambassador to Nigeria.  
79 According to Vitug and Gloria (2000), Libya supported Nur Misuari because it “wanted to make Misuari another 
Arafat through Ali Abdussalam Treki, Libya's foreign minister, who had succeeded at that time in getting Arafat to 
speak before the UN” (pp. 32-33). 
80 Basilan, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Palawan, South Cotabato, 
Sulu, Sultan Kudarat, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur. 
81 The area comprised Region IX (including Western Mindanao with the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, 
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur: its government had its main seat in Zamboanga City) and Region XII 
(including Central Mindanao with the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, 
and Sultan Kudarat: its government was in Cotabato City). Thus, the Regional Autonomous Government in Western 
and Central Mindanao finally only included ten provinces and seven cities. Davao del Sur, Palawan, and South The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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government consisted of 13 District Governors – six Muslims and seven Christians (Yegar 2002: 
307). The MNLF returned to warfare but with less intensity than before the ceasefire. The support 
of Tun Mustapha of Malaysia ceased, several datus and rebels surrendered, and some accepted 
positions in the new government (Kreuzer 2003: 30).  
  These  developments  led  to  a  split  in  leadership  of  the  MNLF  under  Vice-Chairman 
Hashim Salamat in December 1977. In 1984, Salamat changed the name of his faction to Moro 
Islamic  Liberation  Front  (MILF)  to  underscore  an  Islamic  perspective  as  central  to  the 
Bangsamoro movement. He petitioned the OIC and the Muslim World League to oust Misuari 
from the MNLF leadership, and accused Misuari of driving the MNLF away from an Islamic 
basis  toward  a  Maoist  orientation  and  of  monopolizing  the  organization’s  decisions,  and 
plannings (Abreu 2002: 5). However, the basic line of the MNLF can hardly be seen as Maoist 
but was nationalistic and secular, a direction that nevertheless was in opposition to the explicitly 
Islamic orientation of the MILF
 (ibid.: 3).  
  Sultan Rashid Lucman first supported Salamat
82 but later on revived his own group, the 
BMLO, which  w as,  after  Lucman's  death,  under the leadership  of  Macapanton Abbas .  Its 
Supreme Council elected Norodin Alonto Lucman as caretaker Chairman. However, the group 
was said to cooperate with the government and to campaign  for surrender and was thus rejected 
by the hard-core rebels. Another group was formed around 1982: the MNLF-Reformist Group 
(MNLF-RG), which was mainly composed of Maranaos under Dimas Pundato, a former MNLF 
Vice-Chairman  (Yegar  2002:  350). The  MNLF-RG  also  wanted  an  Islamic  state,  but  it  was 
“dominated by traditional Maranao aristocrats with a secular education” (Gonzales 2000: 117). 
Thus, the MNLF split and new groups formed around leaders from the different major ethnic 
groups.  The  MNLF-RG  was  dissolved  when  its  leader  accepted  a  government  position  in 
Manila.
83 Among the major rebel groups, only the MNLF and the MILF continued to exist,  and 
only the MNLF was recognized by the OIC. 
  Salamat moved the headquarters of the MILF in 1979-80 to Pakistan. About 500 of his 
men were trained in Afghanistan (Kreuzer 2003: 30; Yegar 2002: 311), where they fought against 
Soviet forces, and were financially supported and supplied with weapons by the sponsors of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cotabato were not included because of the plebiscite.  
82 Gonzales (2000) writes that the split of the MNLF was forced by Senator Salipada Pendatun and Representative 
Rashid Lucman, “who were seeking to control the MNLF”. As a reaction to reports of his replacement, Misuari 
expelled leaders with elite backgrounds, among them Hashim Salamat, who had been “groomed to replace Misuari,” 
and Abul Khayr Alonto (p. 116). 
83 He became executive director of the OMA. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Afghan mujahideen (Yegar 2000: 344). In Mindanao, they built their own training camps, which 
were more religious than those of the MNLF. Women’s, youth, and ulama organizations were set 
up and members of the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) were recruited. 
  Over  the  years,  the  MILF  developed  an  organizational  system  that  can  be  seen  as  a 
parallel government. The group’s structure is patterned after that of a republican government with 
executive, legislative,
84 and judiciary branches.
85 Its highest policy-making body is the Central 
Committee. There is a department of political
86 and military affairs, which supervises the BIAF
87. 
Like the MNLF, whose women’s division is called the Bangsa Bai Women’s Auxiliary Forces,
88 
the BIAF includes a women’s group,  the Bangsa Moro Women Auxiliary Brigade (BMWAB), 
who attend a military crash course. The women mainly handle kitchen and medical work but each 
of the six BIAF divisions has one d ivision of armed women fighters — “for every battalion a 
company and for every company a squad” (Abreu 2002). Some of the members of the BMWAB 
are contract workers abroad, sending money to the MILF. The BMWAB has regular meetings and 
schooling, but  its decisions have to be approved by the Central Committee. The behavior of 
women in the MILF is regulated according to sharia laws.  
 
                                                 
84 The legislature is the Majlis-as-Shura or Consultative Assembly, with 80 members, including permanent members 
from the Central Committee and regular members from the MILF's 13 regional commands. The representatives from 
the women, youth, business, professional, and non-Muslim sectors, which maintain large organizations by their own, 
are recommended by the Majlis and confirmed by the Central Committee. 
85 The judiciary is characterized by the sharia system; its highest unit is the Islamic Supreme Court. At the village 
level there is the Barangay Reconciliation Committee, which is headed by an ustadz together with a traditional leader 
who is well versed in the adat (customary-law). It handles cases where no fines would have to be paid and capital 
punishment is not applicable; these include land disputes; violence against women, including wife beating and sexual 
harassment, and local conflicts that are not rido. The next level are the district and municipal sharia courts (which 
can handle cases were fines would be imposed) headed by an alim (religious scholar), who usually has an education 
from abroad and is not involved in cases of bribery. The Supreme Court handles cases that involve the death penalty 
by public execution as well as those involving ridos.  
  The Bangsamoro was initially imagined by the MILF as an Islamic state. It would have had an executive 
under a chairperson addressed as Amir, as legislative body the Majlis-as-Shura, and its judicial body would be the 
sharia system of courts. Everybody in an Islamic state is imagined to be equal before Allah, and the Islamic state 
would have been a kahlifat, which means that man is only a vice-regent of Allah on earth. The MILF knew that not 
everyone would accept Islamic law immediately. Thus, in 1980 they established a 20-year Four-Point Program. One 
point is gradual da’wah, Islamization. By 1998, the MILF had about 7,000 da’wah workers who practice in schools 
and colleges, among government workers and professionals as well as among non-Muslims. (Abreu 2002: 17).  
86  Included  in  the  department  of  political  affairs  are  the  Dawa'h  Committee,  the  Committee  on  Education,  the 
Information Bureau, the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Internal Security. 
87 “Each local committee from the barangay (village) up to the district level has corresponding subcommittees on 
dawa'h, education, information, finance, and internal security. Each committee has a chairperson, vice-chairperson, 
secretary, and treasurer” (Abreu 2002). The military training includes physical and spiritual training. The mujahideen 
are required to take up subjects like Islam, Qur'an recitation, history, and tradition, and are given a basic orientation 
in human rights, national and international situations, and the GRP-MILF peace process.  
88 For more detailed information on women in the MNLF, see Angeles (1996) and Siapno (1995). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 6: MILF Majahidat, Camp Bushran, Butig, 1999 
Photo provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman. 
   
At the end of the 1970s, from his exile in the US, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino continued to 
seek partners in his opposition to Marcos and at the same time sought to offer a possible solution 
to the “Mindanao Problem.” He talked to Rashid Lucman, Nur Misuari, and Hashim Salamat, 
urging them to find a common solution. Only Salamat, at this time in Egypt, refused. Aquino 
advocated  full  autonomy  for  Muslim  Mindanao,  including  legislative  powers,  an  educational 
network, local government, and security forces (Yegar 2002: 319). The plans died with Aquino’s 
murder  in  1983  at  the  Manila  Airport.  Meanwhile,  the  influence  of  Iran  under  Ayatollah 
Khomeini grew and the country refused to support Rashid Lucman, who had come to Iran on the 
invitation of Ambassador Rafael Ileto, but agreed to support Nur Misuari and the MNLF. In 1980, 
the MNLF opened an office in Teheran, which was officially recognized as an embassy. Iran The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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declared  that  they  would  stop  oil  exports  to  the  Philippines  to  put  pressure  on  Marcos,  an 
achievement of the MNLF that even the BMLO praised. Iran also acquired arms from Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) storehouses in Syria and gave them to the MNLF. The support of 
Iran was an important factor for the survival of the MNLF since the Libyan support decreased in 
the end of the 1970s. Iran advocated the MNLF demand for independence of the 25 districts of 
the southern Philippines, whereas states like Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states 
were in favor of autonomy based on the Tripoli Agreement.
89  
  In 1986, the “people power” movement ousted Marcos and paved the way for a new 
President, “Ninoy” Aquino’s widow, Corazon “Cory” Aquino (1986-1992). In Lanao del Sur, 
Marcos crony Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was replaced by Tarhata Alonto Lucman as Governor and 
by another Alonto, Domocao “Jun,” as head of MSU. The Alontos and Lucmans had been part of 
the anti-dictatorship movement and were close to the Aquinos (Lucman 2000; Gonzales 2000: 
120).  President  Aquino’s  government  followed  up  “Ninoy’s”  earlier  intention  to  recognize 
Muslim  autonomy  and  planned  to  have  a  meeting  with  the  three  major  Muslim  groups,  the 
MNLF, the MILF and the BMLO/MNLF-GR. Only the delegates of the BMLO showed up, and 
Aquino did not recognize them as representatives of all Muslims (Yegar 2002: 331). 
  The  MNLF  and  the  MILF  were  still  refusing  negotiations  when  the  Constitutional 
Committee in 1986 decided to include a clause in the new Constitution which granted autonomy 
to Muslim Mindanao “within the framework of . . . the national sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines” (Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 
10, Sec. 15), provided that the majority of the people in the Muslim areas ratified the autonomy 
in a referendum. Nur Misuari claimed independence and was convinced to return home to the 
Philippines  in  1986,  when  he  met  with  Aquino  and  agreed  to  a  ceasefire  and  renewed 
negotiations under the auspices of the OIC. Hashim Salamat and the MNLF-GR did not feel 
obligated by this agreement. The MNLF-RG started guerrilla attacks against soldiers and there 
were clashes between the MNLF and the MILF. Many Christians did not agree with Aquino’s 
politics and feared a Muslim secession, leading to the formation of a Christian Liberation Army 
(Yegar 2002: 332). During the negotiations, Misuari, under pressure from the OIC, agreed to 
autonomy but refused to accept a referendum, since this would reduce Muslim Mindanao to those 
districts where Muslims constituted the majority. The MNLF demanded that autonomy for the 
                                                 
89 Even though Saudi Arabia did not support independence, it was disappointed by the non-fulfillment of the Tripoli 
Agreement and provided USD 250 million to the MNLF in the 1980s (Yegar 2002:321). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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districts agreed upon in the Tripoli Agreement be granted not through constitutional but through 
political  means. The  Constitution  was  ratified  in  the  Muslim  districts  even  though  the  rebel 
groups boycotted it. In 1989, Aquino, against the will of the MNLF and MILF, signed a bill that 
granted autonomy to 13 provinces and nine cities, according to the Tripoli Agreement, under the 
condition that those areas ratified it in a referendum. In the referendum only Lanao del Sur, 
Maguindanao,  Sulu,  and Tawi-Tawi  voted  to  be  included  into  the ARMM.  Marcos’s  official 
opponent, the Maguindanao Zacaria Candao, became the first ARMM governor (1990-1993), he 
and other datu politicians quickly arranged their participation in the corrupt patronage-politics of 
the Philippine system (Kreuzer 2003: 33). 
  The  MNLF  returned  to  guerrilla  fighting.  Around  the  end  of  the  1980s,  Abubakar 
Abdurazak Janjalani founded the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters, also known by its 
Arabic name al-Harakatul Islamia and as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (abu sayyaf means the 
sword bearer).
90 He was born in Basilan and, with the help of an MNLF scholarship, educated in 
Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. He was trained by the PLO in Libya and fought in Afghanistan. 
The goal of the ASG was to establish an independent Islamic state, and its means of pursuing the 
goal was to terrorize the Christian population.
91 The ASG believed that Nur Misuari had betrayed 
the Muslims by entering negotiations with the government. The group at this time counted 
between 100 and 1,000 members, sometimes  joined by MNLF or MILF fighters who   were 
opposed to Misuari or Salamat (Yegar 2002: 344). 
  In 1992, peace-negotiations between the MNLF and the government were revived, this 
time with the new President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998). The MILF and Abu Sayyaf continued 
their attacks (ibid.: 339). The role of the OIC decreased at this time, as Vitug and Gloria (2000) 
comment: “After keeping the flames burning for the MNLF for more than 20 years, the OIC also 
finally became weary of this never-ending conflict” (p. 67). Other problems, like the conflict in 
Bosnia, caught their attention. 
b. The Final Peace Agreement (FPA) and the MILF Rebellion 
On 2
 September 1996, the MNLF and the Ramos government signed the Final Peace 
Agreement (FPA). The agreement covered into two phases, the first of which was to last three 
                                                 
90 Janjalani was killed in December 1998. 
91 Between 1991 and 1995, “Abu Sayyaf carried out 94 abductions, 75 explosions, 58 robberies, 50 murders, 24 
cases of arson, 12 raids, 9 demolitions, and other acts of terror in the course of which a total of 165 people were 
killed and 331 wounded” (Yegar 2002: 346).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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years. It set up a Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD),
92 to be supervised by the 
Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which was composed of  a 
Chairman,  a  Vice-Chairman,  and  three  Deputies:  one  each  representing  the  Muslims,  the 
Christians, and the cultural communities. The President appointed them. Misuari as overseer had 
three years to convince the Christian, Muslim, and Lumad inhabitants to join the ARMM in a 
referendum to be held in 1999. Meanwhile the ARMM would have the shape that was decided on 
in  the  1989  referendum  under Aquino. About  7,500  MNLF  fighters  joined  the AFP  or  the 
Philippine  National  Police  (PNP),  and  development  plans  for  the  next  three  years  were 
implemented.
93  In the second phase, the ARMM’s Executive C ouncil, legislative assembly, 
administrative system, and judiciary; its relation to the national government; its role in education; 
its use of  sharia;  and  the  establishment  of  a  special  regional  security  force  were  all  to  be 
determined based on the agreements made in the FPA. 
  Christian  groups,  afraid  of  a  takeover  by  the  MNLF,  formed  armed  groups.  Protest 
demonstrations against the peace agreement were held and the opposition in Manila warned to 
call  on  the  Supreme  Court  (Kreuzer  2003:  34).  Moreover,  the  Senate  accused  the  Ramos 
government of “bending [over] backwards for a rebel organization that they felt did not deserve 
the attention and pampering it was getting” (Vitug and Gloria 2000: 56). The outcome of this 
resistance was that the authority of Misuari and of the SPCPD was limited and directly dependent 
on President Ramos. 
  Misuari stayed in Manila more than in Mindanao and the development projects did not 
work as expected. That failure disappointed many rebels from the various ethnic groups, many of 
whom went over to the MILF, which did not believe in autonomy but demanded the removal of 
the central state system and its replacement with a federal system; one of the federal states would 
                                                 
92 The SZOPAD covered the provinces of Basilan, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, 
Maguindanao,  Palawan,  Sarangani,  South  Cotabato,  Sultan  Kudarat,  Sulu,  Tawi-Tawi,  Zamboanga  del  Norte, 
Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto 
Princesa, and Zamboanga. 
93 In a Tripartite (government, MNLF, and OIC) review of the FPA from 1996, Deputy Presidential Peace Adviser 
Nabil Tan said in March 2009 that Phase One was fully implemented: the integration of former MNLF fighters into 
the AFP and PNP and livelihood, educational, health, and other development programs in the area. These community 
interventions not only contributed to the improvement of access to basic services and economic opportunities, but are 
seen as having served as catalysts for grassroots consensus-building, dialogue, and understanding. But there are still 
five issues from Phase Two that remain to be settled: (1) sharia and the judiciary, (2) a unified regional command, 
(3) education, (4) economic and natural resources, and (5) the political system and the right to representation. The 
government and the MNLF  are to hold further discussions on these issues. The  “Noynoy” Aquino government 
announced on 2 September 2010 that it intends to complete the implementation of the said agreement within its term 
(OPPAP 2010).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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be the Bangsamoro homeland. The native inhabitants of Mindanao, excluding those coming after 
1935, would decide in a plebiscite if they wanted to be part of the homeland. Clashes between the 
AFP and the MILF, which was militarily stronger than the MNLF, became more frequent, mainly 
in Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao but also in Basilan, Cotabato and Zamboanga. Kidnapping 
for ransom became a major source of income for the MILF (Kreuzer 2003: 37; Yegar 2002: 344).  
  Negotiations between the MILF and the government started in 1997 under Ramos. They 
were frequently interrupted by several military clashes, sometimes provoked by the AFP when 
the negotiations needed to be restarted, or by the MILF when they were not satisfied with the 
results (Kreuzer 2003). The most severe violent conflict under Ramos happened in June 1997 
when the AFP attacked Camp Abubakar as a reaction to several abductions and assaults by the 
MILF or groups connected to the MILF in Mindanao (Jubair 2007: 72; Kreuzer 2003: 36ff.). 
Only after the all-out war in 2000 under President Joseph Estrada (1998-2001) did the peace talks 
with  the MILF collapse completely.  In 1998, the Estrada  government  ratified the 27 August 
Agreement of Intent, which underlined the necessity to conclude the conflict via negotiations.
94 
In 1999, the Estrada government acknowledged seven  of the MILF-controlled camps in Lanao 
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato (among them Camp Abubakar) as 
the MILF’s main camps and declared them to be development and peace zones (Kreuzer 2003; 
Vitug and Gloria 2000: 146).
95 Most of these camps share common borders, thus  making it one 
single area.
96  The  MILF  territories  were  not  predominantly  military  camps  but  clusters  of 
villages. Due to lack of any alternative term during the peace negotiations, they were referred to 
as camps.  
  Camp Abubakar, which was the main camp of the MILF before its destruction in 2000, 
developed and grew after 1981 until it comprised an area of 5,000 ha. Included were several 
villages, “where mass supporters of the Islamic revivalist force, more than 90% of whom are 
Moro peasants, live and have their means of livelihood and subsistence” (Abreu 2002: 24). In 
                                                 
94 The notion of an Islamic state was not debated at the negotiating table. Vitug and Gloria (2000) comment that the 
MILF might talk publicly about it, but did not present it during peace talks any longer “realizing how extremely the 
government and media can react to the idea” (p. 145).  
95 Abreu wrote in 2002 that the MILF had 13 major fixed camps and 33 secondary camps, which are said, when 
taken altogether, to be larger than the province of Lanao del Sur (Kreuzer 2003).  
96  Camp  Abubakar  covered  the  towns  of  Barira,  Buldon,  and  Matanog  in  Maguindanao,  and  Kapatagan  and 
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur. In the north, the camp shared a common border with Camp Busrah, the other main camp 
at this time, in Lanao del Sur. The northern border of Camp Busrah is shared by Camp Bilal in Lanao del Norte. The 
same structure can be found to the south and east of Camp Abubakar. It borders Camps Badre, Darapanan, and Omar 
Ibn Al-Khatab in Maguindanao to the south and Camp Rajamuda to the east, in North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat 
(Abreu 2002). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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1995, the camp had a population of 146,311 people, 65% of them Iranon, 25% Maranao, 3% 
Maguindanao,  and  7%  from  other  groups.  Most  of  the  villages  also  had  a  minor  Christian 
population and some villages were supporters of the MNLF. The inhabitants tilled the land, ran 
shops or small business. Schools for Islam, the military,
97 and agriculture as well as an arms and 
ammunition factory and a prison were established. The MILF founded a court and taxation 
system. One of its payers, a South Korean enterprise, started “the MALMAR irrigation project in 
North Cotabato” (ibid.: 22). However, landlordism existed in the camp. One government official 
managed about 1,000 ha of corn and coconut farmland for his  clan. The MILF does not have 
radical land reform as part of its program. Islam recognizes the right to private property, as long 
as the relationship to the workers is not oppressive. The landowners also had to pay more zakat, 
charity payments for the needy. 
  Locals from Camp Abubakar praised the MILF for bringing peace and order to the area, 
mainly by reducing ridos. Criticism could be heard from outsiders concerning women’s rights. 
Professor Rufa Cagoco-Guiam relates the case of a Maguindanao woman raped by a distant 
relative who sought help from an MILF sharia court (1999). The rapist was found guilty, but the 
relatively small fine he had to pay (PHP 30,000) did not reach the victim but was kept by the 
ulama  deciding  the  case.  A  newspaper  article  from  2002  blamed  ulama  groups  for  having 
punished three women who violated the dress code by daubing their heads with enamel paint 
(Unson 2002).
98 Non-MILF interviewees from Marawi City in 2008 referred to members of the 
MILF as having executed acts like these. The rebel group did not officially sanction the culprits. 
The practices were stopped because of a public outcry against them.  
  The final goal of the MILF camps was to make the group financially self-sufficient. This 
was especially important because fund-raising after the 1970s became more difficult. Vitug and 
Gloria  (2000)  explain:  “The  emergence  of  radical  Muslim  groups  that  oppose  and  threaten 
existing governments has led to tighter security measures, including stricter monitoring of fund 
raising activities.” (p. 118). Consequently, the MILF received its main financial support from 
sympathizers working overseas and the local Muslim communities, giving the zakat to the MILF 
(ibid.). By recognizing the MILF camps as the government peace negotiation team had done for 
“purposes  of  ceasefire  implementation  and  coordination”  (Santos  2005:  8),  an  “embryonic 
Bangsamoro sovereignty” (ICG 2004: 6) was acknowledged. The negotiations continued while 
                                                 
97 The two first military academies founded by the MILF were Abdulrahman Bedis and Ibrahim, both located in 
Camp Abubakar. Graduates of the training courses received a certificate of completion (Abreu 2002: 30).  
98 Article provided by Vivienne Angeles. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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peace zones in which development projects were to be realized were established in the ARMM. 
However, at the beginning of 2000, Estrada changed his policy toward the MILF, no longer 
treating it as an equal negotiation partner but instead systematically connecting it to Abu Sayyaf 
and criminal groups (Kreuzer 2003: 38). Attacks by the AFP increased, officially not against the 
MILF  but  against  criminal  groups,  abductors,  and  terrorists  (ibid.:  38).  The  head  of  the 
government  negotiation  team  was  replaced:  Edgardo  Batenga  broke  with  the  policy  of  his 
predecessor and refused to recognize the MILF camps. A bounty was set on the heads of the 
MILF leaders, accusing them of having taken part in assaults in Manila and other places in the 
Philippines (ibid.: 39).  
  After the death of his godson, First Lieutenant Don Alfonso Javier, who was killed in 
Kauswagan (Lanao del Norte), Estrada “in a fit of rage” declared all-out war on 20 March 2000. 
Around 15 June 2000, the peace talks broke down. In response, the MILF declared “all-out jihad” 
(Jubair 2007: 77). The AFP supported Christian vigilant groups like the Alliance of Christian 
Vigilantes for Muslim-free Mindanao and the Spiritual Soldiers of God. Many violent incidents 
occurred, including torture of civilians. There were about one million refugees; villages were 
destroyed; children were taken out of school; people were forced to sell their capital  goods, 
houses or lands, or to take out loans; and many people suffered from malnutrition. More MILF 
camps came under attack and finally, on 9 July 2000, Camp Abubakar, which was considered by 
the MILF not a military camp but a “Muslim community,” was defeated, which fragmented the 
guerrilla movement.
99 This fragmentation further increased after the death of Hashim Salamat in 
2003 (ICG 2004: 3; Jubair 2007: 81). The victory was celebrated inside the camp by the army 
and the President with alcohol and the national food, roasted pig. Muslims perceived this act as 
an offense against their religion (Reese and Werning 2006).  
  At the end of 2000, the government offered an amnesty for MILF members. Nevertheless, 
before Estrada could find a solution to the conflict in the south, he had to deal with corruption 
accusations, attacks from the opposition, and major protests in Manila. EDSA II
100 was in full 
rage and on 20 January 2001, Estrada was ousted from office and replaced by his Vice-President, 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 
  Like Presidents Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada before her, Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-10) 
                                                 
99 In 2009 the MILF declared that it had actually “abandoned fixed camping since 2001 in favour of highly mobile 
tactics” (Khaled Musa in Sun Star Davao, 3 May 2009).  
100 EDSA II refers to the protests against Estrada which largely took place on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, like the 
earlier protests against Marcos. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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started her term with using peaceful means with the Muslim rebels, following an “all-out peace” 
strategy. For the first time, the government’s peace negotiation team was composed of people 
having Mindanao affiliations (either having been born there or being married to a Mindanaoan), 
and was not headed by a military officer but by a civilian, Jesus Dureza
101 (Cagoco-Guiam 2003: 
6). The negotiations, which under Estrada took place in the Philippines, now again involved OIC 
members, and so the meetings took place in Libya and Malaysia. On 31 March 2001, President 
Arroyo signed RA No.  9054, which  was  an amendment of RA  No. 6734. The act  aimed to 
strengthen  and  expand  the  ARMM.  On  22  June,  the  Agreement  on  Peace  between  the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF was signed in Tripoli. It included an 
agreement on a monitoring team with representatives of the OIC to observe the implementation 
of  all  GRP-MILF  agreements,  MILF-led  development  projects,  and  financial  assistance  to 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). It was also agreed that the issue of ancestral domain had to 
be discussed. Both parties signed the Manual of Local Monitoring Teams (LMT), which also 
provided  for  the  inclusion  of  local  NGOs  (Arguillas  2003:  15)  and  Instructions  for  the 
Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), a committee constituted out of 
MILF and GRP members that was responsible for the observance of human rights in accordance 
with the agreement. 
  On 14 August 2001, a referendum was held in 15 provinces and 13 cities
102 in Mindanao, 
again based on the Tripoli Agreement, after the passage  of the Expanded ARMM Law (RA No. 
9054). The goal was to determine if the four ARMM provinces were in favor of the amendments 
to RA No. 6734 and if the residents of the other provinces wanted to be included in the expanded 
ARMM. Only  the province of  Basilan  (excluding Isabela City, which is part of Region IX,  
Zamboanga Peninsula) and Marawi voted for the inclusion into the autonomous region.  The 
MNLF and MILF boycotted the plebiscite, “claiming it was unfaithful to the provisions of the 
1996 FPA and rendered the autonomous region ‘less autonomous’” (Cagoco-Guiam 2003: 7). 
  On 26 November 2001, the MNLF Governor Nur Misuari, together with his nephew, 
                                                 
101 Dureza’s negotiating team included two women: Emily Marohombsar, who was also a member of the negotiating 
team under Estrada, and Irene Santiago of the MCW; and two government officials: Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin 
Sema (also then Secretary-General of the MNLF Executive Committee) and then ARMM Vice-Governor Mahid 
Mutilan. 
102 The plebiscite was held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, 
Maguindanao,  Palawan,  Sarangani,  South  Cotabato,  Sultan  Kudarat,  Sulu,  Tawi-Tawi,  Zamboanga  del  Norte, 
Zamboanga del Sur, and the newly created Province of Zamboanga Sibugay, and in the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, 
Digos, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Kidapawan, Koronadal, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, Tacurong, and 
Zamboanga. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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started a rebellion in Sulu and Zamboanga City, attacking AFP camps and killing over 50 people. 
He argued that the 1996 FPA had not been implemented by the GRP. The attacks happened during 
the expanded ARMM elections in which Parouk Hussin, a member of the MNLF, and Mahid 
Mutilan from the religious OMPIA Party were elected as Governor and Vice-Governor. Misuari’s 
attacks thus occurred when he was about to lose his governorship and after he had been ousted in 
April 2001 from the MNLF chairmanship by the Council of 15 (among them Parouk Hussin and 
Muslimin Sema, who in succession replaced Misuari as heads of MNLF). After the attacks on the 
camps, Misuari fled to Sabah where Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed ordered his arrest. He 
was extradited to Manila and imprisoned at Santa Rosa detention center, facing rebellion charges. 
While imprisoned he nevertheless ran for Sulu Governor twice (and lost) and supported Arroyo’s 
election in 2004 “in exchange for promises that he would be pardoned and freed” (Jacinto 2008). 
On 25 April 2008, he was given conditional freedom on a bail of PHP 50,000. When freed he 
started peace campaigns in Mindanao, gathered former supporters around him, and fraternized 
with the Sultan of Sulu and Sabah, discussing claims of ancestral domains by the MILF. On 3 
December 2009, a Makati Court ruled that Misuari was not guilty of staging the rebellion in 
2001.  
  After the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, the policy of the Philippine government 
changed and peace talks slowed down. In October 2001, Memorandum Order No. 37 provided 
for an “anti-terrorism policy” stating, “Whereas the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against 
the United States of America brought to the fore of international consciousness the threat of 
terrorism . . .” The government approved 14 measures
103 to be taken “in connection with its 
commitment to cooperate in the international struggle against terrorism.” One month later, on 20 
November, Presidents Macapagal-Arroyo and Bush signed a joint statement reaffirming bilateral 
relations.  Setting  historical  political  developments  aside,  “[b]oth  Presidents  acknowledged 
poverty  as  a  contributing  factor  to  terrorism  and  thus  the  necessity  of  promoting  economic 
growth and development” (Tyner 2005: 73). Trade relations were strengthened after this and 
Arroyo was “rewarded” by Bush by allowing increasing quotas on the US imported textiles and 
                                                 
103 The measures were the following: commitment to preventing and suppressing terrorism in all forms within the 
territorial boundaries of the Philippines; supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the government 
against  terrorism;  intelligence  coordination;  an  internal  focus  on  terrorism;  accountability  of  public  and  private 
corporations and individuals; synchronizing internal efforts within a global outlook; legal measures; promotion of 
Christian and Muslim solidarity; vigilance against terrorists and their supporters, equipment, weapons, and funds; 
contingency plans; comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructure; support of overseas Filipino workers; 
modernization of the AFP and PNP; media support; and political, social, and economic measures.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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by granting huge financial credits to the Philippines for private investments (ibid.: 73). The USA 
also provided USD 30 million for development projects in the southern Philippines, “pending a 
peace agreement” between the MILF and the government (ibid.: 111). The US position of being a 
neutral peacemaker, however, can be debated. In 2002, under the Visiting Forces Agreement 
about 600 U.S. soldiers were sent to the Philippines on a non-combatant mission in order to 
support AFP troops. The government in the same year, with the argument that the MILF had to 
prove its sincerity (Cagoco-Guiam 2003: 8), officially suspended the peace talks. The facts show 
the dual strategy of the USA: on the one hand, it officially supported the peace process between 
the  two  parties;  on  the  other  hand,  it  provided  developmental  and  military  assistance  to  the 
Macapagal-Arroyo government in order to marginalize ASG
104 and JI members (US Department 
of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2008). This policy is explained in the 2008 U.S. Country 
Report on Terrorism, which stated that the Philippines as well as Malaysia and Indonesia are 
forming a “terrorist transit triangle” region. According to that definition, although there are only a 
“few remaining terrorists in the Philippines,” the Sulu Archipelago and central Mindanao are 
considered as “safe haven[s] for terrorists”.
105   
  On 6-7 May 2002, back-channel peace talks started in Malaysia focusing on anti-terrorism 
and criminal strategies and development projects. A Joint Communiqu￩ created the Ad Hoc Joint 
Action  Group  to  isolate  or  interdict  criminal  syndicates  and  kidnap-for-ransom  groups  in 
Mindanao. The government also promised not only to pay for the homecoming of IDPs but also 
to  give  repair  property  that  was  destroyed  in  the  2000  all-out-war.  The  Bangsa  Moro 
Development Agency (BDA)  was  founded  and the officers of the  Bangsamoro  Development 
Council, a civil society organization, were asked to run it (according to the BDA’s homepage). Its 
task was to implement development projects that were partly funded by the World Bank or the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency in the Muslim areas. 
  These positive steps toward a solution of the conflict did not continue. The local Muslim 
                                                 
104 The ASG had links to international terrorists, among others to Ramzi Yousuf, who planned the explosions at the 
New York City World Trade Center in 1993. Together with him they planned to murder Pope John Paul II in a suicide 
attack in Manila on 12 January 1995. Yousuf also planned a suicidal plane crash on the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) compound in Washington. He was accidentally discovered when a fire broke out in his Manila apartment; he 
fled but was later on imprisoned in the USA. Under Yousuf, Abu Sayyaf was sponsored by the Libyan and Syrian 
governments, the Palestinian organization Hamas, and the Lebanese Hezbollah; and by Iranian, Malaysia, Pakistani, 
and Saudi Arabian organizations linked to Osama bin Laden (Yegar 2002: 347). In reaction Ramos started an anti-
terrorist campaign, among others, by talking to the PLO and to the Malaysian and Pakistan governments, demanding 
their support in the fight against terrorism (ibid.: 351). In 2009, its main leaders having died in military encounters in 
2006 and 2007, Abu Sayyaf had approximately 350 members (Mogato 2009). 
105 This formulation can also be found in the 2009 report, under the Obama administration.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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political elites, such as the Ampatuans, in the ARMM, did not favor the MILF, which meant a 
threat  to  their  patronage-posts  in  the  government.  In  addition,  some  Christian  politicians  in 
Mindanao did everything they could to reduce the influence of the MILF, among them North 
Cotabato Governor, Emmanuel Piñol, and Zamboanga City Mayor, Maria Clara Lobregat and her 
successor, her son Celso Lobregat. On 10 February 2003, the government negotiating team, then 
led by Jesus Dureza, presented to House Speaker Jose de Venecia and Senate President Franklin 
Drilon a draft FPA with the MILF that offered “enhanced autonomy” as a political settlement. 
This draft probably would not have been agreed to either by the opponents of the MILF or by the 
MILF  itself.  In  an  interview  with  MindaNews  in  May  2005,  Iqbal  explained  that  the  MILF 
considered four possibilities of governance: federalism, a commonwealth, an association of free 
states, and independence (Arguillas 2007). Autonomy, on the other hand, was not part of their 
agenda. 
  On  11  February  2003,  a  military  campaign,  the  Buliok  offensive  targeting  the  new 
headquarters of the MILF, was launched in North Cotabato by the AFP at Eid al-Fitr, with the 
stated intention of attacking not the MILF but “criminal elements” like the Pentagon kidnap-for-
ransom gang (Jubair 2007: 86; Kreuzer 2003: 46; Santos 2005: 9). MindaNews reported that 
military officials later “admitted the operations were against the MILF” (Arguillas 2009c).
106 The 
attacks outraged the MILF and the military conflict started anew with guerrilla and terror attacks 
resulting in about 100,00 0  refugees, damage  to  the local economy,  and several  civilian  and 
military casualties. Some hardliners, like Congressman Celso Lobregat, wanted to declare the 
MILF  a  terrorist  group,  in  order  to  cut  its  international  financing.  The  Macapagal-Arroyo 
government set a bounty on the heads of leading MILF members, accusing them of responsibility 
for twin bombings in Davao City that killed 38 people and wounded about 200 (Jubair 2007: 85). 
Later,  Defense  Secretary  Joel  Reyes  and  Brigadier  General  Victor  Corpuz,  chief  of  the 
Intelligence  Services  of  the Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines,  were  accused  by  mutineers  of 
having ordered the bombings in Davao themselves. The government then promised to drop the 
charges  against  the  MILF  leaders  (ibid.:  85).  As  with  Estrada  before,  the  government  set 
conditions for restarting the peace-talks that could not be fulfilled by the MILF, including the 
demand that the MILF turn in those people who had been involved in terrorist attacks.  
  In July 2003, Washington voiced its concern that the “rule of law” in the Philippines be 
                                                 
106 NGOs claimed that behind the attacks was the desire to control the 200,000 ha Liguasan Marshes, which are said 
to contain oil and where the MILF has its main camps. Governor Piñol, one of the main opponents of the MILF, was 
the chairman of the Liguasan Marsh Development Council (Kreuzer 2003: 46).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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strengthened since peace process was being postponed and the money that had been designated 
for it was being shifted to other programs (Tyner 2005: 111). Minority leader Aquilino “Nene” 
Pimentel,  Jr.,  in  reaction  to  the  possible  reallocation  of  funds,  demanded  that  Malaysia  be 
replaced with the USA as facilitator for the peace talks. According to Tyner, the Macapagal-
Arroyo government was in a difficult position, as it had to broker a peace settlement but not to 
appear soft on terrorism. The USA never defined the MILF as a terrorist group, although it did so 
with  the  New  People’s  Army  (NPA),  and  the Abu  Sayyaf  and  the  Rajah  Solaiman  groups. 
However,  there  were  reports  that  the  MILF  had  connections  with  the  JI  and  al-Qaeda.
107  In 
addition, Southeast Asia was defined as the “second front” in the “War on Terrorism” in 2003 and 
2004. This  intensified  the  pressure  on  the  Philippines  as  a  member  of  the  “coalition  of  the 
willing”
108 to act against terrorism, not only in Iraq but also on its own soil.  
  At the request of the U.S. State Department, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
was engaged between 2003 and 2007 in facilitating the peace process between the Philippines 
government and the MILF, with funding from the Congress after both the GRP and the MILF 
requested U.S. assistance to end the conflict. The intention was through a peace agreement to 
prevent international terrorist groups from exploiting the conflict in the Philippines. The USIP 
reported that, after the early support of the rebel groups in Mindanao by countries such as Libya 
and Malaysia ended, “the MILF agreed to train JI and al-Qaeda fighters in return for financial 
support and arms. The camps also offered JI and other terrorist elements a sanctuary in which to 
rest  and  hide.  Many  of  the  fighters  married  and  settled  in  Moro  areas,  blending  into  the 
population” (USIP 2008).  
In spite of the USIP’s support, a peace settlement could not be reached because of the 
many difficulties the organization encountered. These included the opposition of the Malaysian 
government to an American presence at the negotiating table, and the suspicion on the part of 
Moros of an infiltration of the MILF by the US government via the USIP. Because the peace 
institute lacked a permanent base in Mindanao, communication with the GRP, the MILF, and 
Philippine  civil  society  was  difficult. The  composition  of  the  government’s  negotiation  team 
                                                 
107 On the debate on the question of the MILF relationship to terrorism and the possible problems involved in not 
distinguishing them from terrorist movements, see ICG (2008, 2008a, 2005, 2004); Klitzsch (2006); and Lucman 
(2008). 
108 The Philippines joined the “coalition of the willing” in March 2003 but withdrew its soldiers from Iraq between 
March and June 2004 because of a kidnapped Filipino truck driver whom the kidnappers threatened to kill. Allies in 
the coalition were outraged about the withdrawal and Filipino politicians feared consequences for development aid 
funding. However, the kidnapped Angelo de la Cruz became a national hero, symbolizing the struggle of over 7 
million overseas workers, about 1.4 million of them in the Middle East.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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changed  frequently  and  the  Moro  leadership  had  divergent  perspectives.  The  USIP  also 
mentioned lukewarm support for an effective peace agreement by senior GRP officials, which 
they said hampered the efforts of the negotiators. Finally, “corruption and criminality among the 
Moros, exacerbated by centuries-old clan loyalties, created other hurdles” (USIP 2008). In 2007, 
the US Congress ended the institute’s funding and thus the project ended without having reached 
an FPA. In 2008 the situation in Mindanao escalated, and the USIP predicted that if the conflict in 
Mindanao returned to violence, terrorist groups, like the ASG or the JI, would likely exploit the 
situation  to  infiltrate  and  destabilize  the  Philippines  (USIP  Special  Report  2008).  The  US 
government did not itself join peace talks and it was only in March 2008 that the US-Ambassador 
to the Philippines for the first time officially met with the MILF leadership. This was a public 
change of strategy, as before the US government would not negotiate with “terrorists,” leaving 
the issue to the USIP. 
  On 13 July 2003, Hashim Salamat died from a heart attack in Butig, Lanao del Sur. The 
MILF hid this from the government but agreed to a ceasefire on 19 July 2003. Shortly afterwards, 
Al-Hadji Murad Ebrahim was elected as new Chairman of the MILF, which was “viewed as a 
‘swing’ to a more pragmatic and ‘lay’ style of Moro leadership . . . contrasted to what seemed to 
be the previous ‘religious’ slant  within the MILF leadership” (Mercado 2008:  242). Military 
skirmishes, even though on a lesser scale that was explained by the presence since 2004 of the 
Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team (IMT), continued on and off and so did the peace 
talks. 
II. The “No War, No Peace” Environment 
A. Theoretical Approach 
1. Definition of Terms 
The  Muslim  regions  in  Mindanao  are  frequently  defined  as  a  “no  war,  no  peace” 
environment
  (see,  e.g.,  MacGinty  2006:  111;  MacGinty,  Muldoon,  and  Ferguson  2007).
109 
According to Dennis Dijkzeul, societies which are defined  as  “no war, no peace ”  can be 
described as being involved in a situation “where  neither positive peace nor full-out war occur 
                                                 
109 In relation to Mindanao, it seems to be more appropriate to use the term in relation to the environment rather than 
the society since not only is the local society involved, but there are local as well as national players involved in the 
creation and maintenance of the local situation.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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but where violent conflict may recur anytime” (2008: 15). He further argues that these societies 
can be characterized by their reproduction of conflict-generating institutions:
110  
As stated, our main research assumption is  that a “no war, no peace”  society 
continuously  reproduces  institutions,  such  as  structures,  formal  organizations, 
informal groupings, and norms and values that generate conflict potential within a 
society, as well as within and among neighboring states. This  reproduction of 
conflict potential undermines democratic transitions, economic development, and 
peacebuilding.  Moreover,  such  reproduction  usually  implies  strong  normative 
disagreements within society, among or within groups, and the social exclusion of 
certain groups. Therefore, the taken-for-granted nature of institutions may erode 
and sometimes informal or weak institutions may become more prevalent. Other 
institutions, for example, ethnic or religious ones may reify. (ibid. 24) 
  The “no war, no peace” situation related to the Mindanao conflict reproduces institutions 
that undermine peace-building. It implies that normative disagreements among or within groups 
lead to a weakening of formal institutions. However, this is only one characteristic trait of the 
situation. Additionally, there are counteracting agents creating structures of peace, democracy, 
and  economic  development.  Several  international,  national,  and  local  NGOs  and  People’s 
Organizations (POs), peace agents, women’s organizations, etc. (see Abubakar 2007) attempt to 
strengthen if not peace then at least the peace process and the ceasefire situation. Demands have 
been  made  to  institutionalize  the  Office  of  the  Presidential  Adviser  on  the  Peace  Process 
(OPAPP) as the “Department of Peace,” and to maintain the ceasefire in the form of peace zones 
and development projects. So far, the MILF itself has signed several peace zone agreements in 
order  not  to  involve  certain  communities  in  violent  conflicts.  It  established  the  Bangsamoro 
Development Agency (BDA), which is responsible for local development, and signed a document 
promising to help the government capture criminals, such as kidnappers, in the area of the MILF. 
In a recent (2009) agreement, the MILF and the AFP committed themselves to providing civilian 
protection and avoiding collateral damages.  
  Government officials are likely to be entangled in war- as well as peace-strengthening 
measures. In 1996, the Ramos government and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement 
(FPA), which called for post-war and development projects in the Muslim areas. On the one hand, 
government officials build peace and development based on the 1996 agreement and take part in 
peace  negotiations  with  the  MILF.  On  the  other  hand,  some  politicians,  mainly  those  from 
                                                 
110 Institutions, according to Dijkzeul (2008), “constrain and enable human action,” for example by providing moral 
or  cognitive  frameworks  for  interpretation  or  action  (pp.  21ff.).  This  can  be  realized  by  formal  (e.g.,  state 
bureaucracies, NGOs) as well as informal institutions (e.g., warlords, patronage). Institutions can be reproduced 
consciously as well as unconsciously.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Mindanao who would lose land area by a final comprehensive agreement or those forming the 
opposition using the Mindanao issue to mobilize against the president, are frequently involved in 
verbal abuse or tactical resistance against peace agreements between the  government and the 
MILF. The military and, in some cases, paramilitary groups are ensnared in violent conflicts with 
rebels and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Sulu Archipelago.  
  It is thus a specific characteristic of the present Mindanao “no war, no peace” situation, 
besides  the  permanent  threat  of  a  new  outbreak  of  violent  conflict  being  initiated  by  the 
government, the army, the MILF, the MNLF, the Abu Sayyaf, local clans, warlords, or criminals, 
to have conflict-, as well as peace-generating institutions. But even though periods of ceasefire 
have lasted for years, for example from 2003 to 2008, thus providing time to strengthen peace-
building mechanisms, an overall environment remains that can be found in situations of war. This 
is described by MacGinty (2006) for similar cases as being characterized by  
inter-group tensions and systematic discrimination against out-groups, widespread 
insecurity arising from the presence of armed groups, grinding poverty with few 
prospects for economic advancement, militarism, poor provision of public goods 
and a profound disconnection between government and people. (p. 2) 
Although, direct violence might be absent for some time, the characteristics of a war environment 
remain  (see  also  Richards  2005:  6).  The  outbreak  of  violent  conflicts  is  then  only  the 
manifestation of the above-mentioned characteristics. MacGinty explains that such “no war, no 
peace” situations might be found following a formal end of conflict in which no positive peace 
has been achieved and also “in cases of stalled peace processes, wherein the antagonists have 
failed to reach a comprehensive peace accord but the peace process and its ceasefire assume 
semi-permanence” (2006: 4). Such a situation brings about one major problem. It might become 
chronic in case the peace process is “more comfortable than war, but this comfort brings with it 
little urgency to push for a far-reaching peace settlement.” MacGinty concludes that, in this case, 
the peace process might become a “comfort zone” (ibid.).  
  In the following section, I discuss how far conflict- as well as peace-building efforts in a 
“no war, no peace” situation are consciously and unconsciously institutionalized and sometimes 
even instrumentalized among concerned groups, and for what reasons. Additionally, I consider 
when the institutionalization of conflicts means that they are automatically reproduced or imply a 
potential for the limitation of violent conflicts, as in the case of the Joint Coordinating Committee 
on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). MacGinty warns that such institutionalization might The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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merely lead to  an  absence of violence but not  to  a positive peace.
111 This is so because an 
agreement might be to the liking of international groups but not much appreciated locally. This 
appeared to be the case after the creation of the ARMM at the beginning of the 1990s  and the 
FPA of 1996, which did not include the MILF in a possible solution. The task is thus not only to 
stop violence but also to create positive peace by solving the root causes of the problem and to 
provide prospects for the future. This in the Mindanao case  is mainly a question of “ancestral 
domain,” governance, and economic development.  
2. De-Embedding and Alternative Structures 
  Christoph Zürcher describes the process leading to the rebellion of an ethnic group as “de-
embedding” (“Entbettung”) (2004: 102). He defines four steps towards a de-embedding. “The 
steps of de-embedding are the loss of the cohesiveness of state institutions, loss of the legitimized 
monopoly on violence, access to necessary resources to organize violence and finally the creation 
of internal coordination within the violence-prone groups.” (ibid.: 105).
112 All four elements can 
be found within the Muslim rebellion starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
  The  Philippines  are  ruled  by  elite  families  who  occupy  the  state  system  and  have 
transformed it into an instrument of multi-dimensional leadership  (Celoza 1997: 22; Kreuzer 
2007:  20). When  applying Weber’s  theory  of  statehood,  one  can  talk  about  an  uncompleted 
monopolization  of  violence,
113  which  is  characterized  not  by  a  lack  of  law  enforcement 
mechanisms but by political elites using state mechanisms for their own purposes. This leads to a 
privatization of the executive, for example in the establishment of private armies (Kreuzer 2007: 
20). In the 1960s and 1970s, those could partly be justified  via the Constitution as Integrated 
Civilian Home Defense Forces (Kraft 2010: 188). Conflicts over land and political influence 
became consequently more violent in Mindanao , fueled by settlement programs and political 
fractionalizations under Marcos’s government.  
                                                 
111  For  a  debate  on  the  notion  of  peace,  see  MacGinty  (2006),  who  defines  peace  as  “the  facilitation  of  non-
exploitive, sustainable and inclusive social relationships free from direct and indirect violence and the threat of such 
violence” (p. 59). 
112 Translation mine. (“Die Schritte der Entbettung sind Verlust der Bindekraft staatlicher Institutionen, Verlust des 
legitimen Gewlatmonopols, Zugang für Gewaltorganisation notwendigen Ressourcen und schließlich Herstellung der 
internen Koordination innerhalb der gewaltbereiten Gruppe.”) 
113 This concept of statehood is among others questioned by Klute (“Beyond the state. Tracing emergent forms of 
power in contemporary Africa”, lecture at the Goethe-University of Frankfurt, 10 June 2010), who supposes that the 
state according to Weber is only one structure among many that opt for a domination of the others.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Muslim Filipinos felt neglected by the central government. After the Jabidah Massacre, 
international help was offered first by Malaysia and later on by Libya. With the assistance of the 
Muslim  royalties  and  international  support  and  funding,  young  educated  Moros  acquired  the 
logistics and a philosophy, which, if it did not unify, at least activated huge numbers of people 
from  the various Muslim  ethnic groups and classes under the umbrella of the demand  for  a 
Bangsamoro  homeland.  This  was  to  be  established  in  the  defense  of  Islam  and  the 
democratization of wealth, providing a possible counterforce to what was perceived as Filipino 
colonialism. The notion of Moro identity, used before only by non-Muslim Filipinos, thus became 
a reality, unifying several Muslim ethnic groups in rebellion. 
  Artur  Bogner  explains  that  the  development  of  homogeneous  ethnic  groups,  through 
violence  with  outside  groups,  becomes  increasingly  possible  through  an  uncompleted 
monopolization  of  legitimized  violence.  He  refers  to  Weber’s  conception  of  statehood  as 
involving  the  “monopoly  on  the  legitimate  use  of  violence,”  but  he  adds  a  “diachronic 
dimension” (“diachronische Dymension”), thus talking more about a process of monopolization 
than about a monopoly as such (Bogner 2004: 65). The incompleteness, he concludes, can lead to 
a situation in which neither the traditional nor the modern institutions are capable of providing a 
feeling of physical security (ibid.), which then can lead to a homogeneous ethnic group filling the 
gap. However, assuming that the Mindanao conflict and the Moro identity were the result of a 
lack of a monopoly on legitimized violence is of limited explanatory utility. The reason why the 
conflict broke out is rather a culmination of various incidents, structures, and historical wrongs, 
as discussed above.
114 In addition, Georg Elwert explains the development of a collective ethnic 
identity primarily as a reaction to ascriptions from outside: “ The self-ascription of a collective 
identity is not an act of free will. It is a reaction of defense, alienation, dependence or adoption of 
ascription” (Elwert 1989: 449).
115 The “Moro” identity was the adoption of an ascription from 
outside and can hardly be understood as homogeneous, but rather is a constructed identity that is 
mainly applied on a transnational but not on the local level. Patricia Horvatich , for example, 
writes that the Samal, a Muslim ethnic g roup from Tawi-Tawi, has  three identities:  they  are 
Samal on a local level, Filipinos on a national level, and Moros on a transnational level (2003). In 
brief, even though the MNLF and the MILF might be the biggest Moro collective groups in the 
Philippines; this does not mean that these groups are homogeneous ethnic groups. Local ethnic 
                                                 
114 For a general approach to causes of conflicts, see MacGinty (2006: 86). 
115 Translation mine. (“Die Selbstzuschreibung von kollektiver Identit￤t ist kein Akt des freien Willens. Sie reagiert 
in Abwehr, Distanzierung, Anlehnung oder ￜbernahme auf Fremdzuschreibungen.”) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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identities  like  “Maranao”  or  “Maguindanao”  remain  of  primary  importance  and  even  these 
become marginal when confronted with clan or family loyalties. The Mindanao conflict thus 
cannot be defined as an ethnic conflict — as it is in several publications (see, e.g., Trijono and 
Djalong 2004) — and the Moro identity cannot be equated with a homogeneous ethnic group. It 
rather was inserted into a process of convergence of interests: a constructed collectivity as a 
vector of a desired national and/or religious identity. 
  The rebellion thus led not to the de-embedding of an ethnic group but to the strengthening 
of oppositional structures, like rebel camps. In addition, state-supported alternatives developed, 
such as sultanate structures. Muslim as well as non-Muslim conflict-prone groups, apart from 
rebels, developed, like warlords who profited from the conflict situation, being involved in illegal 
businesses  like  drugs  or  weapons,  and  landlords  and  politicians  not  wanting  to  lose  their 
advantages. All of them strengthened what Elwerts calls the “markets of violence.”  
3. Markets of Violence 
  The  Muslim  regions  already  were  among  the  poorest  in  the  Philippines  when  the 
Americans  colonized  the  country  (Kreuzer  2003:  16).  The  economic  situation  tremendously 
worsened in comparison to other regions in the Philippines after the declaration of martial law 
and the outbreak of the MNLF rebellion (Rasul 2003: 144a). Every escalation of the conflict in 
the Muslim regions led, under the Marcos regime in the 1970s and 1980s; under Aquino and 
Ramos in the 1990s; under Estrada in 2000; and under Arroyo in 2003, 2007,
116 2008, and 2009, 
to massive evacuations and economic breakdowns. For example, during the “all -out  war” in 
2000, there were about one million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Hundreds of villages had 
been destroyed and more than half of the families in the affected areas took their children out of 
school. About 50% of the population was to sell their means of production, like animals or gears. 
In addition, 21% had to sell their houses and their land and about the same number had to obtain 
credit to be able to survive (Kreuzer 2003). When the latest conflict was over and a ceasefire was 
officially restored, the total number of affected areas between August 2008 and July 2009 was 
about 435 barangays, 51 municipalities, three cities and eleven provinces in Regions X and XII 
and the ARMM. The total number of affected persons having to abandon the area was about 
160,000 families (about 760,000 persons), the majority of which were from the ARMM. There 
                                                 
116 The conflict in 2007 mainly escalated in Sulu as part of the “War on Terror” focusing on the ASG. The MNLF 
became involved after a local family was killed in the course of an operation against “ASG members,  [which] 
resulted in the displacement of up to 85,000 people” (IDMC 19 August 2008). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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were 112 killed and 139 injured from encounters, and 268 dead and 31 injured because of illness 
at the evacuation centers. The highest numbers of deaths from encounters was in Region X (56), 
followed by the ARMM (30). Illness in the evacuation centers caused the highest number of 
deaths in the ARMM (225), followed by Region XII (25). About 4,000 houses were damaged and 
the cost of damaged properties was about PHP 250 million
 (approximately EUR 4 million).
117 
The total cost of assistance ext ended to IDPs in Mindanao was over PHP 370 million.  The 
majority of that money was distributed by the government and specifically by the Department of 
Social Welfare and Development. NGOs, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), 
and the UN system provided about 16% of the money. According to the Social Weather Station, 
self-reported poverty rose by 17 percentage points in Mindanao, from 45% in February to 62% in 
June 2009 (nationwide it rose by three points to 50%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 2: Cumulative Total Persons Affected by the Mindanao Conflict, 10 August 2008–7 July 2009 
Source: National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), Sitrep No. 86, 14 July 2009. 
 
  Since  the  conflict  escalations  with  their  negative  consequences  for  the  economy  are 
frequent, parallel businesses are prospering, like illegal logging; trafficking in drugs, women, and 
children; kidnapping for ransom; bank robbery; smuggling; piracy; and the arms trade (Santos 
2005:  17).  The  long-lasting  conflict  has  thus  developed  a  group  with  “pro-war  interests,” 
                                                 
117 Of the total damage, about PHP 100 million was to infrastructure and PHP 150 million agricultural. 
ARMM 
435619 
58% 
Region X 
161063 
21% 
Region XII 
159872 
21% The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
106 
including criminal elements, warlords but also “big landlords and agro-corporations, who feel 
threatened by all the peace talk about ancestral domain, agrarian-related issues, and land rights” 
(ibid.: 18).  
  Elwert (1999) defines structures in which profit is made out of a conflict situation as 
markets of violence. “These markets of violence exhibit a self-stabilized structure and owe their 
reproduction to a profit-oriented economic system which combines violence and trade as a means 
of access to commodities” (p. 85). Markets of violence prosper when “alternative income sectors 
come  under  pressure  and  for  the  most  part  lose  their  opportunities  for  reproduction  with 
workforce  and  capital  being  absorbed  by  the  —  relatively  —  higher  wages  and  profit 
opportunities in the violent market sector” (ibid.: 94). Kidnappings, for instance, are rampant in 
Mindanao. From June 2008 to November 2008, more than ten people, including a local television 
crew, were kidnapped in the southern Philippines; most were released after a ransom was paid. In 
Lanao del Sur, from January 2008 to June 2010, about 15 kidnappings were reported. Four were 
faculty members of MSU, three businessmen, six employees, one a foreign Muslim educator, and 
one a son of a Maranao poll commissioner. The victims were Filipino Christians, except one 
Korean and one Yemini, and just two Maranaos.  
  In some cases, people are kidnapped to put pressure on the person who is supposed to 
protect them, maybe to enforce an employment agreement, as for example in the case of the new 
MSU President. On June 26, 2008 Sherwin Nacua of the Biology Department of MSU in Marawi 
City was abducted for several weeks. Nacua, along with other faculty and students, was aboard a 
jeepney going home to Iligan City when armed men in Saguiaran, 15 minutes from the MSU 
Campus, stopped the car. Nacua was brought in a vehicle “towards Piagapo town, where an 
MILF camp holds base” (Gutoc 2008). The kidnappers were reportedly discontented employees 
of MSU who had been removed by the new administration of MSU President Macapado A. 
Muslim, installed in January 2008. Five groups tried to negotiate for the release of the kidnap 
victim. MSU put together an emergency team and a Crisis Management Committee headed by 
Provincial  Governor  Mamintal Adiong  was  founded. Additionally,  the  following  groups  and 
persons were involved in the negotiations: a local government unit of Piagapo, Marawi Mayor 
Fahad Salic, and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group of the military and MILF. Details about the 
ransom were not given since politicians feared the same fate as Mayor Alvarez Isnaji from Sulu 
and his son, who had been imprisoned and accused of masterminding a kidnapping of a television 
crew when actually they were helping in the negotiations. The accusation against Isnaji, who The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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planned to run for ARMM governor in the 2008 elections under the banner of the MNLF, was 
proven wrong 22 months later (Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 7, 2008).  
  In other cases, students might express their discontent over failed exams. One week after 
Nacua’s abduction, another faculty member, Lolita Rodriguez, was kidnapped, supposedly by 
“disgruntled students who had failing marks.” She was released days later. Another reason for 
kidnappings  is  to  put  pressure  on  a  certain  person.  In  2010,  the  son  of  a  Maranao  poll 
commissioner was abducted and the kidnappers demanded the nullification of election results in 
certain  areas  of  Lanao  del  Sur.  The  victim  was  later  on  freed,  though  the  results  were  not 
changed.  Kidnapping for ransom is  another major reason,  sometimes  to  pay  for  an electoral 
campaign, Ramadan expenses, car damage, or a debt for which the one being kidnapped or one of 
his relatives or patrons is held responsible. On 29 March 2010, a Korean businessperson and 
mining  investor  interested  in  chromite  potentials  in  Butuan  City  and  Ditsaan-Ramain,  and  a 
Filipino were kidnapped. Both were released after 56 days in captivity “due to a concerted effort 
of negotiations by tribal leaders, LGUs [local government units], the police and the military” 
(Gutoc 2008). On 16 October 2008, unidentified gunmen snatched a budget officer of MSU and 
brought him to the camp of a rogue MILF field commander. He was freed four days later thanks 
to the negotiations of a mayor. In July 2009, five employees of the Vicmar Logging Concession 
were kidnapped in Kapai. In October, a Filipino architect was abducted by kidnappers disguised 
as police officers who flagged down a passenger van, again on the Iligan-Marawi highway in 
Saguiaran. One month later, a trader who had debts in the area was kidnapped on the same 
highway. In January 2010 a Yemeni educator and member of the World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth was abducted by armed men in police uniforms in the parking place of the guest house of 
the Markaz al Sabab Bil Philippines in Marawi City. And on June 10, 2010, a Maranao Marawi 
University professor was abducted and freed three days later. He was kidnapped after his wife 
refused to pay the damage to the kidnapper-to-be’s vehicle. The gas station attendant had refilled 
it with diesel, instead of regular gasoline.  
  Abductions  are  resolved  with  the  help  of  local  datus,  the  MILF,  politicians,  and  the 
military. In all the cases described above, victims were unharmed when released. Carnapping and 
carabaonapping are also frequent. It used to be the datus of the area who were involved in tracing 
the culprits and negotiating with them. Usually a token amount was given for the return of the 
item. Today this money covers “the miscellaneous expenses” (Madale 1996: 121) incurred by the 
kidnappers.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Foreign  aid  money  to  the  Muslim  regions  is  another  source  of  profit  from  the  war 
situation. In an interview with an NGO in Marawi City, the participants complained that there are 
NGOs that are actually founded by the ARMM LGUs. There are no checks or balances and 
money from foreign donors can be used for political purposes, for example elections. For 2008, it 
was reported that the official development assistance (ODA) to the Philippines was about USD 9 
billion (59% of ODA projects went to Luzon, 30% to Mindanao, and 11% to the Visayas). The 
bulk of the development funds involved infrastructures in mining areas in Luzon, paving the way 
for the entry of big companies. Further, Aids Watch Mindanao reports that the majority of the 
ODA funds that went to conflict areas is linked with the MNLF and the MILF. Areas in Mindanao 
involved in conflicts with the NPA, or in ridos, are neglected. Aids Watch Mindanao thus asked 
foreign donors to comply with their commitment in the Paris Declaration of 2 March 2005 to 
make  aid  more  effective  by  involving  recipient  communities  in  decision-making  and 
implementation of the aid. 
  Refugees of the combat between the MILF and the AFP constitute another possible source 
of income since they obtain their food in Marawi during their stay (Abreu 2002) and are thus 
susceptible to corruption that entails their having to pay for it. As a member of a local NGO 
stated: 
After the 2000 all-out war there were about 150,000 refugees who were crowded 
here [in Marawi City]. There is a building here, which was crowded by refugees. 
And another group near my place. And it took more than one year to relocate 
them. And they really suffered under very distressful conditions. Because of the 
lack of support services from the provincial government . . . Even if there is help 
it goes to the wrong people. Even rice and medicine are not given to the people. 
But it ends up in places where it is sold. And even blankets. Even the relief goods 
coming from Saudi Arabia, it ended up in the markets, not in the hands of the 
refugees. So there is too much corruption in the distribution of the relief goods to 
the refugees. This is something that must be corrected and only the NGOs can do 
that. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
  Drug pushing became rampant in Lanao del Sur. Reports from the organization Narcotics 
Command  have  said  that  Marawi  ranked  number  two  in  drug  addiction  cases  throughout 
Mindanao in 2009 and grabbed the top seat in 2010. According to Disoma (1999), Marawi City 
ranked third in the number of drug addicts in the Philippines in 1990 (p. 161). Because of the rule 
of silence, it is rather difficult to break down criminal syndicates. This rule is  similar to the 
omertà  code  of  the  Italian  Mafia
118. Locally it is more likely explained by the concept of 
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maratabat, which includes a prohibition on a clan member speaking ill of another clan member. 
Those living from the markets of violence are usually well-armed and in some cases they become 
governmental officials based on their income, making it difficult to accuse them because of their 
positions.  
4. Community Ceasefires: Peace Zones 
  Besides  conflict-prone  groups,  there  are  also  actors  strengthening  structures  of  non-
violence in the form of cease-fire zones, or peace zones. Peace zones in the Philippines developed 
in 1988 and “must be understood within the context of the People Power movement that brought 
down Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship by peaceful means” (Avruch and Jose 2007: 51). When the 
peace talks between the newly installed Aquino government and the NPA broke down, peace 
organizations  like  the  Coalition  for  Peace,  an  umbrella  organization  of  more  than  fifty 
organizations based in all regions of the Philippines, changed their strategy. Instead of pushing 
the  peace  process  through  negotiations,  they  encouraged  initiatives  that  would  immediately 
relieve involved  communities from  the pressure of armed  conflict. The outcome was  that in 
southern  Luzon,  in  the  Bicol  area,  Naga  City  was  declared  a  Zone  of  Peace,  Freedom,  and 
Neutrality by the local non-governmental coalition Hearts of Peace. Shortly after that, other peace 
zones developed not only in Luzon but also, since 2000, in Central Mindanao. Communities that 
did not want to wait for the government to make peace organized the zones (Rood 2005: 24).  
   Not only have NGOs used the notion of peace zones, government officials have used it 
also. In 1992, the Aquino government declared children as “Zones of Peace” (Art. 10, RA No. 
7610: the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). 
The declared goal was to resolve armed conflicts in considering children as zones of peace — 
they thus should not be the object of an attack, are entitled to special respect, and should not be 
recruited  into  armed  groups.  The  delivery  of  basic  social  services  like  health  and  education 
should be unhampered and children are to be “protected from any form of threat, assault, torture 
or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.” NGOs since then have repeatedly reported 
violations of this act, for example in the context of children being involved in civilian volunteer 
organizations (CVOs) that are being used as private armies in Maguindanao under the leadership 
of powerful datus (see Camacho, Puzon, and Ortiga 2005). The situation is complex: on the one 
hand,  in  2008  the  MILF  was  accused  of  using  child  soldiers  (Coalition  to  Stop  the  Use  of 
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Childsoldiers  2008).  The  AFP  on  the  other  hand  was  charged  by  the  Davao  Children’s 
Rehabilitation Center with justifying the killing of children via aerial bombings in Datu Piang in 
September 2008 by defining them as child soldiers.  
  The Ramos government financially supported “bottom-up”
119 peace zones. Whereas the 
funding strengthened some communities, it had the opposite effect than intended on others. Thus 
in communities that were only loosely structured, the governmental support led to the instability 
of the community because of local rivalries, the waste of money, and the fear that the NPA might 
understand this funding as an effort by the government to win over the communities (Avruch and 
Jose 2007). The notion of  peace zone was also applied in the 1996 FPA, which declared 14 
provinces and nine cities S pecial Zones for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). In addition, 
Estrada  employed the term and declared main camps of the MILF as peace zones, which 
nevertheless were attacked in the 2000 all-out war. Avruch and Jose add that during this war the 
Estrada government declared areas taken over by the AFP after combat with the MILF as peace 
zones; they were thus “pacified.” As a reaction to such governmental efforts other notions, like 
“space for peace” and “peace pact,” were developed on the grassroots level (see Iyer 2004: 12; 
Neumann  2009:  24;  Rodil  2003:  183).  These  different  notions  also  partly  define  different 
approaches. Thus “sanctuaries for peace” are those areas that do not provide for any AFP or 
MILF presence (camps, foot patrols, etc.), whereas “spaces for peace” do not involve such a 
demand. In 2005, the majority of these protected areas in Mindanao were in the second category 
(Avruch and Jose 2007: 5). The basic idea of peace zones being organized by communities, 
however, remained the same: an area where no violent conflict occurs.  
  The all-our war under Estrada let to a second wave (2000-2004) of peace zones in which 
about 82 zones were created, the majority of them in Mindanao (ibid.: 54). For example, the 
community of Kapatagan in Lanao del Sur was defined as a peace zone after it was devastated by 
the all-out war, apparently because the inhabitants were believed to be supporters of the MILF. A 
project pushed by local leaders resulted in the signing of a security agreement by LGUs, the 
military, the MILF, and peace advocates. In addition, a local committee was established to settle 
ridos. The national and local governments, and local and international organizations, helped to 
provide infrastructures like roads and buildings, livelihood, gender programs, and basic services 
—  “projects  that  were  sorely  lacking  in  this  former  no  man’s  land”  (Uy  2008).  Mrs.  Raida 
Maglangit, mayor (2001-2010) of the predominantly Maranao Muslim Kapatagan, under whose 
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administration the project was implemented, commented that it was difficult at first for the people 
to put their guns aside and keep the peace. “But when they saw that many investments were 
coming in nobody complained anymore” (ibid.). Certainly, one cannot take such an affirmation 
for a confirmation and further research has to show how the peace zones concept worked out in 
Kapatagan.  
  Peace  zones  such  as  the  one  in  Kapatagan  or  the  ones  in  Barangay  Nalapaan,  Pikit, 
Cotabato (a Peace Zone since 2001, see Neumann 2009, and Rodil 2003: 187), a barangay which 
comprises a mixed population of Muslims, Christians, and Lumads, became possible through the 
involvement  of  several  different  organizations,  the  church,  and  local  leaders  establishing 
connections to the AFP and the MILF. Peace zones are usually accompanied by economic and 
gender development programs being initiated by local and international NGOs. One characteristic 
which was identified by Iyer in his research on several peace zones is that the barangay officials 
were given “a lot of power” by the community in order to settle conflicts, including the power to 
sanction violations of the peace (Iyer 2004: 37). Elite structures were consequently strengthened. 
  Rodil (2003), writing on the Maladeg peace zone in Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, 
explains that ridos were the main reason for creating a peace zone in this area, which nevertheless 
did not carry this name when it was founded in 1978. The inhabitants created a committee to 
solve their local conflicts. In the barangay, the Council of Elders and the committee prohibited 
and controlled armed conflicts, gambling, the use of drugs, and any form of criminality. In case a 
conflict breaks out, they mediate and, unlike traditional mediators, they do not demand 30% of 
the settlement sum (p. 199).
120  
  Nevertheless, the sanctions for breaking the peace in the zones which have so far been 
reported have been applied in times of ceasefire or concern the settlement of ridos or other local 
conflicts. In case of a full outbreak of war, the peace zones can again be involved. In 2003, when 
the headquarters of the  MILF in  Buliok were attacked, a community  that  was  a peace zone 
became involved in the conflict and relief had to be given to IDPs rather than support long-lasting 
peace-building (Rood 2005: 26). Another case was the one of Kauswagan in Lanao del Norte, the 
site of countless incidents between the MILF and the AFP as well as attacks on the Christian 
population  by  the  MILF.  In  2001,  Christian  and  Muslim  leaders  gathered  and  formed  an 
organization (Pakigdait) that adopted a five-year peace-building program for the municipalities of 
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Kauswagan,  including  a  “Week  of  Peace,”  consisting  of  inter-religious  dialogue  involving 
women and youth and local officials. However, there was not any agreement with the MILF or 
the AFP. On 18 August 2008, Commander Bravo, member of the MILF, attacked Kauswagan and 
nearby Christian communities, resulting in many dead and injured.  
  Hannah  Neumann  presented  at  the  International  Sociological  Association  Forum  of 
Sociology in Barcelona, on 5-8 September 2008, a paper which argued that “[i]f we can train 
people for war, we can train them for peace,” referring to the communication theory of Jürgen 
Habermas  as  a  theoretical  basis  for  creating  peace  (see  also  Neumann  2009).  Since 
communication has helped to establish peace zones and thus to settle inter-religious and inter-
ethnic conflicts, it has to be considered if these special areas are to be regarded as sufficient for 
solving  the  Mindanao  conflict  and  creating  a  “positive  peace.”  The  Mindanao  problem  is  a 
political one and not, in the first place, a problem of ethnicity or religion. Frequent events like 
summits or weeks of peace involving different ethnic groups and religions, especially since 2000, 
are  one  example  of  the  possible  strengthening  of  the  culture  of  peace  and  inter-religious 
understanding  on  the  grassroots  level.  For  example,  a  Summit  of  Peace  was  celebrated  in 
September 2008, in Iligan City, shortly after mass demonstrations, initiated by, among others, the 
mayor,  against  the  Memorandum  of Agreement  on Ancestral  Domains  (MOA-AD)  and  the 
attacks by lost commands (sub-commands that act without the official orders of the MILF head 
command) of the MILF on villages in Lanao del Norte. Christian and Muslim politicians from 
Lanao gathered and the mayor of Iligan City, Lawrence Lluch Cruz, announced that MILF stands 
for  “Marawi  Iligan  and  Lanao  Friendship.”  Peace  zones,  summits,  conferences,  and  inter-
religious dialogues are valuable in providing a platform for the further establishment of peace in 
the  area.  However,  without  a  Comprehensive  Peace Agreement  and  thus  a  political  solution 
between the government and the MILF, no satisfying solution can be achieved. The main effect of 
the establishment of community-built peace zones, which Soliman Santos defines as community 
ceasefire agreements (2005a), is the institutionalization of the “no war, no peace” situation in 
form of ceasefires.  
5. Case Study: MSU Marawi 
  One example of the interrelations between the local and the national levels of conflict is 
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educational institution. Marawi is the site of the main campus among seven autonomous MSU 
campuses all over Mindanao. When it was founded in 1961 (RA No. 1387) it had the  
unique mandate to  address  three challenges  — quality education for academic 
excellence,  preservation  of  the  cultural  heritage  of  Mindanao,  and  responsive 
peace education for Mindanao and the country. It is the only University directly 
charged by the government to advance the cause of national unity and actively 
pursue integration through quality education. (MSU, Annual Report, 2007) 
These goals are still unrealized. Quality education, for example, is difficult to achieve, as for 
instance  books  are  lacking.  Receiving  money  for  the  university  depends  on  the  so-called 
“political clout” of the university president. Dr. Emily Marohombsar, the former President of 
MSU Marawi (1993-1999), describes the dependence of the MSU President on Manila: 
You have also to have political clout. Because you get your budget from Manila 
from the national government, and then you go to the Congress to defend your 
budget. The congressmen and the senators. If you do not have connections there 
you  will  have  difficulties.  You  have  to  defend  your  project  and  justify  it. 
(Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
   
Beside political connections to Manila, local connections are also important for the president to 
run the university effectively. Thus, it is an advantage if the president comes from an influential 
family and clan. Marohombsar’s father had been governor and a military man and her husband 
had  been  vice-governor,  a  congressman,  and  a  commissioner.  With  this  background, 
Marohombsar could introduce entrance exams at MSU against the protest of influential parents, 
to elevate educational standards: 
But so many people did not like this [entrance exams]. So many politicians came 
to me, so many important people in Mindanao came to me, they said why are we 
not admitted, this is a government institution, you cannot turn down our children. 
So I have to explain to them very well the purpose of the program. Because of the 
respect for me, so they accepted the program. (ibid.) 
 
Family and clan influence also help to protect the teachers at MSU: 
 
Emily Marohombsar: There is an incident I would like to tell. During my time. Some 
teachers were so scared of failing students, because whenever the students failed, 
especially the Muslims students, they threatened the teachers, and they tell them: 
you give me five [referring to an F grade] and I give you forty-five [referring to a 
handgun]. The faculty members get so scared. There was a student and he said to 
the teacher I have security force, search for security training! And I was told that 
he threatened Miss so-and-so and so I said, what will happen to people like you, if 
we allow you to graduate in the university when you go out and practice your 
profession you will be a very corrupt official, you will be just like, you will be 
[promoting terror, changing votes]. And we do not want this kind of students. We 
do not train you for this. I said. Do not think that when you kill this teacher that I The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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cannot find you. You cannot hide anywhere in this place. We will find you. And so 
he was so scared. I am advising you stopping to threaten this teacher and enroll in 
this subject again. He did and after his graduation he came to me and said: Ma'am, 
I want to apologize I believe in what you told me and now I have graduated and at 
least I have learned something. And I tell the teachers, after you gave the grades, 
you can leave the campus immediately, if there is any student complaining send 
them to me. I will answer them.  
Birte Brecht: Did you ever feel scared about this?  
EM: No. It is just a matter of having the guts. Because when people realize that you 
mean business . . . (ibid.) 
Regarding  the  peace  and  order  situation,  not  only  family  and  clan  connections  but  also 
connections to the military and paramilitary sector are advantageous. Thus, Marohombsar could 
resolve kidnapping incidents at the university: 
You know, we would like to go out and share what we have in the university with 
the people in the communities. But sometimes it is really difficult to penetrate the 
communities because of the peace and order. There were times, I think twice, 
when our faculty of the university was kidnapped . . . I was in Manila when that 
happened and I called up my chief security. “Did you know already? Did you 
discover  who  kidnapped  them?”  He  said:  “Yes.”  And  I  said:  “Give  them  an 
ultimatum, give them 24 hours to return the people kidnapped, or we are going 
there and we are going to get their families.” When I arrived they were already 
released. (ibid.)  
Marohombsar said the government was regarded as an “employment agency,” with the MSU 
President needing to have the ability to turn people down. In a society in which there is little 
social security, a high rate of unemployment and poverty, where the family and the clan are the 
ones to rely on, and where it is the maratabat of a well-to-do clan member to take care of the 
other clan members,
121 it is risky to turn down someone who is requesting help. If a request is 
turned down, feelings can be hurt and there can be revenge.  
Birte Brecht: Why did they kidnap? They wanted to have money?  
Emily Marohombsar: Money, and I also think positions.  
BB: Jobs?  
EM:  Didn’t  you  know  that  the  people  think  we  are  an  employment  agency  of  the 
government? And that people think that we have so much money for employment 
so everyone wants to get to be appointed as security guard, as . . . Even though 
they are not qualified. That is one problem that usually faces the president of the 
university. How to accommodate people who want to be employed. How to turn 
them down. If you turn them down then they may give you problems.  
BB: You turn them down and then they kidnap?  
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EM: That is right. Or they threaten to burn buildings.  
BB: Did you have a lot of security?  
EM: . . . I had a very good one. At that time we did not have very many soldiers at the 
campus. Right now there are very many soldiers at the campus. But at that time, 
no. We depended on our security, which was very good. And then I have also 
people in the university who are influential in different parts of the province.  
BB: So they could protect you.  
EM: Oh yes. (ibid.) 
  Presidential attributes like political clout, support of an influential clan or family, and 
military influence have an impact on the financial, educational, and peace and order situation at 
MSU Marawi. They can also be misused in order to serve the political agenda of a president, or if 
the  president  doesn’t  have  these  qualities,  the  peace  and  order  situation  can  become  quite 
difficult. In 2005, Arroyo ignored the list of nominees for the MSU presidency and picked an 
interim president. Ricardo De Leon, a Christian and retired general, had to “clean [up] the mess 
in the institution” (Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), September 13, 2005) 
concerning “squatters, firearms, drugs, and officials occupying portions of the MSU compound” 
(Bucay 2009). Being a former police general, De Leon used the threat of arms and his contacts in 
Manila to bring back peace and order to the university. And even though he was welcomed with 
protests, and the fear of a militarization of the campus, De Leon, visiting the campus for the first 
time with the support of the Philippine marines, succeeded to maintaining his position and in 
“cleaning up” the campus. No kidnappings were reported during his time at MSU and the faculty 
named him “Daddy Pres,” appreciating that he had no political agenda.  
  The President of the Philippines appoints the President of MSU. This means that there is a 
ranked list of nominees for the presidency of MSU, chosen by a Malacañang (Office of the 
President of the Philippines)-authorized search committee, and the final decision belongs to the 
head of state. Of former university presidents, it had been reported that they politicized their 
employees in order to stay in office. De Leon did not do such a thing, being an acting president. 
That his presidency was quite peaceful can be further traced back to the following facts. Firstly, 
his contacts with the Philippine President’s office helped in raising funds for projects at MSU. 
Secondly, because of his connections to the military, people did not dare to challenge him, even 
though there were criticisms that he discriminated against Muslims and that, being a general, he 
did not have the academic credentials needed for the presidency of a university. Thirdly, he is not 
a  Maranao,  which  means  there  are  no  relatives  demanding  that  he  should  care  for  them  by The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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providing them with jobs, and he does not feel responsible for helping non-relatives to share his 
advantages.  
  The  peace  and  order  situation  in  MSU  Marawi  is  difficult;  violence  and  markets  of 
violence are all over the place and traditional social structures and thus pressures are strong, in 
large part since there are few alternatives. Leadership of the educational sector is not an exception 
to political influences, since the presidency of the university is chosen in Manila. The installation 
of a Christian police  general  as  interim  university  president  to  bring peace and order to  the 
campus in a Muslim-dominated area was a radical decision by the president of the Republic of 
the Philippines. In any case, it gave fuel to rumors of a cultural colonization policy and Maranao 
suspicions about the real purposes of the national government. 
B. Why the Situation Remains: The Failure and Success of Peace Talks 
There  have  always  been  two  options  while  the  problem 
remains unresolved: the peace process or war.   
—Mohagher Iqbal in Gomez 2010 
1. Ceasefire or War: The Importance of Peace Talks 
  In this section the Muslim areas in Mindanao, particularly Lanao del Sur, will be shown to 
be characterized by a “no war, no peace” situation that frequently manifests itself as one of war. 
Since  the  1970s,  the  region  has  often  been  defined  as  a  conflict  environment,  a  broad 
characterization usually understood to mean violent conflict. The advantage of describing the 
region instead as a “no war, no peace” environment is that the situations before and after violent 
conflicts as well as peace-building initiatives are included in the analysis. Furthermore, according 
to Dijkzeul, “no war, no peace” societies develop their own dynamics and characteristics and are 
hence “social phenomena in their own right” (2008: 17). Moreover, Heike Schmidt also writes 
that, in order to understand violence, one has to investigate the times when there is neither war 
nor  peace,  “because  it  is  here  that  sense  is  being  made  of  memories,  experiences,  and  the 
perceived threat of violence” (1999: 225).  
  In Lanao, violent conflict occurs on two levels. On the national level, it signifies the 
Muslim rebellion. Whereas the conflict officially started at the beginning of the 1970s, the “no 
war, no peace” situation in Mindanao is the result of a back-and-forth between peace negotiations 
in  times  of  ceasefire  and  war  since  1975  when  the  peace  negotiations  between  the  Marcos 
government and the MNLF started. On the local level, conflicts might result in a family or clan The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
117 
feud, a rido. Ridos break out when the maratabat or honor of a person, family, or clan is spoiled 
and neither family nor clan can be pacified by other means. A rido may be interrupted and ended 
by conflict-settlement initiatives. It may also linger for many years until it erupts again. Families 
involved into a rido, especially in times of ongoing negotiations after a murder case, are engaged 
in a “no war, no peace” situation with the adverse family. There might be certain areas the family 
members cannot transgress: they might not be able to go to work or send their children to school, 
and in case the settlement does not work out a violent conflict can break out anytime. 
  While Ridos can nevertheless ideally be settled via institutionalized measures with the 
help of mediators, the national conflict on the other hand has been lingering for more than 30 
years and instead of a common solution being found, the ceasefire environment has merely been 
strengthened. Family feuds and the Moro rebellion are different conflicts, and the one cannot be 
explained by the other, but the two levels of conflict sometimes have similar sources — for 
example, land conflicts — and they influence each other in some respects, which will be shown 
below.  
Within the “no war, no peace” situation being connected to the national conflict, some 
places are less directly affected and some more affected by violent conflicts. However, it can 
generally be said that the whole Muslim region is affected, although this may only be through 
economic consequences and the markets of violence. There are special zones of peace and there 
are  also  other places  that  are not  officially declared as  such  but  that  will only be  randomly 
included in direct combats. Marawi City is mainly protected from direct clashes (Abreu 2000: 9), 
even though there have been incidents and the rebellion in the 1970s had its starting point on 
MSU campus. Marawi nevertheless has to deal with the consequences of combat: the increased 
presence of the military; checkpoints; red alerts; IDPs; and injured and killed relatives. The area 
hence has thus for many years been involved in a “no war, no peace” situation. This means 
largely the absence of positive peace because of the development of structures that define a war 
environment even though direct combat is absent.  
  The figure below shows major combat zones — mainly between the MILF and the AFP, 
but  also  between the MNLF or the Abu Sayyaf  Group  and the AFP (especially in  Sulu  and 
Basilan) — from August 2008 until August 2009. The ARMM regions, except Tawi-Tawi, are all 
integrated  into  the  combat.  Major  hotspots  include  Maguindanao  and  Basilan,  and  also 
northwestern Lanao del Sur and western Jolo. Outside of the ARMM the combat areas include 
North  Cotabato,  northern  and  southern  Lanao  del  Norte,  western  Sarangani,  Sultan  Kudarat, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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South Cotabato, and the outskirts of Zamboanga City. The incidents between the MILF and the 
AFP occurring outside of the ARMM occurred in most of the cases in areas that are claimed by 
the MILF as part of their ancestral domain.  
 
 
Map 5: Map of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Hotspots of the Conflict between the AFP and the MILF 
and between the AFP and the ASG from August 2008-August 2009 
The map is based on newspaper articles and information provided by the NDCC. The number of encounters is not 
accounted for. Handmade map by the author; proportions do not entirely correspond with reality. 
 
  The explanation for the “no war, no peace” situation since 2000 has lain with the national 
context. This period saw more times of ceasefire between the MILF and the GRP than actual 
combat,  but  a  positive  peace  was  never  achieved. As  the  chart  below,  representing  conflict-
induced displacement in the Philippines from 2000 to 2009, shows, there are times when the 
clashes have been more frequent and times when they are few or almost absent: the former are 
the  times  of  failed  peace  talks  and  the  “War  on  Terror”;  the  latter  are  the  times  of  peace 
negotiations and monitored ceasefires. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 3: Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Mindanao from 2000 to 2009 
IDPs  include  those  from  ridos  or  clashes  between  MILF/NPA/ASG  and AFP  as  well  as  natural  disasters.  The 
numbers of IDPs represented in this chart are nevertheless mainly the consequence of clashes between the MILF and 
the AFP in 2000, 2003, and 2008-09. The high number of IDPs in 2007 can be traced back to an increased “War on 
Terror”  against  the ASG  in  Sulu.  Source:  International  Displacement  Monitoring  Centre  (IDMC)  and  National 
Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). 
 
 
Graphic 4: Number of Violent Incidents between the AFP and the MILF from January 2002 to September 
2008 
Source: CCCH. 
 
 
  In 2000, the peace negotiations collapsed completely and turned into an all-out war under 
President  Estrada,  resulting  in  about  one  million  IDPs  in  Mindanao  and  Sulu  (International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, IDMC). Peace talks were resumed under President Arroyo but 
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soon the global “War on Terror” was used as an excuse to launch new attacks on the MILF, which 
was believed to be connected to terrorist groups like the ASG and JI. In 2003, when a new peace 
agreement  should  have  been  signed,  there  was  a  major  attack  by  the  army  on  the  new 
headquarters of the MILF. Guerrilla fights broke out again, resulting in about 400,000 refugees 
(Kreuzer 2003). After that, a new ceasefire was agreed upon by the GRP and the MILF and the 
peace talks were resumed, having been interrupted by the “War on Terror” and minor clashes. 
The ceasefire officially lasted until August 2008 and was re-established in July 2009. Santos, 
referring to the all-out war under Estrada in 2000 and the Buliok offensive under Arroyo in 2003, 
noted that violent conflicts interrupted the peace process “just when negotiations were nearing 
discussions of substantive issues . . . As a consequence of these, the complexion and even some 
substantive agenda items changed” (Santos 2005a: 5). The same can be said about the 2008 
outbreak of war.  
  Under Estrada, the consent that had been given to recognize rebel camps was withdrawn 
and clashes started anew. Officially, however, it was claimed that the attacks were aimed against 
criminals and terrorists. They were encouraged by pressures resulting from reports connecting the 
MILF  with  terrorist  groups.  In  2003,  under  this  pretense,  government  troops  attacked  MILF 
posts,  one  day  after  an  agreement  draft  was  presented  to  the  House  speaker  and  the  Senate 
president. The incident in 2008 was the outcome of frustration on the part of the rebels about the 
non-signing of an important agreement (MOA-AD). The interventions of 2000 and 2008 seem to 
be  similar:  in  both  cases  consent  for  recognizing  the  rebels  was  given  by  the  governmental 
negotiation panel, which was concerned with substantive agreements. It was withdrawn through 
the intervention of other government officials and had to be re-negotiated after a violent conflict. 
While the 2003 incident followed the same structure, it can additionally be seen as an outcome of 
the “War on Terror.”  
  Violent conflicts on a larger scale are the result of failed or stalled peace talks, showing 
their importance. This importance partly let to a focus on the continuation of such talks and on 
maintaining the ceasefire. The establishment of development groups and projects, the Ad Hoc 
Action Group to catch criminals, the ceasefire committee, and the IMT were all designed to 
institutionalize the ceasefire rather than to find an agreement. These developments, as positive as 
they might be in comparison to a looming war, thus only succeeded in institutionalizing the “no 
war, no peace” situation as the lesser evil.  
   The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
121 
2. Looming Conflict 
  In this section, I demonstrate the importance of peace talks and the consequences of their 
failure by discussing the incidents resulting in the 2008 outbreak of war. After four years of 
ceasefire in December 2007, peace talks stalled when the MILF accused Manila of reneging on 
its earlier commitment to grant the demanded ancestral domain. The governmental negotiation 
team insisted that this could solely be done through constitutional processes. This suggestion was 
not accepted by the MILF because the Philippine Constitution prohibits the dismembering of the 
country. They likely rejected the “extended ARMM” offered by the GRP because the autonomous 
region  is  judged as  inefficient in  meeting  the basic needs  of the  Bangsamoro people and as 
worsening the already depressed conditions. Instead, the rebels opted for a Bangsamoro Juridical 
Entity (BJE) of which the ARMM would be a part, with areas outside the region to vote on 
inclusion through a referendum (4 May 2008). The government, ignoring such wishes, organized 
a legal group in order to study the agreement-draft, setting its constitutionality as a non-debatable 
condition. 
  In response, the Malaysian mediator Othman Abdul Razak said that peace talks were not 
moving due to the lack of political will on the part of the GRP. In addition, he demanded that it 
stop insisting that an agreement conform to the Constitution. Filipino government officials asked 
for the replacement of the Malaysian mediator on the negotiation panel after this statement. Since 
the government did not move, on May 10, 2008 Malaysia withdrew the first contingent of the 
group heading the IMT to supervise the ceasefire in Mindanao. The MILF stated that this was the 
consequence of the violation of the IMT’s Terms of Reference (TOR),
122 on which basis the team 
can withdraw in case there is lack of support  for its reports. The government did not respond to 
these accusations but instead requested that Libya should assume the IMT leadership. The rebels 
then blamed the government for having no interest in the peace talks but only in the ceasefire. 
However, Malaysia was not replaced: since the TOR stipulated Malaysia as head of the 60 -men 
IMT, it could not be replaced unless the TOR was amended, which could only happen when both 
peace panels resumed their talks. Civil society groups urged the two parties to go back to the 
                                                 
122 According to IMT-TOR Article 8, Sections 2 and 3, the IMT might cease or suspend the performance of  its 
functions, with due notice to the GRP and MILF Peace Panels, in the event that: (Section 2) either the GRP or the 
MILF fails to fulfill its commitments and responsibilities to the peace process; or (Section 3) there is lack of support 
from  either  the  GRP  or  the  MILF  for  any  of  its  reports. According  to  the  MILF,  the  government  delayed  the 
resumptions  “in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  GRP  and  MILF  peace  panels  have  practically  agreed  on  the  draft 
memorandum of agreement (MOA) on ancestral domain, as early as February 22, this year.” And it violated Section 
3 “for deliberately ignoring the call of the Malaysian facilitator to resume the talks immediately as everything is 
already settled regarding the ancestral domain agenda” (Bompat 2008). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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negotiating table. Senate Minority Leader Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel,
123 with the support of 15 
other senators, authored in April 2008 Joint Congressional Resolution No. 10, proposing a federal 
system of government of which Bangsamoro would have been one state.  The Constitution thus 
would be amended (a charter change, popularly known as cha-cha) in order to create a federal 
system; the resolution was still pending as of August 2011. However, the MILF had already 
agreed  in  January  2008  to  the  idea  of  a  federal  state,  but  insisted  that  the  changing  of  the 
Constitution was an internal affair of the government for which the MILF did not want to be 
instrumentalized (in order to extend Arroyo's term) (Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao 
Wee 2008).  
  On 25 April 2008, Nur Misuari was freed on bail and MNLF leaders met in unification 
talks  in  Tripoli,  brokered  by  the  Libyan  leader  al-Gaddafi  and  his  son  Saif Al-Islam. Also 
participating  at  this  meeting  was  Presidential Adviser  Jesus  Dureza. A  follow-up  joint  press 
statement appreciated among other things the initiative of the government in its plan to establish a 
federal system. It was urged to involve the MNLF in this development. The next day the Arroyo 
government appointed retired General Hermogenes Esperon as presidential adviser on the peace 
process. That led to an outcry among civil society groups and Amina Rasul of the Philippine 
Council on Islam and Democracy (PCID), which accused Arroyo of having appointed a “military 
hawk,”  a  peace  adviser  who  was  more  acquainted  with  war  than  with  peace. Among  MILF 
leaders, a governmental document signed by a brigadier general of the AFP on 3 April 2008 was 
discussed.  In  the  document,  about  one  billion  pesos  were  demanded,  “in  view  of  the  crisis 
situation that may develop in Mindanao and the uncertain conditions of Airmunition and Artillery 
Ammunition  currently  in  the  AFP  inventory,  may  we  request  the  [Department  of  National 
Defense] to conduct emergency procurement.” (Jalandoni 2008) The MILF accused the GRP of 
provoking an outbreak of the conflict. On the other hand, rumors circulated in January among 
Maranaos that the MILF had threatened the government with a revival of the conflict in case it 
would not end its refusal to discuss the constitutionality of the peace agreement. Both parties thus 
prepared for a possible war.  
  On 24 May 2008, according to the MNLF, about 50,000 supporters gathered in Davao for 
a Peace Summit with Nur Misuari as key speaker. Other speakers included the Sultan of Sulu, 
making the Sabah question an issue, with the support of Nur Misuari. The present (2010) Sultan 
of Sulu and Sabah, Muhammad Fuad Abdulla Kiram I, is in favor of a Sabah independence 
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movement and claims the area as part of his sultanate. He accuses Malaysia of having illegally 
occupied Sabah since 1963 when the British left and not returning it to the sultan, and he has 
further declared
124 that the sultanate’s historical domains comprise the Zamboanga Peninsula 
(Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, and Zamboanga City) as well 
as Basilan, Palawan, Sabah, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. In his speech as Guest of Honor at the MNLF 
40
th Year Foundation and Bangsamoro Freedom Day Celebration on 18 May 2008 the Sultan of 
Sulu stated: 
We welcome the possibility of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the 
Philippines signing a peace agreement, but we must not agree and not allow that in 
any peace  agreement between the two, that the Sultanate of Sulu & Sabah be 
promised as area of jurisdiction of the MILF, as the Sultanate of Sulu & Sabah is 
the land of the Tausugs, the Samals, the Badjaos and other indigenous traditional 
peoples but not the members of the MILF who are from Central Mindanao far 
away  from  Sulu,  Basilan,  Tawi-Tawi,  Zamboanga,  Palawan  and  Sabah. 
(Homepage of the Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah 2008) 
  The mutual agreement of the sultanate and the MNLF against claims from the MILF may 
be  the  outcome  of  a  divide-and-rule  policy  by  the  government  against  the  MILF.  Both  the 
division of Moro groups and the Sabah claim have the potential to make the peace process more 
complicated especially since the Sabah issue remains a source of potential conflict between the 
Philippines and Malaysia, which has facilitated the GRP-MILF peace process since 2001. The 
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral  Domain (MOA-AD) refers to the sultanates in the 
times before the Moros became a minority in its declaration of them being a “first nation” of the 
Philippines.
125 However, the MILF does not sympathize with a revival of the sultanates. On 18 
September 2008, Marines confiscated the Sulu sultanates’ flags that had been displayed in several 
barangays  since  March.  The  MILF  Central  Committee  on  Information’s  official  website 
commented on this by quoting an anonymous person saying:  
Better for them [the Sulu royal houses] to support the cause of the Bangsamoro 
people for freedom and right to self-determination now led by the MILF than by 
                                                 
124 Agreement of Recognition and Declaration of Support between Sultan Muhammad Fuad Abdulla Kiram I and the 
MNLF, signed on 15 January 2008. 
125 According to the MOA-AD, under “Concepts and Principles,” “Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-
governance of the Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain 
authority  of  their  sultanates  and  the  Pat  a  Pangampong  ku  Ranaw.  The  Moro  sultanates  were  states  or 
karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of nation-state in the modern sense. As a 
domestic community distinct from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic homeland. They 
are the “First Nation” with defined territory and a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and 
commerce with foreign nations. The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro 
homeland as a territorial space is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights and resources 
as well as to establish a system of governance suitable and acceptable to them as a distinct dominant people.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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asserting  and  reviving  the  grandeur  of  the  sultanate  in  this  21
st  century.  This 
century is the age of democracy and Islam, which draw their right to rule not on 
one man or monarchy but from the people, in the case of the former, and man, as 
representative (khalifah) of Allah, in the case of the latter. (18 September 2008) 
  Military skirmishes erupted in Basilan between the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf and the 
AFP. On 31 May 2008, eleven cities in Mindanao were plunged into darkness following an attack 
on  the  National  Power  Cooperation  (NPC)  towers  in  Lanao.  Rumors  were  heard  that  rebels 
wanted to make the government bleed financially, adding to the record energy and rice prices at 
this time and, as a result, to make it more responsive to political demands. Members of the MILF 
also calculated how much the transfer of military equipment and soldiers to places under alert 
cost the government. On 8 June, bandits, who were assumed to be from the Abu Sayyaf Group in 
Sulu, kidnapped an ABS-CBN
126 crew; it was freed several months later. The incident led to 
violent clashes with the MILF, which was accused of involvement in the kidnappings. 
  On 14 June, the Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference (BSC) was formally approved by 
leaders of the MNLF, headed by Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin Sema, and members of the 
MILF, headed by Al-Hadji Murad Ebrahim. The BSC functions as a coordinating body between 
the two groups and others who wish to join. It agreed that unity was paramount in the search for a 
genuine solution to the Mindanao conflict. Apparently, the group was founded as a reaction to the 
“divide and rule” tactic assumed by the government in freeing Misuari. The major component 
groups  were  identified  on  the  MILF  Central  Committee  on  Information’s  official  website  as 
MILF, MNLF-Nur Misuari, and the MNLF-Committee of 15 headed by Muslimin Sema, as well 
as traditional politicians. Nur Misuari was not present at this meeting.  
  On 18 June, the National Security Council approved the final draft of the agreement on 
the  ancestral  domain  issue.  Six  days  later  President  Arroyo  met  President  Bush,  who 
congratulated her on her “carrot and stick” counterterrorism-approach: “‘sticks’, of course, say 
we’re not going to allow for people to terrorize our citizens; the ‘carrot’ approach is that there's 
peace available” (Bush 2008). About 500 to 600 members of the American military are stationed 
at  present  (2010)  in  Mindanao;  they  have  been  there  since  2002  under  the  Visiting  Forces 
Agreement as part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P). Their task 
is to “support the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their 
fight  against terrorism in the southern Philippines” (JSOTF-P Fact Sheet 1 April 2009). The 
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headquarters of the recruits are located at Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City.
127 They have a 
strictly non-combatant role because of the abrogation of the US-GRP military bases agreement in 
1991.  Additionally,  the  US  government  increased  its  involvement  by  supporting  American 
civilian agencies in the Philippines. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Navy Admiral Mike 
Mullen stated that these agencies were important assets in the effort to combat terrorism and 
asked the Congress for more financial support in 2008. USAID had spent until then USD 50 to 60 
million a  year in  the country, with  60%  going to  Mindanao, including  10%  for  military aid 
(Garamone  2008).  The  US  Congress  followed  this  strategy  and  even  increased  its  Grant 
Assistance to the Philippines in 2010 under the Obama government.
128  
  The  MILF  Central  Committee  on  Information  website  indicates  that  the  question  of 
development  aid  was  debated.  Khaled  Musa,  deputy  chairman  of  the  MILF  committee  on 
information, said that it would be a failure to use development to undermine the Bangsamoro 
movement  since  “the  problem  is  not  about  poverty  or  economic  but  political  [and]  can  be 
addressed only by political solution.” On the other hand, the rebels did not categorically reject the 
presence of American troops, nor did they join protests against common exercises of AFP and US 
soldiers (the Balikatan exercises).
129 They only pronounced their concerns about possible human 
rights violations based on incidents involving US soldiers in the Philippines (especially the 
accusations in 2006 that a US marine raped a Filipina at the former US Subic Bay Naval base) in 
                                                 
127 Additionally, there are three subordinate regional task forces, for Camp Navarro in Zamboanga del Sur Province 
named Archipelago, Camp Siongco in Maguindanao Province named Mindanao, and Camp Bautista, Jolo Island in 
Sulu Province named Sulu. 
128  Specifically,  the  combined  Development Assistance  and  Economic  Support  Fund  was  increased  to  USD  70 
million  in  Fiscal  Year  2010  from  USD  60  million  previously.  Of  the  whole  amount  of  USD  135  million  of 
development and security assistance which was approved by the U.S. Congress as a grant to the Philippines for the 
fiscal  year  2010,  two-thirds  were  “devoted  to  Mindanao for  livelihood,  basic  services,  and  reintegration  of  ex-
combatants” (Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, 17 December 2009).  
129 Under the motto “U.S. Troops Out Now! Junk Visiting Forces Agreement!” in February 2008, various civil 
society groups protested in February 2008 against R.P.-U.S. Balikatan exercises. The ARMM issued Resolution No. 
353, adopted on 5 February 2008, “Expressing the Objection of the Regional Assembly to the Holding of Balikatan 
Whether Military, Medical or Civilian Exercises in the Province of Lanao del Sur and the Islamic City of Marawi.” 
The City Council of Marawi urged in Resolution No. 112 in January 2008 “that the President of the Republic refrain 
from participating in the Balikatan exercise in Marawi”. Their reason was that it would have negative effects on the 
peace-loving citizens, igniting their desire “for the enhancement of gambling, [prostitution], alcoholism which is 
totally prohibited in the entire Province of Lanao del Sur and the Islamic City of Marawi.” Members of the Ranao 
Crescent against Balikatan Exercises led protests against the arrival of US soldiers in Marawi City, accusing them of 
being  a  threat  to  the  ongoing  peace  process  in  provoking  unpleasant  memories  of  the  Bayang  massacre  under 
colonial rule. The MILF announced in February 2008 that it would coordinate its activities with NGOs on questions 
in connection to human rights violations, and wrote a letter to the government demanding that it guarantee the 
protection of rights of the Muslims and indigenous people during the training. It nevertheless did not oppose the 
arrival of US troops categorically, as long as their activities were not directed against the Bangsamoro people. Some 
datus accompanied US soldiers on medical missions in Lanao del Sur, meeting thankful Muslim farmers who named 
their children after Barack Obama. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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connection  to  them.  Mohagher  Iqbal,  chair  of  the  MILF  peace-negotiation  panel,  warned  in 
August  2009  that  the  MILF  would  not  take  issue  with  the  American  military  presence  in 
Mindanao as long as the military’s activities were not directed against the Bangsamoro people. 
The line of this argumentation is based on a 16 June 2003 response from US Assistant Secretary 
of State James Kelley to a 20 January 2003 letter from MILF chair Salamat Hashim, who called 
on the US to help solve the Mindanao conflict.
130 The US would support a  bona fide peace 
process (Santos 2005: 25) and ask the US Institute of Peace (USIP) to encourage the negotiation 
process (ibid 2005a: 99). 
  On 25 June 2008, the Philippine Cabinet agreed to include about 600 Muslim-populated 
villages  in  the  homeland  proposed  in  the  MOA-AD.  This  number  was  half  the  total  being 
demanded  by  the  MILF.  Nevertheless,  the  600  villages  were  contiguous  and  not  scattered 
throughout Mindanao and parts of Luzon. The inclusion was linked to a plebiscite. While the 
peace talks were not officially resumed, the governmental draft was forwarded to the MILF. That 
same day MILF fighters launched attacks in Maitum, Sarangani, and North Cotabato province, 
leading  to  about  3,000  IDPs.  The  barangay  chair  of  Maguling  in  Sarangani  reported  to 
MindaNews that the rebels “passed through to us their demand for the President to give them a 
separate  state.  They  also  complained  about  the  rocketing  prices  of  rice,  fuel  and  basic 
commodities”  (Elusfa  2008:  5).  Several  newspaper  articles  stated  that  the  MILF  commander 
legitimized the attacks “out of frustration over the slow progress of the talks” (Arguillas 2008c). 
Through its chairman Murad Ebrahim, the MILF, however, explained that the group’s leaders did 
not sanction the attacks.  
  Peace rallies to urge the government and the MILF to resume negotiations and to sign the 
MOA-AD  were  organized  for  28  June  2008  by  the  Moro  umbrella  organization  Mindanao 
Alliance for Peace. Some Christian NGOs, popular organizations, and peace advocates expressed 
their willingness to join these events. Demonstrations took place in Basilan, Cotabato, Davao, 
General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Pagalungan, Pikit, and Tacurong, and are estimated to 
have  included  between  100,000  and  300,000  people.  Not  all  politicians  supported  the  peace 
                                                 
130 Hashim Salamat wrote two letters to President Bush. In his letter from 20 January 2003, he explained that the 
MILF demanded decolonization under the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 1514 (15) of 1960. As he detailed, 
already under American colonial rule, Muslims had appealed to the US government for the lands to remain as a 
territory under a US protectorate rather than to become part a Filipino state. And had it not been for the outbreak of 
the Pacific War, “the Moro nation would have been granted trust territory status like any of the Pacific Islands states 
who are now independent or in free association with the United States of America . . . For this purpose, we are 
amenable to inviting and giving  you the opportunity to assist in resolving this predicament of the Bangsamoro 
People.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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movement. Zamboanga City Mayor Celso Lobregat rejected an application for a permit to hold a 
peace rally in this city. That same day anti-tank rockets severely damaged a power generating 
plant in Sultan Kudarat; the costs were estimated to be about PHP 3,4 million. Four days after 
they  received  the  government's  proposal,  the  MILF  answered  with  a  counter-proposal  in 
multiple-choice form to hasten the process. Still, the peace talks did not resume and regional 
army chief Major General Reymundo Ferrer said that the armed forces had recorded more than 
ten  violent  incidents  by  the  MILF  in  June.  Eid  Kabalu,  MILF  Civil-Military Affairs  Chief, 
admitted that commanders and military leaders who were not necessarily connected to the MILF 
were involved in these clashes and acted out of frustration with the peace talks. At the same time, 
he stressed that the leadership did not approve of the offensives. On 8 July, government troops 
were  placed  on  high  alert  in  Mindanao  due  to  intelligence  reports  that  the  MILF  planned  a 
military offensive against the AFP. The MILF, on the other hand, accused the AFP of having 
broken the ceasefire by having moved troops without proper coordination with the rebels. One 
day  later  an  informal  emergency  meeting  took  place,  called  by  Malaysian  IMTs,  to  diffuse 
tensions between the two parties. Military chief General Alexander Yano said there had been a 
spike in the number of violent incidents; 40 skirmishes had been recorded from 1 May to 30 June.  
  The  North  Cotabato  Provincial  Board  passed  a  resolution  urging  citizens  to  mobilize 
village guards as part of their defense against MILF incursions. Civil society groups feared the 
mushrooming of vigilant groups, and on 15 July the Regional Peace and Order Council of Region 
XII  received  three  proposals  advanced  by  Vice-Governor  Emmanuel  Piñol,  Aleosan  Mayor 
Loreto Cabaya, and Midsayap Mayor Manuel Rabara that would allow LGUs of North Cotabato 
towns to arm civilians. The proposals came as a reaction to recent skirmishes in the area. The 
MILF’s lead negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, already in 2007
131 described Piñol and Zamboanga City 
Mayor Celso Lobregat as “warlord politicians” who had immigrated to Mindanao and had anti-
Moro aspirations (International Contact Group (ICG) 2008). Two days later, the GRP and the 
MILF met  in  Malaysia to  discuss  the word “freedom” in  the MOA-AD, which, as  the GRP 
feared, might be interpreted as meaning independence and thus as unconstitutional. The MILF 
suggested  replacing  the  word  with  “self-determination”  or  with  “full  measure  of  rights  and 
freedoms.”
132 The two sides agreed, saying that the MOA-AD does “address the aspirations of 
                                                 
131 In his book The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (2007 Cotabato City: Institute of 
Bangsamoro Studies). Published under the pseudonym Alah Jubair. 
132 According to MILF Vice-Chair Ghadzali Jaafar, the MILF in agreeing had to sign a ceasefire agreement, and, 
negotiating for a political settlement with the Philippine government, in effect dropped its secessionist goal (Espejo The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the  Bangsamoro  people.”  Government  peace  negotiators  additionally  proposed  to  amend  the 
Constitution to change the current system of government to federalism; this would allow the 
MILF to have a separate state. Another meeting was planned on 25
 July to sign the draft of the 
MOA-AD. At the urging of the MILF to postpone ARMM elections since the officials are elected 
for three years (which might conflict with a signed peace deal), Arroyo said she would support 
the suspension of ARMM elections after an agreement of the peace panels. That declaration gave 
the  opposition  the  possibility  of  accusing  the  government  of  trying  to  postpone  the ARMM 
elections and change the Constitution in order for Arroyo to extend her term. 
  On 21 July, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Board) of North Cotabato passed a 
resolution opposing the inclusion into the Moro territory. Four days later the peace talks collapsed 
after the government re-opened discussions about the date of the plebiscite in connection with the 
inclusion of non-ARMM villages into the BJE. The government wanted to conduct a plebiscite in 
the  predominantly  Moro  villages  (categorized  as  A  in  the  MOA-AD)  to  be  held  after  the 
Comprehensive Compact had been signed, not six months after the signing of the MOA-AD. On 
27 June, an agreement was reached (that the plebiscite would be held a year after the signing of 
the MOA-AD). A Joint Communiqu￩ was signed; the MOA-AD was initialed and it was decided 
to meet again on 5 August to sign it. High officials were invited for this event, among them US 
Ambassador Kristie Kenney. Both parties also agreed to complete in the following 15 months the 
negotiations on the Comprehensive Compact, the final version of the peace agreement of which 
the MOA-AD was only one framework agreement. Thus, the issue of political settlement would 
be negotiated after the MOA signing, as well as the future of former MILF combatants.  
  On 2 August, officials from North Cotabato (represented by Governor Jesus Sacdalan and 
Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol), and Zamboanga City (represented by Mayor Celso Lobregat 
and Representatives Isabelle Climaco and Eric Fabian) asked the Supreme Court to block the 
signing of the agreement between the GRP and the MILF.
133 Sultan Kiram I of Sulu stated that 
the government should not give away land that belonged to his ancestral domain. Likewise, Datu 
Albi Julkarnain, chair of the Council of Royal Datus, argued that the MOA-AD would “encroach 
on  areas  under  the  sultanate,”  while  the  Cotabato  City  Citizens’  Movement  for  a  Federal 
Philippines warned that the signing of the MOA-AD would lead to war. In Manila, the United 
                                                                                                                                                              
2008). 
133 For North Cotabato, about 30% of its total number of barangays were listed in category A and about 48% in 
category B. Six percent of the barangays from Zamboanga City, more specifically those on Sacol Island, were listed 
in category A and 40% in category B.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Opposition  asked  the  government  to  await  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  (Philippine  Daily 
Inquirer, 4 August  2008). Finally, the  Supreme  Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 
(TRO) against the signing. Protests against the accord demanding the exclusion of some areas of 
the province from the proposed BJE were held in Iligan City, Isulan (Sultan Kudarat), Kidapawan 
(North Cotabato), and Zamboanga City. On 14 August, the governors of Mindanao gathered to 
sign a Statement of Solidarity of the Caucus of Mindanao and Palawan governors. The Statement 
declared that the governors supported the peace process and were against any violence.  
However, the Statement also demanded that the GRP Peace Panel and the MILF adopt 
actions and decisions concerning the MOA-AD within the legal framework and the rule of law, 
and make them the foundation for subsequent agreements. Further, the GRP Peace Panel was 
expected to conduct wider and more comprehensive consultations with LGUs to help resolve 
issues that would affect the peace process in Mindanao. Fifteen governors from the 27 Mindanao 
provinces  signed  the  Statement  after  a  closed-door  caucus  with  Defense  Secretary  Gilberto 
Teodoro,  the  former  military  officers  Hermogenes  Esperon  and  Rodolfo  Garcia,  and  former 
Presidential Adviser on Political Affairs Gabby Claudio.
134 
  Iligan  City  officials  and  eight  of  its  barangay  captains  presented  a  petition  seeking 
exclusion from the BJE. According to the petitioners, Muslims in those eight Iligan barangays 
that were included in Category A in the MOA-AD
135 constitute a minority of the population. The 
barangays’ combined land area is about 66,500 ha or 82% of the total land area of Iligan. These 
are  also  the  city’s  main  agricultural,  mineral,  and  watershed  areas. According  to  “historical 
evidence”, Higaonons living in the eight barangays never came under Bangsamoro suzerainty 
because of pacts they forged with Muslim sultans that implied that they were treated as coequals. 
City Mayor Lawrence Lluch Cruz, Representative Vicente Belmonte of the 1
st District of Lanao 
del Norte and Iligan, and the eight captains of the concerned barangays signed the petition. 
                                                 
134 The signatories were: (1) Governor Mamintal “Bombit” Alonto Adiong – Lanao del Sur; (2) Governor Erlpe John 
Amante – Agusan del Norte; (3) Governor Jum Akbar – Basilan; (4) Governor Aurora Cerilles – Zamboanga del Sur; 
(5) Governor Douglas Cagas – Davao del Sur; (6) Governor Miguel Dominguez – Sarangani; (7) Governor George 
Hofer – Zamboanga Sibugay; (8) Governor Oscar Moreno – Misamis Oriental; (9) Governor Loreto Leo Ocampos – 
Misamis Occidental; (10) Governor Maria Valentina Plaza – Agusan del Sur; (11) Governor Jurdin Jesus Romualdo – 
Camiguin;  (12)  Governor  Abdusakur  Tan  –  Sulu;  (13)  Governor  Rolando  Yebes  –  Zamboanga  del  Norte; 
(14) Governor Joel Reyes – Palawan; (15) Vice-Governor Elvis dela Merced – Dinagat Island; (16) Vice-Governor 
Norris  Babiera  –  Misamis  Oriental;  (17)  Governor  Mohammad  Khalid  Dimaporo  –  Lanao  del  Norte; 
(18) Congressman “Bobby” Dimaporo – Lanao del Norte; (19) Governor Jesus Sacdalan – North Cotabato. The 
Sultan Kudarat governor, Esmael “Toto” Magundadatu, was not present but pronounced his discontent  with the 
inclusion of almost the entire area of Sultan Kudarat into the MOA-AD.  
135 Namely Digkilaan, Dulag, Hindang, Kalilangan, Lanipao, Mainit, Panorogana, and Rogongo. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Map 6: MOA-AD, Map of Annexes A and B: Lanao del Norte 
Handmade map by the author; proportions do not entirely correspond with reality. 
 
  Shortly  after  the  TRO  the  President’s  spokesman,  Jesus  Dureza,  still  pronounced 
optimism  about  the  signing  of  the  MOA-AD.  The  opposition  in  Manila  on  the  other  hand 
engaged in polemics against the MOA-AD. Makati Representative Teodoro Locsin for example 
said that a Bangsamoro state would be “bereft of respect for civil and human rights” since it was 
not included into the framework of the Constitution. “Indeed,” Locsin said about the BJE, “it 
shall  possess  absolute  powers  without  any  prohibition  against  the  discrimination,  abuse  and 
enslavement of women which happens in some Muslim states.” He ignored the fact that the 
MOA-AD specifically refers in its TOR to RA No. 8371 (otherwise known as the Indigenous 
Peoples  Rights Act  of  1997),  the  UN  Declaration  of  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples,  the  UN 
Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, international humanitarian law, and internationally 
recognized human rights instruments as bases of the agreement. Frustrated, so-called “lost” or 
“rough commands” of the MILF meanwhile lost faith in the peace process and attacked Christian 
villages; this was answered by AFP counterattacks. The situation of violent conflict lasted for 
about one year and led to about 700,000 IDPs and 400 deaths. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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3. The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) 
  The  MOA-AD  is  the  result  of  eleven  years  of  negotiation  (from  January  1997  to 
September 2008) between the government of the Philippines and the MILF. It is based on the 
Agreement on Peace signed by the two parties in Tripoli in 2001, which defined three clusters of 
issues to be negotiated: (1) security, (2) humanitarian aid and development, and (3) the “ancestral 
domain,” the territory to be included in the BJE. In order to reach the first goal the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) formed an IMT
136 in Mindanao “to facilitate and negotiate [the] 
peace process between the GRP and the MILF, more importantly in monitoring both parties ’ 
adherence to ceasefire agreements” (House Resolution (HR) No. 578, 12 May 2008). The IMT, 
headed 70% by Malaysians, was quite successful. Under its supervision from 2004 onwards, 
military clashes decreased considerably from “one thousand two hundred fifty-seven (1,257) in 
the span of two years alone (2002-2003) to only forty-six (46) from 2004 to 2008” (ibid.)
137 
However, with stalled peace talks in December 2007 and the final breakdown of the talks in 
September 2008, the IMT left the Philippines in November 2008. Until then  it  continued to 
monitor those areas where there were no operations against the  (according to the  military) 
“recalcitrant”  MILF  commanders Abdullah  Macapaar   (Commander  Bravo),  Ustadz  Ameril 
Umbra Kato, and Alim Solaiman Pangalian (Arguillas 2008).  
  In  order  to  put  into  practice  the  second  goal,  the  MILF  created  the  Bangsamoro 
Development Agency (BDA).  Implementing the third goal of the Tripoli Agreement  was the 
biggest challenge and the MOA-AD was to be the result. It contains five sections. In the first part 
(Terms of Reference) it lists the main documents it is referring to. In the second part (Concepts 
and Principles) it explains whom the BJE is designed to include, stating that this is not only 
Moros, but that it is the birthright of “all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves 
and be accepted as Bangsamoros.” Furthermore it explains why the Bangsamoros have a right to 
self-governance and how the ancestral domain is to be defined. The third part (Territory) sets 
                                                 
136 With a membership of about 60 people, the IMT has its headquarters in Cotabato City while its five Team Sites 
are located in the cities of Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan, and Zamboanga. The IMT’s jurisdiction covers 
14 of Mindanao’s 21 provinces. Members of the Malaysian Defense Forces have been in Mindanao since 2004 to 
lead the monitoring team, composed of 41 officers from the Malaysian Defense Forces, the Royal Malaysia Police, 
and the Prime Minister’s Department. It is also supported by ten military officers from Brunei Darussalam and five 
from Libya. Canada and Japan also have members on the IMT.  
137 The head of the governmental CCCH reported that from a height of 698 incidents in 2002, the number went down 
to 569 in 2003 even as a war was being fought in the Buliok area and neighbouring towns. In 2004, the year the 
Malaysian-led IMT came, the number went down to 16; was down to 10 in 2005; up to 13 in 2006; down to eight in 
2007; and then back up to 128 in 2008 (Arguillas 2008a). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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limits  to  the  territory,  which  covers  parts  of  the  Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan  geographic  region. 
“[T]he core of the BJE shall constitute the present geographic area of the ARMM, including those 
municipalities
138 in the province of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during 
the 2001 plebiscite.” Beside this core area, 737 Muslim-majority villages, identified as Category 
A, had the chance to opt in through a plebiscite held within twelve months after the signing of the 
agreement. Category B included 1,459 “Special Intervention Areas” that would be “the subject of 
special socio-economic and cultural affirmative action implemented by the Central government” 
for 25 years, after which another plebiscite would be conducted to “determine the question of 
their accession to the BJE.” The International Crisis Group adds that “[t]he category B areas 
included some of the most resource-rich land in Mindanao” (ICG 2008). The MILF reduced its 
main territorial claims to cover only the areas where the Bangsamoro are dominant, and all non-
ARMM residents have the option to vote against their inclusion into the BJE. 
  The forth part of the MOA-AD discusses how resources and all “royalties, bonuses, taxes, 
charges, custom duties or imposts on natural resources and mineral resources” in the homeland 
should be split between the BJE and the central government “on a percentage ratio of 75:25 in 
favor of the BJE”. The last point, governance, settles the details of how the BJE  was to be 
governed and is left to a final Comprehensive Compact. It is stated that the relationship between 
the BJE and the central government should be “associative.” This notion later on led the Supreme 
Court to judge the MOA-AD unconstitutional, because it could establish an independent state. 
The International Contact Group (ICG) reports that a government negotiator explained that the 
MILF saw the BJE as “akin to a state in a federal system. For them, the use in the MOA of the 
term ‘central government’ was clear acknowledgment that the BJE was part of a larger whole, not 
a co-equal policy” (ibid. 2008). 
                                                 
138 Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan, and Tangkal.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Map 7: MOA-AD, Map of Annexes A and B 
Handmade map by the author; proportions do not entirely correspond with reality. 
 
On 14 October 2008, the Supreme Court, voting 8-7, declared that the MOA-AD was 
“contrary to law and the Constitution.” Two main reasons were given: first, the “failure to consult 
the LGUs or communities constituted”; second, that the respondents “exceeded their authority by 
the  mere  act  of  guaranteeing  amendments  to  the  Constitution”  (Supreme  Court,  14  October 
2008). Regarding the first point, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he contents of the MOA-
AD are matters of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order . . . at 
least three pertinent laws justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant 
matters relating to the peace agenda.” Concerning the second point, the Supreme Court explained 
that the MOA-AD was unconstitutional since it envisioned an associative relationship between 
the GRP and the BJE; “the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies 
that the same is on its way to independence.” Thus, the MOA-AD would require changing the 
Constitution.  The  MOA-AD  “virtually  guarantees  that  the  necessary  amendments  to  the 
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the 
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to 
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress” (ibid.). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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4. Subsiding War and Stabilization of the “No War, No Peace” Environment 
  After  the  failure  of  the  MOA-AD,  “MILF  lost  commands”  under  Commander  Kato 
occupied Christian villages in North Cotabato. Combat then broke out between the AFP and the 
MILF,  involving  aerial  bombings.  Several  people  died  and  thousands  fled  the  area.  A  big 
contingent of soldiers was sent to Mindanao among other place to secure the ARMM elections, 
which took  place on  11 August 2008.  On 27  May, the MILF released an official statement, 
reiterating  its  consistent  policy  of  non-recognition  of  and  non-participation  in  any  election 
undertaken under the Philippine government and Constitution. On Election Day, rebels occupied 
the town hall of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan, to prevent the election from taking place. Apart from this 
incident, elections were generally peaceful. However, the following period was marked by further 
clashes. Commander Bravo led an attack on Christian villages in the north of Lanao del Norte on 
18 August 2008.
139 He was accused of plunder and terroriz ing the population, raiding towns, 
spraying gunfire, hacking civilians with machetes, and torching houses. A Maranao recounted: 
In Kauswagan where atrocities happened again, there were many of the civilians 
who were threatened including my Christian uncle who was nearly killed by the 
so-called members of MILF. Fortunately, my uncle married a half Maranao and at 
the time, the MILF pointed [a] gun into his head, his  wife's  relative spoke in 
Mranao [sic] and told alleged MILF to withdraw the gun. Thanks are to Allah, my 
Christian uncle is still alive although his house was burned and they have not 
saved their properties. (Email correspondence, 2008) 
In nearby Iligan 3,000 civilian volunteers organized themselves to undertake a foot patrol around 
the  city  and  set  up  checkpoints.  The  city  government  provided  them  with  communications 
equipment for easier coordination with the police. For the mayor, Commander Bravo’s attacks 
and bombings of two hotels one day before had an evident signification:  
We only took the position that we want to be excluded! Look what they have done 
to us! I could not imagine [what else they can do] when we campaign for “No” to 
our  inclusion  in  the  Bangsamoro  Juridical  Entity  when  the  plebiscite  comes. 
(Gillera 2008).  
The gun owners club in Iligan as well as civilians demanded to be allowed to carry their licensed 
guns to be able to defend themselves. In addition, an anti-Moro group named “Shepherds” was 
founded as a reaction to the attacks. Iligan Professor Rudi Rodil, who specialized in the history of 
the Mindanao conflict, was granted an “Outstanding Citizen” award by the Iligan government in 
1994.  He  also  became  vice-chairman  of  the  government  peace  panel.  Nevertheless,  he  was 
                                                 
139 The affected municipalities were Kauswagan, Kolambugan, Linamon and Maigo, all included in the MOA-AD 
under category A. The affected barangays were Kulasihan, Lapayan, Larapan, Libertad, Napo, and Tacub. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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declared persona non grata by Iligan’s City Council on 9 September for having told the Council 
that a high percentage of Iligan's land area
140 was included in the BJE
141 and thus 
for his alleged participation in the “grand conspiracy to fool the people, 
cut  Iligan  City  into  pieces  and  of  the  biggest  blunder  the  Philippine 
government has ever made which is the carving and giving of a big chunk 
of  Mindanao  to  a  rebel  group,  just  to  attain  the  simple  word  peace.” 
(Declaration by the Iligan City Council, in Arguillas 2010a) 
Rodil answered that people tend to omit that the inclusion of the  barangays into the BJE is 
connected to  a plebiscite and that  consequently the MOA-AD  would not  have automatically 
included land area from Iligan into the BJE. 
The government offered PHP 5 million for information that would lead to the arrest of 
Commanders Kato and Bravo. The AFP launched counterattacks in Muslim areas in search of the 
lost commands.
142 In western Lanao del Sur, clashes were reported between  the AFP and  the 
MILF. The majority of the clashes, however, took place in the Ma guindanao area.
143 People in 
Lanao del Sur spoke of a state of war, whereas the government talked about a “law enforcement 
campaign to neutralize and bring to the folds of the law the MILF lawless groups who attacked 
the civilian communities” (Arguillas 2008b).  
  In October and November 2008 and then since January 2009, Basilan and Sulu were 
increasingly involved in violent combats. In particular, there were clashes between the AFP and 
the Abu Sayyaf Group, which kidnapped several persons, among them three members of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. The MILF offered to aid in their safe release, stating 
that kidnapping is  against  the principles of  Islam. The AFP frequently  accuses the MILF  of 
involvement in  kidnapping  cases,  even though their leadership  categorically  denies this. The 
rebels proved their good intentions by helping to free an Irish priest kidnapped in November 
                                                 
140 The mayor of Iligan City complained that the BJE would reduce the land area of his city by 82%, and Steven 
Rood (2008) from the Asia Foundation added that this “would reduce by over 20 percent the block grants the city 
receives from the national government.”  
141 Eight barangays of Iligan are listed in the MOA-AD for inclusion in the BJE; however, they were to be included 
only after a plebiscite to be held within one year from the signing of the MOA-AD.  
142 In Lanao the 104
th AFP Infantry Brigade was assigned to hunt down Commander Bravo. About 60% of this unit 
are former MNLF rebels who, after the 1996 FPA, had been integrated into the AFP. Among them was Captain 
Alonto Maamo, a Maranao who helped 112 families return home in military vehicles in October 2008. The families 
were Maranao IDPs from the highlands of Paiton (Kauswagan), Pantaon, and Tangclao (Poona Piagapo) (Balay 
Mindanaw Foundation, Inc. 2010).  
143 Maguindanao was according to the Philippine Human Development Report of 2005 the province in Mindanao 
with the highest number of encounters between rebels and AFP and the highest number of casualties from 1986 to 
2004. Lanao del Norte numbered second in terms of casualties, followed by North Cotabato, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, 
Sulu, and Sultan Kudarat. In terms of encounters Maguindanao was followed by North Cotabato, Basilan, Lanao del 
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Zamboanga del Sur.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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2009. Criminals from Lanao had abducted him for ransom. However, neither the government nor 
the MILF could prevent the beheading of another victim, a state school principal from Sulu, 
abducted at about the same time as the Red Cross members by the ASG. 
  Several bombings in major cities outside the ARMM areas that are claimed by Muslims 
took place, including, in Iligan, on 17 August 2008, one day before Commander Bravo’s attacks 
on barangays in Lanao del Norte, and on 18 December, one day before President Arroyo was 
scheduled to visit the city. In other places, like Sulu, military installations were targeted. No 
group took responsibility for the bombings. Among the injured were Muslim as well as Christian 
citizens. The government in most cases blamed hardline MILF rebels, a MILF Special Operations 
Group,  bandits,  or  members  of  the Abu  Sayyaf  Group  for  the  attacks.  The  MILF  officially 
condemned the bombings. 
Table 3: Bombing Attacks in 2008-2009 
 
Date  Place  Region  Target  Killed  Injured 
8/17  Iligan  Lanao del Norte  Hostels  0  3 
9/14  Kiamba  Sarangani  Public market  0  0 
12/11  Isulan  Sultan Kudarat  Public market  0  7 
12/18  Iligan  Lanao del Norte  Department stores  2  36 
4/26  Besana Beach Resort  Sultan Kudarat    1  3 
7/5  Cotabato City  Lanao del Norte  Near the cathedral  5  51 
7/7 
Jolo  Sulu  Near the cathedral  5  30+ 
Iligan  Lanao del Norte  In front of a lending firm  1  21 
 
  After the first escalation of the conflict at the end of August 2008, both negotiating parties 
were very strict in their demands. The MILF declared that the MOA-AD was a “done deal” 
especially since the MOA-AD had already been initialed,
144 and because it saw it in the context 
of international, not  national, law (referring to  the UN framework;
145 see also Santos 2004). 
                                                 
144 Presidential Peace Adviser Hermogenes Esperon disagreed with the MILF position; according to him the affixing 
initials to the draft accord was meant only to ensure that it would not be altered or changed, not to indicate that an 
agreement had been reached.  
145 The MILF, for example, in July 2010, hailed the ruling of the United Nations International Court of Justice on the 
legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence as “a trend in the resolution of the conflicts in the world today” and The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Additionally it had supposed to have negotiated not only with the executive but with all three 
branches of the Philippine government. The GRP thus had to consult the other branches before 
making  major  decisions.  The  MILF  would  only  go  back  to  the  negotiating  table  if  the 
government  signed  the  MOA-AD.  The  scholar  and  human  rights  activist Attorney  Soliman 
Santos supposed that the MILF would not reconsider negotiations with the Arroyo government at 
all but would wait for the next president, taking what had happened to the MOA-AD as evidence 
of “the GRP having negotiated in bad faith, and thus the basic trust built by years of peace talks 
has been seriously eroded. The bottom line is that the Arroyo administration cannot deliver after 
all” (Santos 2008). Additionally, the drafting of the MOA had already marked the success of the 
MILF in putting its demands on the national agenda and in unifying Moros under the agreement. 
“They cannot for their own self-respect go into ‘further negotiations’ which would not be on the 
basis of a signed MOA.” (ibid.). The MILF also considered the possibility that any further peace 
negotiations apart from the MOA might end up in the same way.  
  Because of violent incidents in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte and mass protests 
against the MOA-AD from concerned LGUs, citizens, and the opposition, the government, which 
initially had been positive about resuming peace talks, stated that it would not sign the MOA-AD 
even if the Supreme Court decided on 14 October that it was constitutional. On 3 September 
2008, it dismissed its peace panel, not wanting to negotiate again before the DDR (disarmament, 
demobilization,  and  rehabilitation)  of  the  rebels  had  been  completed.  By  doing  so,  the 
government set impossible conditions for the return to the negotiating table. Murad Ebrahim 
characterized this demand as illogical since DDR was designed to happen after the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Compact. The government announced that it would focus from then on 
“on working with Moro communities and civil society to bring peace to Mindanao” (Martin 
2008).  In  September,  an  increased  reward  of  PHP  10  million  was  promised  to  anyone  who 
captured, dead or alive, Commanders Bravo or Kato, who were by this time held responsible for 
the death of 62 civilians and the displacement of about 200,000 people. The Ilagas
146 announced 
                                                                                                                                                              
an example that seeking independence under international law was possible. It further highlighted the strong support 
of the Kosovo struggle for independence by the US (MILF Central Committee on Information Official Website). 
146 The Ilaga (rats) are sometimes said to have been founded in 1968 by Commander Toothpick (Feliciano Luces), a 
Christian Ilonggo. But the movement of Luces is a different movement. McKenna (1990) writes that Luces led the 
first of the sectarian conflicts in Cotabato, in Upi Valley in 1970, which became rampant later on, mainly as a result 
of land conflicts and political rivalry. Commander Toothpick, who later on earned a reputation as a fanatical anti-
Muslim, was initially perceived as a local Robin Hood who defended poor Christians, Muslims, and Tirurays against 
Muslim outlaws. “Influential Muslims and Christians had reportedly titled a good deal of occupied land in the area 
and were using Muslim outlaw bands to gain possession by scaring off the inhabitants” (p. 264). And Muslim datus The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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that they would take part in the manhunt. On 23 September, according to the Philippine Institute 
for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, the government declared that it would ask the UN 
to add the “renegade commanders” Abdullah Macapaar (alias Commander Bravo), Umbra Kato, 
Alim Solaiman Pangalian, and nine other MILF commanders to the list of terrorists. The main 
argument was that many of them were “secretly trained in bomb making and urban warfare and 
propaganda  by  Al-Qaeda-linked  JI”  (Philippine  Institute  for  Peace,  Violence  and  Terrorism 
Research, Inc. (PIPVTR), 24 September 08).  
  The rather drastic measures against the MILF are partly the result of pressures by the 
opposition. According to the Social Weather Station, Arroyo’s popularity rate (June 2008) was the 
lowest of any president since the start of the study in 1986. The opposition blamed the Arroyo 
government for acting against the Constitution by signing the MOA-AD. Some speculated that 
the agreement was a tool for charter change and thus for the extension of Arroyo’s term. In 
Mindanao, settlers, being at the same time landowners and politicians, reacted the strongest to the 
MOA-AD. The ICG writes that these groups feared that 
if the document became official, it would be a recognition of Moro land claims 
whether or not the population voted to join. From the point of view of settlers who 
acquired title through dubious means during the Marcos years, it would be a threat 
to vested interests. In some areas such as North Cotabato, where land disputes 
have been particularly bitter and clashes often take place between farmers and 
MILF  fighters  at  harvest  time,  there  was  a  sense  that  the  MOA  could  be  an 
invitation to “renegade” commanders to take back land by force. (ICG 2008) 
  Complains about lack of information as well as about the vagueness of the memorandum 
were issued by governmental groups, civil society organizations, and indigenous groups. The lack 
of public information was finally one reason why the Supreme Court declared the MOA-AD 
unconstitutional.  The  MILF  therefore  created  in  November  the  Department  of  Mindanao 
Migrants to focus on non-Moro issues. It sought to establish contact with the Lumad groups of 
the Tedurays, Manobos, Arumanens, and B’laans. Additionally, it declared that it would increase 
its information campaign (Arguillas 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                              
demanded  tribute  from  Christian  and  Tiruray  villagers.  Later  on  Luces  was  employed  by  Liberalista  Christian 
politicians in the attempt to oust the local leading Muslim political family (the Sinsuats). Thus he gained his anti-
Muslim reputation. The Ilaga were also founded around this time. They are described by Abreu as an anti-Muslim 
vigilante group. They were founded by “ultra rightist traditional politicians in Cotabato under then AFP Deputy 
Defense Minister for Civil Relations (and later North Cotabato governor) Lt. Col. Carlos Cajelo” (Abreu 2002: 3; see 
also McKenna 1990: 267). Yegar (2002) reports that they were financed by large businesses and companies and 
supported by the AFP (p. 254).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  In addition to the protests of local politicians, initiating rallies and filing petitions against 
the signing of the MOA-AD, civil society organizations urged the GRP and the MILF to return to 
the  negotiating  table.
147  The  Mindanao  Peoples’  Caucus  (MPC)  accompanied  IDPs  to 
Malacañang to pressure Arroyo for a return to negotiations. Symbolically, the personal meeting 
took place on 11 September 2008, on the seventh anniversary of the World Trad e Center and 
Pentagon attacks, which had led to a radicalization of Filipino politics towards the MILF. Arroyo 
promised no more air strikes during Ramadan but did not agree to renew ing negotiations. The 
visit was part of MPCs campaign  “Bakwit sa Syudad II” (Evacuees in the City II). (Bakwit sa 
Syudad I had taken place during the heavy military clashes in 2003; see Woodward 2005: 26).  
Whereas  the  National  Disaster  Coordinating  Council  noticed  that  clashes  slowed  down  in 
September, they increased again at the end of Ramadan.
148 
  On 14 October, eight of 15 justices of the Supreme Court voted to declare the MOA-AD 
unconstitutional. In response, the MILF announced that it would take the accord to the UN and 
the  OIC  to  seek  their  guarantees  that  if  talks  resumed  their  outcome  would  be  respected. 
Coincidence  or  not,  four  days  later Arroyo  awarded  73  soldiers  who  had  been  involved  in 
military operations against the MILF with medals of  honor in Cotabato. On 19 October, the 
National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) documented a new peak in IDPs, reaching a 
total of 391,266,
149 with 91 dead and 120 injured (mostly civilians)  since the outbreak of the 
conflict in 2008. The Moro umbrella organization Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Socie ty 
(CBCS)
150 organized a demonstration, in Marawi in front of the AFP military base, to call on the 
UN and the OIC to intervene to stop the war in Mindanao and to put pressure on the government 
                                                 
147 As part of the celebration of the United Nations Decade of a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence to Children of 
the World (2000-2010), and the Mindanao Week of Peace, the religiously mixed NGO MCW and Mothers for Peace 
initiated the campaign “Million Thoughts and Acts for Peace” (1 September-1 December 2008), urging the GRP and 
the MILF to go back to the negotiation table.  
148 The governmental CCCH recorded (on 8 October) for the year 2008 one incident between the AFP and the MILF 
in January; zero in February, March, and April; two in May; four in June; five in July; 77 in August; and 39 in 
September. Of these 128 skirmishes, 66 were initiated by the AFP in their manhunt for the lost MILF commands.  
149 As of 14 October 2008, according to the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), a majority of IDPs 
were from Maguindanao (123,324), followed by North Cotabato (87,555), Lanao del Sur (62,258), Lanao del Norte 
(58,532), Shariff Kabunsuan (24,485), Basilan (13,870), Sarangani (6,775), and Misamis Oriental (17). The IDPs in 
Lanao del Sur are from the following municipalities: Balindong – 8,425; Bubong – 150; Butig – 11,640; Calanogas – 
3,000;  Ditsaan  Ramain  –  1,525;  Ganassi  –  1,410;  Kapai  –  1,300;  Lumbayanague  –  2,680;  Madalum  –  3,170; 
Madamba – 4,490; Malabang – 3,585; Marantao – 2,990; Marawi City – 2,785; Marogong – 4,605; Masiu – 1,000; 
Malundo –  115;  Pagayawan  –  505; Picong  –  1,188;  Poona  Bayabao  –  70;  Pualas –  1,160;  Saguiaran  –  5,000; 
Tamparan – 750; and Tugaya – 715.  
150 The CBCS describes itself as “a conferential body and network of 168 Moro civil society organizations based and 
operating in the whole of Mindanao who have converged for the purpose of advocating for peace, human rights and 
good governance.” It was founded in 2002 and has its main seat in Cotabato City. It was one of the first umbrella 
Moro NGOs, helping to strengthen the by-then rather limited tradition of Moro NGOs.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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to  honor  the  botched  MOA-AD.  NGOs  spoke  of  a  humanitarian  crisis  in  the  region.  On  2 
November,  six  Maranaos  were  killed,  including  two  children,  aged  five  and  nine. Ten  were 
wounded  in  the  municipality  of  Magsaysay,  Lanao  del  Norte. According  to  relatives  of  the 
victims, they were killed by Ilagas in Civilian Volunteers Organization (CVO) attire. The Police, 
the AFP, and media branded this incident, regarded by Moros as a massacre, as a rido, ignoring 
laments  made  by  Moro  civil  society  groups  about  mounting  human  rights  violations  against 
Bangsamoro people, including illegal arrests, torture, the burning of houses of civilians, looting, 
and harassment.  
  In November 2008, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary-General of the OIC, appealed to the 
Philippine government and Muslim rebels to end clashes and  return to  the negotiating table. 
Moreover, the OIC promised to mobilize resources from affiliated institutions to alleviate the 
suffering of civilians. Later on, the European Parliament, which had spent EUR 13 million in aid 
to Mindanao by April 2009, also urged the groups to renew their negotiations and even offered to 
facilitate the peace process (European Parliament Resolution, 12 March 2009). The American 
Ambassador  Kristie  Kenney  announced  that  her  country  had  released  USD  2.5  million  in 
additional aid for the evacuees, asking in return that both parties agree to a ceasefire. Clashes 
between the AFP and the MILF decreased again in December during Christmas holidays. 
  On 30 November, the last Malaysian IMTs left the Philippines but said that they might 
return if there was progress in the peace process. The MILF submitted a proposal with certain 
conditions after the GRP requested an extension of the IMT’s stay and the resumption of peace 
talks. The conditions were: the peace panel had to be reconstituted; there must be an international 
guarantor; the status of the MOA-AD had to be agreed upon by the parties; the IMT would 
conduct investigations of ceasefire violations; the warrants of arrest issued against Commanders 
Bravo, Kato, and Pangalian be declared null and void; and Malaysia would remain as a third- 
party  facilitator.  On  2  December,  Arroyo  appointed  Foreign  Affairs  Undersecretary  Rafael 
Seguis
151 as the new chief of the government -negotiating panel. The MILF defined this as a 
positive step but refused to renegotiate the MOA-AD. Moro hawks urged that the best strategy of 
                                                 
151 The diplomat Seguis replaced retired General Rodolfo Garcia as chief negotiator. He is known as an expert on 
Islamic affairs, having been assigned as chief of mission to several Muslim countries like Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, 
and Saudi Arabia. He studied Arabic while assigned to Baghdad. Seguis successfully brokered the safe release of 
Filipino workers Angelo de la Cruz and Roberto Tarongoy, who were held captive by Iraqi dissidents in Baghdad in 
2004 and 2005.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the MILF was to intensify the war and thus to pressure the government to change the Constitution 
in order to accept the MOA-AD.  
  In  December  2008,  large  protests  occurred,  supported  by  the  political  opposition,
152 
representatives of the religious group El Shaddai, the Makati business sector ,  and  also civil 
society groups
153 and the “Hyatt 10”
154 against another move by the government and its will to 
change the Constitution – a measure that would have included an extension of Arroyo’s term that, 
according to the opposition, could have led to dictatorship.  
  On 19 January 2009, the government issued E.O. No. 777, creating a national preparatory 
committee for the Amendment of RA No. 9054 (creating an expanded ARMM), dating back to 
2001. On the MILF Central Committee on Information official website, it was said that the MILF 
does not want an expanded ARMM but the implementation of the MOA-AD. Khaled Musa, 
deputy chairman of the MILF committee on information, said: “The MILF will not settle for it 
because it is not negotiated; it is imposed”. He further complained that the E.O. 777 “is nothing 
but a “paikot” (a runaround) that was chiefly conceived by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita.” 
He told a group of non-government organizations from Mindanao: “Papaikutin lang natin sila 
gaya ng ginawa natin sa MNLF” (We will just take them on a runaround just like what we did 
with the MNLF) (Recio 2009).  
  For the opposition, it seemed evident that the “Mindanao option” was the last card of 
President Arroyo to remain in power beyond 2010. According to Jejomar Binay, Makati mayor 
and United Opposition President, E.O. 777 as well as the MOA-AD designed to trigger conflict 
in the Muslim south in order to declare emergency rule and thus cancel the 2010 elections: 
We have had strong suspicions that an escalation of the conflict in the 
south will be used to justify the declaration of emergency rule, that could 
lead to the cancellation of the 2010 elections. It began with the MOA-
AD, and while conflict in the south has subsided, the EO could trigger 
fresh hostilities. (Callar 2009) 
                                                 
152 Among them were Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas II, Senator “Noynoy” Aquino, former Senate President Franklin 
Drilon  (all  Liberal  Party),  Loren  Legarda,  Francis  Escudero  (Nationalist  People's  Coalition,  NPC),  and  Panfilo 
Lacson (independent). 
153  Like  the  nationalist  Bayan,  committed  to  the  people's  struggle  for  national  freedom  and  democracy,  or  the 
women's rights group Gabriela. 
154 The “Hyatt 10” were ten government employees who announced their resignation in a press conference at the 
Hyatt Hotel in Pasay City after the “Hello Garci” scandal in 2005. (This scandal refers to a recorded phone call of 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo with Election Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano in which they allegedly talk about vote-
buying in the 2004 elections in her favor.) Their resignation was an appeal to President Arroyo to follow their 
example in order to solve the controversy and to bring prosperity to the country.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  The  MILF,  several  peace  activists,  and  the  religious  sector  were  instead  asking  for 
international pressure to end the conflict, specifically from the UN and the OIC but also the 
newly-elected President Barack Obama. Amina Rasul, a Tausug women’s activist, delivered a 
letter to Pope Benedict XVI in November 2008 regarding the search for peace. On 18 February 
2009, thousands of Marawi City residents demonstrated to call on the UN to support the signing 
of  the  MOA-AD  (Bangsamoro  Updates,  February  2009).  The  MILF  leaders  wrote  a 
congratulatory message to President-elect Obama. A rumor even speculated that an MILF lobby 
was working for Barack Obama, trying to force the issue of an unconditional peace agreement 
between the GRP and  the  MILF. This  would serve to  stabilize the entire East Asian region, 
particularly in the Malay and Mindanao economic zones. In November 2009, the MILF received 
an answering letter wherein the White House assured it of America’s continued support for the 
peace process, expressing a desire to see formal negotiations resume as soon as possible.  
  The OIC advised the Arroyo government and the MILF to go back to the negotiating 
table. It initiated a conference on minorities on 18-19 April 2009, and convened MILF delegates 
for the first time to address the meeting. The invitation followed the 10 March 2009 talks in 
Manila with Maulana “Bobby” Alonto and Abdullah Camlian, leaders of the MILF delegation 
(GMA News, 18 April 2009). At all past conferences of the OIC, the MILF was only invited as 
part of the MNLF delegation, which is the only representative of the Bangsamoro that the OIC 
recognizes (MILF Central Committee on Information official website, 18 April 2009). The OIC 
took this occasion to call on the MILF and the MNLF to open up dialogues and start to work 
together. Such a demand was already frequently pronounced by Moro civil society organizations, 
among others by the Mindanao Commission on Women (MCW). In May, OIC members opposed 
the Philippines’ bid to be granted an observer status in the organization.  
  However, the government continued to soften its approach towards the MILF. In order to 
induce  a  broader  participation  in  the  peace  process  as  a  consequence  of  the  shift  in  the 
government’s strategy from negotiating with armed rebels to engaging in “authentic community 
dialogues,” it tapped the Bishops-Ulama Conference (BUC) to take a more active role. Under the 
BUC commission, “Konsult Mindanaw” was designed by an interfaith committee constituted by 
members of Mindanao’s academic community, the Ulama League of the Philippines, and the 
Lumad. The project conducted 311 multi-sectoral and cross-regional focus group discussions in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
143 
various parts of Mindanao and southern Palawan.
155 The conclusions were underlined in a final 
report in January 2010. Among others, it stated that many Muslims but also some Christians in 
Central Mindanao and ARMM considered the approval of the MOA-AD as the key answer to the 
conflict. Others, however, saw peace in Mindanao more as a result of “satisfying basic needs, 
respecting  collective  identities,  exercising  good  governance,  caring  for  the  environment,  and 
deepening in one’s spirituality” (Arguillas 2010d). Many people shared the desire to be involved 
in the search for peace. From a certain point of view, a general confusion was rampant about what 
was  the  exact  standing  of  the  government  but  also  about  the  different  Bangsamoro  groups 
(including MNLF and MILF) and about civil society and the political sector. Some demanded 
that the peace process include dealing with prejudices and discrimination. The MILF was asked 
to clarify the BJE and to include more religious leaders in the peace process and in teaching good 
governance.  Finally,  a  professionalization  and  institutionalization  of  the  peace  efforts  was 
demanded, starting with the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP), 
which should be transformed into a “Department of Peace”. 
  On 5 March 2009, the government dropped its demand for the arrest of the three rogue 
sub-commanders of the MILF (Commander Bravo, Ustadz Ameril Umbra Kato, and Solaiman 
Pangalian) as a precondition for the resumption of the stalled peace talks. Eleven days later, it 
shifted its official strategy from DDR to Renegotiate, Reaffirm, and Renew (RRR) with regard to 
the MOA-AD, rendering a return to the negotiation table more likely (ibid. 2009e). It also asked 
Malaysia to continue to facilitate the peace talks. Having met the MILF demands, the government 
created a six-point guideline for the peace panel: (1) any consensus or agreement reached shall 
always  be  subject  to  constitutional  processes;  (2)  any  future  agreement  must  be  within  the 
purview of Philippine citizenship and there shall be no talk of independence; (3) the government 
panel shall utilize available mechanisms to reflect in the agenda and the agreements the values, 
sentiments and principles of the Filipino people; (4) DDR shall be the overall framework; (5) 
whether the negotiations succeed or not, hostilities on the ground must end; and (6) while peace 
negotiations are ongoing the government shall also intensify development efforts in the conflict-
affected areas as part of its confidence-building measures. 
  Great Britain and the UN again offered to support the peace process. While the MILF and 
the GRP welcomed this initiative, the opposition, represented by Franklin Drilon, warned that too 
                                                 
155 All these groups were asked to answer four questions: What is your vision of peace in Mindanao? What are your 
recommendations for the GRP-MILF peace talks? What other activities must we do to attain broader peace? What 
are you willing to offer and sacrifice for the sake of peace in Mindanao?  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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much  internationalization  of  the  peace  process  might  be  counter-productive  and  against  the 
national interests of the Philippines (ABS-CBN, 1 April 2009). Military clashes had decreased 
since  December  but  were  still  rampant  (NDCC  2009).  On  5  April,  underlining  “that  the 
Philippines values its Islamic culture” (Gutierrez 2009), Arroyo issued Proclamation 1808 and 
declared Eid al-Adha a nationwide non-working public holiday in the Philippines. Arroyo thereby 
continued  what  Vivienne  Angeles  describes  as  government  help  “to  make  the  environment 
conductive to Islamic resurgence,” applied initially by Marcos during the period of martial law 
(Angeles 2001: 197).
156 Nevertheless, Arroyo's decision did not last for long. In October 2009, 
Proclamation No. 1808-A declared Eid al-Adha again only a regional non-working holiday in the 
ARMM. Another movement in this direction was made several months later on 23 September 
2010. The bicameral Conference Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
approved Senate Bill (SB) 3307, the addition of a ninth ray to the sun in the Philippine flag. The 
rays in the flag represent the eight provinces that declared war during the Philippine Revolution 
in 1896. The new ray has thus a high symbolic value by recognizing Muslim Filipino efforts for 
the nation's independence.  
  On 13 July 2009, the government again declared a new strategy, which was named HELP-
CM (Health, Education, Livelihood, and Progress Task Force-Central Mindanao). It was created 
under Administrative Order 267  and signed on  29 June. HELP-CM  may  have partly been a 
reaction to a report by the Norwegian Council of Refugees in which the Philippines had the most 
number of evacuees worldwide for the year 2008, with 600,000 people displaced. The program 
had the main intention
157 of overseeing and ensuring the safe return of thousands of families 
displaced by armed conflicts in parts of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, South Cotabato, and Sultan 
Kudarat.
158 PHP 10 million were allocated for it. Violent military clashes still occurred and after a 
serial of bombings in Mindanao the Arroyo  government declared a full and then  a heightened 
alert  in  metropolitan  Manila,  activating  an  Anti -Terror  Command  Center  and  leading  the 
                                                 
156 Indeed, in order to underline its positive intentions towards Muslims, the Marcos government  had officially 
recognized Islam as an historic inheritance of the Philippines, declared Eid al-Fitr a holiday and finally integrated 
aspects of sharia law into the Constitution. At the same time, the MNLF were considered as rebels and consequently 
military operations were launched against them (Angeles 2001: 197). 
157 It had four main goals: “1) to forge a peaceful, negotiated, final political settlement with the MILF, including the 
effective implementation of ceasefire, development, and monitoring agreements; 2) addressing the concerns arising 
from continued armed hostilities, and the protection of civilians and non-combatants, especially from lawless MILF 
renegades; 3) reducing the impact of the conflict on the communities in the conflict-affected areas, especially the 
IDPs; 4) pursuing “humanitarian offensives” to address the root causes of conflict (poverty and exclusion from 
access to education, employment, and livelihood)” (Arguillas 2009d). 
158 HELP-CM was criticized because it did not cover Lanao del Norte. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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opposition to accuse the government of “lay[ing] the groundwork for the President’s declaration 
of a state of emergency” (Felipe, Laude, Calica, Adraneda and Carcamo 2009). Through the 
declaration of martial law, the Constitution can be set aside and regular terms of office abrogated, 
as under President Marcos in 1972.  
  On  23  July  2009,  Malacañang  announced  the  Suspension  of  Offensive  Military 
Operations (SOMO). Two days later Mohagher Iqbal declared a Suspension of Military Action 
(SOMA).  On  28-29  July,  a  special  meeting  between  representatives  of  the  MILF  and  the 
government took place in Kuala Lumpur. Both parties agreed to a Joint Statement in which four 
major  initiatives  were  introduced.  First,  SOMO  and  SOMA  should  be  sustained  by  mutual 
efforts.  Secondly,  the  MOA-AD  would  be  acknowledged  as  an  unsigned  and  yet  initialed 
document and the consensus points would be reframed with the end in view of moving towards 
the comprehensive compact to bring about a negotiated political settlement. Thirdly, the parties 
would work for a framework agreement on the establishment of a mechanism for the protection 
of non-combatants in armed conflict. Finally, they would work for a framework agreement on the 
establishment  of  an  ICG  consisting  of  states  and  non-state  organizations  to  accompany  and 
mobilize international support for the peace process.  
  When  President Arroyo  met  her American  counterpart  on  30  July  2009,  she  honored 
“President Obama’s reaching out to the Muslim world” and “ let President Obama know that the 
Muslim secessionists have agreed, together with a Philippine government panel, to work towards 
a resumption of formal peace talks” (President Barack Obama and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 
President of the Philippines, press conference, Washington, DC, July 30, 2009). At the beginning 
of August, the AFP launched an attack against ASG training camps in Basilan, killing 23 soldiers 
and injuring 22. The military urged the government to change its policy towards the MILF and be 
stricter on them, since the MILF, according to the military, had cooperated with the ASG during 
the attack. The MILF admitted that ten MILF members had been killed when the AFP attacked 
the ASG camp but that those MILF members had not supported the ASG but had acted on self-
defense, allegedly having been caught unaware by the arrival of government troops. The military 
then accused the rebels of not having sufficient control over their members. Arroyo called for the 
“annihilation” of Abu Sayyaf extremists and those MILF troops having aided them. At the same 
time, the government took care to not offend the entire Moro population by emphasizing that 
operations against the MILF in Basilan should not affect efforts to revive the peace talks. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Military clashes after the end of July 2009 were mainly limited to those between the ASG 
and the AFP in Sulu and Basilan. The incidents between the AFP and the MILF were mainly 
followed by protests to the Ceasefire Committee, in order to prevent similar incidents in the 
future. The procedure of protesting to the committee is not new: it was used frequently before, 
when  one  side  believed  that  the  other  had  broken  the  2003  ceasefire.  In  defiance  of  the 
reinstatement  of  the  ceasefire  agreement,  about  250,000  IDPs  remained  in  the ARMM.  The 
majority of them came from Maguindanao, where a flood exacerbated the disastrous situation.  
  On 15 September 2009, the peace panels signed a framework agreement in Malaysia on 
the  formation  of  an  ICG. The  accord  was  reached  in  recognition  of  the  role  that  interested 
countries and international non-government organizations can play in the peace process. The 
tasks of the ICG would be to attend and observe the face-to-face negotiations upon invitation by 
the  parties  and  with  the  concurrence  of  the  facilitator.  It  would  also  have  to  conduct  visits, 
exchange views, and give advice on a discreet basis in coordination with the parties and the 
facilitator. It had to seek out the assistance of recognized experts, resource persons, or groups on 
specific issues in order to support the parties. Finally, it had to meet upon request by any of the 
parties to help resolve substantive issues based on the agreed agenda. The ICG would engage the 
OIC, the EU, and eminent persons to participate in its activities. Concerning the INGOs, their 
task was mainly to function as a bridge between the parties and to provide research input and 
feedback (Arguillas 2009b). Shortly after this, during a diplomatic journey in Europe, Arroyo met 
the  Secretary-General  of  the  OIC  in  Turkey  to  talk  about  a  possible  involvement  of  this 
organization in the peace process.  
  Mindanao women leaders from the NGO Mindanao People’s Caucus (MPC) initiated the 
Mindanao  Women’s  Framework  for  Civilian  Protection.  It  suggested  that  a  Joint  Civilian 
Protection Authority (JCPA), composed of members from the government and the MILF as well 
as associate members from various civil society organizations, LGUs, the media, and the MNLF, 
should be established to protect civilians and IDPs against violence, deprivation, and threats to 
their lives. The composition of the JCPA was to be 70% female. In response, the MILF’s Central 
Committee, while commenting that the exchange with women leaders constitutes an important 
forum, rejected their views in the decision process (Elusfa 2009). Instead, the government and the 
MILF signed in Kuala Lumpur an agreement to include civilian protection into the TOR of the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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IMT. The IMT was to monitor non-compliance
159 by the parties to their basic unde rtaking to 
protect civilian communities. They  would be supported by humanitarian organizations, NGOs , 
and  INGOs (Arguillas  2009a).  The  MPC  expressed  dismay  about  this  decision  since  the 
protection  of  civilians  being  attached  to  the  IMT  gave  the  impression  of  being  only  an 
“afterthought”. The peace panels answered that the MPC could be among the NGOs to carry out 
the  civilian  protection  functions  and  later  on  invited  officially,  which  was  accepted  by  the 
women's group.  
  With  the  signing  of  the  Joint  Statement  on  29  July,  a  ceasefire  was  also  agreed  to, 
officially  ending  roughly  one  year  of  combat  in  which  about  500  clashes  had  taken  place, 
counting only those in the marshy heartland of Maguindanao province. According to the AFP, 
about 123 guerrillas (the rebels say about 20) were killed along with 41 soldiers (Hranjski 2009). 
Between August  2008  and  July  2009,  the  NDCC  estimated  that  over  700,000  people  were 
displaced and nearly 400 people were killed.
160 On 8-9 December 2009, peace negotiations were 
resumed in Kuala Lumpur after a 16-month impasse. The negotiations from then on included the 
ICG,  involving  governmental  representatives  from  Japan,  Turkey,  and  the  United  Kingdom 
(Saudi Arabia joined it in December 2010), four INGOs, the Muhammadiyah, a socio-religious 
organization from Indonesia (represented by Dr. Sudibyo Markus and Prof. Din Syamsuddin), the 
Asia Foundation (represented by Herizal Hazri and Steven Rood), the Geneva-based Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (David Gorman), and the London-based Conciliation Resources (Kristian 
Herbolzheimer  and  Cynthia  Petrigh).  The  mandate  of  the  IMT  was  a  main  issue  at  this 
meeting.
161 
                                                 
159 The parties agreed to: “(1) refrain from intentionally targeting or attacking non-combatants, prevent suffering of 
the civilian population, and avoid acts that would cause collateral damage to civilians; (2) refrain from targeting or 
intentionally attacking civilian properties or facilities such as schools, hospitals, religious premises, health and food 
distribution centers, or relief operations or objects or facilities indispensable to the survival of the civilian population 
and  of  a  civilian  nature;  (3)  take  all  necessary  actions  to  facilitate  the  provision  of  relief  supplies  to  affected 
communities; (4) take all precautions possible to avoid incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and danger 
to civilian objects; (5) ensure that all protective and relief actions shall be undertaken in a purely non-discriminatory 
basis covering all affected communities.” (Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International 
Monitoring Team (IMT) 27 October 2009). 
160 Since its eruption in the 1970s, the conflict has caused about 150,000 fatal casualties. 
161 It was decided to invite the following groups to join the IMT:  (1) the initial members (Malaysia as leading 
member, as  well as Brunei, Japan,  and Libya), (2) additional new  members such as Indonesia, Norway (which 
accepted),  Qatar,  and  the  EU  (which  accepted);  (3)  non-governmental  organizations,  namely,  the  International 
Committee of the Red Cross (which declined), the local MPC (which accepted), and Nonviolent Peace, based in 
Brussels (which accepted). On 5 March 2010, other NGOs accepted an invitation, including the Cotabato City-based 
Mindanao Human Rights Action Center and the Marawi City-based Moslem Organization of Government Officials 
and Professionals, Inc. (MOGOP).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  On 20 January 2010, the two parties submitted their respective draft proposals on the 
Comprehensive  Compact.  The  MILF  draft  covered  every  aspect  of  the  proposed  interim 
Bangsamoro  governance.  It  was  premised  on  a  state/sub-state  relationship,  similar  to  the 
regulation of the state of Sarawak in Malaysia. This demands an amendment of the Constitution. 
The  government’s  draft  offered  enhanced  autonomy  by  amending  the  R.A.  6734  (An  Act 
Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). The author of Understanding the 
Mindanao Conflict, Patricio Diaz, criticized the GRP for being still involved in implementing the 
expanded autonomy promised to the MNLF in 1996.
162 This might conflict with the suggested 
enhanced autonomy promised to the MILF. After the panels met on 27 January, the MILF panel 
did not show up for the following day, claiming that the GRP had not offered anything new and 
that the MILF had already in 2000 and 2003 declined the offer of enhanced autonomy.  
  Despite stalled peace talks, the first group of the IMT returned to Mindanao in February. 
Under its guidance both ceasefire committees signed an agreement on 23 April that violence and 
any  disturbance  —  including  attacks  on  power towers  —  should be avoided during election 
times. As a reaction to the efforts of the GRP, the MILF, and international groups to push peace 
negotiations, the North Cotabato vice-governor, gubernatorial candidate Emmanuel Piñol, and his 
younger brother, Representative Bernardo Piñol, filed a petition in the Supreme Court to stop a 
possible  signing  of  an  interim  agreement,  unless  it  was  made  public  beforehand. They  thus 
showed their vigilance and the will to repeat their court attack against an agreement, which was 
judged by them as unconstitutional. On 23 May, the MNLF (headed by Nur Misuari) and the 
MILF  formed a coordinating committee to  consolidate their movements.  Commander Umbra 
Kato  was transferred  from  his  military  post to become a senior staff  member of one of the 
political organs of the MILF. Peace talks were on hold until after elections. 
5. The Inclusion of Women in the Peace Process 
  Unlike on the MILF negotiation panel, several women were members of the governmental 
peace panel. Only one Muslim (Maranao) woman, Professor and former MSU President Emily 
Marohombsar, was part of it (1998-2004). From 2001-2004 Irene Santiago, a Christian women's 
activist and feminist from Davao, joined it. Known for her contributions to a culture of peace in 
Mindanao, she was granted a title (Bai Romapenet, Princess of Hope and Solidarity) by the royal 
                                                 
162 In 2006 a tripartite (GRP, MNLF, OIC) review was recommended after the OIC sent a fact-finding team to look 
into the implementation of the 1996 peace pact. In 2009 the OPAPP reported that the first phase of the FPA had been 
implemented but that there were still some open issues from the second phase.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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houses  in  Lanao,  becoming  an  adopted  daughter  of  the  Islamic  City  of  Marawi.  Under  her 
leadership,  the  inter-religious  MCW,  which  was  founded  in  2001,  initiated  the  “Mothers  for 
Peace” campaign in 2003 (Rood 2005: 11). “With almost no resources but a lot of contacts and 
commitment, Mothers for Peace launched a relentless campaign using TV and radio time and 
print space offered free by media networks that believed in its message.” (Sanz-Zarate 2006: 
148). Other civil society groups had similar agendas and it was supposed that the public pressure 
contributed to the bilateral declaration of a ceasefire a couple of months later.  
  The  MCW  also  advocated  for  more  women  participating  in  peacemaking  efforts.  In 
February  2006,  a  conference  was  held  with  the  title  “Mindanao Women’s  Peace  Summit:  If 
Women Negotiated the Peace Agreement . . .”, with the goal of training women to participate in 
the ongoing peace negotiations. Women sympathizers of the MILF and the MNLF were invited 
as  well  as  indigenous  women. At  least  325  women  participated,  as  well  as  MILF  resource 
speakers Attorney Lanang Ali (the MILF’s legal counsel and member of the Peace Panel), Datu 
Jun Mantawil (head of the MILF Peace Panel Secretariat), Dr. Alpha Amirulhaj (member of the 
MILF Technical Committee), Jimmy Labawan (MNLF Vice-chairman), and sponsors from the 
Australian Agency for International Development and the GTZ.  
  The Summit resulted in a position paper that was given to the peace negotiating panels. In 
this document, several suggestions were made for enhancing the peace process in Mindanao. 
Among them were the inclusion of the MNLF in the peace process; building on the 1996 peace 
agreement; and establishing the executive, legislative and judicial powers and functions of the 
future  BJE  government  from  the  existing ARMM  structures.  In  addition,  the  peace  process 
introduced a requirement for the amendment of the Constitution and the inclusion of women in 
post-peace  agreement  political  decision-making,  reconstruction,  and  recovery.  Finally,  the 
Mindanao Trust Fund was to be 30% female in its decision-making structure.  
While we anticipate that the Mindanao Trust Fund will adhere to guidelines on 
mainstreaming gender into all its programs, projects and activities, we strongly 
recommend the establishment of a Special Fund for Women. This recommendation 
comes  from  the  lessons  learned  from  the  nine  years  of  implementing  the  UN 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund after the signing of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Accord 
where women were able to access a miniscule percentage of the funds but showed 
that their projects were the most sustainable. The decision-making body of the 
Special Fund for Women must include representatives from Mindanao women’s 
groups with constituencies in the conflict-affected areas. (Homepage of the MCW, 
2010) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Concerning projects that should be implemented in a post-peace BJE, the paper mentioned as a 
first point free formal and informal education. This was followed by livelihood, health, gender, 
and  development  projects.  Issues  like  the  integration  of  the  madaris  into  the  mainstream 
educational system (including the study of the sharia and the teaching of comparative religion in 
all elementary and secondary schools), the promotion of a peace culture and indigenous ways of 
conflict resolution and transformation were also of interest. The position paper was handed over 
to Lanang Ali as a member of the peace panel and Silvestre Afable, Chair of the GRP Peace 
Panel. While Afable especially appreciated the role of women in the microfinance sector, Lanang 
commented on the paper from a conservative religious point of view, emphasizing that women 
are the assistants of men: 
I cannot yet give [my comments]. I have to submit this to the central committee 
for them to scrutinize but I am sure that everything here will be considered by the 
MILF. As I scan it and heard from point to point, I do not see any reason why the 
MILF will not respect this document.  
We cannot disregard the role of women in Mindanao. The role of women 
has been revealed in the Koran. To respect the role of women. Empowerment is 
already there also. We  need to  consult  our Ustadz what  specific verses  in  the 
Koran that emphasize the empowerment of women. Ex: A woman is the assistant 
of the man. The man is always the head of the family. It is haram if the woman 
heads the family. The man also heads the prayer. That is haram for a woman to 
lead the prayer. It cannot be that the woman will always be the head of the state. 
As long as there is a male capable to head the state then he should lead. There is 
always an exception to the rule. A female may be allowed to rule the nation but 
only as such time that the male cannot perform. By nature, women are emotional. 
That is why females are discouraged to rule the nation. (Homepage of the MCW, 
2010) 
The MILF did not reconsider the MCW demands concerning the gender-composition of 
the peace panel, but in 2010, it formed a board of consultants, which also included two women: 
an indigenous woman and an alima (female religious scholar). Nevertheless, the participation of 
GRP and MILF functionaries at the conference could already be seen as representing the success 
of the MCW in putting its demands on the peace panel agenda.
163  
                                                 
163 Jun Mantawil in 2009 emphasized that in the proposed BJE the MILF would be more liberal in its approach to 
women than the Taliban. There  would be no prohibition on  women  seeking public office but  men  would  have 
“priority” in that field under an Islamic government “because women are encouraged to become good mothers and 
regents of families, first and foremost, as the real foundation of an ideal society.” Mantawil elaborated on this by 
saying that “the success of women in laying the foundation for a good society within their respective families will 
serve as a community model as they move on further to a secondary task of public service. Should they be able to 
become successful in both endeavors, then they prove to be more successful than us, men.” Finally he stated that like 
men, “women are part and parcel of any struggle for reform in Islam” (Maulana 2009). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Some months after the conference, in May 2006, Irene Santiago was appointed senior 
adviser to the OPAPP.
164 MCW continued pursuing its agenda of more female participation in 
2010 by handing over a letter to President Arroyo urging her to promote the involvement of more 
women  on the new governmental peace panel. In March 2010, Dr. Grace Jimeno -Rebollos 
became a member. She, however, stayed in office only a short time, being replaced by candidates 
chosen by the newly-elected President Aquino.  
  Sylvia  Okinlay-Paraguya,  a  Lumad  from  Bukidnon  and  member  of  the  organization 
Mindanao  Coalition  of  Development  NGO  Networks,  thus  again  from  civil  society  and  a 
women’s rights organization, joined the government's peace panel in 2004. At the same time, the 
attorney Leah Tanodra-Armamento was appointed an alternate member. Both stayed in office 
until 3 September 2008 when the governmental panel was dissolved.  
  In August 2010 under the Aquino government Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer became a 
member  of  the  governmental  peace  panel.  Santiago  and  Coronel-Ferrer  participated  in  the 
drafting  and  finalization  of  the  National Action  Plan  (NAP)  on Women,  Peace  and  Security 
(September 2009-March 2010). The NAP is based on UN Security Resolution No. 1325, adopted 
by  United  Nations  Security  Council  on  31  October  2000.  It  was  sponsored  and  was  to  be 
implemented and monitored by government agencies with advisory functions, OPAPP and the 
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women. The NAP, like the UN resolution that was 
its model, seeks to advance the participation of women in the peace process.  
  Among those civil society activists who promote the participation of indigenous people, 
and particularly of women in the peace process, the lawyer and peace advocate Mary Ann Arnado 
has to be mentioned. In 2001, civil society groups were for the first time allowed to join the peace 
negotiations,  even though they were excluded from  the closed-door negotiations. Among the 
observers were representatives of the NGO Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC), like the journalist 
                                                 
164  The  OPAPP,  including  its  support  Secretariat,  had  been  founded  by  the  Ramos  government  in  1993.  The 
government at this time also created the Peace Panels for the peace talks. The OPAPP supports and coordinates the 
negotiating panels appointed by the president and supervises the implementation of existing peace agreements. The 
OPAPP was part of a governmental peace policy which provided a broader official perspective on peace, an official 
policy that defined a comprehensive, multi-track peace process, an infrastructure to carry out the government peace 
effort,  and  significant  achievements  in  the  reform  and  negotiations  process.  Besides  the  OPAPP,  the  Ramos 
government in 1992 also created the National Unification Commission (NUC). The NUC was given the task to 
“formulate and recommend, after consulting with the concerned sectors of society, to the President . . . a viable 
general amnesty program and peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace” (E.O. 19, 
1992).  The  NUC  received  support  from  the  Catholic  Bishops’  Conference  of  the  Philippines  (CBCP)  and  the 
National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), and Regional and Provincial Convenors Groups were set 
up which also included NGOs and POs. The aim of the peace efforts under Ramos was a “shared ownership” of the 
peace process (OPAPP homepage). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Carolyn Arguillas and Mary Ann Arnado. In Kuala Lumpur, Arnado was the one to point out to 
MILF functionaries that there was no woman on their peace panel. In response, she was told that 
they could  not  find anyone competent  (Woodward 2005:  31). Under her initiative, the MPC 
developed, initially as a component of an institution with its main seat in Davao (Initiatives for 
International Dialogue) promoting solidarity among the peoples of Southeast Asia. In 2002, MPC 
established the Bantay Ceasefire monitoring team. The idea was based on the formation of LMTs 
provided  by  the  Tripoli Agreement  of  2001.  Military  generals  and  the  MILF  did  not  want 
civilians to monitor the ceasefire, and in particular, women were seen as being not competent 
enough in dealing with military tasks (ibid.: 23). Therefore, the Bantay Ceasefire Monitoring 
Team was established as an independent monitoring team, which worked in zones of conflict to 
educate involved groups on international humanitarian law and human rights. During the 2003 
outbreak of conflict, the MPC helped to convince the MILF to announce a ten-day ceasefire on 
28 May, but the AFP declined a similar move; one military commander explained to the MPC 
they could not do so without appearing like “homosexuals” (soft) (ibid.: 34). In June 2008, the 
MPC succeeded in mobilizing 10,000 evacuees for a demonstration for a ceasefire and initiating a 
broad  media  campaign  demanding  the  same.  The  protests  accompanied  those  of  other  civil 
society organizations like the Mothers for Peace (see above). In 2010, the MPC became part of 
the newly-established Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team.  
  Since UN Resolution No. 1325, non-Muslim women have increasingly been included in 
the peace negotiations as part of the governmental panel. Most of these women are active in inter-
religious civil society movements. They are pushing for greater participation of women not only 
in the peace process but also in the future BJE. Also Muslim women’s activists were recently 
more involved as consultants of the MILF. In 2011, the Tausug Muslim lawyer Raissa Jajurie and 
the Maguindanao Muslim educator Bai Cabaybay Abubakar, along with Timuay Melanio Ulama, 
a member of the T’duray tribe in Mindanao, were appointed members of the MILF peace panel’s 
board  of  consultants.  Raissa  Jajurie  is  heading  the  women’s  organization  Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi 
Bangsamoro confederation (Women for Justice in Bangsamoro). This demonstrates that the MILF 
is  open  to  the  issues  of  Muslim  women’s  rights  being  presented  by  a  progressive  Muslim 
women’s activist. So far, however, women are not included into the MILF peace panel but remain 
as consultants.  
 The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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6. Outlook: The Benigno Aquino Government 
  The national media commented that the 2010 national elections showed that even though 
they  are  prohibited  by  the  1987  Constitution,
165  political dynasties are “stronger than ever” 
(VERA  Files,  14  May  2010).  Benigno  Simeon  “Noynoy”  Cojuangco  Aquino  III,  who  was 
strongly supported by leading political clans in Lanao del Sur, was proclaimed the new President 
of the Philippines. The same families that had been in politics for decades were (re-)elected in 15 
out of 39 provinces in Luzon (38%), eight out of 16 in the Visayas (50%), and 11 out of 25 in 
Mindanao (44%). Some political families suffered a setback. Of the 11 Piñol brothers who ran for 
local posts in North Cotabato, seven succeeded, but still Emmanuel Piñol could not regain the 
governorship he had held in Cotabato from 1998-2007 (Tiongson-Mayrina 2010a).
166 The MILF 
commented that with the loss of Piñol , the peace process might now progress  more easily. The 
Ampatuans of Maguindanao on the other hand were among the biggest winners  among the 64 
political families in the 2010 elections who won two or more posts. They counted about 15 
winning relatives, among them eight mayors and six vice-mayors. Zamboanga City Mayor Celso 
Lobregat and Iligan City Mayor Lawrence Lluch Cruz were also re-elected.  
  Soon after Aquino assumed office, he  chose a  new  chair for the  governmental  peace 
panel, Attorney Marvic Leonen. This choice was widely welcomed by peace advocates.
167 In July 
2010, the newly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Teresita Deles, known as 
one of the “Hyatt 10,” explained that the Aquino government was following a four-point strategy 
(not the six-point strategy applied by the Ramos and Arroyo governments) to put an end to the 
Mindanao conflict. Priority would now be given to more delivery of basic services, particularly 
education  and  health.  Also  mentioned  were  economic  reconstruction  and  the  sustainable 
development of Mindanao, “to spur growth areas in the region wherein the Autonomous Region 
for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is an integral part.” The last two points are the reforms of the 
security sector, in particular the disbanding of private armies and good governance (Cal 2010). 
Thus, RRR as well as a peaceful, negotiated settlement with the rebel groups are not mentioned 
any  more  as  major  issues.  In  an  interview,  Leonen  made  clear  that  an  amendment  to  the 
                                                 
165 Article 2, Section 26 states: “The State  shall guarantee  equal access to opportunities for public service and 
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”  
166 Piñol lost to Emmylou Taliño-Mendoza in his run for governor. Former North Cotabato Governor Jesus Sacdalan 
traded places with 1
st district Representative Emmylou Taliño-Mendoza: Sacdalan is now 1
st district representative 
while Mendoza is the new governor.  
167 The other panel members are Maranao Dr. Hamid Barra, a former ARMM education secretary and incumbent 
chairman of the Ulama Council of the Philippines, UP Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, a peace activist; former 
Agriculture Secretary Senen Bacani; and Maguindanao Vice-Mayor Ramon Piang Sr. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Constitution was not being categorically refused. This left an open door for further elaborations 
on the implementation of the MOA-AD under the condition that all sides would accept it. The 
government’s optimism about solving the Mindanao conflict within the following six years of 
Aquino’s  governance  seems  familiar,  similar  promises  having  been  made  before  by  other 
Presidents.  
  The Aquino government announced at the beginning of its term further support for the 
MNLF-GRP-OIC tripartite meetings as well as the closure of the FPA of 1996. Moreover, it 
continued the new development, which began under Arroyo, of including a larger variety of 
groups  in  the  peace  talks.  Along  with  international  governmental  representatives  (including 
Malaysia, Norway, and the EU), international and local NGO representatives are also involved. 
For its part, the ARMM government demanded to “be heard” by both parties in the peace process. 
Its  first  action  was  to  sponsor  the  first  region-wide  peace  summit,  inviting  members  of  the 
MNLF, the MILF, religious and traditional groups, and the government to discuss the issue. On 
20 September 2010, Muslimin Sema from the MNLF, a guest speaker, as well as government 
representatives and international guests took part in the summit, while the MILF declined the 
invitation,  arguing  that  the  gathering  was  a  government  initiative.  It  announced  it  would 
participate in negotiations only under the third party facilitator, Malaysia. Muslimin Sema stated 
that he did not believe that the GRP and the MILF would be able to find an agreement and that 
the only solution the MNLF saw was “the enhancing of autonomy already in place” (Arguillas 
2010). 
  On 5 September 2010, Aquino formed an advisory body, which was assigned the task of 
assisting government negotiators. The body is composed of members of Congress, retired justices 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  members  of  the  1987  Constitutional  Commission,  members  of  local 
governments in strife-affected areas, representatives of NGOs, and chairmen of previous peace 
panels. While negotiations with the MILF continue, the court was asked by the government to 
outlaw the Abu Sayyaf Group as terrorists and to blacklist the roughly 200 members. In order to 
get around the law stating that the Abu Sayyaf members cannot be arrested if they do not commit 
a crime, the government asked for the criminalization of the group under the 2007 anti-terrorism 
law. 
Regardless of the MILF’s will to end the conflict, the implementation of the MOA-AD 
remains its central condition, as it is not satisfied with mere development projects but demands a 
political solution. In particular, a “state/sub-state relationship” is favored. This would require an The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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amendment to the 1987 Constitution’s Article 10, Sections 15-21. The Malaysian state Sarawak 
and  the  “one  country,  two  systems”  of  Hong  Kong  as  part  of  China  are  named  as  models. 
According  to  Soliman  Santos,  an  amendment  would  only  change  the  setup  of  the ARMM, 
including a higher degree of self-determination, without necessarily requiring a federal system in 
the whole of the Philippines (ibid. 2010c). In September 2010, the MILF announced its new 
peace panel.  It retained Mohagher  Iqbal as chairman, the lawyer Michael  Mastura, Maulana 
“Bobby” Alonto, and Sama-Bangingi-Tausug Abdullah Camlian, formerly Chair of the MILF 
Technical Panel. New to the panel was Professor Abhoud Syed Mansor-Lingga, Chairperson of 
the Institute for Bangsamoro Studies. Datu Antonio Kinoc, a B’laan tribesman from Colombio 
(Sultan Kudarat), became an alternate member of the peace panel. Replaced because of health 
reasons were lawyers Lanang Ali and Musib Buat. An additional Board of Consultants was also 
formed with five members, two of them women: one to represent the indigenous people and one 
to represent the religious sector. 
  However, negotiations were put off until February 2011 because of a dispute about the 
Malaysian facilitator
168. Demonstrations in Marawi City demanded that the MILF return to its 
original quest and ask for independence.
169 At the end of 2010, President Aquino started a new 
anti-rebel  campaign  under  the  Internal  Peace  and  Security  Plan  (IPSP). This  meant  that  the 
military relied on field commanders’ experiences of their areas of command to win the people’s 
hearts and minds in order to defeat threats to national security. Compared to the old campaign — 
a pure military plan known as Oplan Bantay Laya (Operation Freedom Watch) — the new IPSP 
involves  all  sectors  of  society,  with  the  primary  objective  of  winning  peace  without  the 
implication of violence.
170 The military will support the local governmental units in the delivery 
of basic services like health care. Further, the government plans to include community leaders in 
                                                 
168 The Malaysian Othman Abdul Razak is not accepted as a facilitator by the Aquino government. Officially, no 
reasons are given for this, allowing the media to speculate that the government suspects him of having a biased 
standing towards the rebels. 
169 About 30 to 40 thousand people gathered in Marawi City during a rally organized on 22 November 2010 by 
Bangsamoro Solidarity Action for Peace and Justice. They issued a manifesto that cited the “bleak developments” in 
the negotiations as their reason for asking the MILF to quit the talks. stating, “Toward this end, we now strongly urge 
the  MILF  and  its  leadership  to  withdraw  from  the  peace  negotiations  with  the  GRP  and  revert  to  the  original 
aspiration and stand on which the Bangsamoro liberation movement was founded more than four decades ago: The 
political independence of the Bangsamoro nation from the Philippine state” (Lacson 2010). 
170 Apart from its humanitarian approach, the campaign also identified the following groups as enemies of the state 
and  threats  to  national  security: the  Communist  Party  of the  Philippines  and  its  negotiating  arm,  the National 
Democratic  Front;  the Moro  Islamic  Liberation  Front;  the Abu  Sayyaf  Group and  its  foreign  ally,  the Jemaah 
Islamiyah;  Moro  rebel  groups;  and  the  private  armed  groups,  including  armed  civilian  auxiliary  groups  being 
maintained by politicians and influential personalities. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the planning and coordination when carrying out Civil-Military Operations, meaning operations 
to gain the maximal civil support for military operations. Around this time, it became publicly 
known that Umbra Kato had left the MILF, taking about 1,000 fighters with him to form his own 
rebel group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Militiamen held responsible for 
the Maguindanao massacre (Gomez 2011) also joined the group, accusing the MILF of having 
abandoned its original demand for independence.
171 This, however, became only a marginal issue 
at the February meeting in Kuala Lumpur, where the MILF withdrew its proposal submitted to 
Arroyo, and introduced a new one in which its area claims were reduced to only 7 -9% of earlier 
demands made in the MOA-AD. Further, the idea of an asymmetric state/sub-state relationship, 
taking Northern Ireland as an example, was enhanced (Wee 2011).  
The peace talks or renegotiations that have taken place since the last outbreak of violence 
have included large numbers of international and local players, as well as an increasing number 
of women and indigenous people on both sides. Amina Rasul from the Philippine Center for 
Islam and Democracy, who was named Mindanao Peace Champion by the UN-sponsored Action 
for  Conflict  Transformation  for  Peace  Programs  in  2011,  commented  on  the  increase  in  the 
number of women, wondering “what role do Muslim women play in the fashioning of peace in 
Muslim Mindanao even if many women have been appointed peace adviser and sat in GRP peace 
panels?” (Glang 2011). To discuss this issue alimat and civil society leaders held the Second 
National  Conference  of  Muslim Women  Peace Advocates  in  Zamboanga  City  from  7  to  10 
February 2011, in which 150 individuals participated, mostly women.  
All agreements between the GRP and the MILF since the return to the negotiation table 
under  the  Arroyo  government  have  served  only  to  institutionalize  the  “no  war,  no  peace” 
situation, especially the increased focus on the monitoring team, development projects, and good 
governance rather than on the solution to the conflict. The newly installed Aquino government 
announced  its  basic  willingness  to  change  the  Constitution  and  altered  its  security  plan  to 
increase human security with the help of LGUs and local leaders. At the same time, the MILF 
was declared a threat to national security. The MILF, on the other hand, proposed reducing its 
area claims in a newly drafted Comprehensive Compact to push the peace talks. 
                                                 
171 In August 2011 Kato renamed his organization Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) because the 
number of supporters had grown since the foundation of the organization and included civilian members. The goal of 
the movement is to create a puritan Islamic state. The MILF declared Kato and his supporters rebels against the 
authority of the MILF (Unson 2011). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The inclusion of a larger interest group in the peace process has a biased character. On the 
one hand, people are not able to complain any more about not being involved; on the other hand, 
this arrangement might harbor a potential for further conflicts in case each group chooses to 
defend its own interests against the others. The development might prove a disadvantage for the 
MILF  in  its  becoming  again  a  minority  in  relation  to  the  various  Muslim  groups  that  are 
supported by the government, like the MNLF and the ARMM LGUs. However, it could also be 
an  advantage  in  taking  into  consideration  the  future  and  compatibility  of  already  existing 
arrangements.  In  an  environment  in  which  family  politics  (see  chapter  two)  are  of  crucial 
importance, it might be a gain in opening the door for multifocal power structures.  
C. Conflict as a Tool of Stabilization 
1. Family Feuds (Ridos)   
  Whereas the violent conflict on the national level has been defined as a process of “de-
embedding”  (“Entbettung”),  violence  on  the  local  level  is  “socially  embedded”  (“sozial 
eingebettet”)  (Elwert  2004;  Zürcher  2004:  102).  It  follows  certain  cultural  patterns  and 
institutionalized  forms  (Bierschenk  2004:  186).  Ridos  aim  not  at  changing  of  society  but  at 
stabilizing it. They strengthen local norms and cultural patterns, whereas the national conflict 
tends to destabilize national norms and patterns. 
  Ridos were already a part of the Maranao social structure when the American colonial 
forces arrived. Magdalena quotes a comment of General Leonard Wood: “If this intense family 
fighting can be stopped, great  progress  can be  made by this  people, but  they are  constantly 
fighting with each other” (Wood, 12 August 1903, in Magdalena 2002: 33). General Pershing, 
after seeing that all Moro villages had kotas (forts), which varied in strength according to the 
power of the local chief, observed that they were actually built to protect “themselves and their 
property from covetous neighbors” (Magdalena 2002: 34). Mednick (1965) noted that Maranaos 
would usually not leave the area of their relatives without being accompanied or armed since they 
feared becoming victims of a family feud (see Mednick 1965: 359; Saber and Tamano 1985-
1986: 118). Mednick said of Maranao society at this time that “lack of effective authority beyond 
the kin group, endemic conflict, and an absence of permanent or cohesive social groupings thus 
continually threatened the continuity of community life” (p. 363). Gonzales (2000) emphasizes 
that ridos actually refer to “the traditional Moro mode of ‘dispute settlement’ that has boosted the 
Maranao reputation for belligerence” (p. 88). However, conflict settlement includes not only the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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mobilization of the extended family in order to execute revenge on the culprit or his extended 
family, but also peaceful means, like payment of blood money or forgiving (see chapter two).  
  The institutionalization of ridos as a measure for solving conflicts stems from the belief 
that every clan must have a “robust member” — someone who has already killed (Matuan 2007: 
93) — in order to earn the respect of the society. This signifies that being able to defend oneself 
by violent means does earn the respect of others. It is said that Maranaos prefer death to soiled 
honor (Disoma 1999: 183). In addition, those Maranaos “who have no maratabat” (status-honor) 
and would not revenge the killing of a relative, even by hiring a killer, or defend their relatives, 
are looked down upon as marata a taw, meaning “bad/low people” who do not have kinship ties 
and thus any social standing (Seagoing 2000: 223). It consequently may be difficult to avoid 
becoming involved in a rido. When a close relative has participated in a killing, the revenge can 
also comprise the extended family, and one might have to be from a very powerful clan or group 
not to be bothered or to move away from the area to avoid being included, maybe thereby losing 
status.  
2. Ridos and Elections 
 
Graphic 5: Frequency of ridos in Lanao del Sur from 1994 to 2005 
Source: Matuan (2007: 79). 
  An Asian Foundation study from 2007 on ridos from the 1990s up to 2005 in Muslim 
Mindanao shows that the number of ridos grows in times of elections. The chart above indicates 
the frequency of ridos between 1994 and 2005 in Lanao del Sur. It is striking that there are two 
maximum  points  and  both  correlate  with  either  local  barangay  (1994)  or  national  (2005) 
elections. The outbreaks of war in 2000 and 2003 had neither an augmenting nor a decreasing 
effect. 
46 
25  25  25  30 
16 
23 
32  36  33 
86 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
159 
Mednick (1965) mentions as causes of ridos disputes over “land, killings, thefts, bodily 
injuries,  soiled  honor,  and  fancied  grievances,”  but  not  disputes  over  political  positions. 
According to Matuan (2007), conflicts over political positions are nevertheless the reasons for 
most ridos in present times (p. 79). Even for small posts like barangay captain, there are bloody 
fights. In some cases, those persons who have succeeded in being elected to a lower position like 
board member (without an Internal Revenue Allotment, IRA)
172 spend more money being elected 
(there is a case in which a person spent about PHP 10 million by shelling out large sums of bribe 
money to the Commission on Election (ComElec) to tamper with the election results) than they 
would actually gain by occupying the position. But still people come to them and ask them for 
money, and if they cannot help out, they  are not re-elected, which means they have a lot of 
debt.
173 Thus, they are dependent on those higher -ranking posts that have their own IRA, like 
governor, mayor or congressman. The holders of these positions tend to give additional money to 
the lower officials who agree with their decisions. 
  The national elections in Lanao del Sur in 2010 were accompanied by several violent acts 
that the national gun ban law and the placement of the ARMM under AFP control for the election 
period  could  not  prevent.  VERA  Files,  an  online  publication  initiated  by  veteran  Filipino 
journalists “to look deeper into Philippine issues” (according to its homepage), even reports a 
worsening of violence compared to previous elections. On 20 October 2009, a bomb exploded in 
Marawi City during voter registration, killing at least one person (some say three) and injuring 
20. In Tamparan, gunmen fired indiscriminately on those who registered, injuring five people. 
Political  clans  were  accused  of  initiating  these  violent  acts.  Colonel  Ray Ardo,  chief  of  the 
Marawi-based 104
th Infantry Brigade, explains that since as a result of the automation of the 
election  process  cheating  became  more  difficult,  some  candidates  sowed  fear  so  that  people 
would not register. The kidnapping of a foreign priest for ransom was also traced to election-
related  violence,  and  was  justified  by  the  desire  to  have  enough  funding  for  the  electoral 
campaign. The MILF put pressure on the kidnappers to free the victim. 
  On Election Day, another bomb exploded in Marawi, this time not hurting anyone, and a 
shootout happened in Tugaya, in which one woman was killed and two were injured. Father Chito 
                                                 
172 IRA is a share local governments receive from the revenues of the national government.  
173 Disoma (1999) writes that a normal salary does not suffice to meet the “liberality expected of an official or 
ranking employee” (p. 73), meaning that the official has to borrow money or augment it in any other way to meet the 
expectations of the relatives. “If this income is somehow augmented and his great solvency is shown, he is given 
high valuation, but if he fails in this expectation, regardless of how morally proper he may have conducted himself as 
a Muslim, he becomes a nobody — he is looked down upon in the society.”  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Suganob, head of the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting in Marawi, reported that 
armed  confrontations  took  place  in  Tugaya  because  of  disagreements  among  candidates  and 
municipal Commission on Elections (ComElec) officials. Others reported that members of the 
Balindong and Guroalim clans initiated the shootout. A member of the Balindong family ran for 
representative of the 2
nd District in Lanao del Sur,
174 also covering Tugaya. Alber Balindong and 
Alimatar Guroalim ran for the post of municipal mayor in Tugaya (Gloria 2010a). Guroalim was 
shot dead in September 2010 while on his way to celebra te the end of Ramadan. The results of 
the 10 May 2010 elections in Tugaya, in which Alber Balindong  was the sure winner, had been 
nullified after Guroalim filed a protest. ARMM Governor Assaruddin “Hooky” Adiong appointed 
Mangawan Rinabor, a relative of both warring parties as Officer in Charge (OIC) for Tugaya on 
22 July. The wife of Guroalim, Rohamina  “Nini” Guroalim, announced  she was  running for 
mayor in place of her husband.  
  Three other persons were reported killed in an encounter between armed men and soldiers 
in Kapai. In seven towns
175 — the majority of them in the Pangampong (a traditional principality 
to the south of the lake) Unayan — elections could not take place. Among other reasons, this was 
because  the  new  precinct  count  optical  scan  machines  remained  with  the  Commission  on 
Elections in Marawi City and because the Board of Election Inspectors did not show up due to 
the climate of fear (Gloria 2010). In barangay Linamon of the town of Ramain, elections were 
reportedly peaceful but some officials went inside the polling places to see whom the voters 
chose. In those towns where elections failed, new elections had to be organized on 3 June 2010 
(they had to be repeated in ten barangays in Basilan, in the ARMM; and in one barangay in 
Western Samar, and in one in Sarangani, both outside of the ARMM). The new elections were 
again  accompanied  by  vote  buying,  allowing  some  people  speculate  that  the  repetition  of 
elections may please those getting paid for their votes. In eight other areas in Lanao del Sur,
176 
because of the irregularities, voting was scheduled for November 2010.  
  Lanao del Sur is not the only place where election-related violence could be found, but it 
is frequently mentioned. Of the 82 election-related violent incidents recorded by the Philippine 
                                                 
174 The 1
st and 2
nd Districts in Lanao del Sur were created along divisions of the traditional sultanate system. The 2
nd 
District covers the whole of Unayan and Western Masiu. The Balindongs are descendants of the Sultanate of Masiu.  
175 Bayang (Western Unayan), Lumba Bayabao, Lumbaca-Unayan (Eastern Unayan), Marogong (Western Unayan) 
Masiu, Sultan Domalondong (Eastern Unayan), and Tubaran (Western Unayan). These seven towns involve almost 
72,000 voters in 190 clustered polling precincts. 
176 The voting would take place in one barangay in Buadiposo-Buntong, six in Calanogas, four in Ganassi, ten in 
Kapai, two in Lumbatan, one in Marantao, one in Pagayawan, and three in Tugaya, involving about 12,000 voters. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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National  Police nationwide from  10 January to 9 May, only  eleven of them occurred in  the 
ARMM, among them the reported murder of six people in Lanao del Sur. In the 2007 mid-term 
balloting, 181 persons were either killed or injured in 242 polling-related attacks in the whole of 
the Philippines. During the 2004 presidential elections, the PNP recorded 140 casualties in 129 
incidents during the first 92 days of the election period (Kwok and Ramos 2010). The 2010 
elections were declared by various organizations to be the most peaceful elections so far, whereas 
others claimed that the elections had the most severe violent cases. Both attributed this mainly to 
the computerized voting, which was held for the first time in the Philippines. The Consortium on 
Electoral Reform, a non-government poll watchdog, commented: “While the number of incidents 
is relatively lower as compared to the same period in the 2007 elections, what is [disturbing] is 
the significant number of fatalities [and that] there are victims killed in almost every incident.” 
(VERA Files, 10 May 2010). 
  Since the number of ridos can grow in connection with elections, it can be speculated that 
it  is  mainly  the  rival  political  elites  who  are  triggering  a  disproportionate  number  of  ridos. 
However, it needs to be mentioned that an increase in the number of ridos does not occur during 
every election and that not every politician will be involved in a rido. Kreuzer (2007) suggests 
that violence in Mindanao in connection with elections occurs only when there is a political 
rivalry and an unstable authority that is challenged. Thus in the case of opposing political clans 
running for the same political position, violent incidents may occur. Because of the national 
conflict  situation,  the  purchase  of  weapons  and  the  founding  of  private  armies  pose  few 
difficulties, which makes violent conflicts more likely to appear. Further, since elections today 
are more frequent and office-holders are subject to term limits authority can be challenged more 
often. In times when only one group claims authority, elections can be quite peaceful. This does 
not necessarily mean that there is no vote buying, but it does mean that the number of conflicts in 
connection to politics will be limited. In the 1998 elections, for example, no dramatic increase in 
the number of ridos in Lanao del Sur was observed. 
  Additionally, not every case of election-related violence can be categorized as a rido. The 
murder of the mayor of Tugaya was judged not to involve a rido, but as portending a possible 
rido  in  case  the  relatives  of  the  mayor  sought  to  retaliate. As  can  be  seen,  election-related 
violence throughout the Philippines is not exceptional. The “no war, no peace” situation in the 
area can nevertheless lead to a culmination of violence, as in the case of the Ampatuan massacre 
(see below), which again is not necessarily defined as stemming from a rido (see also Kamlian The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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2010). As one NGO member stated, the settlement of ridos should not diminish the reasons for 
the rebellion. Whereas ridos are perceived as a problem in the area by locals as well as by non-
locals, they are not the main problem to be solved.  
 
 
Picture 7: Haram-Streamer 
The positioning of a streamer with the message “Avoid haram [things that are forbidden according to Islamic law], 
the  only  way  to  progress  and  paradise,”  by  the  Islamic  Movement  on  Electoral  Reform  for  Good  Government 
(IMERGG), beside a picture of President Arroyo surrounded by leading politicians of the ARMM, might not have 
been accidental. The founder of IMERGG was Hadji Abdullah Dalidig, former head of the National Movement for 
Free Elections chapter in Lanao del Sur who testified before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security 
that he had observed massive cheating in the 2004 elections. Photo taken by the author, 2008. 
3. Interconnections and Differences between the National and Local Levels of the Conflict 
  Recent  studies  indicate  that  ridos  have  intensified  since  the  time  of  martial  law  (see 
Seagoing 2000: 221). In most of the cases the proliferation of arms, which is an effect of the 
national conflict, is seen as a major reason. The number of loose (unlicensed) firearms in Marawi 
is estimated by governmental sources to be only about 300 (City Planning and Development 
Office, 2002). However, local NGOs estimate that every third household has firearms. Others say 
that 85% of households in Lanao del Sur possess a gun. Women have purchased majority of the 
weapons, since they are not stopped at checkpoints (Bamgbose 2003: 91).
177 
                                                 
177 In the Philippines, according to police estimates, there are about 1.3 million licensed firearms. About 600,000 are The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
163 
  The proliferation of arms, along with the questioning of the elders’ authority by young 
Moros starting in the 1970s in the framework of the rebellion, have challenged the traditional 
authority of leading datus and families. Former weak and uninfluential clans thus developed 
“new attitudes, new awareness and consciousness by their empowerment through the possession 
of modern arms and the skill to shoot guns.” They no longer believed in the invincibility and 
“invulnerability  of  the  Maranao  influential  kinship  families.”  New  elites  which  based  their 
influence on the power of the gun defined clan conflicts as a method of oppression since they 
demand the closing of ranks and “do not likely bend for subservience to the Maranao dominant 
and  strong  families  when  it  comes  to  conflict  or  social  violence”  (Seagoing  2000:  221). 
“Moreover, the proliferation of arms in the Maranao society has also unlocked violent tendencies 
from the undisciplined and delinquent Maranaos, especially the young Maranaos who are drug 
addicts, to express unpredictably their violent behavior [in] acts of social and factional violence.” 
(ibid.). These new developments did not lead to a complete falling apart of “we-groups”, even 
though there was and still is a high fractionalization. According to Elwert, material (like land) or 
immaterial resources (like honor-status) which depend on group cooperation sometimes include 
conflicts about these resources within the group. As long as there is a part of the group that is not 
systematically destroyed, the coherence of the (ethnic) group can still be maintained (2004: 35). 
Gluckman already writes in 1956 about the integrative functions of feuds.  
  The fractionalization includes an interconnection between the national conflict and family 
feuds. People involved in ridos might ask rebel groups for their support. On the other hand, rebel 
groups may be involved in ridos among each other, as had happened in June 2009 when a two-
year old  clan conflict between MILF and MNLF members escalated, leading to about 5,000 
people fleeing the area of the conflict in Maguindanao. Additionally, the main reasons for ridos 
are  politics  and  land  disputes,  which  are  also  the  two  main  issues  of  the  Muslim  rebellion 
(Matuan 2007: 78). 
  Another effect of the national conflict situation is that the markets of violence prosper, 
and because there is no real alternative since economy is poor, illegal business prospers. If one is 
rich, he can challenge local authorities. In addition, the police in Lanao del Sur enforce national 
justice only minimally most of the time, since clan members are well-armed, do they not dare to 
                                                                                                                                                              
in the hands of private citizens and the military and police hold the rest. It is further estimated that there are about 
one million unlicensed firearms. “The combined tally means there is roughly one firearm in circulation for every 40 
Filipinos” (Macaraig 2010). For the year 2007, about 93 private armies were officially identified in the country 
(Kraft 2010: 186). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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interfere when there is a conflict (Abreu 2002); or else they are in the service of leading political 
clans.  In  2002,  54  police  officers  were  employed  in  Marawi,  who  were  according  to  a  city 
brochure,  “ill  equipped  and  less  motivated.”  According  to  the  Marawi  City  Planning  and 
Development Office, the local police are too inadequately armed and understaffed to be able to 
solve a conflict. At the same time, local politicians sometimes do not want to interfere, partly 
because they fear that one party might not be satisfied with the solution, that they will be forced 
to take sides and become involved in the rido, or because the conflicting parties are not their 
relatives. When a politician is able to solve a rido, both parties will usually vote for him or her 
(Gonzales 2000: 92). In the case of a rido, a “powerful force both militarily and politically can 
mediate,” a role which among others the MILF with its sharia court system and military force 
can perfectly manage (Abreu 2002: 31). The traditional sector, namely the sultanates, often does 
not have the money or weapons to enforce traditional laws, and ridos are settled by involving 
government employees, the military, politicians, or the MILF. Some families involved in such 
conflicts are members of the MILF and consequently ask the rebel group to solve their rido. In 
some cases, the MILF has to arrange things with major political families; in other cases, it will 
work hand in hand with the family that has called upon it, depending on the case and the kinship 
connections.  
  Connection  to  a  rido  is  the  subject  of  warrior  narratives  which  are  part  of  the 
institutionalization of violence that has “taken root in Moro society as a result of centuries of 
warfare — first against the colonizers, and now against a government which is perceived as an 
extension  of  the  colonizers”  (gobyerno  a  sarwa  nga  tawo)  (Abreu/Rose  2003:  25-6).  The 
narrative is nurtured by local conceptions of being male, associated with bravery and the ability 
to defend maratabat, Islam and women. Repeatedly, local publications mention the role Muslims 
played in colonial times where they were brave fighters against the Spanish who never succeeded 
in subduing them. They also went to battle against the Americans and later against or alongside 
the Japanese. If an ancestor was a colonel or any other official in the army, he is mentioned 
proudly. Warrior narratives are not only used in connection to family feuds or the rebellion. In 
recent publications, one ancestor (apo) of each of the 16 royal houses was mentioned as having 
fought  against  and  defeated  the  Spanish  colonial  forces.
178  These  narratives  are  symbolic, 
                                                 
178 A booklet on the 16 royal houses published under the guidance of Topaan “Toni” Disomimba, Sultan sa (of) 
Masiu, stated for example that Dianaton Naim of Butig and Balindong Bezar of Masiu (Major Ancestors of the Royal 
Houses of Butig and Masiu) fought side by side with Sultan Qudarat against Spanish intruders. It is also written that 
the four ancestors of the Pat a Pangampong led the resistance in Lanao against the Spanish in 1640: Datu Alanak sa The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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designed to associate the royal houses with collective resistance and victory. In this case, the 
narrative invokes the resistance of all Filipinos against the Spanish and thus has a nationalistic 
character. A warrior narrative is also sometimes employed among women. A Bai a Labi sa (of) 
Marawi recounts: 
Even before, during the time of our ancestors, the women were already taking part 
in the activities of the communities. During the war, when this place had been 
conquered by the Spaniards the sisters of [Taringanoi], who happens to be a datu, 
fighting for the — you know this people are saving their own place, so it will not 
be taken by the Spaniards. You know you have read in our history, that the places 
they have conquered, they have to work for the Spaniards, from 16-year-old boys 
up to — But here we never served the Spaniards or the Americans. Because our 
people  fight,  usually  they  fight  against  it. And  the  women  take  part.  Because 
before I become bai a labi, I have asked those questions to the old datus. And then 
we  can  remember  the  war  during  the  First  World  War  and  even  during  the 
American time — the women cooked for the warriors. (Interview, Marawi City, 
2007) 
 
  According to a study by Capal-Guro, the MNLF rebellion was morally supported by a 
majority  of  Maranao  women  in  Marawi,  while  a  minority  provided  military,  financial,  or 
educational assistance (1996: 77).  
  MILF rebels sometimes strengthen the religious elements in combination with the warrior 
narrative, defining the rebellion in certain situations as holy war or jihad. In addition, Muslims 
dying in this war may be seen as martyrs. Men in Lanao can be heard pledging their life and 
maratabat in public for the defense of their homeland: “Kamorkaan ako o Allah sobhanaho wa 
ta’ala o bakn indaraynon so tindeg ago maratabat akn ko Islam ago so kapag inged.” (“God 
curse me if I fail in my duty to defend Islam and my homeland!”)  
  Not every Maranao employs warrior narratives. Disoma (1999) reports that some parents 
forbid their children to join the rebellion and instead prefer that they will be educated and become 
professionals (p. 91). Some refuse an offer to be trained in combat while others have been trained 
but do not join the rebellion and prefer to become professionals. In view of the devastating living 
conditions, young Maranao elites ask themselves whether it is the duty of a Muslim in Mindanao 
to support the rebellion in case it is a holy war. Many people instead support the peace movement 
based on the assumption that Islam means peace.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Baloi, Datu Pascan sa Unayan, Datu Popawan sa Bayabao, and Amiyaona Siman sa Masiu (Madale 2003: 5). Other 
authors of the booklet mention all the other major ancestors of the royal houses as having joined the resistance 
against the Spanish intruders at this time.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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4. National Politics as Family Politics and the Remaining Datu System 
  The  situation  of  social  and  economic  insecurity,  discrimination  and  lack  of  prospects 
deepened by the national conflict situation increases the importance of family, clan, and any other 
group support. Neither the introduction of a new political system by the colonial forces, nor the 
rebellion, nor religion has completely replaced the datu system, even though “new elites” and 
new groups have been established. There are three possible reasons for this. Ridos and thus the 
closing of ranks among relatives in case of conflict is one. The second is that in case of a violent 
conflict  because  of  damaged  honor,  the  non-traditional  political  and  juridical  system  cannot 
protect family or clan members. For example, people who are imprisoned might still be killed by 
avenging clans. Therefore, clan members try to strengthen the system which gives them social 
standing  and  protection,  which  means  their  own  family,  clan,  or  faction.  Seagoing  (2000) 
explains: 
The situation of revenge may alienate the Maranao individual from the Maranao 
political system. The Maranao individual knows that he cannot be protected by the 
political system in a situation of revenge. He can be protected only by his own 
family, kinship or faction group. The more powerful his own family, kinship or 
faction group – the more secure he would feel. Therefore, he gives and directs his 
own support and loyalty to help create and strengthen the power of his own family, 
kinship or faction groups. The weaker his own family, kinship or faction groups, 
the better he behaves himself to avoid being humiliated by the more dominant 
families, kinships or faction groups in the community. (p. 223)  
  A third reason is that political families are supported by the national political system. The 
best-known example here would be the Ampatuan case in Maguindanao. The Ampatuans had 
been American prot￩g￩s and several of them became ARMM governors. The family grew to 
become strong warlords in their area, feeling so invincible that they massacred the family of a 
political  opponent,  the  Magundadatus,  who  are  themselves  an  established  dynasty  that  has 
occupied political posts in Sultan Kudarat for 25 years (2010). When the Buluan vice-mayor, 
Esmael “Toto” Magundadatu, wanted to run for Maguindanao governor, he was warned that this 
might be dangerous. Thus instead of going himself, he sent female relatives in the company of 
several journalists to file his candidacy in the May 2010 elections, since women are said not to be 
targeted in clan conflicts. The cars of the relatives ran into a hold-up: 32 media workers; Esmael’s 
wife, who was the vice-mayor of the Magundadatu municipality;
179 his sister and aunt, along with 
several other people who were “accidentally” involved — a total of 57 people all in all  — were 
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killed. The main suspect, Mayor Andal Ampatuan Jr., had the support of over 100 members of his 
clan’s private army. The patriarch of the Ampatuan clan, being Maguindanao governor at this 
time; his son, Andal Junior, his supposed successor in politics; and Zaldy Ampatuan, ARMM 
governor, were suspended from Arroyo’s Lakas-Kampi-Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD)
180 
party. From 4 to 11 December
181  Maguindanao was placed under martial law ,  including the 
suspension of the writ of  habeas corpus for those people who were charged with rebellion. The 
justification for this measure was that a high  number of heavily armed gunmen loyal to the 
Ampatuans had threatened to attack security forces and civilians if the clan chiefs were taken into 
custody. Several persons were charged with rebellion, among them Andal Ampatuan Sr., as well 
as members of his private army. Murder cases were additionally prepared against them. 
  The ICG warned that branding the massacre as a rido, as was widely done in the media, 
would diminish the role of the government “in allowing a local despot to indulge his greed and 
ambition,  including  through  building  up  a  private  army  in  the  name  of  fighting  insurgents” 
(Abbott  and  D￡valos  2009).  Norodin  Alonto  Lucman  writes  about  the  culture  of  impunity 
according to which political motivated killings, specifically those of journalists, throughout the 
Philippines
182 remain unsolved since “corrupt officials and landlords” continue protecting their 
power through violence (Lucman 2008: 456). Several national and international civil society 
organizations blamed the Philippines for its high number of extra -juridical killings since 2001 
(Kraft 2010: 287). The World Bank noted a decline in the rule of law in the country, especially 
since the end of the 1990s. In the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, the rule of law 
indicator dropped from 52.9 to 39.7 between 1998 and 2008 (Mogato 2010).
183 This may be a 
result of the further privatization of the executive under the Arroyo  government but was also an 
effect of anti-terror laws. The formation of private armies throughout the Philippines was widely 
criticized by human rights groups, describing the high number of extra-juridical killings in the 
Philippines as an outcome of a culture of impunity serving the political elites.  
  The Maguindanao massacre was seen as one outcome of this general culture of impunity. 
The Ampatuan clan had established a private army in order to protect its members against the 
                                                 
180 Lakas means power in Tagalog; KAMPI is the acronym of Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of the Free 
Filipino). 
181 Martial law was lifted on 11 December, just before a joint session of Congress was to vote on the constitutionality 
of the proclamation. 
182 In the year 2010, the Philippines attained third place on the New York Committee to Protect Journalist’s Impunity 
Index. This list spotlights countries  where journalists are  murdered regularly and  governments  fail  to solve the 
crimes.  
183 Indicators are on a scale of 1 to 100; the lower the number, the less the rule of law is upheld. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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MILF. In 2006, Arroyo issued E.O. 546, under which public funds could be used to support and 
maintain  a  private  security  force.  E.O.  546  directs  the  Philippine  National  Police  (PNP)  to 
undertake  active  support  of  the  AFP  in  internal  security  operations  for  the  suppression  of 
insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The document states that the PNP is 
authorized  to  deputize  barangay  tanods  (volunteers,  or  “village  watches”),  also  known  as 
Civilian  Volunteers  (CVOs)
  —  unarmed  volunteers  for  community  self-defense,  like 
neighborhood watches — as force multipliers in the implementation of the peace and order plan 
in  the area,  which included arming them. Some activists  saw  this  measure as  a tool for the 
legalization of private armies. As a reaction to bad experiences under the Marcos government, 
private armies are explicitly forbidden in the 1987 Constitution (Art. 18, Sec. 24).
184 However, 
after the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, the Arroyo government 
authorized the arming of selected members of the CVOs in high security risk areas (Kraft 2010: 
194). E.O. No. 546 enforced this law. It was issued days after a media debate broke out about 
heavily armed CVOs being employed by Governor Zaldy Ampatuan in order to protect himself 
from supposed MILF attacks. President Aquino promised at the beginning of his term to revoke 
this E.O. (Arguillas 2006).  
  The trial of the Ampatuans was, beginning in August 2010, frequently delayed. According 
to  a report of Human  Rights Watch  issued two  months  earlier, witnesses  who had not  been 
included in the witness protection program since they were part of Ampatuan’s private army were 
killed. Shortly after this, the Aquino government improved the witnesses’ protection. Esmael 
“Toto”  Magundadatu  won  the  election  for  Maguindanao  governor  in  2010  and  the ARMM 
governorship went to Vice-Governor Adiong-Alonto from Lanao del Sur. The Ampatuans were 
nevertheless  among  the  biggest  winners  in  the  2010  elections,  winning  15  local  posts  in 
Maguindanao, among them one representative, eight mayors, and six vice-mayors. 
  It is an open secret that national elections are partly won in Muslim Mindanao since datus 
can provide the needed votes.
185 In the 1980s, Mohamad Ali Dimaporo boasted that he could 
                                                 
184 The 1987 Constitution provides, however, the possibility of a Citizen Armed Force mandate in E.O. No. 264. On 
this basis, in 1991, the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) were founded as an integral part of the 
AFP reserve forces. The reserve then, chosen by local politicians and businessmen, was enrolled in company-sized 
units, the CAFGU Active Auxiliary. Neglecting the high number of human rights violations which accompanied their 
formation,  the  CAFGU  were  seen  as  “important  parts  of  the  Philippine  Defence  System”  and  its  use  more 
economical than increasing the number of recruits of the AFP; their number thus increases and decreases with the 
state of negotiations with the NPA and the MNLF/MILF (Kraft 2010: 191-3). 
185 The “Hello Garci” scandal in the 2004 elections is one incident in regard to which there are speculations about the 
importance of Mindanao in national elections.  “Hello Garci” refers to a taped conversation supposedly between The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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deliver  votes  for  Malacañang  (Bentley  2007:  259).  In  the  2007  senatorial  elections,  all  12 
candidates  whom Arroyo  had backed for senator won in  Maguindanao.  In the 2008 ARMM 
elections, the Lakas-Kampi-CMD
186 candidates were re-elected as governor and vice-governor. 
In addition, the 2010 election results transmitted to the ComElec central server included results 
from  nine  ghost  precincts  in  Lanao  del  Sur.  Of  these  votes,  the  mayoral  candidate  Usman 
Sarangani from Lakas-Kampi got 90% (808) and Governor Mamintal “Bombit” Alonto Adiong, 
also from Lakas-Kampi, 79% (705). The representative of the 2
nd District, Pangalian Balindong, 
of  Lakas-Kampi  got  599  votes  whereas  only  199  were  credited  to  former  Representative 
Benasing  Macarambon  of  the  Nacionalista  Party.  In  the  presidential  race,  Senator  Benigno 
“Noynoy” Aquino led with 328 votes, former Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro followed with 
285, and Senator Manuel Villar with 161 (Rosau 2010). 
  Strong political families, serving as buffers against rebel groups and being able to provide 
needed  votes,  are  thus  of  advantage  for  Manila  politicians.  However,  as  McCoy  (2007) 
demonstrates, political families cannot only be found in the Muslim areas. The 2010 election 
results showed that political dynasties are rampant in the Philippines since “[i]n at least 34 of the 
country’s 80 provinces, political families won tandem posts — one family member winning as 
governor and another as representative — in a new configuration that will give them a lock on 
power for years to come” (VERA Files, 14 May 2010). 
Lanao is thus no exception, but it has its special form of datu-ship, influenced by the “no 
war,  no  peace”  situation.  The  Adiongs,  Alontos,  Balindongs,  and  Dimaporos  are  especially 
important in the area, because they have dynasties that have been established for several decades. 
All  of them belong to the traditional political  elite and have royal  ancestry. Their dynasties, 
especially since the introduction of limited terms (three terms at the mayoral level), also include 
women, taking turns in exercising power with their husbands, fathers, or sons. These forms of 
dynasty can be found particularly on the mayoral level. The Disomimbas in Tamparan are one 
example where husband and wife take turns as mayor. Topaan “Toni” Disomimba is the Sultan sa 
Masiu and the chairman of the 16 Royal Houses of the Pat a Pangampong (Four Principalities). 
Since 2007, the Royal Houses are recognized by the government as peace advisers and receive an 
annual  subvention.  Dynasties  are  further  strengthened  by  intermarriages  between  different 
                                                                                                                                                              
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and election commissioner Virgilio Garcillano wherein the women's voice is asking to 
ensure a lead of at least one million votes over her rival. To realize this wish, the regional election director (RED) of 
the ARMM was said to have been tapped. The ARMM later on was called the “cheating capital” of the Philippines.  
186 Lakas-CMD and Kampi were the biggest parties in the Philippines in 2008; they merged in June of that year. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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political clans having in many cases a royal background. The marriage patterns partly follow the 
sultanate structures where the royal houses have stabilized their leadership via intermarriages 
with other royal houses. The connection between the sultanate system and the present form of 
governance in the “no war, no peace” situation will be the focus of the debate in the second 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
Out of a sense of historical wrongs and an increasing national awareness after World War 
II, Moro rebels de-embedded themselves from the national state. The insurgency strengthened 
directly or indirectly alternative state structures in the form of rebel camps  and the sultanate 
system, but also the markets of violence. A de-embedded non-war situation can be defined as a 
“no war, no peace” environment when war characteristics dominate the area and, among other 
things, are institutionalized through stalled peace talks. The Mindanao conflict  has lasted for 
several decades and it can be defined as a situation in-between peace and war in which neither 
constitutes the “norm.” This is of special importance to ethnographic research since it provides 
the possibility of understanding violence as part of cultural dynamics, not only regarding how 
peace and war are defined but also to what extent the current situation is used and misused to 
constitute them. In considering the local, national, and international links, it becomes obvious that 
the cultural dynamics are not isolated. Family feuds, even though locally fought, are connected to 
national circumstances, like elections or the challenge of traditional leadership as a consequence 
of the rebellion and the proliferation of arms. The settlement of ridos became a matter of “peace 
and  order”  on  the  national  and  international  levels.  However,  ridos  acquire  their  main 
signification on the local level. Indeed, they are part of conflict settlements between clans and 
serve to stabilize the clan and datu system. The idea that by solving family feuds through the 
revival of the traditional system, “peace and order” would come to the area is contradictory. On 
the one hand, the efforts of re-traditionalization can be misused in a divide and rule policy and 
can be a potential source of violence by creating conflicts of interest. On the other hand, this 
conception  ignores  rebellion  and  ridos  as  causes  of  violence:  rebellion  reflects  a  political 
confrontation,  while  ridos  belong  to  cultural  dynamics  that  render  them  part  of  a  relative 
autonomous process. They are not, however, immunized against alien influences, notably those 
arising  from  political  issues. Thus,  the  frequency  and  severity  of  ridos  has  increased  in  the 
national conflict and through the national political system, which includes political violence in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the form of private armies. These forms of violence will not stop by applying the traditional 
means of conflict-solving. Political clans involved in ridos are too powerful, among other ways 
through their support by the national government as a measure to counter the rebellion.  
 
 
Photo 8: Entrance to Lanao del Sur 
Amai Pakpak Avenue, which extends from Iligan City to Marawi City, at the entrance to Lanao del Sur. Checkpoints 
cluster this road, which are occupied in case of red alert. Along the highway are military facilities of the AFP and in 
Marawi City the AFP Camp Ranao can being found in barangay Datu Saber. Under the Joint Special Operations 
Task Force (JSOTF)-Balikatan, U.S. military facilities are also part of this camp. Photo taken by the author, 2008. 
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Chapter Two: The Lineage System, the Importance of Status, and 
the Revival of the Sultanates 
Introduction 
Tradition,  according  to  Shils  (1981),  preserves  and  conveys  the  great  bodies  “of 
knowledge  and  skill”  that  have  been  developed  over  time  (p.  8).  It  further  constitutes  a 
mechanism of transmission (Armstrong 1982: 71; see also Jacobs 2007). This transmission is not 
static because traditions change by adapting to social developments. This perception of tradition 
can be found within the concept of multiple modernities: 
 
The  realization  that  modernity  is  not  a  project  but  one  encompassing  many 
possibilities of development places tradition in a unique situation of facilitating 
social change by readjusting cultural practices. In a sense, such change does not 
destroy  traditions  but  redefines  them  through  innovative  actions  to  produce  a 
modern context not shorn of traditions. Thus, multiple modernities guarantee the 
continuity of tradition  but  not  necessarily in  its original  form. The concept  of 
diversity emphasizes the localization of modernity in which diverse traditions do 
not  disappear  completely,  but  are  transformed  or  absorbed  into  new  forms  of 
thought  and  action.  In  effect,  it  is  this  diversity  that  determines  the  multiple 
trajectories of the modernity project. (Lee 2006: 363; emphasis original) 
 
Following  George Klute’s  idea of heterarchy  (2007),  I define  the traditional sultanate 
system in Lanao (Pat a Pangampong sa Ranao, the four principalities of Lanao) as one element 
of many, among them the national state, in a complex power structure, each searching for more 
influence — or at least a stabilization of it. In describing its mythical origins and developments 
and in particular the consequences of the “no war, no peace” situation on this system, the Pat a 
Pangampong  will  be  defined  as  part  of  historical  and  current  processes.  The  revival  of  the 
sultanate  system  and  the  state’s  and  civil  society’s  increasing  recognition  of  it  and  financial 
support for it can be described as the result of three main developments: first, the emic search for 
more influence in the form of an alternative governance to the national system, which is seen as 
corrupt and headed by foreigners; secondly, the symbolic and, since 2007, financial support by 
governmental  officials  of  the  sultanates  as  an  alternative  to  the  rebellion;  and  thirdly,  the 
recognition  and  financial  support  of  the  traditional  system  as  an  effective  measure  in  the 
resolution of local conflicts by international development organizations.  
The  traditional  sultanate  system  never  vanished  even  though  it  declined  in  (state) 
authority. The reasons why it remained are manifold, but one of them is that it is functional in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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solving local conflicts (ridos). Additionally, the clan and family system is deeply connected to the 
sultanate system and its system of maratabat (status honor). Political clans are, as described in 
the previous chapter, indirectly supported by the state system, which is often defined as cacique 
democracy  (see  Anderson  1988).  Whereas  initially  the  independent  Filipino  government 
discouraged  the  sultanate  system,  its  representatives  were  symbolically  recognized  as  a 
countermovement to the rebellion in the 1970s and 1980s. Recently, members of the sultanates 
have become official advisers of the government, which has recognized their role as peacekeepers 
in  the  area.  This  development  can  be  seen  as  a  strategic-political  reaction  by  the  national 
government  to  the rebellion as  well  as  participation in  a  global  movement of  the  revival  of 
traditions since the 1990s and the end of the Cold War.  
  Discussing the sultanate system in Lanao del Sur requires considering its mythical origins 
as a lineage society, its descent from Prophet Mohammad, but also its connections to the social 
organization of datu-ships and clans on which it was superimposed. This reveals traces of a social 
form of “competitive equality” (Toren 1990). Being a sultan or a bai a labi (the highest female 
royal title, literally “highest woman,” this title is the counterpart to sultan) is predominantly the 
result  not  of  a  birthright  but  of  many  other  factors  leading  to  election  by  clan  elders.  The 
authority of titleholders among clan members only remains with the continuous maintenance of 
supporters, be it via “patron-client” relationships or financial contributions and conflict settling. 
Influence should consequently not be confused with carrying a title, which in many cases serves 
as a mere status symbol in a status- and honour-oriented society.  
  Whereas the sultanate system declined in lieu of the national political system, fusions can 
be observed between the two. Geographically, ancient area divisions became part of the new 
administrative divisions and sultanates adapted to the barangay structure. Many of the political 
elites elected in the post-independence period were from the royalty. Their election to public 
office  legitimized  their  traditional  power  positions  and  hence  the  traditional  social  structure 
remains important today. In most cases, the traditional elites have the power, the followers, and 
the money to win elections. Politicians who have a royal background and come from what is 
locally defined as “good people” do not necessarily have a royal title anymore, but others whose 
royal  background  is  not  that  strong  may  acquire  a  title  in  order  to  legitimize  their  political 
position traditionally. Still others with political ambitions and the lineage but a lack of money and 
power  first  become  titleholders  to  establish  their  traditional  and  also  their  national  support, 
because it is presumed that politicians in Manila think titleholders are influential. The political The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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influence of traditional elites was temporarily interrupted through an increasing influence of the 
MNLF  and  religious  parties,  especially  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  but  soon  returned  at  the 
beginning of the  twenty-first  century. The mythical  origins  of  and  changes  in  the traditional 
system are described in this chapter in order to contribute to the broader debate on movements of 
revival of traditions (Br￤uchler 2007; Henley and Davidson 2007; Hirtz 2003; Klinken 2007; 
Kohl 2006). The revival of the sultanates in Lanao cannot be placed within the framework of 
“global indigenous movements,”
187 which I have found to be of marginal importance in this case. 
Royalties do not refer to a general indigenousness nor to the Indigenous  People’s Rights Act 
included in the Philippine constitution in 1997.
188 Of more importance are local norms of conflict 
resolution designed to bring peace and order to the area. Similar attempts to revive traditional 
structures connected to royalty (datus, rajas, or sultanates) in order to solve conflicts can be 
observed  in  Indonesia,  for  example  in  the  Kei  islands  of  southeastern  Maluku  or  in  South 
Sulawesi (Henley and Davidson 2007: 18). In Lanao, this task is seen as insufficiently being 
fulfilled by politicians who even contribute to an increase in local violence through conflicts over 
political positions. The question of this study is hence why there has been a revival of Lanao 
sultanates, what is their relationship to the “no war, no peace” environment, and what are the 
possible effects of external financial support on internal social order, including gender relations. 
I. The Lineage System 
A. Pat a Pangampong sa Ranao 
1. The Salsila 
The ways of the ancestors (andang sa muna) are manifested in pre-Islamic epic poems 
like the Darangen, which comprises several volumes in its published English version and evokes 
the mystical realm of Bumbaran. Parts of it are quoted on special occasions and qualities of 
leadership — particularly bravery (Macarampat 2008) — are traced back by traditionalists to the 
time of the leaders in Bumbaran. Tawagon (1987) connected this to the concept of anonen a 
rawaten  (the  height  of  emulation),  meaning  that  the  ways  of  the  ancestors  are  worthy  of 
emulation and that “any event or ceremony has a justification in the past” (1987: 23):  
                                                 
187 Following Morgan, the global indigenous movement can be defined as “the discourse and movement aimed at 
advancing the rights and status of indigenous peoples worldwide” (2007: 278). 
188 For the debate on the relationships between indigenous rights movement and Moros, see Eder and McKenna 
(2004). Worth mentioning in this connection is the existence of two separate offices for the affairs of indigenous 
people and Muslims since 1987. The two groups are thus treated differently by the government.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The claim that their ancestors really exist and the events  actually happened is 
supported by their genealogy or chain of descent lines which links the present 
generation  of  Maranaos  to  the  characters  in  the  narrative  and  the  epic  [the 
Darangen and other local folk tales] on the one hand and Sarips Kabungsoan and 
Alawi [supposed descendants of Prophet Mohammad] on the other hand. (ibid: 36) 
Maranao history and society are thus very much connected to salsila (genealogy). Every 
royal  family  has  its  own  salsila.  Traditionally  the  specialists  on  family  genealogy,  the 
pananalsila, kept the salsila secret. In the past, if someone wanted to know more about his salsila 
he or she would have to sacrifice a carabao (water buffalo) and would be informed only when 
meeting with the expert in a place designed to prevent eavesdropping by means of a blanket 
covering the two of them. Interviewees related that they were not told about the salsila since they 
“like to talk much”. 
  There were several reasons given for keeping the salsila of a family hidden from the 
public.  One  is  that  through  the  publication  of  the  salsila,  the  secrets  of  a  family  would  be 
revealed, for example intermarriages with people from witch-clans or descendants of slaves. A 
datu explains: 
Dagamot, sorceress, clans practicing sorcery are also mentioned in the salsila, if 
someone wants to marry a girl whose background is unknown, then the keeper of 
the  salsila  will  be  asked  to  check  the  salsila  to  determine  where  she  belongs 
among the families. The keeper will check the document under absolute discretion 
and confidence. In the old days, a keeper is isolated in an area covered on four 
sides by a tent or cloth so as to give him privacy upon examining the document. 
Because not the whole community should know who are the sorcerers. Only the 
sultan knows and the keeper of the salsila. The sorcerers are protected since they 
can also be used for healing, etc. If the keeper finds out that the girl’s clan is 
kialilidan sa bangsa (one whose bloodline is suspect) or belongs to the family who 
practice witchcraft, then the family of the groom is advised not to push through 
with the marriage. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
Monalinda Doro (2007) writes that an investigation into family lineage might be considered a 
serious offense and an affront to the family's maratabat (p. 240). The questioning thus has to be 
done in a private atmosphere and diplomatically. Another reason to keep a salsila secret is that it 
is an expression of a society in which one has access to influence and authority in large part via 
descent lines. In keeping genealogies secret, or rather restricted among the elders, no person can 
claim a title if not really related to title-holders or at least accepted as such by the elders. If not 
kept  secret,  this  would  reduce  the  influence  of  the  elders.  Genealogical  connections  are 
nevertheless shown or talked about in public on special occasions like weddings or in recent 
times through publications. Some Maranao royalty publish their personal genealogies as proof of The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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their rightful claim when enthroned. These can, in one way or the other, be modified salsilas (see 
Majul 1999). 
Leadership of the royal houses in Lanao takes its legitimation from two main lines of 
ancestry. One is  that of  the Shariefs  (descendants  of the Prophet  Mohammad who stayed in 
Mindanao),  and  in  particular  Sharief  Kabungsoan,  who  brought  the  sultanate  system  to 
Maguindanao  and  who  is  said  to  have  been  a  descendant  of  Prophet  Mohammad.  In  some 
Maranao genealogies, the line of Sharief Kabungsoan is traced back to the 12 imams, the Prophet 
Mohammad, and Adam and Eve. The second line of importance is the one of local datus and 
Rajah Indarapatra, the first ruler in Lanao, who originally came from Mantapoli, an ancient state 
in Malaysia. Rajah Indarapatra is sometimes traced back to the Sultan of Istanbul and the Sultan 
of Istanbul to an ancestor of Prophet Mohammad. Some sultans also refer to Alexander the Great 
as their ancestor, similarly to the royal houses in Aceh, Indonesia. 
According to Mednick (1965), it was mainly women who guarded the salsila. He writes: 
“The actual recording of genealogical details in the form of a salsila is the task of those who are 
felt to be maongangan (wise). These are older persons and most usually are female” (p. 145). 
One interviewee, a sultan, related that his father wrote the salsila of his family. The father handed 
it to his wife who gave it to her sister. The sister later transferred it to the interviewee, and he will 
leave it to one of his daughters, who are both titleholders. In most cases, the salsila was guarded 
by women; this might, however, be different from sultanate to sultanate. 
Whereas the salsila was traditionally written in Arabic letters, there are now salsilas based 
on the Latin alphabet. Salsilas are never the same: each one adds some siblings or erases them, 
names ancestors only by their titles or their names, or exchanges the order of descendants. Family 
salsilas include only certain lineages; thus, no salsila comprises every descent line. Recently, 
however, there are publications that connect the most important lineages, bringing them into one 
order, like in Macarampat’s book (2008), which is taken by many royalties as a reference when 
they have to give public speeches. The author published the genealogy in the Maranao language, 
comprising  the  whole  sultanate  system.  It  starts  with  Adam  and  Eve,  includes  the  Prophet 
Mohammad, and ends with the naming of the first apos (lineage/founding ancestors) of the royal 
houses in Lanao. It is interesting to notice that in this public genealogy, the descent lines of the 
royalties and the Shariefs are separated; direct connections are not drawn between the two lines. 
In addition, this salsila stops several generations in the past. Thus, there is still room for secret 
knowledge,  and  family  genealogies  remain  of  importance.  Simultaneously,  there  is  room  for The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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“modifications,” leading to rumors that some royal titles are “bought,” for example via a strategic 
marriage with a woman from an influential clan.  
Women as well as men are part of the salsilas, women primarily as marriage partners and 
daughters, who can transfer claims to important male and female titles but also as ancestors 
through whom the descent to the founding ancestor is claimed. An exclusively male lineage, 
without  the  spouses,  can  only  be  found  among  the  claimed  Arabic  ancestors  from  outside 
Mindanao,  going  back  to  the  daughter  of  the  Prophet  Mohammad  and  then  to  Mohammad 
himself. In genealogies of a clan every member, male or female, within the last five generations 
is mentioned. It is important to notice that women, even though they marry exogamously, are still 
seen as part of the clan, as through their marriage outside the clan support of their marriage 
partner’s relatives can be expected and vice versa. Women and men marrying outside of their 
lineage in bilateral lineage systems are recognized as important links, particularly if there are 
children who belong to both lineages. 
  Knowledge of the salsila by titleholders varies. Most minor titleholders, male or female, 
did not know more than the connection to their elders, clan, and maybe the first titleholder of 
their  own  title,  especially  when  the  former  titleholder  was  in  the  parents’  or  grandparents’ 
generation. They leave to the specialists the duty to trace back their genealogy any further. Others 
say that descent lines have lost their importance, for example in connection to marriages, which 
today are only limited in so far as a Maranao should be married to a Maranao, no matter what the 
exact descent lines. In a lot of cases, titleholders complained about a lack of interest by the 
younger generation in the traditional system. They accuse the youth of being more focused on 
Western education and political positions and regret that they are not able to read the salsila when 
it is written in “old Malay” or Arabic.  
2. The Four Principalities 
The  sultanate  system  in  Lanao  is  named  Pat  a  Pangampong  sa  Ranao
189,  the  four 
principalities or encampments of the lake. The division of the area around Lake Lanao into four 
entities is explained through descent lines that go back to four brothers. The ancestors of these 
brothers  came  from  the  mythical  realm  of  Bumbaran.
190  The  heroes  of  the  Darangen  are 
                                                 
189 According  to  Madale  (1997),  pangampong  is  derived  from  the  Portuguese  word  “Kampong,”  which  means 
settlement and was adopted by trading Maranaos around 1511 (p. 22). 
190 Mednick in 1965 similarly traced back the mystical origin of the Pat a Pangampong to the Darangen. However, 
he did not mention any kinship relations among the founders of the Pat a Pangampong, letting the local descent lines The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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descendants of Rajah Indarapatra, who is said to have been the first to reside in Lanao, ruling 
over the Aetas
191, who are defined as  “pagans.” There are slightly different accounts  of how 
Rajah Indarapatra came to Lanao. The following, based on a speech of Sultan sa Marinaot, will 
serve as one example.  
  Rajah Indarapatra came to Lanao to look for a lost brother. From a tree spirit, he learned 
that his brother had been killed by the monster Omakaan, and how he could defeat it. After Rajah 
Indarapatra killed the monster, the people came out of their hiding places and he named the place 
Bumbaran, which means “starting life.” He married a water nymph named Raina Laut, and built a 
house in Masiu. They had two children, one of them could not be seen and became the ancestor 
(apo) of the tonong (spirits who are believed to be benevolent). The other child came to be the 
apo of Bumbaran, of which Diwatan Tanda o Gibon sa Ilian a Bumbaran was the first ruler or 
“Ayonan” (Cali and Manalising 1983: 27). The two sons of Indarapatra declared that the tonong 
would help and protect the Maranaos and that the Maranaos would have to hold ceremonies for 
them in return (Disoma 1999: 108-09).  
  The Darangen describes the rise and fall of Bumbaran over four generations. The last 
ruler under which Bumbaran prospered was Pasandalan a Morog, who married Aya Paganay Bai 
sa Kodaraan a Lna. They begot the four brothers who first inhabited the four principalities of 
Lanao. They were out on a hunting trip when Bumbaran was destroyed as a punishment by the 
Muslim missionary Sharief Aulis, who came to the kingdom but was rejected because “who could 
be higher than the Ayonan?” (Cali and Unte 1983: 140). Of the initial five brothers who survived, 
also  named  the  Five  Datus,  one  “went  north,”  while  Butuanun  Kalinan  stayed  in  Dagodob 
(today’s Bayabao),
192 Dimaampao Kalinan in Marogong (today’s Unayan), Batara di Kilatn in 
Maganding (today’s Masiu),
193 and Amerogong Topaan in Mimbisa (today’s Baloi). The four 
brothers married four sisters who were also descendants of Rajah Indarapatra. Some generations 
later  the  heirs  of  the  datus  met  to  define  the  boundaries  by  naming  the  Pat  a  Inged  a 
Kiyasosoludaan  o  Bangsa  o  Pat  a  Pangampong  sa  Ranao  (places  of  intersection  or 
                                                                                                                                                              
just “appear” in the genealogy, which was mainly focused on the Kabungsoan line, the line of descent that is said to 
go back to Prophet Mohammad. 
191 An indigenous group in the Philippines. 
192 Bayabao is referred to as “the one who chooses first,” since it was Butuanan Kalinan who first chose his abode 
(Madale 1997: 75). 
193 Masiu is described as “a place where Lanao's royal bloods meet” (Madale 1997: 75). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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demarcation)
194 and to arrange the taritib (order) of the Pat a Pangampong. They also gave the 
principalities their names. They met in Sawir, Masiu, where there are still three stones (telo a 
dibarosan)  to  mark  the  meeting  place.  Baloi  is  the  only  principality  that  does  not  have  a 
Demarcation Sultanate and it is said that the representative of Baloi did not join the meeting 
because he was in Maguindanao for a visit. Others state that Dilion of Baloi or Batolakongan, a 
grandchild  of Amerogong Topaan  of  Baloi,  had  been  there,  that  there  is  no  boundary  since 
Bayabao and Baloi are from the same lineage, and that they were connected in the name of 
kingginawa-i (friendship) and thus did not need boundaries.  
  The three heirs who are frequently mentioned to have met in Sawir are Pascan of Unayan, 
Popawan of Bayabao, and Amiyalongan Simban of Masiu. The regulation of the boundaries was 
sealed with a pledge on the Qur’an, of which every region has its own name (Dibolodan in 
Bayabao, Kiraat in Baloi, Maradika in Masiu, and Mokadam in Unayan). Certain rituals and a 
curse were spoken over every person who broke the vow by stealing a title or property. Sultan sa 
Butig explains:  
When they were about to swear and make their pledge, that they will not take any 
property  and  the  like  that  are  not  lawful  to  them,  they  did  the  following: 
(1) (tinimbakan)  they  had  gunfire;  (2)  (piyarngan  sa  solo)  they  put  off  light; 
(3) (linilayan sa gi) they hung hay leaves; (4) (biyotosan sa alad) they ripped out a 
fence; (5) (biyomboran sa ombi) they sprinkled ash; (6) (pisaan sa oraka manok) 
they broke chicken eggs; (7) (tipdan sa balagn) they cut rattan; and (8) (sindagan 
sa  odang a pmasipsik)  they  roasted live shrimps  [symbolizing that  any  of the 
descendants who broke the vow would be cursed like an egg that breaks]. They 
did these rituals and likewise four (pamalian) curses were identified so that if a 
person  broke  the  pledge,  and  went  against  the  taritib  [order]  of  the  four 
principalities of Lanao, they would invoke Allah that this person might suffer the 
four  dreaded  wraths.  These  wraths  were  identified  as  follows:  bgaw 
(leprosy/ungainly  appearance)  in  Unayan,  songkor  (severe  vomiting,  stomach 
pains,  and  diarrhea)  in  Masiu,  na-as  (destruction)  or  gapn  (black  magic)  in 
Bayabao, and taryan (insanity) in Baloi. This made these datus united during their 
time and live peacefully in their community. They compared the existence of our 
ancestors to water that is cool, undisturbed, and peaceful in Lanao. (Speech given 
in  2008,  Marawi  City,  translated  by  Montia  Jamilah  D.  Sarip,  Bai  a  Labi  a 
Panorogan ko Bayabao Masiu, translation modified) 
  The taritib, meaning the order or arrangement of the Pat a Pangampong, was established 
by the local datus and protected through the curse, which is still used in case the taritib is not 
                                                 
194 The task of the Demarcation Sultanates is to help to settle conflicts between the pangampongs. The places are 
Sawir between Sebangan sa Masiu and Sebangan sa Unayan, Madamba between Sedapan sa Unayan and Sedapan sa 
Masiu, Bakayawan between Sedapan sa Masiu and Mala a Bayabao, and Dalama between Mala a Bayabao and 
Sebangan sa Masiu. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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followed. The names of the wives of the brothers are mentioned in the salsila but no story about 
them was related to me. However, the curse counts for women as well as for men. The system at 
this point was not yet a sultanate, since in order to claim leadership of a sultanate one has to be a 
descendant of the Shariefs and in particular of Sharief Kabungsoan.  
3. The Seven Districts 
The taritib was initially divided along the four major local descent lines of the datus. 
Later, they were subdivided into seven major descent lines and respective districts (sukus). The 
Royal House of Masiu is divided into two Royal Houses: the Sultan sa Masiu and the Cabugatan 
sa Masiu (Crown Prince of Masiu). However, they share the same taritib and descent line with 
the same male founding ancestor, and each alternates (idal) in supporting the other. They thus 
form only one district. The genealogy of the Royal House of Baloi has linear connections with 
the Five Datus down to the first titleholder of the Royal House; thus, the taritib of Baloi was not 
subdivided. The taritib of Bayabao split along the descent lines of three brothers, the sons of 
Popawan, developing three sukus in Bayabao. Paskan sa Unayan had five sons, also called apos, 
which makes them all titled. However, the taritib of Unayan was only subdivided into two sukus. 
It is said that it was subdivided into five parts at the beginning but that some of the lineages, 
among them the Iranons,
195 declared independence.  
In summary, the four principalities Bayabao, Baloi, Masiu, and Unayan, derived from four 
major bloodlines out of the Darangen, thus from ancestors who gave rights to the places but not 
rights to royal titles since at this time intermarriages with Sharief Kabungsoan had not yet taken 
place. The major lineages further branched, forming seven lineages that were accompanied by the 
development of respective sukus, as can be seen in the following map and table. 
 
                                                 
195 Maranaos frequently claim that they are Iranons and that “Maranao” is a misnomer used to divide and rule the 
Moros. A similarity in language between the Iranons, Maranaos, and Maguindanaos  supports this claim,  which 
supposes that the Iranons were there first. Some of them went to Maguindanao, others went to Lake Lanao and 
became labeled Maranao, which means lake dwellers. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Map 8: Map of Places of Intersection and Demarcation of Sultanates (Pat a Inged a Kiyasosolundaan o Bangsa 
o Pat a Pangampong a Ranao) and Districts (sukus) 
Lumba a Masiu, Poona Masiu, and Sedepan a Masiu are sometimes identified as sukus. However, when defining 
sukus as a subdivision of a pangampong according to descent lines with equal authority, each suku containing four 
Lawmakers, Masiu has no suku. Handmade map by the author; proportions may not correspond entirely with reality. 
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Table 4: Districts (sukus) within the Pat a Pangampong, Divided According to Descent Lines 
 
Bayabao 
Subdivided into three sukus 
Mala (big)  
Lineage of Borawasan of Mala Bayabao, 
son of Popawan 
Poona  
(origin/source)
196  
Lineage of Gimbolanan of Poona Bayabao, 
son of Popawan 
Lumba  
(paragon) 
Lineage of Maniri of Lumba Bayabao, son 
of Popawan 
Masiu 
Undivided 
The  territory  of  Masiu  is  divided  into  three  traditional  ingeds 
(townships),
197 which are sometimes also called sukus. However, all 
three areas share the same ancestor Balindong, and have altogether 
only one Sultan and one Cabugatan (Crown Prince) sa Masiu; each 
forms one of the 16 Royal Houses. The traditional residential area of 
the  Sultan  and  Cabugatan  sa  Masiu  is  Taraka.  Masiu  is  also 
sometimes divided along the lake into Western and Eastern Masiu. 
However,  when  following  the  principle  that  sukus  divide  the 
pangampongs  according  to  descent  lines  into  areas  of  equal 
authority, each area having four Lawmakers, Masiu has no suku. 
Unayan 
Subdivided into two sukus 
Sedapan/Sudupan  
 (Western Unayan) 
Lineage of Borowa of Sudupan a Unayan, offspring of 
Matanog of Subangana Unayan, offspring of Pascan 
Sebangan/Subangan  
 (Eastern Unayan) 
Lineage of Dozonan of Butig, offspring of Pascan 
Baloi  Undivided 
                                                 
196 It is said that the first ruler of Bayabao lived at the mouth of the Rugnan river; the area around it was called po'on 
(origin/source) a Bayabao. 
197 The three ingeds are: Poona Masiu, comprising the  municipality of Masiu; Lumba a Masiu, comprising the 
lowland of Molondo, Tamparan, and Taraka; and Sedepan a Masiu, comprising the highland of Bacolod Kalawi, 
Madalum, Tugaya, and Wato Balindong.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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4. Introduction of the Sultanate System  
The  sultanate  system  was  introduced  through  the  descent  line  of  the  Shariefs,  who 
claimed to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. Two of them are predominantly mentioned 
as having brought the sultanate to Lanao: the brothers Sharief Alawi and Sharief Kabungsoan. 
Alawi is said to have come to Tagoloan (Misamis Oriental) and to have introduced Islam to the 
north of the lake, while Kabungsoan is said to have come to Malabang and to have introduced 
Islam to the south of the lake. Some also mention Sharief Alauya, an ancestor of the brothers who 
came to Lanao two generations before them. Some exchange the names Alawi and Alauya/Aulia. 
  In the case of Butig, another connection to the bloodline of Mohammad is drawn through 
a descendant of Sharief Abdul Rahman, the uncle of Sharief Kabungsoan, whose granddaughter 
Umpas married a local datu, a descendant of Indarapatra (see appendix 9). This descent line, 
however, does not provide the right to claim a royal title. The Sultan sa Butig explains: 
One line of genealogy is Umpas. She was married to Datu Punduma sa Butig. 
Umpas was first married to Dimasangkay a Adil of Maguindanao. During that 
time, the rulers were on equal footing, when there was no sultanate. Dimasangkay 
a Adil sa Maguindanao ruled the entire region of Maguindanao, which was later 
divided into five provinces. Umpas came to Lanao from Johor [Malaysia] with her 
brother  Sandab. When  Umpas  divorced  her  first  husband,  she  was  married  to 
Punduma  of  Butig.  Punduma  sa  Butig  was  the  first  panoroganan  [literally 
“decision  maker”,  also  described  as  “executive”  and  later  as  head  of  a  Royal 
House] in Lanao, whose power was respected, during the time when there was no 
sultanate yet in the four principalities of Lanao, because the Shariefs had not yet 
introduced the sultanate leadership. 
When Punduma married Umpas, leadership started, but during this time, 
their  leadership  was  not  sultanate  but  datu.  The  legislature,  supporting  the 
leadership of Punduma [was implemented by] his uncles. (Speech given by the 
Sultan sa Butig in  2008, Marawi City, translated by Montia Jamilah D. Sarip, 
translation modified) 
 
Why then is the marriage to Umpas important? According to local oral transmissions from 
Unayan (see appendix 8 for the whole story of how Umpas and Sandab came to Mindanao), 
leadership  in  Lanao  started  in  Unayan  with  Datu  Punduma,  who  was  chosen  to  be  the  first 
panoroganan. His relatives considered him the leader because his father, Amerogong Topaan, 
was a descendant of Sharief Alawi,
198 and also because of his marriage to Umpas. She was a 
descendent of Prophet Mohammad and, more importan tly, the former wife of Dimasangkay a 
                                                 
198 Sharief Alawi married Asinalang, the daughter Suinal sa Kapai. They begot Radia Kunug and Inon. Radia Kunug 
married Merimbai, the daughter of Sultan sa Dimagalin. They begot Amerogong Topaan, who married Lilangun sa 
Butig. Their son was Punduma. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Adil sa Maguindanao, an ancestor of the Maguindanao sultanate and Sharief Kabungsoan. As a 
result of his marrying her, the lineages from both the mother’s and father’s sides of the children 
of Punduma were higher than the lineages of Punduma’s other relatives. Additionally, Punduma 
could  declare  himself  a  leader  in  front  of  the  Dimasangkay  of  Maguindanao,  the  rulers  in 
Maguindanao that were established before those in Lanao, and the latter could trace back their 
genealogy to the former in order to claim royal titles through Sharief Kabungsoan. The following 
is an extract from the oral transmission of how Umpas and Sandab came to Mindanao and how 
Punduma claimed leadership: 
And  Punduma  asked  [Umpas  and  her  brother  Sandab]:  “Why  are  you  here?” 
because they are not Maranaos. And they explained why [because they had had a 
row with their brother, the Sultan of Johor, and went to Mindanao. There Umpas 
married  the  Dimasangkay  a Adil  sa  Maguindanao,  but  the  other  wives  of  the 
Dimasangkay got jealous and planned to kill Umpas, so they had to flee]. And he 
said: You come with me to my place. Because there are no people in Lanao, it is a 
hunting place. [Sandab asks Punduma]: “Can you take the anger of Dimasangkay 
because they are still married?” [And the Punduma said]: “Make it ten times, I can 
still  protect  you.”  (Extracts  from  an  interview  given  in  two  parts  by  the 
Masiricampo sa Butig, later modified by the translator Amer Rashid Mindalano, 
Marawi City, 2008. See appendix 8 for the whole interview) 
Punduma, however, is not a sultan; only his descendants can receive royal titles, as a result of 
intermarriages with the descendants of Sharief Kabungsoan and thus the Maguindanao sultanate. 
Mednick writes that the connection between the genealogies in Maguindanao and Lanao is in 
most cases through Dimasangkay a Adil, who married, among others, two women from Lanao. 
One was Umpas, the other Bai Simuol. The first gave birth to a boy named Omon, the second a 
girl named Mboring. After a disagreement with his brother-in-law, Dimasangkay left his wife 
(Umpas)  and took  his  daughter  (Mboring) with him. Mboring and  Omon met again without 
knowing that they were brother and sister, married and begot a child named Amatonding a Noni, 
which means “pure blood” or “solid royal blood.” Amatonding married Gayang, offspring of 
Kabungsoan.  In  other  versions  —  in  which  the  marriage  between  siblings  was  declared  by 
interviewees to be wrong and something one should not talk about — it is Umpas who is the 
mother of Mboring and Omon, Dimasangkay a Adil the father of Omon, and Punduma sa Unayan 
the father of Mboring. The descendants of Amatonding and Gayang, the five (female) Nonis (full-
blooded), can be found as important links in genealogies in the Pat a Pangampong, but not in the 
Maguindanao genealogy anymore. For the foundation of the Butig sultanate, the five Nonis are of 
crucial importance because they have bilateral descent from the lineage of Sharief Kabungsoan. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The founding ancestor (apo) Dianaton of the Royal House of Butig is only listed as such because 
one of the Nonis (Paramata Asia of Butig) married him. It is interesting to note that it is the 
women who are pure blooded descendants of Sharief Kabungsoan on whose basis the Butig and 
also the Masiu sultanates are founded. However, the apo of the Sultanate in Butig is not Paramata 
Asia but Dianaton, her husband, the grandson of Punduma, who, as direct ancestor, thus provides 
the rights of the local datus.  
The  local  lineage  is  thus  as  important  as  the  one  coming  from  the  Shariefs.  The 
importance of the pure bloodedness of the Nonis, besides their high-ranking descent line, may be 
the  result  of  their  neutrality  to  local  demands  and  rights,  which  are  then  traced  through  the 
husband. It may also be that, as in ancient Malaysia, men could only attain a powerful position 
when marrying a royal woman (Karim 1992: 52). Women are still important links when one 
wants to claim a title and they can transfer rights to titles but they are usually not apos of a 
sultanate, though there are some exceptions among women with minor titles. In case of a female 
title, the claimant has to trace back her lineage to the male founding ancestor of the sultanate. 
Male as well as female titles, however, can be claimed through the father’s as well as through the 
mother’s  side  (preferably  both),  which  means  there  is  neither  a  patri-  nor  a  matrilineage 
concerning the inheritance of titles.  
  The Maranao sultanates trace back their genealogy to Maguindanao royal genealogies in 
order  to  justify  their  rightful  claim,  but  distance  themselves  from  claims  of  authority  or 
superiority of Maguindanao over the Pat a Pangampong. The chairman of the Marawi Sultanate 
League,  Sultan  Mansing  Macabando,  emphasized  in  an  interview  that  the  first  sultan  in 
Maguindanao, a descendant of Kabungsoan, was a Maranao. He was a Maranao since Sharief 
Kabungsoan begot three daughters from Maguindanao wives and a daughter and a son (Sharief 
Makaalang or Saripada Macaalang) from Maranao wives (Mazawang and Angintabo). Sharief 
Makaalang begot  one son,  Sharief Bangkaya,  who begot  three children, Dimasangkay, Gugo 
Sarikula, and Kapitan Laut Buisan (the father of Sultan Qudarat). Kapitan Laut Buisan begot 
Potri Gayang. Dimasangkay begot Omon, and then Omon begot Amato Biganono (Amatonding a 
Noni). Amato Biganoni married Potri Gayang. The Five Nonis are their descendants.  
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Graphic 6: Five Nonis sa Unayan 
The  Nonis  are  important  links  in  bringing  the  lineage  of  Sharief  Kabungsoan  to  the  Lanao  sultanates.  Source: 
Masiricampo sa Butig, 2008. 
 
When Sharief Kabungsoan reached old age, he enthroned his first native son, Sharief 
Makaalang, the son of his Maranao wife Angintabo, as the Sultan sa Maguindanao. A Maranao 
sultan comments:  
Here in  Lanao those three brothers, Dimasangkay, Gugo Sarikula, and Buisan, 
their descendants all went down to Lanao and Cotabato, Maguindanao. That is 
where the rival[ry] arose. Because the people of Lanao would not admit that they 
are  under  the  influence  and  leadership  of  the  people  of  Maguindanao  and  the 
people of Maguindanao will also not admit that they are under the influence or 
leadership of the people of Lanao. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
Declaring that the Sultan of Maguindanao was actually a Maranao served thus as a challenge to 
claims  of  superiority  by  Maguindanao  Muslims  and  was  contested  by  members  of  the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Maguindanao  sultanate.  The  claim  to  be  of  equal  or  even  higher  birth  and  authority  is 
additionally of importance since initially the Maranaos were Islamized through Maguindanaos.
199  
  Similar arrangements of different sultanates that are connected through bloodlines but that 
at the same time would not allow leadership of another lineage over their own lineage can be 
found concerning the major royal lineages comprising the Pat a Pangampong. The Royal Houses 
of Bayabao and Baloi draw their genealogical connections to the Shariefs via Sharief Alawi and 
Sharief Kabungsoan. Baloi can be traced back to Sharief Alawi but it can also be seen as a branch 
of the pangampongs of Bayabao and Masiu. One of the progenies of the apo Balindong sa Masiu 
(from the line of Sharief Kabungsoan) got married to a descendant of a leader in Baloi. They 
begot a daughter, Aminsalam, who was married to Alao of Ditsaan, a descendant of Sharief Alawi 
(Bayabao). The descendants are the seven Marohom of Baloi and the sole bearer of the title 
Sultan sa Baloi.  
In  Bayabao,  a  daughter  of  Sharief Alawi  married  Popawan  sa  Bayabao.  One  of  their 
children married the great-granddaughter (from the line of Sharief Kabungsoan) of Dianaton sa 
Butig (apo of Butig). One of the descendants of Popawan married Bai Batola of Baloi. Their 
children again intermarried with descendants of Balindong (from the lines of Sharief Kabungsoan 
and Masiu) and formed the Sultanates of Bayabao.  
The genealogical connections to Sharief Kabungsoan of the Royal Houses in Bayabao are 
drawn via Unayan and Masiu, whereas the connections to Sharief Alawi in Masiu and Unayan are 
drawn through Bayabao and Baloi. The connections to Sharief Kabungsoan nevertheless are said 
to be of more importance in claiming leadership. However, Masiu and Unayan are not superior to 
Bayabao and Baloi. All 16 Royal Houses are equal in authority since there were intermarriages 
between them. The intermarriages between Masiu and Unayan are the following: the sister of the 
apo Dianaton sa Butig married Onggor and begot Balindong. The latter is the apo of the Royal 
Houses in Masiu. He married Pindawa-dawa Oray, the sister of Dianaton’s wife, Paramata Asia; 
the sisters are two of the five Nonis sa Unayan. In most cases, the women marry into another 
sultanate through which the connections are established. But when a woman or a man marries 
into another lineage, she or he provides the needed connections with other sultanates but not their 
authority. Their children, however, may claim rights to a higher lineage transferred through the 
father or the mother.  
                                                 
199 Loyr￩-de-Hauteclocque (1989) mentions that the Islamization of the Maranao groups was initiated by  
Maguindanaos in order to strengthen the bonds among the groups against outsiders (p. 127). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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5. The Development of the 16 Royal Houses and the 28 Lawmakers  
After intermarriages between major descent lines of the Pat a Pangampong and Sharief 
Kabungsoan, apos developed, providing the right to land and titles in the sultanates. The initial 
seven major descent lines sub-branched again into 15, forming 16 royal houses (Masiu has two 
royal houses, which have the same apo). It is not certain when these 16 developed, since descent 
lines undergo fissions when one sub-line is strong enough to claim the highest status. The last 
royal house that developed was Domalondong in the 1970s. At this time, Mohamad Ali Dimaporo 
was the chairman of the 15 royal houses. He recognized the lineage of Domalondong, a brother 
of the apo of the Royal House of Butig, as the lineage of a 16
th Royal House. There have been 
further attempts to add a royal house. For example, the Sultanate of Tagoloan in Baloi wanted to 
become a panoroganan in the 1980s (Cayongcat 1984: 16), but the upgrade was not granted. The 
addition of a 16
th Royal House shows that the taritib can be altered and that it is possible to 
change the arrangement of the Pat a Pangampong. Nevertheless, to add or to subtract a royal 
house requires the agreement of all 16 royal houses and the 28 Mbabaya ko Taritib (they are 
translated  as  the  Houses  of  Peers,  Policymakers,  Lawmakers,  Pat  a  Datu  [Four  Datus],  or 
Legislative Assembly). Each of the initial seven major descent lines in the pangampongs has four 
Mbabaya ko Taritib; there are thus 28. It is the descent line division before the intermarriages 
with Sharief Kabungsoan that comprise the area according to which the guardians of the taritib 
(the Mbabaya ko Taritib) are subdivided. Sultan sa Butig explains:  
It is not allowed for panoroganan to have no datus. Meaning that these four datus 
are responsible for making taritib for their place. These 28 serve as the Legislative 
Assembly of the sultanate of the pangampong of Lanao. (Speech given in 2008, 
Marawi City, translated by Montia Jamilah D. Sarip, translation modified) 
  The descendants of the Founding Ancestors of the 28 Mbabaya ko Taritib are also called 
the supporters (pagawid) of the panoroganan. This does not necessarily mean that the 28 are 
from a lesser descent line. For Masiu, it is said that of the children of the apo Balindong, the two 
youngest, Maruhom Jalalodin and Maruhom Rahmatola, stayed with their father. Their siblings 
left the house, became connected to other places, and decided to support for leadership over the 
whole sultanate of Masiu the two brothers who stayed. Jalalodin and Rahmatolan thus became the 
lokes (carriers of the rights of the apo) of the titles Sultan sa Masiu and Datu a Cabugatan sa 
Masiu, the highest titles in the sultanate of Masiu and thus the pagawidan (supported) (Mednick 
1965:  114).  Their  brothers  became  their  pagawid.  In  the  case  of  Eastern  Unayan,  however, 
marriage  into  the  descent  line  of  the  Shariefs  made  the  crucial  difference.  Amizaman  and The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Rombaan had seven boys and one daughter. The daughter,  Lilangun,  married Amerogong sa 
Kapai, a descendant of Sharief Alawi, and it was decided that her son, Punduma, would be the 
panoroganan and that his uncles would support him. The support was based on the one hand on 
Punduma’s descent through his father from Sharief Alawi (he could thus claim a higher descent 
than his uncles and cousins), and on the other hand on the marriage with Umpas, the former wife 
of the Dimasangkay sa Maguindanao and a descendant of Prophet Mohammad. This enabled him 
to claim equal authority to the Dimasangkay and it elevated the descent line of his children from 
the mother’s side. Further, it has to be remembered that women can claim titles for their sons and 
that it is said that the wishes of a woman have to be granted because of taritib, which demands 
paramount respect to women. The situation that Lilangun was the only daughter who additionally 
had married into a higher descent line might thus also have been a result of the decision to accept 
Punduma  as  leader.  Some  of  the  uncles  of  Punduma  became  the  four  Lawmakers  and  thus 
supported him. Others, however, did not agree and left the area. Mamintal married into the area 
of  Bayabao  and  his  descendant, Apha  sa  Borokhot,  became  the  apo  of  the  Royal  House  of 
Borokhot in Lumba Bayabao.  
  The determination of which genealogical lineage is supporter (pagawid) and which gets 
supported (pagawidan)
200 is in most cases an individual process within the sultanates and no 
general rule can be applied here. Regarding Mala a Bayabao, the  apo of the Sultan sa Marawi 
was the brother of Batara of Ramain-Ditsaan, whose descendants hold rights to the titles Sultan 
sa Ditsaan and Sultan sa Ramain, belonging to those supported in Mala a Bayabao. The Sultan sa 
Marawi  instead  belongs  to  the  supporters.  Marriages  of  the  apos  may  decide  who  will  be 
supported and who is a supporter, but other factors may also play a role in this determination. 
Supporters and supported claim descent from the ancestor of the area in the major descent line, 
which, in the case of Mala a Bayabao, was Borawasan of Mala a Bayabao. Then they regulate 
who is the supporter and who is the supported. This regulation, however, is not as fixed as it 
looks like in the chart below; it goes along with descent lines and claims to certain titles but it can 
change through intermarriage. The uncle of the present Sultan sa Butig, Sultan Dalinambas sa 
Ragayan, carries a title of supporter. However, since his ancestor married the Bai a Labi sa Butig, 
                                                 
200 Authority in  Lanao  datu-ships is based on the people  who support a chosen leader in exercising his or her 
authority. If the leader is not able to sustain his or her supporters through good leadership or other qualities, his or her 
authority will decline. This concept of leadership can similarly be found in patron-client relationships (see Teves 
2000). In the Lanao sultanates the organization of supporter and supported (or patron and client) is connected to 
genealogy.  One,  however,  has  only  a  birthright  to  a  title  but  not  to  authority,  which  still  has  to  be  earned  by 
sustaining supporters.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the lineage has claims to both the supporters and the supported. Who is supported and who will 
support is  then the result of descent  line, marriage politics,  (re-)arrangements  of the kinship 
groups/clans, and the qualities of titleholders. These structures can additionally be subdivided 
into several sets of supporters and supported, if there are various people having claim to the same 
title. Further, the same  group  that  is  supported in  one  place  can  act  as supporter in  another 
framework.  
  The  titles  of  the  lineages  presented  in  the  chart  of  the  16  Royal  Houses  and  the  28 
Lawmakers are listed below, including the apos. These are founding ancestors of a lineage that is 
descended from the Shariefs (who give the right to a title) as well as from local datus/bais (who 
give the right to the land). An apo can be male or female but in most cases is male, as the paternal 
lineage is given priority, even though one preferably needs both lineages to claim a title. In 
addition, some lokes are included in the chart. Lokes are certain descendants and carriers of the 
rights of the apo; they were the former elders of the communities. The elders are the carriers of 
the rights of the apo and they are in the position to pick a titleholder among their clan members. 
In case there is a split or reorganization of descent lines, elders might become lokes. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 7: Descent Line Divisions and Hierarchies in the Pat a Pangampong 
The elders choose new titleholders, not only on the ground of their genealogical connections. 
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The  names  of  apos  are,  in  most  cases,  only  known  by  specialists  of  the  salsila  or 
researchers. In addition, many titleholders do not know the titles of all 16 and 28, which is an 
indicator of the autonomy but also of the influential position of elders.  
 
Table 5: The 16 Royal Houses, the 28 Lawmakers and the Demarcation Sultanates 
 
Royal Houses 
(panoroganan) 
Lawmakers 
(Dwapolo ago Walo a Mbabaya ko Taritib) 
Title  Lineage Ancestor  Title  Lineage Ancestor 
UNAYAN 
1.EAST UNAYAN 
Sultan sa Butig
201  Dianaton 
Sultan 
sa Dolangan   Labiolan/Rabiolan
202 
Sultan 
sa Malalis   Ditoklan  
Sultan sa 
Domalondong
203  Domalondong 
Sultan 
sa Ragayan  Didaitun 
Sultan 
sa Timbab  Sabbo 
2.WEST UNAYAN 
Sultan sa Bayang  Diwan 
Sultan 
sa Binidayan  Boadi 
Sultan 
sa Boribid  Matanog 
Sultan sa Pagayawan  Arobiro 
 (others say Borowa) 
Sultan  
sa Padas  Sandab 
Sultan 
sa Pualas
204  Lawango  
   
                                                 
201 The first titleholder of the title Sultan sa Butig was Gomogaw, the son of Utto (Uto); his father was Datu sa Palao 
sa Butig. Uto was one of the 11 Moriatao (offspring) of Baracat (11 Kalokes a Moriatao Baracat) who had the right 
to hold the title of Sultan sa Butig. Sultan sa Baracat sa Butig was the grandson of Dianaton Naim sa Butig and 
Paramata Asia sa Butig. He was married to the Bai a Labi sa Ramain, Bondayo. Their children were Datu sa Palao sa 
Butig and Bai sa Palao sa Butig. Both married and had several children. Eight of the children (two of them female) of 
Datu sa Palao and three of the children of Bai sa Palao (one of them female) were chosen as the lokes of the Sultan sa 
Butig.  
202 This apo was a woman. 
203 This title was founded in the 1970s. However, the genealogy can be traced back to a brother of Baracat. 
204 He was, as of 2008, the Secretary-General of the 28 mbabaya ko taritib of Lanao. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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MASIU 
Sultan of Masiu
205  Balindong 
Sultan 
sa Pitakes  Abagat 
Sultan 
sa Malungun  Madayao 
Datu a Cabugatan 
of Masiu
206  Balindong 
Sultan sa 
Lima Inged
207  Pondag 
Sultan 
sa Lumasa  Kadayon 
BAYABAO 
1.POONA BAYABAO 
Sultan sa Bansayan  Dato Palawan 
(others say M’Baor) 
Sultan 
of Bualan  
 
Onawal  
Sultan of Rogan
208  Dato Aribo 
(others say M'Baor) 
Sultan 
sa Bubongn  Omilang 
Sultan of Taporog  Dato Benol  
 
Sultan 
of Lumbaca Ingd  Akari 
Sultan 
of Talagia   Sheik 
2.LUMBA BAYABAO 
Sultan of Bacolod  Digoa of Bacolod  Sultan  
of Botod  Lomalag 
Sultan of Borocot
209  Apha of Borokhot   Sultan 
of Galawan   Domaraag 
Sultan of Maribo  Ibango of Maribo  Sultan 
of Maguing  Mamintal 
Sultan of Minitupad  Okoda of Minitupad  Sultan 
of Talowan   Danno 
   
                                                 
205 The first sultan was Marohom Sarip Mahaduddin. His title Sultan Samporna was changed into sa Masiu. 
206 The titles Cabugatan and Sultan sa Masiu are exchanged (during one term, each title is held by the one descent 
line, and in the next term by the other) between two descent lines: those of Maruhom Jalalodin and Maruhom 
Rahmatola, both sons of Balindong Bezar of Masiu and Pindawadawa-Orai. 
207 Sultan sa Lima Inged means sultan of the five places. 
208 He was, as of 2008, the Secretary-General of the 16 panoroganan. 
209 The first Sultan sa Borokot was Sultan sa Pinud, married to Paramata Balintao. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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3.MALA A BAYABAO 
Sultan of Ditsaan 
 
Dato Olok 
(others say Otowa) 
Sultan 
of Buntong  Makadiar 
Sultan 
of Didagun  Mayaman 
Sultan of Ramain  Acari Simbaan 
(others say Otowa)
210 
Sultan 
of Marantao  Gomising 
Sultan 
of Marawi  Gomisa 
BALOI 
Sultan of Baloi 
Ora-in is mentioned, 
and also Alanak. The 
latter begot the seven 
Maruhoms (Princes) 
who are the source 
(lokes) of the 
nominees for the title 
Sultan of Baloi 
Sultan 
of Bazagad  Papas 
Sultan 
of Kabasagan  Atongao 
Sultan 
of Lumbak  Bai 
Sultan 
of Matampay  Rajah Ali 
The Sultanates that are Places of Intersection/Demarcation 
(Pat a Inged a Kiyasosoludaan o Bangsa o Pat a Pangampong sa Ranao) 
Sultan of Bacayawan 
Sultan of Dalama 
Sultan of Madamba 
Sultan of Sawir 
Source: Macarampat [2008]; Tawagon 1987; Interviews by the author in 2007 and 2008. 
 
The chart below presents the distribution of the in table 5 mentioned sultanates in the Pat 
a Pangampong. There are three hierarchical levels, those of the royal houses, the lawmakers and 
the  Demarcation  Sultanates.  Only  the  highest  male  representatives  of  the  sultanates  are 
mentioned; they each have a female counterpart but she is usually not listed. In particular, the 
number of Royal Houses is uneven in relation to the area, depending on the regulations of the 
single sultanates. Each pangampong, or when subdivided, each suku, has four lawmakers. But 
some pangampongs/sukus have more than one Royal House, ranging from one to four per four 
Lawmaker. The four Demarcation Sultanates are also not equally distributed since there is no 
border to Baloi. They only divide the area around the lake. This unevenness can be seen as an 
indication that  Baloi joined the other  sultanates later. The unequal  number of Royal  Houses 
                                                 
210  Marohum  Sarip Aulia Ala Awalo  Zaman  and  Mrohum  Sarip  Sapaatula Akiro  Zaman  are  mentioned  as  the 
Puphagidala sa Solotan sa Ramain, the heirs who are in line or vying for the Ramain sultanate. The first Sultan of 
Ramain was Maruhom Baraguir. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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shows  the  autonomy  of  the  single  pangampongs/sukus.  The  even  distribution  of  the  28 
Lawmakers, however, signals that there is a loose but common order (taritib) of the whole Pat a 
Pangampong.  
 
 
Graphic 8: Pat a Pangampong sa Ranao 
Chart provided by the Sultan sa Butig, 2008. 
 
Royal  titles  of  the  16  and  28  are  connected  to  a  certain  area.  Originally  the  inged, 
township, of which the sultan was responsible, including surrounding agamas (communities), 
would be related to the higher-ranking descent line in the inged. High-ranking titles are thus 
connected to the name of a place, an inged, where the sultan also had his torogan
211. The Sultan 
                                                 
211 A torogan (derived from torog, to sleep), a palace residence of the sultan and his clan, is the venue where the 
sultan can hold his majlis (consultative assembly) and discuss solutions to social, political, and economic problems 
in his domain. A torogan is a sprawling wooden structure, usually 500 m
2 in a covered area, large enough to hold 
1,000 or more people and 20 live-in families. The torogan in Bayang, which is 200 years old, is one such structure 
still standing. A torogan was built by pagawidan, and similar houses which are called mala a walai (big house) were 
built  by  the  28  Lawmakers.  Other  minor  sultans  also  built  their  torogans  in  case  there  was  a  split  of  a  major 
sultanate, like the one of Dayawan, which split from Marantao (one of the 28). The torogan in Dayawan became one 
of the places where selected Maranao datus (Madale 1996: 34) signed the Dansalan Declaration of 1935. With the 
decline of the sultanates, among others enforced by President Quezon, who did not recognize traditional titleholders, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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sa Masiu is an exception. He carries the name of the pangampong and the place of the torogan 
was not Masiu but Taraka. This, however, may be a new development and has to be clarified 
through further studies. The following two maps present the approximate places of the lineage 
ancestors of the 16 and 28 within the Pat a Pangampong. This does not necessarily mean that the 
present titleholders will reside in these places. 
 
 
Map 9: Map of the 16 Royal Houses and Their Approximate Places of Origin 
Handmade map by the author; proportions may not correspond entirely with reality. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
a sultan might have a big house or use community or public places instead of a torogan. The office of the municipal 
president became the center of community activities and a place for celebrations. People build some torogan-like 
houses (rather concrete than wooden constructions) without being titleholders, like mayors or those who take a liking 
in the okir designs. If the owner of the torogan-like house is a government official, the function of the house may be 
similar to that of an ancient torogan. The Capitol Complex of Marawi City is a modern version of a traditional 
torogan. Sultans today, however, usually do not live in a torogan anymore.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Map 10: Map of the 28 Law Makers and Their Approximate Places of Origin 
Handmade map by the author; proportions may not correspond entirely with reality. 
  
6. Administrative Division 
Whereas the administrative division in the Philippines is by province, municipality or city, 
barangay, and purok, the division of the Pat a Pangampong is by pangampong, suku, inged 
(township  arranged  around  supported  descent  line),  agama  (community),  and  bangon  (3-5 
families). Each descent line in the salsila has traditionally certain rights to land, which is usually 
the joint property of a kinship group. Land to which a community lays claim is called gapa and is 
subdivided into two categories. The first is kakola, comprising uninhabited land, like forestland, 
owned in common. The second is mianggapa, “settled land sub-divided among different kinship 
groups and classified under private ownership,” since it was “acquired by prior use and continued 
occupation” (Fianza 2004: 33; Saber and Tamano 1985-86: 114). Usually the sultan distributed 
free land. In case a farmer abandoned the land, the sultan could assign it to someone else. Those 
farmers working on the land generally gave parts of the harvest to the sultan (Madale 1996: 26). 
A study from 1989 found that the traditional modes of land acquisition and ownership continued The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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to prevail in the Muslim areas even though they were joined by Islamic laws and state laws 
(respectively, affecting 37%, 23%, and 11% of farmers) (Abreu/Rosa 2003: 9). 
  If a family lived outside the community for several generations, their claim to royal title 
and territory would be eliminated. This changed partly with the introduction of land titles. To 
keep  a  claim  to  land,  traditionally  one  had  to  be  from  a  certain  descent  line,  which  was 
represented by titleholders, and to maintain contact with the community in order to have one’s 
claim recognized by its members. Today there are titleholders and claimants not living in the 
communities anymore. They still may have property or rights to land or land titles in the area of 
their claim. They may have left for employment in Marawi City, Iligan City, or elsewhere and 
only go back to their communities if there is a special event. Others send a representative — male 
or female — who contributes financially in the name of the bai a labi, the datu, or the sultan. One 
datu  a  cabugatan  who  lived  and  worked  in  Manila  was  represented  by  his  elder  sister,  a 
barangay captain in Marawi. After a while, she complained and said, “Either you come back to 
Marawi or you resign.” The cabugatan decided that it was time to face the problem of earning a 
living in Marawi and organized a cooperative so he could survive and contribute according to his 
position. 
  One  of  the  former  sultans  bequeathed  land  equal  to  50  football  fields  to  his  direct 
descendants. Clan members staying on such land may pay taxes and have political loyalty to the 
family owning the land. A 1994 study found out that in Lanao, 26 Moro clans control large 
landholdings in the area (Abreu and Rosa 2003: 13). Among them, the Lucmans occupied a 
central position with about 5,000 ha consisting of coconut and cacao plantations bought from an 
American settler who was involved in a rido with the sultan of the region.
212 The land was later 
on partly placed under the voluntary offer-to-sell scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP), while the rest was distributed among immediate members of the clan.
213  
  Some of the landlords in the Lanao area aligned with Moro insurgent  groups against 
“land-grabbers,” thus making difficult the implementation of agrarian reform, as was demanded 
through CARP
214 in the ARMM. The MILF considers CARP “an instrument of assimilation by an 
external power” that threatens to weaken the struggle for self-determination (Abreu/Rose 2003: 
                                                 
212 The dignitary was Sultan Sarip sa Subuan in Sultan Gumander. 
213 In 2000 about 2,885 households in Lanao del Sur owned land, which was acquired through CARP (NSO 2000). 
214 CARP was initially applied for the whole Philippines by the Corazon Aquino government after the downfall of 
Marcos,  in  order  to  distribute  land  more  equally.  The  land  reform  program  is  still  in  the  process  of  being 
implemented. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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25). The consequence is that possible power abuses by traditional leaders have become a minor 
issue: 
It appears a common view among the Moro liberation front leadership that the 
rules on stewardship and usufruct as laid down in adat and sharia and shown in 
practice  among  the  Moros  are  sufficient  to  address  democratization  of  asset 
distribution in the countryside . . . This view, however, would tend to disregard the 
fact that in many instances the traditional authority of the datus and sultans, the 
heads of powerful families within clans and tribes, has been abused, which led to 
privatization of ancestral lands. (ibid.) 
According to the traditional land distribution system, descendants of different descent lines have 
rights to the land of each line they belong to. Thus, a person might have the right to build an 
estate on the land of the father’s as well as on the mother’s side. Common ownership of land 
poses a problem in case one of the descendants gives away land without the knowledge of the 
relatives. There are cases where, after a Maranao sold land to a Christian, the buyer got involved 
in a dispute or a rido with the relatives of the seller, who, not knowing that the land had been 
sold, regarded it as their property.  
  Where  there  were  not  yet  land  titles,  land  was  sometimes  given  to  non-relatives  in 
appreciation for their services. For example, the former Sultan sa Marawi had land rights  to 
certain bangon (lots): he distributed the land among his relatives but also lent some property to 
vassals or gave some away to non-relatives. After the introduction of the title system by the 
American  colonizers,  the  land  that  was  distributed  by  the  sultan  and  should  have  been 
redistributed by his descendants became the permanent property of the residents. Some of them 
are thus not genealogically connected to the sultanate but reside there due to formerly accorded 
privileges. Conflicts over property erupted. As a remedy for the confusion of systems and its 
negative outcomes, a local NGO called Reconciliatory Initiatives for Development Opportunities 
(RIDO), Inc. provides resources to family members of the Sultan sa Marawi who claim the land 
in order to stop the ridos concerning property in the area. 
  Similar conflicts erupted in other regions of Lanao. Land may not be used because the 
family owning the land title is afraid of a rido or because there are old regulations that are still 
applied. The  former  Paramount  Sultan  Lucman,  who  possessed  land  titles  in  Kapai,  Mala  a 
Bayabao, gave peasants the right to cultivate some parts of the land without paying dues, as long 
as they lived in wooden shelters. The peasants let some fields lie unused until the son of the 
sultan gave them the right to use it. In some cases, the sultanates are still intact in relation to land The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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rights and taxes. Thus, peasants give some share of their crop to a strong datu of the area. The 
datu is obliged to protect and take care of them in the event of death, marriage, or financial need. 
  Land rights  were  deeply  connected to  descent  line membership and thus  traditionally 
families were mainly surrounded by their relatives. This is still more or less the case. In general, 
people living in a Maranao community have relatives there or an influential host. Either they are 
connected to a well-accepted organization or another arrangement, based on the friendship and 
thus protection of a local leader, has been made. Mistrust among different groups exists. People 
feel safe mainly when among relatives — especially if they are involved in a rido.  
  The traditional agama is composed of bangons, which belong to different descent lines. It 
constitutes one social, political, and religious (represented by a mosque) unit, having in most 
cases its own set and organization of royal titles, and forms an autonomous sultanate.
215 Agamas 
today do not always correspond to the superimposed political units of the barangays. There are 
several  configurations:  in  some  places,  there  are  several  agamas  within  one  barangay;
216  in 
others, the agama is newly connected to an inged (township, headed by a high-ranking sultan, 
and  consisting  of  a  collection  of  agamas)  that  they  originally  did  not  belong  to.  This 
superimposition can also reduce the area of influence of one inged by cutting off its tributary 
sections or by elevating an agama that was traditionally a supporter of one inged to a government 
district (Saber 1979: 71, 107). One can still find the place names to which the 28 and the 16 are 
traditionally  connected.  However,  hierarchy  was  sometimes  disregarded  by  the  new 
administration and thus they “‘divided and conquered’ the social and territorial organization of a 
traditional  community”  (ibid.:  107).  Marantao,  belonging  to  the  28,  became  a  municipality, 
whereas the Royal House of Poona Bayabao, belonging to the 16, became a barangay. Marawi 
was  initially  a  supporter  of  Ramain  and  Ditsaan,  but  finally  the  provincial  government  was 
established in this city and the high-ranking government officials, who in many cases belonged to 
the Royal House of Ramain, had to establish themselves in Marawi.  
  The superimposed administrative subdivision of a place can also change the connections 
between  a  sultanate  and  its  area.  In  1977,  under  President  Marcos,  today’s  municipality 
                                                 
215 Agama derives from Sanskrit, meaning faith. In Lanao it is sometimes traced back to the Arabic concept of  
jam’a, community or school of thought. Regarding the fact that an agama in the Pat a Pangampong is a community 
of  people  related  by  blood  and  centered  around  a  mosque,  the  concept  can  be  understood  to  refer  to  faith, 
community, and kinship/clanship.  
216 Tawagon (1987) states that almost every agama, which has a mosque, has its own set of sultans and bais. The 
number  of  barangays  according  to  NSO  (2000)  in  Lanao  del  Sur  is  1,158.  Since  there  are  more  agamas  than 
barangays, it thus can be estimated that there are more than 1,158 sultanates in the province. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Buadiposo-Buntong  separated  from  the  municipality  of  Ramain-Ditsaan  and  formed  its  own 
entity. The descent line claimants in this newly created area belonged previously to the Sultanate 
of Ramain. After the split, they proclaimed their own set of sultans and bais. Hence, the sultanate 
branches out with the branching out of administrative divisions. It is problematic if two clans 
claim the same title. In consequence, some alterations were produced: two different clans would 
take titles at the same time, or in turns, and some new ones would be created. 
  Inged literally means place, but it denotes a seat of recognized authority. According to 
Tawagon (1987), there are 43 ingeds in the Pat a Pangampong, which were formerly divided into 
those that support (pagawid) and those that are supported (pagawidan) (1987: 85). The supported 
were the royal houses, the supporters the 28 Lawmakers. Mednick defines ingeds as agamas 
within which the superordinate descent lines are located. An inged can also be an association of 
agamas around a superior descent line (1965: 250). Marawi City, for instance, is known as the 
Pamagsopa  sa  Marawi  (the  Alliance  of  Marawi),  a  collection  of  five  sultanates  plus  their 
satellites forming one inged. The five Sultanates of Marawi City are Bacolod, Buadi Sakayo, 
Guimba, Madaya, and Toros. The taritib was thus that the descent line among them, which holds 
the title Sultan sa Marawi, is the representative of them all and superordinate as being one of the 
28. The founding ancestor of the Sultanate of Marawi had five heirs, namely (from eldest to 
youngest): Tobacan in Buadi Sakayo, Boriongan sa Bacolod, Saolangan sa Toros, Makalilay sa 
Madaya, and Timbang in Guimba. Abdul Hamidullah Atar (2007) from RIDO explains: 
In other words, Dansalan or Marawi today has five unions and every union has its 
own  sultan  with  territorial  boundaries.  Part  of  the  values  among  Maranao 
ancestors was “kaseselae” or honoring, which they applied even in the selection of 
grar or titles. Since Tobacan is the eldest among our ancestors, they agreed that 
the  Sultan  of  Marawi  should  be  .  .  .  the  eldest  son  of  Gomisa  known  as  the 
descendant of Tobacan in Buadi Sacayo. The Sultan of Marawi is only confined 
and recognized in the territory of Buadi Sacayo comprising several  Barangays 
with 19 clans.  
Each of the five sultanates has a barangay named after it. They have their own set of sultans and 
other minor titleholders, which are affiliated with them. Some of these minor sultans have now 
their own barangays, as does the Sultan sa Rorogagus. Rorogagus was, according to the taritib in 
the 1960s, subordinated to the Sultanate of Guimba (Mednick 1965).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Altogether, Marawi City has 45 sultanates, which have their own sets of male and female 
titles.  The  Marawi  Sultanate  League
217  was founded to coordinate and conne ct the different 
sultanates but also to preserve the culture of the Maranaos. The son of one of the founders 
commented:  
The main purpose of my father was to preserve our culture. Because according to 
him, without the sultanate we cannot call ourselves Maranaos. That is our identity. 
In order to preserve it we have to organize it, make it strong. And the way I look at 
it, the Sultanate of Lanao, among the 44 Sultanates of Lanao [the 16 royal houses 
and the 28 Lawmakers], the Sultanate of Marawi [as one of the 28] claims to be 
the biggest and highly respected. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
Finally, some places have no claim on a title. They are defined as da-i-bangenda, which means 
that they do not have any genealogical connection to local families from a certain place, and thus 
no social rank or status (Tawagon 1987: 94). Formerly such people were slaves, freemen, or non-
Maranao. Today, this may be a community of Maranaos having claims elsewhere or a community 
of foreigners. The community of “witches” is also mentioned in this connection. 
The Pat a Pangampong, being geographically divided as described in the chart below, 
developed hand-in-hand with the modern administrative divisions of Lanao. Baloi comprises the 
area of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur includes the other three pangampongs. Some royalties 
remained with this division but others divide the area differently and there are parts which belong 
to Lanao del Norte that are claimed by the pangampongs of Masiu and Unayan. The division of 
Lanao was introduced in 1959 (RA No. 2228) by Senator Ahmad  “Domocao” Alonto (1955-
1961),
218  who originated from the  pangampong  Bayabao  and  was  the  son  of  the  Sultan  sa 
Ramain. At this time, Baloi was mainly populated by Christian settlers, while most inhabitants of 
Lanao del Sur were Maranao Muslims. The division of the province was thus not protested, 
according to Mednick (1965). 
 
 
                                                 
217 The present chairman of the Marawi Sultanate League is the Sultan sa Marinaot. He is one of the founders of the 
League and was Executive Secretary from 1974-1986. Even though his term was planned to last four years, he has 
been the chairman for more than 20 years now. Information about who is a member of the Marawi Sultanate League 
and  especially  the  internal  hierarchy  within  the  sultanates  are  said  to  be  classified,  only  kept  for  the  elders. 
Information on the members, not the internal hierarchy, is nevertheless provided to the younger generation. The 
reason for this may either be that the information was never classified, as it is only classified for certain people, or 
that the general interest in the sultanate system among Maranaos is shrinking and thus the sultans are eager to 
reclaim their status, and in order to do so they de-classify knowledge. 
218 Ahmad “Domocao” Alonto was the son of Senator and Sultan sa Ramain Alauya Adiong Alonto (1934-1935, 
1941-1945 and 1946-1947). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Table 6: Areas Claimed to be Part of the Pat a Pangampong 
 
BAYABAO 
1.MALA A BAYABAO 
1 City  Marawi City 
8 Municipalities 
Bubong  Buadiposo-
Buntong  Kapai  Marantao 
Piagapo  Ramain-Ditsaan  Saguiaran  Tagoloan II 
2.POONA BAYABAO
219 
1 Municipality  Poona Bayabao 
3.LUMBA A BAYABAO
220 
4 Municipalities  Bumbaran  Lumba-Bayabao  Maguing  Wao 
MASIU 
1.SEBANGAN A MASIU (EASTERN MASIU) 
4 Municipalities  Masiu  Mulondo  Tamparan  Taraka 
2.SEDAPAN A MASIU (WESTERN MASIU)
221 
5 Municipalities 
Balindong  Bocolod Grande  Madalum  Madamba 
Tugaya   
   
                                                 
219 Under the American administration, Poona Bayabao was called Gata. 
220 Under the American administration, Lumba Bayabao was called Maguing. 
221  According  to  a  publication  of  the  16  Royal  Houses  (2003),  the  municipality  of  Madamba  belongs  to  the 
pangampong Unayan and the border between Unayan and Masiu is Madalum. The same border can be found in 
Mednick (1965: 293). This change of border might stem from the fact that the demarcation sultanates are said to have 
not been able to decide to which pangampong they belonged and thus sometimes were counted in the one and 
sometimes in the other area. The Royal Houses also mention Munai as part of Masiu and not of Baloi. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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UNAYAN 
1.SEBANGAN A UNAYAN (EASTERN UNAYAN) 
5 Municipalities 
Butig  Domalondong  Lumbaca-
Unayan  Lumbatan 
Lumbayanague   
2.SEDAPAN A UNAYAN (WESTERN UNAYAN)
222 
12 
Municipalities 
Balabang  Bayang  Binidayan  Calanogas 
Ganassi  Kapatagan  Malabang  Marogong 
Pagayawan  Pualas  Sultan Gumande  Tubaran 
BALOI
223 
1 City  Iligan City 
22 
Municipalities 
Bacolod  Baloi  Baroy  Kapatagan 
Kauswagan  Kolambugan  Lala  Linamon 
Magsaysay  Maigo  Matungao  Munai 
Nunungan  Pantao Ragat  Pantar  Poona Piagapo 
Salvador  Sapad 
Sultan Naga 
Dimaporo 
(Karomatan) 
Tagoloan 
Tangcal  Tubod   
                                                 
222 According to a publication of the 16 Royal Houses (2003), Unayan includes the municipalities Lala, Koramatan 
(Sultan Naga Dimaporo), and Tubod in Lanao del Norte. Thus, large areas that are attributed to Baloi are claimed by 
Unayan. The publication does not mention Pagayawan and Lumbaca-Unayan, which may automatically be attributed 
to  Unayan.  Mednick  (1965)  did  not  mention  areas  belonging  to  Unayan  in  Baloi  but  included  places  in 
Maguindanao. He listed the following distribution of communities for West and East Unayan: (1)  East Unayan: 
Bayang, Binidayan, Ganassi, Lumbatan, Madamba, Taratikan; (2) West Unayan: Butig, Pualas, Tubaran, and the 99 
lipongan (dependent places) stretching southwest to the coast and taking in “Barira and Buldun in the Parang district 
of  Cotabato”  (p.  275).  Mednick  might  also  have  referred  to  Barira,  Buldon,  and  Parang  of  the  Maguindanao 
Province. 
223  The  16  Royal  Houses  (2003)  do  not  mention  Baroy,  Kapatagan,  Nunungan,  Salvador,  and  Sapad  in  their 
publication, and they might thus either not be counted or belong to Unayan, since it “covers the South of Lake Lanao 
strictly from the Barira, Matanaog and Parang of Maguindanao Province and the long coastal area parallel to Illana 
Bay going Northwest up to Zamboanga-Lanao border.” Munai belongs to Masiu. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  The  first  Lanao  del  Sur  governor  after  the  division  was  the  younger  brother  of 
“Domocao,” Abdul Gafur Madki Alonto (1959-1967). Rashid Lucman, husband of the sister of 
“Domocao” Alonto, became congressman of Lanao del Sur (1962-1969). With the subdivision, 
Senator Alonto secured the province for the rule of the Alonto-Lucman families until the Marcos 
government supported their opponents, the Dimaporos.
224   
After  Marcos’s  downfall,  the  Dimaporos,  coming  originally  from  the  pangampong  of 
Masiu, retreated to Lanao del Norte — the pangampong of Baloi, giving way to the Alontos in 
Lanao del Sur. In interviews Maranao clan members, of clans which had been strong in Lanao del 
Norte before the Dimaporos arrived, complained that this political family is actually not from the 
area and that other clans and royal families hold the traditional authority in the place. Abreu and 
Rosa (2003: 15) report that the Dimaporo brothers, Naga and Ali, bought land in Lanao del Norte 
from a datu who sold it without the knowledge of his kin group. The latter only got to know 
about the sale when they were chased away from the land by the brothers, who were better armed 
than the locals were. Mohammad Naga Dimaporo was killed and the rido was still ongoing in 
2000 (Gonzales 2000: 93).  
  The  political  power  of  the  Dimaporos  developed  out  of  their  possession  of  vast 
plantations  and  fishponds,  and  trading  ventures.  Their  Christian  political  opponent, Arsenio 
Quibranza, became finally an ally through intermarriages between the families. During the 2000 
all-out war, the original inhabitants of the land supported the MILF and launched attacks against 
the  Dimaporos,  while  the  political  clan  supported  the  AFP.  Thus  the  local  conflict,  about 
traditional  land  claims  that  could  be  traced  back  to  the  sultanate  system,  added  to  the 
confrontation  between  the  MILF  and  the  AFP,  showing  that  ancestral  land  rights  are  still 
important and fueling the “no war, no peace” environment. 
As  the  following  maps  illustrate,  the  regulation  of  which  areas  belong  to  which 
pangampong is not entirely fixed. Claims and belongings changed over the years, while areas of 
dependency  vanished.  The  division  into  four  pangampongs  and  the  number  (four)  of 
Demarcation  Sultanates  nevertheless  remained  the  same  in  every  description.  The  first  map 
shows traditional area claims by the pangampongs Bayabao, Masiu, and Unayan documented by 
                                                 
224 The new Lanao del Norte governor (who previously had been governor of the whole of Lanao) was the non-
Muslim Salvador Lluch. He was followed the Maranao Congressman Mohamad Ali Dimaporo (1960-1965), who, in 
1966  became  the  congressional  representative  the  of  province,  while  his  vice-governor  and  opponent  Arsenio 
Quibranza became governor. Their rivalry led to the development of local Muslim and Christian private armies in the 
1970s. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Mednick in  the 1960s. Areas  of dependency  are included not  only in  Lanao but  also  in  the 
Maguindanao area. The second map shows claims made by the 16 royal houses (as of 2003). This 
map does not include areas of dependencies, and does not divide the pangampongs into sukus, 
making the principalities rather unified constructions. In particular, the area claims of Unayan are 
huge in comparison to the other pangampongs. Baloi, which usually is equated with Lanao del 
Norte, lost some of its area to Unayan and Masiu.  
It is not completely clear whether the traditional subdivisions were used as a basis to 
subdivide Lanao into its present form or if claims of the pangampongs lie at the root of today’s 
subdivisions. There is, however, an influence of the two systems of land and political division, 
resulting in a fusion of both. The division of Lanao as well as the subdivision of Lanao del Sur 
into  two  political  districts,  which  start  and  end  at  the  Demarcation  Sultanates  of  Sawir  and 
Bacayawan, cutting Masiu into two parts but leaving Bayabao and Unayan whole, illustrates this 
(see map 13). 
 
 
Map 11: Map of the Pat a Pangampong according to Mednick, 1965 
Information on Baloi is not available for this period. Mednick mentions Barira and Buldun in the Parang district of 
Cotabato as being dependent on Unayan. In this map, it is only supposed that the described areas are meant, based on 
data of the original map. Handmade map by the author; proportions may not correspond entirely with reality.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Map 12: Map of the Pat a Pangampong according to the 16 royal houses, 2003 
The sukus are not mentioned, making the pangampongs rather unified constructions. Handmade map by the author; 
proportions may not correspond entirely with reality. The white spots are not mentioned in this dissertation. 
 
 
Map 13: Map of the Pat a Pangampong and the Political Divisions in Lanao del Sur, 2008 
Handmade map by the author; proportions may not correspond entirely with reality. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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B. Arrangement of Lineages 
1. Order and Agreement 
The Pat a Pangampong developed out of a datu-ship system into a sultanate system. This 
development  is  locally  explained  in  relation  to  taritib  and  igma.  These  are  Arabic  notions 
meaning system, order or arrangement (taritib) and consensus (igma). The term taritib replaced 
the Maranao term attoran (Macabando 2008: 4). Macarampat (2008), a Maranao writer, explains 
the origin of taritib: 
Allah  first  created  taritib  fifty  thousand  years  before  creating  Prophet  Adam 
(Alaihi Salam). Taritib is one of the foundations of Islam. Islam is taritib. When 
one follows taritib, he is rightly guided. When he is incomplete in it and extremist 
in it, as well as makes errors in it, then that is his injustice. Taritib is natural to all 
creatures and comprehensive to everything. Error is a great fault to Allah. Taritib 
is an Arabic term which means system, order, arrangement, life ways and mores. 
That  is  the  relationship  between  man  and  his  creator,  the  system  of  man  in 
everything he does and his relationship to his community. (ibid.: 39)  
 
According to the author, taritib has two forms. One is used by Allah to systematize himself, his 
creations, and the way to worship him. This taritib cannot be mended. The second taritib is the 
one of human beings as caliphs or vice-regents on earth. “That is the taritib which is to be added 
and be deducted of which measurement is the Book of Allah.” (ibid: 40). 
  The  taritib  of  the  Pat  a  Pangampong  consists  of  geographical  and  social  regulations 
within and between the sultanates and it divides them according to a hierarchical order of descent 
lines. On the one hand, the pangampongs are connected through the taritib, while on the other 
hand each pangampong, and accordingly its subdivisions (sukus) and sultanates, have their own 
taritib. The taritib includes titles and their duties, their place in the hierarchy, and the length of 
terms. A traditional taritib can also indicate special behavior towards the sultan or the bai. For 
example, one should not overtake a sultan when he is walking; one should bow when a sultan 
passes; a bai has to go in front; if a man enters a house where a woman is alone, or he would like 
to meet a woman he could marry, he has to pay an adat (share) to her family; a man crossing the 
path of a woman who is not his wife should always go to the side where the wind blows in order 
not to smell the woman (Cayongcat 1986: 23). Taritib also influences the outbreak and resolution 
of ridos, since it specifies the relationship and the hierarchy between different descent lines. 
Thus, an offense against someone from a high-ranking descent line may be perceived to be worse 
than one against someone from a lower ranking one, and the punishment would be different The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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accordingly. When the taritib is not followed, it may become a matter of maratabat (honor). 
Taritibs  were  orally  transmitted;  they  have  only  recently  been  codified  by  some  sultanates. 
Basically, the taritib can be seen as a tool to connect the multifocal power structure of the Pat a 
Pangampong.  It  sets  the  borders  between  the  groups  and  defines  their  internal  and  external 
relationships. The single sultanates stay relatively independent in the organization of their own 
place. Thus, authority does not go much beyond kin groups or clans, which are the actual basis of 
the sultanate system. Taritib is flexible and can be amended through igma. Igma is said to be 
ideally realized via the “seven ways of perfect brotherhood”: consideration (kapamagongoai), 
respect  (kapanagadata),  glorification  (kaphoparoai),  giving  weight  (appreciation) 
(kapuphunuda),  help  (kathatabanga),  protection  (kazisiapa),  and  magnification  (kazuzulai). 
When a major agreement is made, it is connected to a pledge on the Qur’an. Such agreements can 
be manifold; one example might be the creation of a new title and function within a sultanate. 
  The  taritib  existed  in  Lanao  before  the  arrival  of  the  Shariefs  but  it  was  changed 
afterwards  based  on  a  knowledge  of  Islam,  Islamic  leadership,  and  Islamic  blood  (meaning 
genealogy based on intermarriages with the Shariefs). Sultan sa Butig explains:  
[The f]our Shariefs came, lived in this place, begot children, and introduced to us 
the sultanate system. The first to have the sultan title among the Shariefs who 
came in the east was Sharief Radia Baguinda. He was the first to have the title 
Sultan Sharief Radia Baguinda. Then came Sharief Abubacar, the first to reign as 
Sultan of [Sulu], the first Sultan of Jolo. From the Shariefs, because when the 
taritib and igma was made, they have indicated that it may be added or subtracted. 
Why did our parents prepare our taritib and igma and emphasize that it may be 
added or subtracted? They did it because they had precautionary measures of the 
happenings in the future. They were also determined that their leadership should 
be directed towards seeking the pleasure of our Creator, our only God, thus they 
included the phrase omanan a lbatan, which literally means “to add or to subtract” 
[omanan a labatan, add and subtract as needed], thinking that they might have 
included laws that are not good, and so this could be subtracted or deleted. On the 
other hand, people may think of good things that are useful, that are based on the 
teachings of our Holy Qur’an and Hadith, and so this can be added. This is the 
reason for the inclusion of the phrase “omanan a lbatan.” (Speech given in 2008, 
Marawi City, translated by Montia Jamilah D. Sarip, translation modified) 
  Maranao traditionalists see the Pat a Pangampong as the perfect defense and protection of 
Islam in Lanao. This is explained by the fact that Islam remained in the southern Philippines but 
vanished in Luzon and the Visayas. The “four kinds of defense for Islam” are: taritib, igma, adat 
(derived  from  the  Arabic  ada,  customary  law)  and  bangsa  (genealogical  connections) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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(Macarampat: 40). All these regulating structures are judged as being in accordance with the 
Islamic creed.  
  Taritib are the old ways of the ancestors, handed down through the generations and igma 
are the newer agreements in the community, which became taritib. Adat are customs on which 
the community has agreed, for example regarding marriage or death. Additionally, there is kitab, 
which are regulations based on the Qur’an and the hadith. Kitab are more rigid than adat. In 
many cases, adat would be changed in order to fit kitab. The openness of adat rights to religious 
modifications  also  means  that  women  cannot  necessarily  rely  on  traditional  laws  to  prevent 
restrictions through Islamic law.  
Igma is valid when it is based on kitab and taritib (Saber and Tamano 1985-86: 117). Bangsa, the 
genealogical connection to the Shariefs linked to rights to places, serves as the main justification 
for leadership in a sultanate. Mednick (1965) writes that high-ranking descent lines were seen as 
kabarakat  (sacred)  (1965:  306).  Still  today,  it  is  said  that  those  who  break  the  taritib  risk 
becoming cursed. A datu recounts the following incident: 
For example, there was a case of one claimant bai a labi, which was forcibly 
enthroned as bai a labi even though it was not her turn. People were saying that 
she could suffer the curse of her ancestral spirits, kaga ba’an, because she violated 
the rules of succession to the detriment of public interest. Thereafter many bad 
things happened to her family: she entered into an affair with another man and her 
husband  lost  his  job,  followed  by  a  divorce,  loss  of  credibility  within  the 
community, wealth and prestige. The husband could not exercise his maratabat 
and  retribution  because  the  wife  belongs  to  a  major  clan.  To  compound  the 
problem, her husband married another woman, his first cousin, and declared her as 
bai a labi . . . against the will of claimant clans, the sultan and other datus of the 
sultanate. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
The  remaining  weight  of  this  traditional  concept  reflects  itself  also  in  several  stories  about 
persons who enthroned themselves against the taritib and subsequently died as the result of a 
curse. 
2. Eastern Unayan as Example of an Autonomous Sultanate  
Each suku has its own taritib. Whereas in taritibs of the 1960s, apos and agamas as well 
as their hierarchical organization were named (ibid: 207), recent ones are publicly presented in 
the style of a modern government. Titles and their hierarchical order are shown but not the apo, 
the agama, or the place of origin. To illustrate this recent form of representation, I will describe 
the system of the East Unayan suku as the Sultan sa Butig presented it in more detail.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 9: Organizational Structure of the East Unayan suku 
Information provided by the Sultan sa Butig, 2008.  
 
On top of the hierarchy in East Unayan are the chief executives, sultans of the Royal 
Houses of East Unayan (Butig and Domalondong). Next in line is the (usually mixed-gendered) 
council of elders (pelokelokesen), which is bicameral. The upper house consists of descendants of 
the  four  sons  of  Datu  Dianaton  Naim  sa  Butig.  These  are  datus,  but  they  cannot  become 
panoroganan.
225 The lower house consists of descendants of four of the 28 Lawmakers. The 12 
sultans who do not have legislative power but whose task is to inform the descendants of the apo 
about the laws that are to be implemented comprise the next level below them. Finally, there are 
the 99 small units (kalipongan) along the coastal area. The number refers to men of Dianaton 
Naim of Butig, who inhabit units within the domain of Eastern Unayan.  
                                                 
225 The reason why the four sons of royal Datu Dianaton Naim sa Butig cannot claim the highest titles is that 
Dianaton Naim, the apo of Butig, married two times. With Paramata Asia, whose genealogy can be traced back to 
Sharief Qudarat (and thus to Sharief Kabungsoan), he had five daughters, one of whom, Saimbo, is the apo of the 
titleholder of Sultan sa Butig. With Insano sa Bayabao, he had five sons; the descendants are today the Five Datus of 
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  The two chief executives are from the descent lines that are supported. They derive their 
ancestry from apos who have the right to the title Sultan sa Butig and Sultan sa Domalondong. 
The Council of Elders normally consists of the parents — male and female — of those who have 
a claim on a title. Each clan with a claim on a title has its own elders who decide which clan 
members will carry the title. When there is more than one clan that has claims, a consensus is 
needed. The apo of the Sultan sa Bayabao, the presiding officer in East Unayan of the Council of 
Elders, was a brother of Lilangun, the mother of Punduma and the four Lawmakers who decided 
to support the first panoroganan. The Sultan sa Butig provided no further information on the 12 
datus, except that six of them belong to Butig and the others to Domalondong. This is the general 
taritib of East Unayan. Its arrangement is based on lineages of the apos, even though those may 
have been recognized only recently, like the Sultanate of Domalondong. There are further taritibs 
in smaller sultanates in East Unayan that are subordinated to the Royal Houses and that trace 
themselves  back  to  this  taritib.  Women  in  this  hierarchy  are  not  particularly  mentioned  as 
representatives even though it is usually the case that there are women among the elders as well 
as counterpart female titleholders (each male title has a female counterpart).  
3. One Arrangement for the Pat a Pangampong 
Every domain has its own taritib but there is also a common structure for the whole Pat a 
Pangampong.  Sultan  Mansing  Macabando  sa  Marinaot,  chairman  of  the  Marawi  Sultanate 
League, explained that the sultanates have one law, even though the protocol might be different in 
each unit. Every sultanate has its own set of sultans, bais, and datus, but it is against the taritib to 
establish another royal house or mbabaya without the consensus of the 16 and 28. Thus, there is a 
certain control and an all-encompassing taritib.  
  According to Macabando, the structure of the Pat a Pangampong has the following order. 
On top, the 16 Royal Houses have authority and supervision over their respective domains. They 
are assisted by the 28, who make up the legislative body, dealing with local customs, traditions 
and laws, which are then brought to the Royal Houses and, after them, the Council of the Elders 
and the Board of Advisors. The two latter arbitrate, mediate, and recommend a solution in case of 
conflict or misunderstanding between the Royal Houses and the 28 or any other sector.  
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Graphic 10: Structural Chart of the Pat a Pangampong 
Information provided by Sultan Mansing Macabando, chairman of the Marawi Sultanate League, February 9, 2008, 
MSU Marawi. 
 
Macabando  (2008)  compares  the  structure  of  the  Pat  a  Pangampong  to  the  national 
government. The royal houses and the mbabaya are, respectively, the chiefs of the executive and 
the legislative powers, while the ulama constitute the judiciary. Thus, in case there is a violation 
of established rules, the mbabaya will “bring the matter to the attention of the panoroganan for 
him to call for a council. After the council’s deliberation, they will submit their findings to the 
ulamas” (p. 7). The ulama are classified into three groups: imams, kallis [qadis], and gurus. The 
imam is the head leader “in the observance and performance of the five pillars and the six articles 
of  faith  in  Islam.  He  is  the  ultimate  keeper  and  custodian  of  the  mosque  and  the  executive The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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authority about the Islamic religious affairs in the community.” The kalli has the authority in 
matters of justice based on sharia law. The guru is the teacher of Islamic knowledge.    
In the Pat a Pangampong, women are also titleholders. This tradition goes back to the 
times  of  the  datu-ships.  Female  as  well  as  male  titles  experienced  a  change  when  being 
transferred  from  the  datu  into  the  sultanate  system.  The  major  male  titles  were  ayonan  or 
simbaan; later they changed into sultan. The major female titles were bai, potri, and paramata. 
Today bai a labi is the highest female title, signifying a major royal lineage within the sultanate, 
the lineage of Sharief Kabungsoan and the right to a certain place, which is added to the title. The 
descendants of a bai a labi have the right to be crowned as sultan. Some titles of bai a labi
226 are 
without any connection to the place, in which case a lower title indicates an absence of rights to 
the place. For example, the bai a gaus (finance) can become in some cases a bai a labi a gaus 
because financial recourses are highly appreciated in some sultanates. Nevertheless, the bai a labi 
of that place is a higher-ranking title.  
  The first female titles in the sultanate system were those given to a female relative of the 
male titleholder coming from the same apo (sometimes from different elders). In most cases, she 
was the sister of the titleholder. Major female and male titles were thus held by close relatives 
within one clan. Titles are inherited, bilateral, and rotational, and female titles do not depend on 
male  titles.  On  the  island  of  Pohnpei,  Micronesia,  the  wife  receives  a  title,  which  is  the 
counterpart to the title of her husband, but she does not retain the title in case her husband dies 
(Keating 2000: 306). In Mindanao, the male and female titleholders may act more independently, 
both being supported by their respective kin groups. 
  Mednick (1965) writes that there were only a few female titles in comparison to male 
titles. They were mainly honorific and not recognized with the community at large in the manner 
of male titles (1965: 242). Female titles are still not recognized as much as male titles but there is 
a large quantity of them. The supposed change in number of female titles has many reasons. One 
reason may be that the number of women taking part in professional life has increased since the 
time of Mednick’s research. Since one major task of a titleholder is to contribute financially to 
community activities and social events of relatives, like weddings, a professional or rich person is 
preferred.  Titles  for  both  men  and  women  go  where  influence  is.  Marcus  (1984)  likewise 
                                                 
226 Royalty are convinced that  initially there  was only one  sultan and one  bai a labi per sultanate, but several 
additional titleholders for bai or datu. Today, there may be several different sultans and bai a labis in one sultanate. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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observes for Tongans in the South Pacific Ocean that those who are dependent on the nobles 
make their “value” possible (see also Matsumoto 1989; Wolfowitz 1991). 
  One example for this is Baicon Cayongcat-Macaraya, one of the young women leaders 
working for a local NGO who later achieved a position at the office of the United Nations World 
Food Program in Iligan City. She quit her law studies during the 2000 all-out war and began 
working with victims in the Baloi region. Under her initiative and with the support of her NGO, 
500 houses,  six mosques,  and five schools, once destroyed by fighting in  Maguindanao and 
Lanao del Sur, were rebuilt (Gutoc 2008a). For her community work, she was offered two major 
titles: Bai a Labi sa Masiu and Bai a Labi ko Shakba. The first was conferred from her father’s 
side but since she has more contacts in Marawi, she decided to take a title from the pangampong 
Bayabao from her mother’s side.
227 The chart below shows her genealogical connections to the 
first Bai a Labi ko Shakba and her place in the rotational system of inheritance. She has a rightful 
claim by birth but was also chosen because of  her personal  qualities as youth leader and 
professional.  
                                                 
227 When she occupied the title, the inheritance of the title was changed on her suggestion. Thus, she did not serve for 
a lifetime but only for six years, since there were others who were waiting their turn to serve the people. Under her, 
other titleholders of the region were enthroned, replacing old titleholders. Each of the new titleholders now serves for 
six years. The bai a labi is related to both Royal Houses in the area of her title (Ramain and Ditsaan), putting her in a 
good position to settle ridos based on her descent line connections. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 11: Genealogical Connections of the Bai a Labi ko Shakba 
Information provided by the present Bai a Labi ko Shakba, who can trace back her ancestry to Bai Dayandayang, 
2008. 
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  The  bai  is  the  partner  of  the  datu  or  sultan  “in  building,  formulating  and  leading  a 
sultanate community” (Macabando 2008: 7-A). Macabando defines the role of the bai a labi in 
relation  to  two  of  the  wives  of  Prophet  Mohammed,  Hadrat  Khadidia  and Aisa,  “who  were 
always acquainted with all the problems in the community.” She can act in behalf of the sultan, in 
case he is not available, and be a leader in peace and in war, “like when Hadrat Rofaida was 
selected to lead a battle against the infidel and won the battle for the Muslims.”
 228 Further, she 
acts as “conciliatory in every dispute in behalf of the sultans and elders in the community” (ibid.). 
 
 
Picture 9: Enthronement Ceremony 
Bai a Labi sa Noni Amina Domato-Sarip and husband Sultan Taha Guro-Sarip. Photo kindly provided by the couple. 
 
  Whereas  Macabando  integrates  female  titleholders  into  the  system  of  the  Pat  a 
Pangampong, they are ignored by most other sources when describing the authority system of the 
sultanate. The Royal House of Masiu published a list of the 16 kalipa of Gapao Balindong (who 
are mandated as the advisers of the Sultan sa Masiu and the Datu a Cabugatan sa Masiu), in 
which women are not included. In addition, the Maranao historian Tawagon (1987) does not 
include women in his structure showing officials on an agama level (they may, however, be 
included among the elders).   
                                                 
228 On the debate on female Muslim leadership and the participation of Muslim women in war and peace during the 
time of Prophet Mohammad, see Schröter (2008). For the active participation in battle of MNLF women, see Angeles 
(1998: 224). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 12: Traditional Hierarchy on the agama Level according to Tawagon (1987) 
The radia moda and the cabugatan (or kabugatan) are defined as the heir presumptive, crown price, prime minister, 
or assistant of the prime minister, depending on the regulation of each sultanate. The kali (local version of the qadi) 
is the judge at the agama court and the wakil the legal counsel. 
 
The Sultanate League of Marawi mentions in documents provided to me female titles only 
as minor titles, and official members of the League are mainly men. Women with titles, even 
though they belong to the sultanates, join meetings only when invited. In addition, Mednick, 
writing his dissertation about the Pat a Pangampong in the 1960s, stated that female titleholders 
had rather symbolic positions. He nevertheless added that women from the datu class, when 
older, were increasingly involved in community affairs: 
After marriage, and as she grows older, a woman participates more and more in 
the informal channels of the society, particularly the kinship universe. She is the 
line of communication between scattered bodies of kinsmen, relaying requests for 
aid,  mediating  and  smoothing  out  potential  or  actual  conflicts,  and  arranging 
marriages. (Mednick 1965: 57-8) 
Female titleholders, however, can have more than symbolic authority, especially if they are from 
a prominent clan or have an influential economic or political position. Also, the fact that titles are 
inherited bilateral, and rotational gives some women the chance to have influence since they are 
not directly related to the sultan and thus  may have support from their direct kin. However, 
female influence on the community does not derive from the possession of a royal title alone, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
219 
which has a rather symbolic nature, but more from the woman’s social, economic, and family 
background and qualities. 
  When a new sultan or bai a labi is chosen, they and other members of the clan might 
replace the set of titleholders of the former clan. A whole set might be up to 14 or more male and 
female titleholders for one sultanate who are crowned at once. The former clan might take other 
titles, since it is a rotational system. The rotational system means that there are several descent 
lines,  originating from  one ancestor. A certain  title rotates among those lineages,  and this  is 
regulated through taritib. The titleholders can keep their titles for life or may agree on terms. In 
some cases, the title stays with one lineage since no better replacement can be found. When the 
set of titleholders changes, the former titleholders officially resign but keep their title even though 
it is not connected to their function anymore. In many sultanates, there is an heir apparent, a 
cabugatan or radia moda from another clan than that of the sultan. According to the rotational 
system of inheritance, it may be presumed that he will become the sultan after the former sultan 
dies. But this is not always the case, since sometimes the cabugatan may have the descent line 
but not the requisite means, local connections, experiences, or knowledge, for example because 
he lives in Manila. In consequence, a conflict can occur in which a person with a rightful claim 
but without the social connections will be challenged. A possible claimant to the title Sultan sa 
Marawi explains: 
If the Sultan of Marawi will die right now . . . the next sultan . . . it might be 
succession, it might be a decision by the body. A decision from the body is for 
example that they will elect a person who is already experienced, has support in 
the community in the past, but is still fighting with a person who is in Manila who 
has no participation in every social activity to be the sultan. (Interview, Marawi 
City, 2008) 
For women there are similar jealousies about titles. In some cases, claims by others are ignored 
and several enthronements of the same title by different families may occur. To prevent a conflict 
a new title can be invented. Clan feuds can break out because women are competing for a title. 
Carrying a title is a question of status. Even though the title does not itself confer authority, it 
provides status for women and men alike, not only for the titleholders but for the whole lineage, 
whether it is a male or female title. A datu comments on a statement made by a religious woman 
who complained about the harm the title of bai a labi had brought to the community. He explains 
the impact that jealousies about titles can have on the distribution of titles but also on social 
relations among relatives: The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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She [the alima] is referring to a spat between two close relatives, ten years ago, 
who vied for the same title as Bai a Labi of Bayang and this created animosity and 
disunity among the Lucmans, who took sides. The other claimant, the first party, 
insulted the other side as inferior in bloodline, which instigated the  maratabat 
[status-honor] of the second party. An insult would shame a person and shame is 
worse than death. The  embarrassment  called for a violent  act  as  revenge. The 
relatives  of  the  second  party  swore  to  spare  no  expense,  time  and  energy  to 
prevent the first party from assuming the title of bai a labi. The rivalry caused 
such dissension and bad blood that the Council of Elders refused to name the next 
Bai a  Labi  of Bayang. The position is still vacant  as  of this  writing. (Written 
statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
 
C. Clan Organization 
1. Clans as the Basis of the Sultanate  
The Sultan sa Marinaot explains taritib as following: on the one hand, there is the division 
into  geographical  areas;  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  hierarchical  division  of  these  areas 
according to genealogy. The hierarchical order includes the 16 Royal Houses, the 28 Lawmakers 
and the Council of Elders, followed by the clan. Every clan is led by elders. 
Each  unit  under  an  elder  devised  a  system  of  designation  and  recognized 
leadership assigning a title (grar) to a ruler, which effectively avoided interference 
and rivalry among a given unit. The arrangement will last, unless modified later by 
agreement of a given clan. (Macabando 2008: 5) 
The elders decide who will carry a title, if new titles within a certain descent line will be added or 
subtracted, and how terms are arranged. When deciding, they rely on the taritib but this structure 
can be rearranged through igma if needed.  
The sultanate system thus is based on clan structures, a connection which is manifested in 
the enthronement oath. The Sultanate Patani in Ramain is one of a collection of 12 agamas which 
had been founded by 12 relatives, named according to their number (sapolo ago dowa ka agama: 
12 agamas) in Mala a Bayabao, and all are subordinated under the Sultanate of Ramain. When 
enthroned,  the  titleholders  (male  and  female)  have  to  pledge  to  deal  in  a  proper  manner  — 
according to taritib and igma — with those clans that are higher in the hierarchy: 
Because  of  our  belief  in  the  wishes  of  God,  almighty Allah,  in  the  choice  of 
leaders and because of the descendants of the Sultan a Pithi-ilan sa Patani, I accept 
the trust and confidence in our designation as leaders of our community, to the 
best of my ability, which is in accordance with Islam and in defense of the truth, to 
protect our community from humiliation and harm. To preserve the dignity of our 
bloodline, may they take the right path, the honest way in dealing with the bigger The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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clans, bigger principalities. May God have mercy on us; may he give us strength 
and power to preserve the legacy of the Sultan a Pithi-ilan sa Patani. (Translated 
from  Maranao  by  Norodin  Alonto  Lucman,  Marawi  City,  2008,  translation 
modified) 
  Despite the overall taritib of the sultanate system, the single sultanates are autonomous, 
though  in  times  of  crisis  or  need  the  ranks  are  ideally  closed  and  the  hierarchy  accepted. 
Otherwise, the order is rather symbolic. It is not a top-down but bottom-up organization where 
the family is the smallest unit of decision-making, being part of a multi-centric clan society. The 
clan and inter-clan relationships are particularly important in crucial moments of a person’s life, 
like marriage, the beginning of a job, illness, and death, and in times of conflict, and are also 
important  in  determining  the  order  of  supporters  and  supported  in  traditional  and  political 
leadership. 
 
 
Photo 10: Enthronement Ceremony, Sultanate of Patani, Lanao del Sur 
Photo by author, 2008. 
 
The sultanate system is based on clan arrangements. The clan, however, is not dependent 
on the sultanate structure and has its own regulations. Mednick (1965) gives an introduction to 
the basic clan (tonganai'i) organization in the Pat a Pangampong: The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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[Tonganai’i are] all persons who are related to each other within the fourth degree 
of consanguinity (tongod makapat), that is, who share at last one set of great-
great-great-grandparents (antecedents in the fifth ascendant generation above an 
ego) . . . They form the largest and most inclusive group of kinsmen. This group 
comes into being through the combination and recombination of kinship circles 
termed mbota’a. An mbota’a is a three generational group traced down from ego’s 
grandparents. It includes the two sets of grandparents and their descendants, but 
does not include the siblings of the grandparents and their descendants. To this 
mbota’a is added the mbota’a of each of his parents, and this grouping is known 
as the mbota’ mbota’a. This group then starts with ego’s great-grandparents, but 
not  their  siblings,  and  includes  the  siblings  of  his  grandparents  and  their 
descendants. Such a descendant in ego’s generation is termed a tongod makadoa, 
relative or cousin of the second degree. The child of such a cousin would still be in 
ego’s mbota’ mbota’a and be referred to as pakiwata’an sa tondog makadoa. The 
same child, however, would not be a part of the mbota’ mbota’a of ego’s offspring 
since  the  relationship  between  them  would  then  be  that  of  tongod  makatelo 
(relative or cousin of the third degree). 
The  effective  kin  group  for  most  intents  and  purposes  is  the  mbota’ 
mbota’a, that is, persons who are no more distantly removed from each other than 
as “relatives of the second degree” tongod makadoa. (p. 77) 
  The effective kin group is the mbota mbota’a (or mbata bataa), which is also defined as 
opakat or saksakb, partnership on a larger scale. It covers all aspects of cooperative survivability 
as a communal component. Clan members, especially those living in one agama (or barangay), 
are ideally connected by mutual support (kapamagawida or awid) or mutual help (katatabanga). 
The  mutual  help,  or  reciprocity  (awidan),  that  the  clan  provides  is  regulated  by  kokoman  a 
kambhatabata’a (the law of kinsmen) (Intuas 1996: 93). This is among others applied in times of 
conflict or when, in rural areas, clan members help each other in farm work (Fianza 2004: 22, 
33). Saber (1979) explains that in a clan the “roles shift alternately between interacting members 
and  kinship  groups  performing  traditional  duties”  (p.  105).  For  instance,  the  civil  elders  are 
supported by their religious counterparts in their activities; in turn, the latter receive support from 
the former in religious affairs. While elders are supported by non-elders, elders also help non-
elders in activities that enhance the membership strength of the kinship group. For instance, if a 
clan  member  contracts  a  marriage  to  someone  from  another  descent  line  to  bring  about  an 
alliance with a certain clan, the elders, when in agreement, support him or her by contributing to 
the ceremonial expenses of the celebration (ibid.).  
Clanship  is  bilaterally  inherited. A  clan  member  might  thus  belong  to  four  different 
descent lines. His or her name is mentioned along with a number of family names in case there is The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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a public announcement.
229 During marriage ceremonies, eight families are given turns to speak 
and explain their roots and connections to other families and clans , ostensibly to assure all that 
the soon-to-wed couple comes from an illustrious family background. According to a Filipino 
naming custom based on the Spanish system, a child has two last names: the one used as middle 
name comes from his mother, which was the last name of her father. The one used as the last 
name, refers to the father, and was the last name of his father. When a male child marries, he 
keeps these two last names. In the Maranao case, he might also add the two other last names of 
his parents. If a girl marries, she normally loses the last name of her mother (her middle name) 
and the name of her father becomes her middle name the  name of her husband (the one he 
inherited  from  his  father)  becomes  her  last  name.  The  female  line,  however,  can  still  be 
mentioned, especially if the line is of importance. This is even encouraged, since the purpose of a 
clan is to broaden the kin relations to other families for political and strategic reasons. This means 
the official naming system is not connected to clan membership, since one belongs to the clan up 
to the fourth generation, no matter whom one has married and what last name one officially 
carries. Disoma (1999) writes that Maranaos accept the country’s surname system for official 
purposes but that it does not have an even pattern. One can take the surname of the father, 
grandfather, or a well-known kin  member  (1999:  74). Some last  names  are  clan or sub-clan 
names. In some cases, a person can be registered with one surname in one barangay and with 
another surname in the next barangay, based on bilateral descent line rights to land and, hence, to 
voting (Warriner 1975a: 78).  
Marriage politics are designed ideally to strengthen one’s family and clan connections. 
One can marry exogamously in one generation but the next generation normally marries back 
into the clan or family. The male offspring of the Alontos intermarried with the Adiongs and 
Alangadis and occupied important political positions for two generations in Lanao del Sur. Their 
female offspring intermarried again with the Adiongs and now their male progeny occupy the 
most  important  political  posts  in  the  ARMM  and  in  Lanao  del  Sur.
230  Intermarriages with 
members of other families from the same or higher rank are one way to keep a hierarchical 
                                                 
229 If a datu gets married, the welcoming banner might state all the names of the immediate families. If the family 
prefers the Arabic version, this would be: given name; name of the sub-clan or family one belongs to, for example 
Aloz, Adiong, Alonto; ibn (son); first name and last name of father. 
230 Other Alontos who occupy political positions are Cabib Alonto Tanog, mayor of Pualas; Bai Normallah Alonto 
Lucman, who became the Liberal Party provincial chairman in Lanao del Sur (2009); Norodin Alonto Lucman, 
deputy governor on Muslim Affairs of ARMM (2010); and several young Alontos like Assemblyman Ziaur Alonto 
Adiong, Assemblyman Yasir Alonto Balindong, Board Member Alexander Boyet Alonto, and Board Member Che 
Alonto Balindong. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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structure. Marriages between cousins, also on the first level, are no exception and are another 
way to maintain high status. Clan endogamy is not sufficient in maintaining a high descent line 
status; one has also to have kinship relations to other high-ranking clans all around the lake.  
It is the task not of a single person or family but of a mbota mbota’a to defend and 
nourish  a bloodline in  a certain  community or principality. Thus, the  marriage  rule is  rather 
general: Maranaos should marry among their ethnic group. However, especially among political 
clans, strategic marriages involving particular descent lines are made to uphold the status and 
strength of the kin group. The Alontos, for example, are members of the lineage of the Patka 
Inaan sa Maul (the Four Matriarchs of Maul). Bai Etha, Bai a Labi a Makadmpas, who lived at 
the turn of the eighteenth century, headed the matriarchs.
231 Her descendants branched out to 
different sub-clans, which number about 5,000 members (as of 2008). The family claims that they 
and  the  Alangadis  were  the  ones  initially  occupying  important  pre-colonial  posts  in  Mala 
Bayabao. To strengthen this position, they intermarry with other important families, not only 
from their own clan but from all around the lake. The political connections of the Alontos today 
are stabilized by intermarriages  with  powerful  political  families  from  the same  area  like the 
Balindongs,
232 the Macarambons,
233 the Pacasums,
234 and in particular the Adiongs. In many 
provinces  in the Philippines, dominated by family politics,  a  family  occupies  in  tandem the 
governorship and a seat in Congress. VERA Files explains the importance of this:  
                                                 
231 Bai Etha was the daughter of Datu Tato and Bai a Pitiilan sa Maul (in Marantao), which means she  was the 
descendant  of  local  datus  and  bais. According  to  local  transmissions,  Bai  Etha  participated  in  battles  against 
foreigners and tribal enemies and ordered the assassination of the Sultan of Sulu, who was accused of conspiring to 
kill the Sultan of Maguindanao. Etha supported her uncle, Sultan Alamada, who ruled Marantao during the years of 
Spanish incursions in Lanao. She was married to Datu Patao, son of Bai a Labi a Torogan sa Uato and great-grandson 
of Rilaola and Bai sa Osonan, descendants of Sharief Kabungsuan. The Marohombsar and Dimakuta-Mandangan 
clans also claim descent from this bloodline, which connected local datus with Sharief Kabungsoan. Patka Inaan in 
2008 was headed by the Alontos and Aloz’, who wielded political power for many generations. They are supported 
by the Alamada, Calacas, Casidar, Cadalay, Cornell-Gutoc, Dimalutang-Gubat, Disomimba, Guro, and Tanggote 
families, who emanated from the same bloodline. 
232 Representative Pangalian Balindong was a member of the MNLF and an assemblyman of the ARMM (1993-
1996). Later he became representative of the 2
nd District of Lanao del Sur (2007); a position to which he was re-
elected in 2010. He is married to Jamela Malawani Alonto. In 2008, Hafsa Dimaporo Balindong married the newly 
elected assemblyman of the 1
st District of Lanao del Sur, Ziaur Alonto Adiong. Ziaur is the youngest son of the late 
Lanao del Sur Governor Mamintal “Mike” Adiong and Hadja Soraya Alonto Adiong, while Hafsa is the daughter of 
Vice-Mayor Alinader Balindong and Hadja Omaima M. Dimaporo. Her grandfather is  the late political kingpin 
Mohamad Ali Dimaporo. She is also related to Sultan Mohammad Naga Dimaporo on her mother’s side and Sultan 
Picong Balindong on her father’s side. Ziaur is the grandson of Senator “Domocao” Alonto and Princess Tarhata 
Alonto Lucman, and the youngest brother of Lanao del Sur Governor “Bombit” Alonto Adiong and ARMM Vice-
Governor “Hooky” Alonto Adiong. 
233 Benasing Macarambon was congressman from the 2
nd District in Lanao del Sur for two terms (2001-2004; 2004-
2007). 
234 The family occupied several political positions in Lanao. See chapter three. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The  posts  of  governor  and  representative  are  both  crucial  at  the  local  level. 
Governors  control  local  officials  from  mayors  down  to  barangay  captains  and 
kagawads  [member  of  the  barangay  Council]  who  constitute  the  political 
machinery that could spell victory in future elections. They also enjoy a sizable 
chunk of the internal revenue allocation, the chief source of revenue for many 
local  government  units.  Members  of  Congress,  in  turn,  control  pork  barrel 
allocations. (14 May 2010) 
Representatives normally have to beg governors for political support, while the latter have to beg 
the former for pork barrel allocations. It is thus crucial that they either are party mates or have 
good working relationships. VERA Files further reports that at least 34 out of the 80 provinces in 
the  Philippines  are  governed  by  such  a  tandem  (GMA,  22  July  2010).  The Alonto-Adiongs 
governed Lanao del Sur for a cumulative 19 years out of 64 (since 1946); the longest time a 
political family could hold the governorship in this province. In addition, they have held major 
political  positions  continually  since  1992.  However,  they  currently  do  not  have  one  seat  in 
Congress.  Instead,  there  are  intermarriages  between  leading  political  families  holding 
congressional seats. Affinal relations can lead to financial and other support between different 
families. The Alontos, Lucmans, and Amai Disalongans are connected through marriage. They 
are categorized as political and religious clans as well as scions of the ancient royal houses. In 
case of danger, they can produce about 2,000 high-powered firearms at any given time in an 
emergency, “in order to discount other political families,” as a local datu put it. 
  Families and clans may be linked to certain classes. The Maranao writer Macarampat 
(2008) defines the classes in the Pat a Pangampong as the leaders, the ulama, the rich, and the 
poor. One can add the warriors. A clan is ideally connected by blood and affinity to all these 
different classes. Leading political clans today may have a well-developed network with access to 
many forms  of authority;  these can  include traditional high-ranking titles or  claims, political 
positions via networks linked to Manila (political clout), economic success, religious authorities, 
or rebels. All these elements can be included within the social and kin network of a powerful clan 
to stabilize their situation. A clan structure is not only connected by blood and alliances but also 
by its code of silence. A person will usually not give negative information on someone higher in 
the hierarchy of his or her clan, among other reasons because he or she would then have to fear 
retaliation. Thus clan members,  and  especially  elders,  can do things  that  normally  would be 
considered as  shameful, as  long as  they do not  get  publicly talked about,  like, for example, 
engaging in secret love affairs, but also drinking alcohol, drug pushing, criminal activities, or 
vote buying. Indirectly some “lapses” are considered normal. Vote buying may jokingly be called The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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“poverty alleviation” since this is a way in which people get money from their political leaders. 
Other affairs are judged as of too low importance to risk getting involved in a conflict, even 
though they might be seen as shameful or wrong. An example is if a politician does not pay his or 
her non-Maranao employees, who then ask for help from relatives of the politician. The relatives 
may not confront the politician with his or her wrongdoings since this may be considered as an 
attack against the maratabat of the family and clan and not worth a confrontation. 
  In short, the clan structure is the basis of the sultanate. The latter organizes the former 
through genealogical hierarchies, which are, however, penetrable through strategic marriages and 
bilateral  and  rotational  inheritance  of  titles.  While  the  sultanate  system  has  declined,  clan 
structures on the agama level have remained strong. Political clans developed: they have the 
needed descent line status to enable members to belong to the “good people,” but do not need 
royal titles to justify their leadership claims. 
2. Political Clans 
The decline of the sultanates in lieu of governmental officials does not signify a decline of 
clan society but a shift from a clan system that was connected to a sultanate to a structure that is 
additionally connected to the national political system. The provincial government in Lanao del 
Sur includes a Council of Elders (a mixed group of women and men) and a Council of Ulama 
(consisting of segregated groups of women and men). Both assist the governor, who is, in the 
case of the Adiongs, from the Royal House of the area (Ramain, Mala a Bayabao). Leadership 
based on clan affiliations is maintained by political dynasties, political clout, and the support by 
the clan of its political candidates, as well as through intermarriages between prominent clans. 
Royalty alone does not enable one to become a leader. The material conditions changed with the 
introduction of a new political system giving more people access to political leadership, not 
foremost  through  genealogy  but  increasingly  via  economic,  professional,  educational,  social, 
warlord,  or  religious  authority.  Leadership  (political  and  non-political)  and  social  security 
nevertheless rarely go beyond kinship groups and each group has its own representatives — be 
they be politicians or royalty, MNLF or MILF, an alim or a person of means or with political 
clout. Decisions are mainly made in the framework of a family or clan, not based on the larger 
community. Thus supporter-supported, or “patron-client” relationships are important and have to 
be frequently cemented by those who would like to remain in leadership. There have been only 
rare and very limited cases when one system, clan, or person could claim authority over all the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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others. One example is that of the Paramount Sultan Rashid Lucman, who combined political and 
traditional  power  with  leadership  in  the  rebellion  for  a  short  time.  He  nevertheless  was  not 
successful: he had to leave his political post and the rebellion was taken over by the younger 
generation.  
Power among political clans is partly maintained through intermarriage, thus through the 
stabilization of relationships and the support of several lineages. A decline in political importance 
of a family can be due to a change in material conditions, intermarriage, connections, or support 
by Manila, as well as the influence of the Islamic resurgence movement. The Alontos initially 
took a stand against the arriving American colonial forces joining the independence movement. 
Later, they became amigos and occupied political posts during the American period, in the time 
of  the  Japanese,  and  after  Independence.
235  During the Marcos  period, the Alonto rival and 
Marcos crony Mohamad Ali Di maporo (1976-1986) governed for ten years in Lanao del Sur 
(Bentley 2007: 246). There were intermarriages between the Alonto Lucmans and the Dimaporos. 
In order to settle a rido, the son of Rashid Lucman was married when he was eleven years old to 
a relative of Ali Dimaporo. However, the influence of the Alontos could not be restored during 
this time. After Marcos was ousted from power in 1986, they occupied the governorship only for 
a short time after Tarhata Alonto Lucman was appointed governor (OIC 1986-1987). Saidamen 
Pangarungan (Officer in Charge (OIC) 1987-1988) then replaced her, to keep the peace in Lanao 
del Sur between the Alontos and the Dimaporos. Saidamen Pangarungan, when he was elected 
(1988-1992), was said to have broken the rule of the traditional elites. This is only partly true 
since his family — known as American amigos (Madale 1997: 144) — also had relationships 
with local royalties and politicians. He married Princess Johayrah Diamond Ali Pacasum, Bai a 
Labi a Gaus sa Ranao, who in 1978 became the first Maranao assemblywoman, coming from a 
prominent political family from Baloi. Pangarungan held the governorship only for one term; he 
was followed by Mahid Mutilan, from the religious OMPIA Party. Mutilan governed for three 
terms, between 1992 and 2001, before becoming ARMM vice-governor (2001-2005). The growth 
of  religious  parties  was  possible  after  the  end  of  the  Marcos  dictatorship  when  democratic 
                                                 
235 Sultan sa Ramain Alauya Adiong Alonto was senator in 1934-35, 1941-1945 and 1946-1947. His son, Ahmad 
“Domocao,” became Lanao governor under the Japanese occupation in 1942, then congressman from Lanao (1954-
1957)  and  later  senator  (1955-1961).  His  second  son,  the  attorney Abdul  Gafur  Madki Alonto,  became  Lanao 
governor for eight years (1959-1963 and 1963-1967); his son in law, Rashid Lucman, congressman of Lanao for 
seven years (1962-65 and 1966-1969); and his daughter, Tarhata Alonto Lucman, Lanao del Sur governor (1971-
1975). Tarhata Alonto Lucman was repeatedly engaged by her family to respected Maranaos but she broke off all the 
wedding plans because she wanted to marry a man of her choice. Finally, she married her mentor, Sultan Rashid 
Lucman (Gutoc 2008a).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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processes enabled oppositional parties to take part in elections (see McKenna 1990). However, 
after several years, the traditional political families made a comeback in politics, replacing the 
religious  parties. The Alonto-Adiongs  entered  Congress  in  the  1990s  with  Mamintal  “Mike” 
Adiong Senior (1992-2001), and were soon followed by others.
236  
 
Table 7: The Return of the Traditional Political Families 
 
Families  Person  Elective post Lanao 
Alonto  Normallah Alonto Lucman, the Daughter 
of Tarhata Alonto and Rashid Lucman 
Lanao del Sur Vice-Governor 
1995-1998 
Adiong 
(married to an 
Alonto) 
Mamintal “Mike” Adiong Senior
237  Lanao del Sur Governor 
2001-2004 (died in office) 
Alonto-
Adiong 
Ansaruddin-Abdulmalik Alonto Adiong 
Son of Mamintal “Mike” Adiong Senior 
ARMM Vice-Governor 
2005-2009  
ARMM Governor 
2009 
Mamintal ‘Bombit’ Alonto Adiong Junior  
Son of Mamintal “Mike” Adiong Senior 
Provincial Board Member 
 1996-2001 
Lanao del Sur Governor 
2007 
 
In  Lanao  del  Sur,  there  has  been  a  return  of  traditional  political  families  into  high-ranking 
provincial  posts  since  the  2000s. A  similar  development  can  be  observed  for  the ARMM,  a 
change of authority that went along with a decline in MNLF and religious representatives.  
  In order to win local elections, political connections to Manila are not sufficient: in fact, 
elections are in large part clan affairs. Before the elections in Lanao del Sur in 2007, political 
clans  connected  to  the  Alonto-Adiong  families  gathered  to  bring  a  change  to  the  political 
leadership in the province and to regain the governorship. Mamintal “Bombit” Alonto Adiong 
posed  his  candidacy  at  this  meeting  and  other  clan  members  announced  their  support.  A 
participant remembers the gathering:  
Before the 2007 elections, as chairman, I called on the four major clans, as clan 
chairman,  for  a  general  meeting  at  the  JPI  [Jamiatul  Philippine  Al-Islamia] 
                                                 
236 Mamintal “Mike” Adiong recovered the Lanao del Sur governorship in 2001 after Mutilan had finished his third 
term and kept it until 2004, when he died the day of his proclamation and was followed by his vice-governor the alim 
Basher “Mustaqbal” Manalao. 
237 He became congressional representative of the 1
st District. The Alonto-Adiongs are descendants of the sultanates 
in Mala a Bayabao. Alauya Adiong Alonto, the grandfather of Mamintals wife, Soraya, had been the Sultan of 
Ramain, one of the 16 Royal Houses. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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quadrangle. It was attended by more than 3,000 people, mostly clan and ward 
leaders, professional and women leaders. [The clans represented were:] Patao-Etha 
(Alonto  and  Aloz  Clans),  Darnding-Purad  (Adiong  Clan),  Maruhom  Baraguir 
(Alangadi Clan), Malawani Clan. I asked each clan to speak and give [a] status 
report whereupon they granted my request and spoke about the state of affairs of 
their  respective  clans.  Speakers  lamented  the  lack  of  unity  and  selfishness  of 
Alonto clan leaders that led to its deterioration as a major political clan. Most 
speakers  spoke  about  the  glorious  generations  of  the  Alontos  who  produced 
Senator  Alauya  Adiong  Alonto,  Datu  Birua  Alonto  [first  elected  mayor  of 
Dansalan 1938-1940], Senator “Domocao” Alonto, governors Madki Alonto and 
Princess Tarhata Alonto-Lucman, wife of the late Sultan Rashid Lucman, whose 
leadership and influence not only touched the Mindanaoans but the entire country 
as well. The Alonto leaders were instrumental in introducing Muslim Mindanao to 
the Islamic world thus becoming part of the international Islamic community. The 
Alontos were instrumental in organizing Islamic nationalist movements, sending 
Islamic scholars to the Middle East for Islamic studies in Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
since 1955, guerilla trainees to Malaysia and Egypt and building state universities 
and  schools  to  educate  the  Muslims  in  Mindanao.  This  was  the  beginning  of 
Islamic  resistance  movement  that  gave  birth  to  Bangsa  Moro  Liberation 
Organization  (BMLO),  Moro  National  Liberation  Front  (MNLF)  and  Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), now a major armed movement dedicated to the 
objective of creating an independent Islamic state in Muslim Mindanao. 
In  the  speeches  that  followed,  it  was  noted  that  there  was  widespread 
discontent that the Alonto clan had retrogressed into a supportive role in politics, 
meaning  “pagawid,”  a  condition  that  dishonors  the  memory/maratabat  of  the 
Sultanates of Ramain and Bayang. And that the clan should put up a candidate for 
governor of the province thus restoring the honor of the clan as “pagawidan,” 
supported, as in the past. The people clenched their fists and emotionally pledged 
support to an Alonto as candidate for governor. Thereupon Mamintal “Bombit” 
Alonto Adiong,  Junior  stood  up  and  announced  his  candidacy  as  governor  of 
Lanao del Sur. He announced that his family will use up all its economic resources 
to  sustain  the  campaign  and  win  the  election.  His  mother,  Bai  Soraya Alonto 
Adiong, tearfully supported her son’s declaration and pledged that her remaining 
assets and wealth will be used for the honor of the clan. The Sani clan of Marawi 
[Asgar Sani is the Sultan sa Marawi], in-laws of “Bombit” Adiong, also declared 
full financial and manpower support to his candidacy. “Bombit” Adiong won as 
governor  of  Lanao  del  Sur  in  the  2007  national  and  local  elections.  (Written 
statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
A collection of clans might decide whom to vote for but usually they do not have influence with 
other descent lines. The candidate may get about 90% of the votes in certain areas, but few votes 
in others. In efforts to win larger support, intermarriages, vote buying, which is covered under the 
notion of “giving kandori,” as well as shootouts are rampant during elections (see chapter one). 
  Clan and family politics also had their effects on the new ARMM government. According 
to Maulana “Bobby” Alonto, a member of the MILF peace panel and of the Alonto clan, the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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ARMM government developed through the downfall of the Ampatuans and the rise to power of 
the Adiong-Alontos “from barbarism to mediocrity” (Alonto 2010). Although less violent, family 
politics remain an issue. Thus by August 2010, several offices in the ARMM were headed by 
Maranaos,  mainly  relatives  of  acting  Governor  Ansaruddin  Adiong.
238  The  ARMM  even 
considered moving its head office to Marawi City.  Appointments also  involved Maguindanao 
province, where Adiong was responsible for choosing an OIC member for the governorship after 
the 2009 massacre. His choice, backed by his Council of Elders, was Datu Gani Biruar, husband 
of Bai Annissah Alonto. The public campaign by 16 Bangsamoro civil orga nizations did not 
succeed in the efforts to  place in office Ina Ambolodto, Maguindanao vice -governor and first 
female (acting) governor of the province.  
II. The Importance of Status 
A. Datu Society 
1. Competitive Equality  
Mednick (1965) describes the different classes that existed when the sultanate system first 
developed in Lanao, before the colonial interventions. On top of the traditional system was the 
datu class, which included every Maranao having a claim on a title or being an actual titleholder. 
He emphasizes that the line between the actual titleholder and those having a claim to a title is a 
thin one: 
All title claimants, and therefore all members of the dato class, have the obligation 
to maintain the communal status and the authority symbolized by the titles with 
which they identify, or are identified. Thus, all members of the dato class as actual 
or  potential  title-holders  are  leaders  or  supporters  in  the  carrying  out  of  the 
traditional order of the society as laid down in the organizational code, the taritib. 
(p. 52) 
The datu class was distinguished from the other classes not only by its blood status but also by a 
certain lifestyle based on the heroes of the Darangen. Its members lived in a torogan or similar 
house, which was richly decorated with silk, trays, and boxes of copper, brass, silver, and gold. 
They had large households with supporters and slaves. The house was open for everyone and 
guests would be served with betel nuts. Community celebrations and gatherings of a secular and 
                                                 
238 Lininding Pangandaman, the first Maranao and the second ARMM governor (1993-1996), similarly appointed 
relatives and friends from his town to office. He thereby followed the politics of the previous governor, Zacaria 
Candao, but on a larger scale. When accused of nepotism, he argued that Candao had left him an empty office and 
that he had to put his own people in charge of sensitive departments in order to prevent further damage (see Gutierrez 
and Vitug 2000: 191). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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sacred nature would take place in the torogan. The datu was expected to contribute financially to 
community  celebrations,  the  building  and  maintaining  of  the  mosque,  and  other  community 
projects. He would also give a financial contribution to his relatives in case of marriage, death, or 
a conflict settlement (ibid.: 55).  
  Unmarried  male  members  of  the  datu  class  would  follow  and  serve  older  members. 
Whereas married ones would not do physical labor, younger members helped in the fields on 
request. In return, they would be helped with their bride price, “the size of which itself is an index 
of  his  (and  his  family’s)  status”  (ibid.:  56).  Unmarried  women  as  well  as  men  learned 
instruments, songs, and dances and would perform on public occasions. The instruments were 
played together, the women playing the kolintang and the men playing the agongs, the debakan, 
and the bebendir,
239 but dancing together was not allowed. Women performed in front of men at 
weddings or other communal gatherings where the performance could also  be understood as an 
“advertisement to would-be suitors for her future marriage” (Sani 1979: 109). Playing music as a 
mixed gendered ensemble decreased in its popularity during the times of the military occupation 
(martial law) (Disoma 1999: 70), but it can still be found, for example, in case a high-ranking 
foreign politician visits Marawi City.  
Before colonial times the dress and behavior of a woman of the datu class was stylized. 
As children, royal women performed the bayok (the traditional song said to be derived from 
Bumbaran, the mystical realm of the Darangen), the chanting of verses from the Qur’an, and the 
kakinikini (walking gracefully) (Mednick 1965: 57). Unmarried woman (raga) rarely participated 
in family life or the ordinary life of the community. Women of high-ranking descent, especially 
when they were very beautiful and beloved, stayed in a room attached to the torogan in a lamin 
(woman’s dormitory tower, built to stand out from the torogan) accompanied by other women. 
The daughter of the titleholder remained there especially when guests arrived. In some families, a 
daughter lived in the lamin. In others, she hid there when someone visited but usually lived in a 
gibon, a bedroom close to the sleeping place of the sultan and his lady (Tawano 1979: 59). When 
a man was interested in her with the parent’s consent, he would come with his companions for a 
kandadaonga session, where verses are exchanged between the girl and the boy in which their 
                                                 
239  The  kolintang  consists  of  eight  graduated  sizes  of  small  brass  gongs  laid  horizontally  on  a  stand  called 
langkongan. Women usually play it but men can also play it on informal occasions. The agong is a brass gong. The 
two brass gongs pemalsan and penanggisa’an are played as a pair by two men. The debakan is a large drum carved 
out of wood, which is usually played by men. The bebendir is a gong that is smaller than the two main gongs. All 
instruments taken together form the kolintang orchestra. (Information provided by the Aga Khan Museum, Marawi 
City.) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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feelings are indirectly expressed. After marriage, the girl moved with her husband to the common 
sleeping place in the torogan until they had their first child and the last part of the bride price was 
paid, after which they might move to the community of the husband. The scope of activity of a 
woman  from  the  datu  class  was  her  home;  she  seldom  left  the  house  of  her  parents  before 
marriage. This image became an idealized picture among bai a labis. The royal woman of the 
past is imagined by female royalty to have been highly respected, not having to do anything apart 
from  beautifying  herself,  since  she  had  slaves  and,  for  her  tasks  in  society  she  sent  her 
representatives. Women of the traditional elite today instead see themselves rather as “working 
bai a labis.” Since one main factor in having a title is to be able to contribute financially to social 
events or relatives in need, bai a labis in Marawi City are in most cases professionals.  
 
Picture 11: Maranao Courting Song  
In this performance at a pagana Maranao, a traditional celebtaion to welcome guests, the woman “snobs” and plays 
hard to get. Photo by author, 2007. 
 
  The next social pre-colonial class, the sakops (freemen/followers/commoners), lived not 
in the inged (township), the place of the datu, but in little houses in the hearing range of the gong, 
which was used to assemble members of this class. Freemen subsisted mainly on agriculture, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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sometimes  on  the  land  of  the  datu.  They  supported  the  latter  and  in  return  he  offered  his 
protection. When he needed armed men, the sakops were asked to come. The female followers, 
on whom little or no bride price was placed, served as second wives to the datus; they were 
known as sandil (concubines). The sakops were not allowed to build their own mosques or to 
carry the color yellow, which was reserved for the royalty. During my research, the word sakop 
was not used and the former freemen I encountered mostly had royal ancestry and royal claims 
because of frequent intermarriages with the former datu class. 
  The bisayas, which means slave in Maranao,
240 composed the lowest pre-colonial class. 
They did not have any claim on titles, nor relatives among Maranaos. Some datus took slaves as 
their wives or married slave men to widows or to women with lesser marriageable qualities. The 
marriage would bind the slave to the family, especially when there were children. Slaves lived in 
the house of the datu, and slept and ate there, and they had to serve the datu and his family in the 
house or the fields.  
The pre-colonial social classes could not be found anymore in the 1960s, when every 
Maranao claimed to have royal descent and social difference was partly constructed by lifestyle 
and not primarily by birth. The lifestyle of the elite followed those of the datus described in the 
legendary tales of the Darangen:  
Upward mobility becomes symbolized in terms of distance from the way of life of 
the  sakop  or  bisaya,  while  downward  mobility  is  limited  by  ascribed  position 
within the dato class. To live in a small house made of bamboo, to work steadily in 
the fields, to own no items of silver and gold, to possess no titles or connection to 
persons who do, remain as signs of a lower class status. Thus, as a Maranao gains 
the means, even today, he is likely to build a big house of lumber, withdraw from 
field labor, acquire items of dato status, take a title and try to arrange marriages to 
influential persons. On the other hand, the simple fact of having been born of 
acknowledged  dato  parentage  continues  to  act  as  a  cushion  for  downward 
mobility. (Mednick 1965: 69) 
The stylized lifestyle remains  a  way of creating in-groups in  the 2000s  and is  based on the 
acquisition of modern status symbols like fancy houses, big cars, and jewelry but also traditional, 
educational, religious, or governmental titles. A certain way of speaking is a sign that one belongs 
to the royalty, as it can only be acquired through socialization. The amount of the bride price 
certain families demand publicly helps to maintain a certain social status. Disoma (1999a) even 
reports that the title hadj is sought primarily not for religious reasons but to display economic 
strength, which connotes power and influence (p. 96). The maintenance of such a lifestyle is 
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called by some Maranaos the “rat-race” for status symbols. Status is thus given initially by birth 
but has to be constructed further in order to be maintained or to be changed.  
As has been noted for other societies like Pohnpei, Micronesia, among Maranaos it is 
difficult to find a person “who will identify himself or herself as a commoner” (Keating 2000: 
307; see also Best 1924: 346 on the Maoris; and Ortner 1996: 64 on Polynesian societies). Most 
Maranaos during my research claimed to be of royal descent, even though some refuse to carry or 
do not get offered a title. Mednick (1965) defines the supposed pre-colonial three-class order as 
“ideally  conceived”  and  identifies  the  social  system  as  “one  without  classes”  (p.  68).  He 
additionally points out that there probably never was a proper class system since there is no rule 
forbidding intermarriages between different classes as long as the bride price can be paid, and 
royal titles can be inherited from either the father’s or the mother’s side. This automatically 
broadens the possible range of candidates for a certain royal title and for membership in the datu 
class.  
  Mednick defined datus primarily through their lifestyle. Others, writing twenty years after 
him, in the 1980s, identified a datu by his interest in the welfare of his community. According to 
Cayongcat,  the  title  datu  connotes  social  rank  and  respect:  it  is  an  attribute  given  by  the 
community  members  to  people  to  show  respect  and  an  honorary  title  to  which  one  has  a 
birthright (1984: 14). Membership in the datu class thus was never strictly inherited. Warriner 
(1975) questions the use of the notion of class system, since “such systems involve mutually 
exclusive categories into which persons are placed by inheritance or achievement” (p. 43). He 
argues that it would be proper to speak instead of a lineage system consisting of “ranked lines of 
descent in which a person inherits the rights and duties of each of his ancestries.” Certainly this 
definition ignores that one can also become a datu without being born one and that those who are 
born datus may not be recognized as such. This nevertheless may also be a recent development. 
  Tawagon (1987) likewise detects a dissolving of the former social classes as described by 
Mednick. He points out a recent social division between those having high descent (mala bangsa) 
and those having low descent, called mabeba-a tao (low people). Those having mala bangsa are 
descendants of many high-ranking descent lines. These people are also called mapia-a tao (good 
people).  They  include  the  former  datu  class,  thus  the  pagawid  (supporter)  and  pagawidan 
(supported). The  pagawid  and  pagawidan  before  were  the  only  groups  to  have  genealogical 
connections to the Shariefs and thus were the only lineages mentioned in the salsila. Apart from 
the pagawid and pagawidan, there were the freemen and the slaves, who were not mentioned in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the salsila and had no right to titles. Because of frequent intermarriages and bilateral inheritance, 
families initially having no bangsa might have low bangsa (only one parent is from the former 
datu class), being included in the salsila and accordingly having rights and obligations within the 
sultanate system (p. 95). Beside the effects of intermarriages, the introduction of the modern state 
and  the  modern  educational  and  economic  systems,  the  prohibition  of  slavery  under  the 
Americans, and the non-recognition of royal titles under the Filipino government have affected 
social arrangements. Former slaves could earn an income and were then able to pay the bride 
price  of  a  higher-ranking  descent  line.  Some  datus  lacked  the  economic  support  of  their 
subordinates and were not able to pay high bride prices anymore. Not only does almost every 
Maranao claim to be from the former datu class, but to call someone “pagawid ka” (supporter) is 
an insult for which one can get killed because of maratabat.  
To conclude, the hypothesis of the existence of a rank society in lieu of a class society is 
questionable,
241 since there are different material conditions and social stratifications that are not 
limited to rank.
242 Hierarchies are not entirely connected to birth; they are penetrable and can be 
constructed on the basis of lifestyle. The fact that almost every Maranao claims to be royal should 
be  considered as a sign  not  of an egalitarian, class ,  or rank society but rather of a system 
characterized by “competitive equality” (Toren 1990), meaning that “hierarchy is not a status quo 
but must be constantly achieved” (Keating 2000: 306).  Leadership is easily challenged, not only 
among titleholders but also among politicians, intellectuals, religious groups , or rebel groups. 
Even within a clan, there are families in competition for a certain title or political position. In the 
case of marriages between persons from two different clans, if one gets offered a title, it  may be 
that the partner also claims one so as not to be inferior to his or her spouse. 
2. Descent Line Status  
Descent  lines  did  not  lose  meaning  as  most  Maranaos  came  to  define  themselves  as 
royalty, but the quantity of claims became more important. Descent line connections are divided 
among “good people” (mapia a tao) — who have many and high-quality claims — and “low 
people” (mabeba a tao) — who have few and lesser claims. This definition is based on the 
descent line status combining the “class rank” (number of claims) and the “descent line rank” 
(quality of claim) (Mednick 1965). Thus, two ranks are combined: the one a person claims by 
                                                 
241 On egalitarian societies, see Flanagan (1989: 262), Kuipers (1986), and Sahlins (1958, 1963) 
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referring to a particular title of a descent line (quality) and the one a person draws on by referring 
to claims on titles from several descent lines (quantity). Rights based on a particular title are only 
recognized in the place of the claim, whereas the quantity is recognized beyond this. Descent line 
status is connected not to actually having a title but to the claim. Persons without a title can be 
recognized as being mapia a tao and can thus rank higher than people with titles. 
Intermarriages between mapia a tao and mabeba a tao are possible and in some cases 
even favored in order to spread the supporter-supported relations of a clan. Arranged marriages 
are thus strategic in the sense that one may try to marry into other descent lines in order to 
increase his or her own descent line status or to strengthen bonds with possible supporters. The 
conferring of titles does not always benefit the person with the highest descent line rank or class 
rank. Even with few and low quality claims, a person can be better off, have more social and 
political  connections,  and  be  the  one  to  be  asked  for  advice  most  frequently  by  community 
members. Such a person has a chance to either get offered a title or, through strategic marriage, to 
offer  a  title  to  his  or  her  children  and  thus  rise  in  descent  line  status.  However,  in  some 
communities, the titleholder has a high descent line status but little influence. The reasons for this 
are numerous: a lack of money, a loss of contact with the community (absence of regular visits by 
the titleholder of the community to which the title is connected), or the presence of a more 
influential relative.  
  Status within the society is provided not only by birth and possible claims on titles but 
also by means, social connections, lifestyles, and professional positions. If a person is of means 
and high birth, he or she will receive frequent invitations as representative of the descent line and 
be asked by community members for financial support. A person of high birth without means and 
social connections will receive fewer invitations and may be not a representative of the descent 
line but a follower. In addition, he or she may not be supported in his or her claim to a title and 
receive less adat (share). Being rich is one way to gain a higher social status: one can establish 
the social contacts that one needs to be of influence by providing financial support, can buy 
oneself into a high-ranking family by being able to pay the demanded bride price, and may even 
gain  a  minor  title,  which  may  be  newly  created  for  him.  Some  persons,  however,  are  very 
effective  in  establishing  social  connections  even  without  having  the  means.  They  may  be 
financially  supported  by  their  relatives  or  by  foreign  donors.  Those  who  may  gain  from  a 
person’s proclamation or election will often support his or her claim to a title. This is one reason 
why social networks are of crucial importance in order to gain a title and status, and are a reason The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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why relatives often support a claimant, since, with the upgrade of one member of the kin group, 
the whole kin group is upgraded. 
Authority and status are not conferred by birth, nor is a title; they are determined mainly 
and foremost by the number of supporters one is able to mobilize and can continuously maintain 
(Ampaso 2001: 12). Interactions between descent line status (traditional background) and social 
contacts and networks, economic means, or professional status (modern structures) are thus of 
importance. The status of a person is the result of a combination of the two. Titleholders and 
people  of  influence  are  consequently  in  many  cases  professionals  and  can  thus  contribute 
financially to community activities according to their status. In addition, status and influence are 
determined by the “no war, no peace” environment. For instance, a drug lord with a low descent 
line status can “buy” himself political influence and a royal title. Both will be accepted as long as 
he can maintain his supporters. Status, thus, does not derive merely from birth and good deeds to 
the community but also from the means, the connections, or the weapons a person can mobilize 
to defend or increase it. Status is connected to authority; having a high rank in society also means 
that one has leadership possibilities. To reach or maintain this rather unstable rank, one has to 
defend  his  or  her  own  status,  which  is  partly  conferred  by  birth  but  has  additionally  to  be 
deserved.  
3. Maratabat (Status Honor) 
The rank of a person within the society is not entirely fixed by birth and can change 
through marriage as well as other factors like acquisition or loss of wealth or political position, a 
broad  network  of  kin  relations,  and  actual  or  even  symbolic  behavior  and  achievements.  In 
consequence, a person  has  to  be observant  about  his  or her status  because it can eventually 
influence the descent line status by his or her being recognized, or not, as a person of high status, 
since the status of the whole kinship group can be influenced. This sensitivity to rank is called 
maratabat, which is partly based on taritib and igma, the descent line organization of the Pat a 
Pangampong.  The  concept  serves  as  a  measure  to  arrange  and  strengthen  status  hierarchies 
within the society.  
The notion of maratabat includes the connection to rank, deriving from the Arabic word 
martaba (ranks). Among some royalty, it is connected with a perception that high-ranking descent 
lines are sacred since they are derived from  the Prophet Mohammad (Mednick 1965). Some The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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people refer to Qur’anic verses, stating that the Prophet and his family should be respected
243 and 
so  should their descendants in Mindanao. The Islamic resurgence movement brought more 
knowledge about Islam, and members of royalty emphasize that religious and worldly affairs are 
separated within the sultanate system. The concept of maratabat, nevertheless, remains and thus 
so do conflicts about status.  
  A  person  from  a  high-ranking  clan  shares  to  a  certain  degree  the  status  of  the  clan. 
However,  if  he  misbehaves,  he  may  also  become  an  outcast.  If  the  status  of  a  person  is 
challenged, the status honor is soiled and has to be regained, which is the task of the kin group. 
Status and likewise maratabat are in large parts “reputationally earned,” wherein the observance, 
gossip, and pressure of the community are of major importance (Disoma 1999a: 82). A person 
with a high-ranking title who does not revenge a severe challenge to his title is said to have no 
status honor, no maratabat. He has to earn it back by taking the challenge (ibid.: 83).  
  Lineage is of importance in the construction of status for a person because of the possible 
rank it can provide and further because of the mutual support of descent line members. The 
kinship group usually feels obligated to support a member financially when he or she marries a 
higher-ranking person from another clan, claims a title or position, or wants to achieve anything 
that might be to the advantage of the descent line. Support by relatives turns into the application 
of  maratabat  in  case  “the  socially  accepted  role  or  status”  of  a  clan  member  “is  offended, 
challenged, or questioned” and this affront becomes publicly known. Revenge  or forgiveness 
must then also be displayed openly (ibid.: 81). If a poor man would like to marry a woman from a 
rich family but cannot afford the bride price, in case the community gossips about this person, the 
maratabat of this person and his relatives may dictate obtaining the money to be able to pay even 
though he later on will be deeply indebted.  
  Mednick (1965) states that a person ranked higher in the descent line naturally feels more 
obligated to it than a lower-ranking one. The former thus has to take care that the latter “shares” 
his or her maratabat (p. 190). Lower-ranking persons can, however, insist on the obligations that 
higher-ranking lineage members have towards them. Disoma (1999a) demonstrates in several 
case studies that the demands of a lower-ranking person might be made indirectly through the 
gossip of the community, thus placing social pressure on higher-ranking relatives. He further 
points out that maratabat is defined via status and not descent line alone. A person with high 
                                                 
243 For example, Sura 49:2 states: “O you who believe! Raise not your voices above the voice of the Prophet, nor 
speak aloud to him in talk as you speak aloud to one another, lest your deeds should be rendered fruitless while you 
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status then can be someone with a high rank within the descent line but it can also be a rich or 
prominent person without a high birth rank. Disoma gives the example of a beggar. It is said to be 
shameful for all relatives if a kin begs in the streets. When the gossip about one such person 
increased, a rich relative slapped him in public and told him to stop asking for money and instead 
to eat at the rich man’s house. The moneyed man was said to have expressed his maratabat 
(1999a: 74). 
  Maratabat can be a motivation to strive for excellence in order to prove that one deserves 
a higher status.
244 Bula (2000), however, notices that assistance for a poor family member in his 
or her studies through  the  financial help of the family, in order to raise their status, is not 
maratabat  but  katetabanga  (collective  mutual  aid  or  services),  which  is  expected  among 
relatives: “This does not enhance maratabat but daradat (social prestige) or bantogan (fame).” 
(p.  18). The proud collection and presentation of  “firsts” in  social,  religious, or professional 
achievements,  which  is  displayed  on  a  high  number  of  streamers  in  Marawi  City  praising 
successful relatives, is an example. However, if a poor family member is denigrated by a well-
educated person because of his lack of education and then, with the help of his relatives, spends 
all  his  effort  to  become  well-educated  and  successful,  maratabat  is  displayed,  because  it  is 
against the custom to degrade an equal, and the person shows that he is equal by becoming as 
successful as the challenger (ibid.). Mednick (1965) points out that maratabat manifests itself 
mainly in people insisting on the fulfillment of the obligations the other party has towards them 
(p. 190). If a person is not treated according to his status, he might complain and maybe revenge 
himself  on  or  try  to  become  better  than  the  other  person;  he  would  thus  be  exercising  his 
maratabat. Since maratabat can be soiled easily, there are many secret or “back door” talks 
before official talks, as well as a ritualized language when one gives a speech or asks for marriage 
(see Alonto 1980: 73). The Islamic influence nevertheless discouraged back door talks with the 
argument that one should always say the truth (Disoma 1999). 
  According  to  a  speech  given  in  2008  by  Sultan  sa  Rogan,  maratabat  has  three 
classifications which are all based on the taritib and igma of the respective places: maratabat sa 
warisan, maratabat sa bangsa, and maratabat sa kadatu ago agama: 
Maratabat  sa  warisan  is  applicable  when  a  man,  not  her  lawful  husband  or 
guardian, has touched a woman’s dignity. When this happens, the man must be 
                                                 
244 The implications of maratabat in the quest for excellence sometimes turn into vast spending of money and effort 
being involved in achieving a certain position or in giving a bigger and more expensive gift than one has received 
(Disoma 1999a: 96). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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subjected to penalty. The man and his parents/relatives should be brought to the 
torogan or house of the lady, clothed in white cloth and must present money and 
valuable materials to the family of the woman, in respect to the maratabat of the 
lady's family. If the negotiation between the two families is done peacefully, the 
man may be allowed to marry the woman. In this event, witnesses must be present. 
(Speech given and partly written down in 2008, Marawi City, translated by Montia 
Jamilah D. Sarip, translation modified) 
A warisan is a female member of a clan. Members of high-ranking descent lines would say that 
only commoners can accept monetary compensation as a damm (penalty) if the maratabat of the 
warisan  has  been  violated. This  implies  that elites would rather revenge the woman’s  honor 
physically.  Warriner  reported  in  the  1960s  that  for  Maranaos  “even  the  mere  touching  of  a 
women’s wrist or forehead, if intentional, is an act of defloration” and constitutes a blow to the 
maratabat of the family (Saber, Tamano, and Warriner 1985-86: 174). Young women during my 
research were supervised by their families but had certain liberties, especially in co-educated 
schools and universities with boarding houses. Revenge of the honor of a woman, however, still 
happens. Women are normally not left alone with a man they could possibly marry. They are also 
advised not to roam around and people may talk about them in case they do so. Maratabat in this 
context is a way to control moral behavior through the pressure or rewards of the community. 
More secular and modern young married women go around Marawi at night with some of their 
friends but the ideal behavior in the traditional context is different. A bai a labi stated that she 
could not go out with her friends anymore since she became a titleholder, which means that she 
has to be a role model for other women of her kin group. 
  In case the maratabat of a warisan is violated and a payment is accepted, the amount has 
to be agreed upon by the families involved. One example was given by Datu Alonto Lucman, of 
the first wife of the male culprit rejecting the second wife. When pure lust is seen as the cause of 
the transgression, the man can be punished by being required to pay the prescribed amount of 
penalty: 
On March, 2008, A., who is married, was involved with a divorced woman who 
has six children. A.’s family rejected the proposal for marriage. The clan consulted 
Noor Lucman [and the following] compromise [settled the case]: A. was married 
for one day to appease the maratabat of the warisan’s clan and paid the prescribed 
dowry [bride price] of PHP 50,000 [about EUR 862]. (Written statement, Marawi 
City, 2008) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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This solution is thought preferable to violent revenge in cases of adultery. Certainly, it has to be 
questioned if this form of regulation does not raise the possibility of turning questions of justice 
and honor into a business.  
There are also situations in which a woman soils the maratabat of a man, for example by 
saying that her husband has battered her even though he has not. When she is found guilty, 
wrongly or rightly, traditionally she is clothed in white as a sign of penitence and brought to the 
house of the victim. This only happens when the clan of the victim accepts the apology — and an 
apology is usually accepted as long as there is no death involved. A woman traditionally will not 
kill herself or others because of maratabat but her relatives will defend her honor. This might end 
up in a clan war or, in cases of prostitution or adultery, can include executing her or letting her be 
killed by  the deceived  husband. Thus, a  woman can  also  be murdered by her own relatives 
because she has violated the maratabat of the kin group. 
Maratabat sa bangsa is the second classification of maratabat: 
Maratabat sa bangsa is applied when a person has belittled the lineage of another 
person, and this can be proven by the presentation of a witness; the person who 
has committed the act is penalized. In case of arguments, both parties may have 
their presentation, and whoever [is] found not following the taritib or laws and 
policies would be subjected to punishment/penalty, as may be prescribed by the 
existing taritib and igma. (Speech given and partly written down in 2008, Marawi 
City, translated by Montia Jamilah D. Sarip, translation modified) 
Members of royalty say that offenders who are proven to have wrongly accused a person in 
public about his blood origins traditionally have to face any of the prescribed penalties according 
to taritib and igma: cutting of the tongue; shrouding of the offender in white cloth and parading 
him in public, followed by his relatives, on top of paying monetary compensation; or a hundred 
lashes;  depending  on  the  decision  of  the  sultan,  datus,  and  imams.  These  punishments  are 
designed to prevent a clan war, and to discourage people from tampering with the salsila or 
interpreting it wrongly. Datu Alonto Lucman nevertheless comments that:  
Today, cases of this nature would spark a violent clan war because the offenders 
would resort to Philippine laws to avoid prosecution by the traditional taritib and 
igma. The traditional leadership does not have the police authority to enforce such 
punishments  and  sentencing.  For  example,  an  offender  would  challenge  the 
aggrieved party to file libel charges against him in court. More often than not, the 
aggrieved  would  not  resort  to  Philippine  justice  because  this  will  take  a  long 
process  to  prosecute.  This  is  done  because  the  offender  would  challenge  the 
aggrieved to come and get him if he is man enough. Unfortunately, this situation 
ends in bloody clan wars. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Claims to high descent can also lead to the defense of crimes. A person who is rightfully accused 
of fraud may still retaliate against the person who blamed him because he or she feels that his or 
her maratabat sa bangsa is spoiled by the allegation. The honor, which is defended, refers to the 
person’s public appearance and status, not the action.  
  The Sultan sa Rogan explains the third category of maratabat: 
Maratabat  sa  kandatu  ago  agama  is  applied  when  the  lineage,  such  as  a 
traditional title, is not respected, including the domain. Then the following should 
be observed:  
Kadatu or power (traditional title): The person who has shown disrespect to the 
title or power would be subjected to disciplinary action including a penalty and 
plea forgiveness from the traditional leader, such as the sultan.  
Agama or religion: The kind and degree of misconduct would be considered for its 
corresponding punishment, such as in the case of:  
1. kasebo/kapakasbo, or adultery (applicable to a married man or woman) 
2. kapakasina/kasina, or premarital adultery (applicable to an unmarried man or 
woman [According to the Islamic concept of zina, fornication]); 
3.  kapmokalid/mimortad,  or  one  who  leaves  the  Islamic  religion  for  another 
religion; 
4. kapaka alampas sa di ta rk, or robbery or stealing 
(Speech given and partly written down in 2008, Marawi City, translated by Montia 
Jamilah D. Sarip, translation modified) 
The traditional penalty for adultery involving a married person (the first case) is 300 lashes or 
stoning. This type of punishment results in death or lifetime disability. Maranao sultans and datus 
tend to compromise on this penalty when offending parties belong to dominant clans. It ends in 
marriage of both at the expense of the first wife. However, there are cases where clan wars have 
broken out because of such an incident.  
Most cases of premarital adultery (the second case) end up in violence or elopement, with 
the couple simply moving to another place or leaving the country to get away from the reach of 
the clans. Marriage is also an option if the datus negotiate properly, to the satisfaction of both 
sides. The bride price, however, is lower than average because the bride is said to be already 
violated and depreciated.  
Cases of conversion to other religions (the third case) are treated as the highest form of 
treachery and betrayal against Islam. It is said that clans are ashamed by this conversion. This 
results in death and physical injury to the offender, who may be accused of being paid by the 
Catholic Church. One case involved a Maranao man who had publicly converted to Christianity The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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and even volunteered to spread the Gospel to the Muslims. His clan, whose members are said to 
have been “very apologetic,” drove him out of Marawi City. He now lives in Iligan City, after 
years  of  hiding.  Cases  of  robbery  (the  fourth  case),  when  identified,  usually  end  in  double 
compensation. Datu Alonto Lucman explains: 
For example, when a robber who belongs to another clan, steals a gun, say, an 
armalite M16, chances are the mediating datus or sultans and politicians would 
demand [from] the offending clan two armalite rifles as a form of compensation. 
This form of conflict resolution applies to a stolen livestock, which will be paid in 
double, or in kind. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
  According to Saber and Tamano (1985-86), in the 1980s the following penalties were 
generally involved in case maratabat was soiled: monetary compensation, clothing in white and 
going to the house of the victim to ask forgiveness (rila), the death penalty (qisas), and marriage 
or divorce. Punishments like pillage (rabai), enslavement for women convicted of high crimes 
(olol), and stoning of convicts for adultery and incest (radiam) are not applied or applied only in 
rare cases (p. 118). 
  When an incident is not settled peacefully, a rido can erupt. According to Disoma (1999a), 
there  are  three  types  of  incidents  linked  automatically  to  a  violent  response  as  the  only 
appropriate way to regain the lost social status (pp. 79, 80). The kin group may intervene if 
someone  has  intentionally  been  bodily  injured  or  killed,  when  a  family  member  is  publicly 
insulted, or when the honor of a woman is violated, thus in case she is raped, kissed, or “touched 
lasciviously”  (ibid.:  79).  Norodin  Alonto  Lucman  described  the  following  case  of  soiled 
maratabat leading to a possible rido: 
Noor Lucman was persuaded by the Maranao community, Imams and provincial 
elders to handle a murder case involving a young man Jamali Maruhom and an 
engineer Macacna Racman, his cousin-in-law, whom [Jamali Maruhom] killed for 
insulting his person and thus his maratabat.  
Noor Lucman went to Ramain and gathered the people of Buada Babai 
including  the  family  of  the  accused  to  appeal  for  the  murder  suspect  to  be 
surrendered  to  him.  The  clan  agreed.  Noor  Lucman  took  the  accused  to  the 
provincial  jail  for  safekeeping.  This  gesture  is  to  appease  the  victim  family’s 
maratabat and prevent escalation of the conflict through vendetta.  
Noor held a series of investigations to validate the claim of the accused 
Jamali Maruhom on why he killed Macacna Racman. Maruhom claimed that the 
murder victim Macacna, a ranking member of the MILF, repeatedly threatened 
him with death, witnessed by Jamali’s wife, or that he will lose his wife, [the 
victim’s] first cousin, for not conforming to [the victim’s] wishes as one of the 
leaders  of  the  Racman  clan.  Jamali  Maruhom,  believing  that  what  he  did  is 
justified in the eyes of God, listed down his reasons for upholding his maratabat: The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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[The victim] spat on [the killer] while performing a prayer in a mosque. 
(There are witnesses.) He claimed that the victim is a fraud for soliciting money in 
the name of their mosque and congregation for his personal use. (True according 
to investigation.) 
Another cousin-in-law Abdulgani Racman, brother of Macacna, physically 
assaulted [the killer]. (There are witnesses.) 
The  victim  took  [the  killer’s]  wife  to  Malabang  ostensibly  to  force  a 
divorce between Jamali and his wife Sittie Noor. This created bad blood between 
Jamali  and  Macacna  because  Jamali  had  no  quarrel  with  his  wife  when  this 
incident happened. They were separated for three months. 
Jamali  took  the  initiative  of  killing  him  first  because  Macacna  already 
swore to kill him, witnessed by people. The manner of the killing was indiscreet 
and in full view of mosque-goers. 
Noor Lucman took statements from the wife of the victim who is an alima. 
Abdulgani  Racman  was  also  investigated  whereupon  it  was  established  that 
Macacna [the victim] was a good family man and that he had no quarrel with the 
accused gunman. He is also a trusted lieutenant of one of the senior leaders of the 
MILF.  They  claimed  that  Jamali  shot  him  without  justification  other  than  the 
reason that they do not like each other. Under Islamic Law, this is punishable by 
death . . . unless the accused has concrete evidence of threat to his life. The family 
of the victim asked Noor Lucman to personally execute Jamali Maruhom and their 
maratabat for revenge will be extinguished. This was not granted. 
In  the  event,  the  religious  leaders  recommended  diat,  blood  money, 
because  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  self-defense.  We  are  still  awaiting  the 
decision of the victim’s family on how much is the amount they might demand for 
compensation.  Other  members  of  the  victim’s  family  told  Noor  Lucman  that 
Jamali Maruhom took Macacna’s life and he should pay for it with his life. 
Status: Noor Lucman and the elders are waiting for the victim’s family to 
answer  the  appeal  of  the  datus  for  the  amount  of  the  diat,  blood  money,  to 
compensate the family of the victim. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
When a rido erupts, it might be that the person who did the first killing did not involve any clan 
elders or other authorities to settle the case but acted upon his own judgment. This can be the 
result of gossip pressuring the person to defend his maratabat (Bula 2000). 
A settlement of a rido is finalized when the concerned parties swear on the Qur’an and 
pledge their brotherhood, thus creating kinship bonds, which might be enforced by a marriage of 
members of the two clans  or families. When the feud cannot  be settled, the murder will be 
revenged.  The  first  choices  of  victims  are  persons  from  the  same  generation  or  above. The 
“legitimate” objects of revenge are thus the father, brother, uncles, and male first cousins of the 
offender as well as the offender himself. Among this group, in particular in case the offender 
cannot be found and the victim had a higher status than the killer, the offended will aim at 
acknowledged leaders, those with “power and wealth (ge-es ago tamok), or the elder-members 
and leaders (manga pelokelokesan) of the clan with influence over the members” (Atar 2007: 10). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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A murder has to be revenged to regain the lost maratabat but also because it is believed that the 
murdered person, if not revenged, will end up becoming a shaitan (a devil or evil djinn) (Disoma 
1999a).  
  Conflicts  have  a  high  potential  to  become  endemic. This  might  either  be  in  a  rather 
friendly  manner  of  competition  to  be  the  “first”  in  achieving  something  without  violence 
involved  or  in  the  effort  to  regain  soiled  maratabat,  which  might  include  violence.  Such  a 
conflict may start with an insult (Bamgbose 2003), which may result in further insults, injuries, 
divorce, or even killings, which can provoke further killings. Or, a woman is accused of adultery 
and the husband kills her and the lover. If the family of the victim thinks that this is not justified, 
it may retaliate against the family of the husband or the husband himself. This can continue until 
a settlement can be found or the relatives concerned are all killed, since an offended family is 
“bound  by  customs  and  tradition  to  retaliate  [in  defense  of]  (sa’op)  his  family  prestige 
(maratabat)” (Atar 2007: 10). According to Disoma (1999a), who based his data on quantitative 
research in two Maranao communities, maratabat is connected for the majority of the people 
questioned with violence, anger,  and defensive traits. Those people who are said to have no 
maratabat were described as patient, religious, and just (1999a: 90). A person with honor or big 
maratabat is thus one who easily gets angry and is ready to kill, and who “is prepared to defend 
and  fight  for  his  extended  self,  his  religion”  (ibid.:  93).  Sultans  of  the  16  Royal  Houses 
complained that this was a false perception of maratabat, which should be based on taritib and 
igma of the agamas and not primarily be connected to (personal) anger. 
  In general men are the aggressors in an outbreak of a rido, even though it may have been 
the maratabat of a woman that was violated; men have to protect the maratabat of the female 
clan  members. This  does  not  mean  that  women  are  spared  from  being  the  victims  of  ridos, 
although this is considered as illegitimate. For instance, there is the case of a mayor who was 
involved in a rido and whose car was ambushed, and his sister and her driver were accidentally 
killed since they were the only passengers in the car with darkened windows. In some ridos, 
whole families, including the children, are the victims of an ambush. There are also incidents 
when women are consciously picked out and shot point blank — despite the fact that the initial 
brawl was between men (Bamgbose 2003: 93). Monalinda Doro (2007), a Maranao researcher, 
writes that the murder of women and children for revenge was a taboo subject in the past: 
Any  family  who  did  so  [killed  a  woman]  was  looked  down  upon  by  the 
community.  Even  old  people,  who  were  not  perpetrators  of  rido,  may  not  be 
targeted. However, these unwritten laws are no longer observed by all Meranao. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The death of women, children, and old folk in vendetta are simply dismissed as 
accidental nowadays. (p. 217) 
It is difficult to judge  whether in the past, before the arrival of the colonial forces, women, 
children, and old people were not victims of ridos or whether the past is idealized. In 2000, 
Gonzales argued that despite the cultural norm that women should not be harmed, there are cases 
where women have been raped as part of a clan conflict (2000: 92). A change in or general 
augmentation of rido victims may stem from a culture of violence being increasingly supported 
by the “no war, no peace” environment.  
B. The Title System 
1. Choosing a Titleholder 
When a titleholder is chosen, his or her descent line status and personal qualities are taken 
into consideration. Members of only eleven clans can claim the title Sultan sa Butig; all stem 
from the moriatao (offspring) of Baracat Amer Hussein. The title should ideally rotate among the 
descendants of these clans. The chairmen of the clans recommend the chosen candidates to the 
Four Datus,  who make  the resolution  and bring the matter to  Lawmakers. The latter  finally 
discuss the recommended candidate. The Sultan sa Butig explains: 
When a new Sultan of Butig has to be selected, the person who will be allowed to 
have the title needs to comply with the following: (1) Only the eleven families, the 
descendants  of  Moriatao  Baracat  Amer  Hussein,  are  the  ones  entitled  to  the 
Sultanate  of  Butig;  (2)  The  best  child  in  one  family  of  the  eleven  families, 
provided that he possesses the qualities of a good leader, will be chosen as Sultan 
of Butig; (3) The eleven families should call for a meeting to discuss and decide 
the date when to enthrone the sultan, and they have to seek the permission of the 
incoming sultan. At the same time, they have to bring the matter to the Four Datus 
of East Unayan because they will recommend the sultan to the Four Datus who 
make the taritib, meaning the Sultan of Ragayan, the Sultan of Timbab, the Sultan 
of  Dolangan,  and  the  Sultan  of  Malalis,  so  they  can  discuss  the  proposed 
candidates of these families, because there are guidelines for becoming a leader.  
There are 17 qualifications for a leader: You: (1) are a Muslim, (2) have 
reached the age of puberty, (3) are wise, (4) are a member of the royal family (who 
behaves in a decent manner), (5) are honest, (6) are trustworthy, (7) are patient, (8) 
are active, (9) are intelligent, (10) are well-behaved/disciplined, (11) are decent, 
(12) have a pleasing personality, (13) have faith in Allah, (14) are considerate, (15) 
have perseverance, (16) are brave in defending your people and community, (17) 
are knowledgeable.  
As stated, our forefathers’ bravery was  measured and tested when they 
fought with the superpowers in the world such as the Spaniards, Americans, and 
Japanese, but they were not conquered by them. In the process, those concerned The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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datus will see if he has the qualifications. Then it is forwarded to the Four Datus 
and they make the resolution. After which, it is elevated to the four sultans who 
are members of the 28. A meeting is called to discuss the recommendation of the 
eleven chairmen, the children of Sultan Baracat for the approval of being a Sultan 
of Butig. (Speech given in 2008, Marawi City, translated by Montia Jamilah D. 
Sarip, translation modified) 
The recommendation of the datus is brought to the panoroganan, the Sultan sa Butig, and the 
Sultan  sa  Domalondong.  “They  will  decide  for  East  Unayan  and  decide  for  the  date  of 
enthronement. It will be held in Butig. The 16 panoroganan, 28 Lawmakers and the Four Datus 
of the four places will be invited.” 
When  [the]  final  confirmation  date  comes,  all  those  sultans  will  witness  [the 
enthronement] and the Sultan of Butig will be confirmed according to the taritib. 
As a general rule, the Sultan of Domalondong confirms the new Sultan of Butig; 
likewise the Sultan of Butig will be confirmed by the Sultan of Domalondong 
because they are brothers and they have the final say. After the confirmation, the 
16 panoroganan will welcome the Sultan of Butig and they have the same powers. 
The 28 sultans frame the laws. (ibid.) 
The qualities of a bai a labi are not said to be much different from those of a sultan. She should 
be Muslim; have the descent, a certain character, the means, social connections, and knowledge 
of  taritib  and  igma;  should  participate  in  the  concerns  of  the  community;  and  should  be 
recognized by the community and be confirmed by the 28 and the 16 or their representatives. 
Since there are many claimants for one title, it might be that the person is chosen according to the 
amount of high-ranking claims from different descent lines: for example a person who could 
become bai a labi in Masiu as well as in Ramain. It is of minor importance whether the claimant 
is connected via the male or the female line to the lokes of the title; the male line is given priority 
but it is preferable to be connected by both lines. The present Sultan sa Butig is an heir of one 
female and one male lokes. His parents are both heirs of the lokes and in large part his descent is 
traced back via female ancestors.  
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Graphic 13: Genealogical Connections of Nasroden Ador, Sultan sa Butig, 2008 
 
2. Reorganization of Descent Line Claims 
Descent lines are frequently reorganized, following the split of a clan which has become 
too  numerous,  or  a split  or fusion of places, but  also  the social  importance of a titleholder. 
Important lineages are usually traced back to an ancestor who intermarried with a descendant of 
Sharief Kabungsoan. They can split or merge with others. Old titles may lose their meanings and The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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new titles gain importance. Sometimes the titleholder does not do anything with the title and thus, 
even though the title still exists, others will be of more significance in the area. The reclaiming of 
authority by an heir of a titleholder can be the source of another restructuration within the power 
structure. In other cases, the title is not claimed anymore and vanishes. Mednick (1965) points 
out that there is a reorganization of descent lines every three to five generations, since the further 
apart are the different lineages with the same claim to a title, the less kinship solidarity there is 
and the less will to support the other lineages. Thus, a reorganization of kinship lines will follow 
in which new titles are created or a title is claimed by a person who finds enough people from his 
or her own lineage to support the claim. In this process, those lokes who are not within the 
boundaries of effective kin to the titleholder and his close relatives, will be eliminated from the 
list of possible claims (1965: 138). Generally, communities and clans only nourish one or two 
descent  lines.  Major  titles  nevertheless  will  rarely  lose  their  claimants  but  they  might  get 
restricted to certain lokes. One example of a reorganization of descent line claims can be given in 
connection to claimants of the title Sultan sa Marawi.
245  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
245 The present Sultan sa Marawi comes from the Balindong Jaman (sub-)clan (who are descendants of the Boadi 
Sakayo clan) and has held the title for over 20 years. He is also the only recognized chairman of the 28. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 14: Rearrangement of Descent lines: The Sultanate of Marawi 
Information provided by Abdul Hamidullah Atar, 2008. 
 
The apo of the title Sultan sa Marawi is Gomisa of Marawi: he had five children who 
constituted the five sultanates in Marawi City (Bacolod, Guimba, Madaya, Marawi, and Toros). 
Each of the siblings became the lokes of a clan and these clans again formed sub-clans with new 
arrangements. In the Boadi Sakayo clan, 19 sub-clans can potentially claim the title Sultan sa 
Marawi. However, it was arranged that only three of them would be the new lokes (Balindong 
Jaman, Maruhom Sidik, and Sidikadatu).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 15: Balindong Jaman Clan 
Information provided by Abdul Hamidullah Atar 
 
The following incident is recounted as an explanation for the reorganization: the first 
Sultan of Marawi was Datu Alangadi, from the Boadi Sakayo clan. He was married to Bai sa 
Samporna, daughter of Maruhom Rahmatollah of Taraka and heir of the title Sultan sa Masiu. 
They had four children: Balindong Jaman, Maruhom Sidik, Mayano (who left the area), and 
Sidikadatu. The couple decided to visit Marawi, the home of Datu Alangadi. As part of Maranao 
tradition,  the  wife  of  a  sultan  or  datu  can  visit  his  place  after  one  year  of  marriage  and  is 
welcomed with a celebration by the family and the clan of the husband (this ritual is called 
lawiin). Before they reached Marawi, Bai sa Samporna
246 stopped the boat, forcing the datus and 
bais to approach them. She insisted that she would not come to the sultanate until every bai and 
datu swore on the Qur’an that only her descendants would have the right to claim the title Sultan 
sa Marawi. Her demand was granted because of the importance of bangsa (she is an heir of the 
16), friendship (with the descendants of the bai), and respect (paramount respect to women is a 
requirement of taritib and igma) (Atar 2007: 33). Thus, the taritib changed through igma. They 
made a pledge on the Qur’an and every person who did not follow this new rule (taritib) would 
be cursed.  
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Since certain families of the Boadi Sakayo sub-clans still cannot wait their turn, there are 
presently five Bai a Labis sa Marawi (two from the Sidikadatu sub-clan, two from the Maruhom 
Sidik sub-clan, and one from the Sharief Muhammad sub-clan). This might not seem surprising 
in view of the fact that the number of the clan members of the three sub-clans alone is over 
30,000, situated in twelve municipalities in Lanao. The candidates can find sufficient supporters 
to recognize them, even though they are not recognized by every sub-clan that has a claim on the 
title. In addition, some titleholders are already aged and have given up their responsibilities to the 
younger  generation.  Some  of  the  bai  a  labis  of  the  younger  generations  are,  however,  in 
competition with each other, claiming that they are the real bai a labi (according to taritib there 
should only be one bai a labi recognized by the elders); one has more money and thus public 
recognition, while the other involves herself more in community activities.  
3. Responsibilities and Advantages of Titleholders 
Among the  four kinds  of royal  titles in  the Pat  a Pangampong, the apos of two are 
mentioned in salsilas which comprise the major sultanates of the four principalities: the 16 Royal 
Houses and the 28 Lawmakers. The others are religious titles, like kali or imam, and minor titles 
varying from sultanate to sultanate. The latter are usually not named after a place but after a 
function: for example, chief of police (sultan a sangcopan), guard (pagaga adel), being in charge 
of decoration (bai a adel) or finances (bai a gaus). Usually, except for the religious titles, a 
female title corresponds to a male one: sultan/bai a labi, sultan a gaus/bai a gaus, etc. As the 
sultan has his set of supporters, so has the bai a labi. 
  When titles are connected to a function, they can have their own legend of origin. The 
Masiricampo  of  Butig  is  one  example. According  to  oral  transmissions,  Dianaton  Naim,  the 
lineage ancestor of the Royal House of Butig, was on a hadj and while he was gone, his men 
celebrated in his torogan. The celebration was so wild that his subjects even clothed the cats and 
dogs with yellow clothing to make fun of the sultanate. In doing this, they violated the tradition, 
which is, as was emphasized by the Masiricampo when relating this episode, also sanctioned by 
Islam. Thus, a bad spell descended upon Butig and the torogan was turned into a big stone. In 
consequence, people who took refuge in other areas surrounding the sultanate abandoned the 
place. Dianaton Naim had to be buried in Guimba, Dansalan, because he could not return to his 
domain. Because of this adverse situation, he created the position of Masiricampo as a caretaker. 
The task of the Masiricampo sa Butig is defined in the taritib. It is mainly to be a go-between in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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case of a dispute either between the Royal Houses of Eastern Unayan or among the sultanates in 
Butig. The Masiricampo has blood relations to both of the Royal Houses in Unayan. Additionally, 
the ten sultans of the domain agreed that, whenever a conflict of interest among the sultans had to 
be resolved, the Masiricampo would have to step in and give a neutral opinion about how to 
resolve it. In Mala a Bayabao, on the other hand, it is said that the title originates from the 
Spanish colonial forces calling a datu “Maestro de Campo.” The Americans named him “Master 
of the Camp.” Maranaos would pronounce it “Masiricampo.” What is perceived as an indigenous 
name and connected to a myth of origin is strictly speaking the result of a fusion between local 
and foreign notions. 
Special functions being connected to a title might be purely symbolic. In one interview 
with several bai a labis from the MSU Royalties,
247 the general obligation of each female title 
was said to be the same: to serve the community, peacekeeping, and to support the bai a labi who 
backs  up  the  sultan. The  bai  a  labi  is  said  to  be  responsible  for  the  women  in  the  gender-
segregated community: she is the role model for the women. She also crowns those bais from her 
sultanate who rank below her. As important as these prerogatives are, a male representative of the 
16 Royal Houses or the 28 should still be present during this coronation. The sultan normally 
makes main decisions, for example whether a mosque is to be built in a community. Women are 
ideally consulted and can contribute their  ideas  and suggestions, though this depends on the 
arrangements of the single sultanates.  
Titleholders  of  both  sexes  are  expected  to  share  certain  expenses  (construction  of  a 
mosque, weddings, funerals, bride price, blood price, etc.). They tend to contribute according to 
their status. There are several events when titleholders can show their gratitude to their relatives. 
The sultan and the bai a labi might be expected to contribute to a feast for the community at Eid 
al-Adha (Festival of Sacrifice) and Eid al-Fitr (the festival that marks the end of Ramadan) as 
well as at the birth and death day of the Prophet. Since giving celebrations on these dates is 
prestigious, other people of means will invite people to their place (Disoma 1999: 143). Disoma 
explains that social gatherings are frequently held in which personal qualities can be displayed, 
such as “oration, respect, hospitality, flattery, sharing, sensitivity, showiness, boastfulness, status 
consciousness, deception and many more”. The host of these gatherings spends a lot of money 
and might even incur debt. However, this is not taken seriously into consideration, as this will 
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safeguard the person from shame (thus, there is a saying: so tamok na linding o kapaka ito — 
wealth is for safeguarding from “shame”) (p. 183).  
Royalty are usually invited to weddings; they are entitled to get their adat
248 if they are 
from the bride's group, and they have to contribute a share of the bride price when they are 
related to the groom.
249 The share for titleholders is given out of respect for the tradition, out of 
fear of a curse, because of group pressure , or for the reason that the titleholder might be really 
influential in the community (Fianza 2004: 7). Titleholders carrying another title  besides the 
sultan or the bai a labi of the place, as well as non-titleholders who have an influential position in 
the clan, will also receive (or give) adat, depending on their status (or the status they want to 
achieve) within the community. They might also be more or equally respected, in case they or 
their  family  contribute  to  the  welfare  of  the  community  or  can  claim  high  status.  When  a 
titleholder is not seen as influential, he or she may not get adat or may get less than others. 
Titleholders can be asked to give a speech at weddings. Normally the sultan is the public 
representative of the descent line, although politicians or other prestigious elders who are part of 
the family may be given priority. Members of royalty usually use the classical way of speaking 
Maranao (the way it was used in the Darangen) when negotiating or giving a speech in their 
language.  For some titleholders  in  Marawi, this  was  one of the biggest  challenges  since the 
classical way of speaking is not used in ordinary life and the Maranao intelligentsia is more 
acquainted with English. Proper presentations are important because one can accidentally insult a 
descent line (for instance, by not mentioning it) and this can lead to a conflict. The only way to 
learn  the  classic  Maranao  is  by  listening  to  the  elders. Whereas  a  generation  ago,  a  person 
speaking the ancient Maranao was regarded as uneducated, today he or she is recognized as 
“wise” because of the knowledge of how to apply the traditional forms. Titleholders have also the 
ability to solve ridos, a function that is shared by NGOs, politicians, the military, the MILF and 
MNLF, ulama, and other traditional leaders. Titles are thus not definitely connected to functions 
that only titleholders can observe. They enjoy “the right of being addressed with [a] title of 
                                                 
248 Adat is given to strengthen relations to the receiver, who will help the couple in times of need. 
249 The adat, for example of the bride price, can be from PHP 50 to 100. If the titleholder has to contribute to the 
bride price of a male relative, he or she has to pay more, perhaps PHP 1,000, than he or she would receive from the 
bride price of a female relative. Abducal Alonto writes that all women at the wedding will get a certain adat but that 
the group of datus will get the most (1980: 77). Traditionally, the datus got a certain part of a butchered carabao 
(water buffalo) — the head was normally reserved for the sultan as chief leader. In the Sultanate of Marawi, also 
known as the triumvirate, during a wedding the Datu sa Marawi got one ganta (a Philippine dry or liquid measure 
equivalent to about three quarts of water) of meat, the Masiricampo got the breast of the carabao, and the Sultan sa 
Marawi got the head. The people ate other parts of the body. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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prestige, but [they hold] no well-defined control over the people or territory” (Madale 1997: 114). 
The symbolic dimension as status symbol, however, is significant. A bai a labi explains:  
[There is no financial gain in a title.] It is only the honor, the respect and the 
popularity.  Because  wherever  you  go,  you  carry  the  title.  When  you  go  to 
neighboring communities, they will always recognize you. “Ah, that is the bai a 
labi.” So you deserve to be entertained, to be honored, to be invited. [On] all the 
occasions the bai a labi and the sultan are always invited. (Interview, Marawi City, 
2008) 
Status is not automatically connected to a title and can be diminished, for example through the 
election of another person carrying the same title. A title and its associated status have to be 
earned up to a certain degree. Possible claimants can refuse a title, considering themselves too 
young for the responsibilities. Other reasons  are that they are not married and thus have no 
children who could inherit the claim (even though there are titleholders who were enthroned 
before they were married, such as the Sultan sa Butig), and also because some do not believe in 
the sultanate system. In such families, the meaning of royal titles vanished and was replaced by 
political  dynasties,  education,  economics,  or  religion;  those  families  may  define  titles  as 
meaningless.  
4. Religious Titles 
Traditionally the sultan is the worldly and religious head of the community. He has a 
special place to sit in the mosque and he is responsible for the maintenance of the building. When 
the end of Ramadan is celebrated, every person has to donate something and it is the sultan who 
provides for the poor so that they can also give. The sultan may also “influence the choice of the 
religious functionaries in the mosques” (Amposa 2001: 9). Apart from this, religious affairs are 
regulated by the ulama of the community, the imam (head of religious affairs), qadi/kali (judge) 
and  guro  (teacher).  These  titles  can  be  inherited  but  a  religious  education  is  normally  a 
prerequisite. In some communities the kali, guro, or imam can be more important than the sultan. 
In one agama, it was the kali who created the local title of bai a labi for his daughter.  
  In Masiu, there are two head ulama, Guro sa Masiu and Kali sa Masiu, who represent the 
pangampong  in  every  ulama  gathering  in  the  province.  The  ulama  of  Mala  a  Bayabao  are 
represented by the Kali sa Ramain, Kali sa Ditsaan, and Kali sa Marawi. An alim becomes the 
head of the ulama in a certain division (suku) or pangampong with the consensus of the other 
ulama in that place. In some occasions, ulama of the Pat a Pangampong meet at a national ulama 
summit. They also meet in case of a disagreement on the common law, the taritib, or the igma; The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the concerned area then initiates a gathering of all co-equals to help in mediating and reconciling 
the dispute. A person from Tokaya (in Madalam) proclaimed himself as Guro sa Masiu but did 
not come from Taraka, which is, according to taritib and igma, the only place where the title can 
be assumed. A family from Taraka also claimed the title and called a meeting of all the ulama and 
datus of Lanao, asking the assembly to prevent the person from Tokaya from taking the title. The 
assembly agreed in order to avoid further divisions.  
  The most well-known alim in the Pat a Pangampong was Dr. Mahid Mutilan, who carried 
the title Guro sa Masiu. In the 1980s, ulama from the Maguindanao area and from Lanao del Sur 
“align[ed]  with  those  ethnic  elites  who  were  interested  in  changing  the  political  status  quo” 
(McKenna 1990: 559). As part of this larger movement of Filipino ulama vying for political 
office in the 1980s,
250 the religious OMPIA Party was founded after a meeting of a coalition of 
ulama organizations, held at Maharlika Village in Taguig, Rizal in 1986. The meeting was mostly 
composed  of  Middle  Eastern  graduates  and  led  by  Mutilan,  Majid Ansano,  and  Ustadz Abu 
Mohammad Sarangani, the head of the Kuwait-backed Ummah Party. In the same year, Mutilan 
ran for a seat in Congress but lost. He then successfully stood for Marawi City mayor in 1988. 
From 1992 to 2001, he was Lanao del Sur governor. There was a schism between the OMPIA and 
Ummah Parties in the 1990 local elections. Sarangani challenged Mutilan for governor, in vain. 
Thereafter, the disunity within the ulama group began to erode popular support as the rivals 
verbally attacked each other on the radio and local cable TV. Eventually, a shoot-out broke out 
between the two parties in 1996, resulting in serious injuries. Mutilan nevertheless won a third 
term as governor and after that, in 2001, ran for ARMM vice-governor and won. In 2005, he lost 
against Ansaruddin-Abdulmalik “Hooky” Alonto Adiong. He later died in a car accident in 2007. 
Alima Khadijah Mutilan, his first wife, who was very active in organizing the women of the 
OMPIA movement, was also granted a royal title during his governorship: Bai a Labi ko Pat a 
Pangampong ko Ranaw, “in recognition of her efforts to help her people” (Gutoc 2008a). 
                                                 
250 In 1987, at a meeting of ulama of Cotabato called by Zacaria Candao, the Islamic Party of the Philippines (IPP) 
was founded, a “regional party without connection to the national party apparatus” (McKenna 1990: 503). The main 
points of the party program were to establish a meaningful autonomy of the Bangsamoro homeland and the equal 
distribution of wealth. In the 1988 provincial elections, the local datus united to defeat the IPP, which had become a 
strong competitor, placing second in the district including Cotabato City in the congressional elections in 1987. The 
IPP shifted from puritanism to populism “as the result of steady resistance by ordinary Muslims to the ulama's 
program for Islamic renewal” (ibid.: 573). This election was the “first ever provincial campaign in which Islamic 
discourse figured prominently in political appeals” but also the “most genuinely democratic election ever held in 
Muslim Cotabato . . . because of the new national political atmosphere and the control of the province by non-datus” 
(ibid.: 506). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  That Mutilan was the Guro sa Marawi does not mean that his role in the sultanate was a 
reason why he won elections. As in every position of influence, it is helpful to have connections 
to each potential source of authority in order to be recognized and supported by as many persons 
as possible. For a titleholder, the chance that traditionalists will support him or her politically is 
higher. Some politicians also see the possibility of legitimizing their political power through 
traditional means when they have achieved a position and thus of improving their descent line 
status. Partly titles are also granted in the expectation that the receiver will feel obligated towards 
the sultanate or as a reward for the efforts of the politician for the community. Mutilan was 
popular for supporting the development of madari schools in the region. In case the politician 
fails to maintain his supporters, they might look for another patron. 
  Apart from religious titles, which belong to the sultanate, ulama and alimat are outside of 
the sultanate system, in that they do not claim a title, and are often even opposed to titles, partly 
considering them un-Islamic. An alima, being educated at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, 
and a former member of the MNLF, now leading a toril school
251, stated that: 
we have a lot of problems with the bai a labis, because sometimes we have a 
relative who is . . . it is a big problem in the family [referring to a conflict among 
two women aspiring to become the bai a labi of the place, which led to a rido]. 
This happens only because they really do not know what Islam is. And that is why 
they fight even for small titles and that creates so much trouble for the family; we 
know that because many of our relatives are not on speaking terms because of the 
bai a labi . . . So it is not good. Those who believe in Islam should not participate 
in bai a labis. As long as they believe in Islam, they know their role in the society, 
they know what should be done, that is good enough, because the bai a labi, the 
title bai a labi is for culture and social affliction only, it has nothing to do with 
Islam. (Interview translated from Maranao by Norodin Alonto Lucman, Marawi 
City, 2008, translation modified) 
Similar statements were made by another alima, also educated in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. She 
preferred to stay isolated from the community since she feared getting involved in things that 
might  violate her beliefs. A visiting scholar from  Saudi Arabia who sponsored a  madari  for 
orphans in Marawi City argued similarly, saying that it will be a long time before Maranaos are 
religiously  enlightened.  McKenna  (2002)  described  the  potential  conflict  between  religious 
functionaries and traditional Moros from the viewpoint of traditionalists for the Maguindanao 
ethnic group. In Lanao, however, open critiques of traditionalists against religious functionaries, 
and in particular Islam itself, are rare. A sultan emphasized that the religious sphere is separated 
                                                 
251 A toril school is a residential school where children from age three and above would be confined in one place and 
taught Islamic religion and the Qur’an. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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from the sultanate and female titleholders would rather humbly state that they are not religious 
enough. One bai a labi added that with time all traditions that do not correspond to Islam will be 
phased out: 
Birte Brecht: What change during the years took place in relation to 
 religion?  
Bai a Labi: Our concept of Islam was changed. Traditional Islam is now  
different from the Islam the way we understand it now. Because before we read the 
Qur’an and we did not know the meaning. But now we read the Qur’an and we 
understand, because it was translated in our language and in English. Before it is 
more influenced by culture and some parts of our culture are against Islam. So this 
time we are reconciling culture with Islam. That any part of our culture that is un-
Islamic we try to phase them out. And we only preserve those that are Islamic. 
(Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
 
Apart from the acceptance of a new concept of Islam and its importance, the sultanate system 
itself and its functions were not questioned but seen as corresponding with Islam.  
5. Numerous Titles 
Tawagon  (1987),  who  described  the  Pat  a  Pangampong  as  the  place  of  the  1001 
sultanates, explains that the number of titles has always been numerous. The sultanate system 
was superimposed on a datuship system. Thus, each community (agama) having a mosque and 
being headed by elders could become an autonomous sultanate. The growth of the population, 
which provoked a split of descent lines and agamas, went along with the creation of further 
sultanates.  The  colonization  of  Piagapo  by  clans  of  Mala  Bayabao,  for  example,  led  to  it 
becoming an extension of the Sultanate of Ramain. Royal titles of Ramain were set aside to 
signify the attachment of Piagapo to Ramain, with the title Mama sa Ramain being exclusive to 
the clan members of the new settlement. Additionally, the bilateral system of title inheritance led 
to a vast number of possible titleholders, and the lack of fixed regulations concerning which of 
the  manifold  claimants  would  inherit  the  title  resulted  in  a  further  augmentation  of  titles 
(Mednick 1965). The influence of a titleholder consequently does not go beyond his or her group 
of supporters.   
Rivalries between clans who have a claim on the same royal title in one agama can lead to 
the founding of a new village (agama) with their own sultan, bai a labi, and other titles. The 
creation of new titles is thus one measure to prevent and resolve conflicts among relatives. In 
comparison to conflicts about political posts, those about royal titles are not as violent. This can 
possibly be traced back to the fewer advantages and lesser authority a titleholder receives and The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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also to the possibility of creating new titles if needed. In this situation, the rank of the new 
sultanate will be equal to the former one. Sultan sa Dayawan and his daughter explain: 
Bai: You have to go back to the culture. It is more like the policy of  
accommodation. Among  the  Maranaos,  everybody  would  like  to  be  somebody 
entitled. To be able to give everybody a title, you accommodate everybody. But 
you need a structure to accommodate everyone.  
Sultan: For example the Sultan of A he has two sons, both of them want to  
become the sultan. Now, my children, you become the Sultan of B, this is yours, 
Sultan  of  C,  this  is  yours.  No  quarrel.  But  you  still  have  the  Sultan  of  A. 
(Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
Also for women, new titles can be invented. In one case, a potential bai a labi was asked to carry 
the title of the bai a labi of a certain place. When she learned that there already was a bai a labi 
of this place, she demanded to be granted a different title (Bai A Labi Sa Noni) which did not 
exist before in order to avoid conflict. That a new sultanate is created for a woman as conflict 
prevention is, however, rare. The sultan is the head of the sultanate. The bai a labi is his symbolic 
counterpart; she cannot become a sultana, as is for example reported from Aceh (Mernissi 1991; 
Kahn 2010) and from the Sulu area, where there were sultanas.
252  
The creation of a new municipality with its own titles in order to pacify a conflict about 
political influence between men is reported in a case from the 1960s. One datu recounts: 
One example is a rido in Balabagan. That was the rido between the Sultan of 
Maguindanao, Pangadapun Benito, mayor of  Balabagan, against the natives of 
Balabagan.  In  the  old  days  the  coastal  areas  were  part  of  the  Sultanate  of 
Maguindanao (part of the Iranon region). Benito is not actually from Balabagan, 
he is from the upper area, Unayan region, but the former Senator “Domocao” 
Alonto  put  him  there  as  mayor  of  Balabagan  because  it’s  a  newly  created 
municipality. To pacify [reconcile] him with Mayor Amir Balindong (Sultan of 
Picong), because he was the rival of Amir Balindong in Malabang. They are both 
Maranaos. The first rido took place when he became mayor of Balabagan and 
many  people  were  killed.  The  mayor  of  Malabang, Amir  Balindung,  defeated 
Pangadapun. They were political rivals. During that time when Malabang was still 
one municipality, that includes Balabagan and Sultan Gumandar (now Picong). 
And the cause of it was political rivalry. This was only resolved when Malabang 
was divided into two municipalities. So Pangadapun became mayor of Balabagan 
                                                 
252 During the entire existence of the sultanates in the southern Philippines, since the fifteenth century, there was just 
one sultana, probably in the seventeenth century, in Sulu (Majul 1999:17). She does not appear in every available 
document, which according to Majul can be explained “by the simple fact that she was a woman and that therefore 
the absence of her name was based on negative opinions regarding the qualifications of a woman to hold office — 
opinions which might have been adopted later” (ibid.: 8). He adds that in addition she married an Iranun datu and 
that it “might have been politically expedient to neglect this fact to prevent the Iranun from having a hand in the Sulu 
royal succession” (ibid.). Vivienne Angeles refers to Inchi Jamila as “The Sultana” who was named as such because 
she was the wife of the sultan and “not an invisible power.” She served as one of two regents in the absence of the 
sultan, and she was seen as a person wielding “real power behind the throne” (1998: 211). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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and Sultan Amir Balindong remained as mayor of Malabang.
253 Amir Balindung is 
the Sultan of Picong, while Pangadapun is the Sultan of Maguindanao.  
Pangadapun  became  the  Sultan  of  Maguindanao  [because]  it  was  a 
privilege that was given to him by the Maranao datus to pacify him. Because there 
were so many people killed already. Apparently, there was no resistance from the 
heirs of the Sultanate of Maguindanao; they did not object to it because they were 
also persuaded by the datus of Lanao led by Senator “Domocao” Alonto not to 
interfere  or  not  to  object  because  they  are  pacifying  a  family  war  between 
Balindong and the Benitos. (Interview, Manila, 2008) 
In relation to the highest royal titles and sultanates, the 16 Royal Houses or the 28 Lawmakers, it 
is rather difficult to split their authority. To create an additional Lawmaker or Royal House, all 
former members have to agree to the division. The consequence is that several sultans or bais 
have the same title, and each one is recognized by his or her own kin group.
254 There are four 
Sultans of Masiu, for example. This is said to be a recent phenomenon, which  began after the 
death of the influential politician Sultan sa Masiu Mohamad Ali Dimaporo. The Sultans of Masiu 
are recognized by their supporters and they are active in different areas. The various sultans or 
bai a labis have a rightful claim on the title but cannot wait for their turn, or a person will “bribe” 
the responsible sultans and ulama who may appreciate a person having the means, even though 
the  genealogical  connection  is  weak.  An  additional  reason  for  multiple  titleholders  is  that 
sometimes one family, seeing it as a matter of maratabat, does not recognize the authority of 
another family. Instead, it proclaims its own sultan or bai a labi. The more distant the kinship 
relations are, the lesser will be the support and the bigger will be the chance that the kin group 
splits  and  forms  its  own  sultanate.  Sometimes,  this  happens  in  agreement  with  the  mother 
sultanate, or titles are enforced for personal reasons.  
Usually, the elders would decide whom to grant a title, even if the title had already been 
given to someone. Alauya Adiong Alonto
255 at the beginning of the twentieth century married into 
                                                 
253 The Balindongs are one of the major ruling dynasties in Lanao del Sur, having occupied the post of the mayor of 
Malabang for several years. In the 2010 elections, the Balindong candidate for mayor in Malabang ran unopposed; 
they also won five other posts, among them a congressional seat for the 2
nd District of Lanao del Sur. 
254 The fact that two people can carry the same title is not a new development. As Labay explains, this already 
happened during the so-called “peace time” (1946-1955) (1980: 124) as well as at the end of the 1970s, when the 
title Sultan sa Marantao was given to two people. Both claimed to be the rightful heirs and each filed a case against 
the other, which cases could not be solved. 
255 Alauya Adiong Alonto had been a leader in the Philippine movement for independence. After his group in Ramain 
was “pacified” by American Forces in 1907, he surrendered and became an amigo (Saber 1979: 119). He among 
others asked for the establishment of schools, which were soon attended by the largest number of Muslim children in 
the Lanao area at this time. All his children attended Western schools. In addition, his daughter, Tarhata, was sent to 
school in spite of family resistance to the education of women (Madale 1997: 145). She had to stop after one year of 
high school because of the outbreak of World War II. At the end of the conflict, she was already considered too old to 
go back to school. Before World War II — Mednick writes that during American times the strongest titleholders were The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the family of the Alangadis, which had a claim to the title Sultan sa Ramain. His wife, Bariga 
Alangadi, was also said to have been the cousin to the Sultan of Maguindanao and the Sultan of 
Sulu. Alangadi, Bariga’s father, was a clan elder at this time, married to a descendant of the first 
Sultan  sa  Ramain,  Maruhom  Baraguir. Alauya Adiong  Alonto  was  a  descendant  of  Sharief 
Kabungsoan and traditional rulers in Ramain. The leader of the Alangadi clan granted him the 
title Sultan sa Ramain. Actually, this title was already given to a child of Aloz, the uncle of 
Alauya Adiong Alonto who had also married into the Alangadi family. Later, the title was given 
to Aloz’s  grandchild,  Rakiin  Macarampat,  who  was  mayor  of  Ramain  for  several  terms,  to 
appease  the  family.  There  can  be  many  reasons  for  the  transfer  of  a  title,  but  certainly,  it 
underlines the influence of clan elders as well as the fact that a title alone does not make a leader 
though a leader may get offered a title. Titles alone do not grant authority but they are also not 
merely honorary since they can boost the ranking of a descent line and social prestige and status 
(maratabat). 
  Royal  titles  can  also  become  part  of  a  divide-and-rule  policy  when  supported  from 
outside.  The  title  Sultan  sa  Ranao/Lanao  is  said  to  have  been  claimed  by  a  competitor  of 
Lieutenant Governor Alauya Adiong Alonto Sultan sa Ramain (he was crowned in 1912). The 
Sultan sa Ranao, Datu Ibra Gondarangin of Marawi, had an actual claim on the Sultanate of 
Marawi, but there already was a Sultan sa Marawi. When Governor Leonard Wood proclaimed 
him  Sultan  sa  Ranao,  traditional  datus  and  especially  the Alontos  refused  to  recognize  him, 
arguing that he could only claim his title with the help of the Americans. Alauya Adiong Alonto 
called Wood a maputia amo (white monkey) and joked that the Sultan sa Ranao might keep the 
title and be the Sultan of the fishes (ranao = lake) and that no maratabat was connected to the 
title. The Sultan sa Ranao nevertheless gained influence because of his government office. He 
first  was  an  elected  municipal  councilor.  Under  the  Japanese  occupation,  he  was  appointed 
municipal mayor and later he represented Lanao as an assemblyman. After World War II, he was 
appointed mayor of Dansalan by the President of the Philippines.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
appointed  to  government  offices  (1965:  85)  — Alauya Adiong Alonto  was  elected  one  of  the  24  senators  and 
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262 
 
Picture 12: The Current Bai a Labi sa Ramain is Declared as Such on a Streamer 
Sultan sa Ramain Rakiin Aloz Macarampat proclaimed Jasmine Tomindug Alip Imam as Bai a Labi sa Ramain. 
Photo taken by the author on the MSU campus, 2007.  
 
  The profusion of titles can also be explained by the importance of financial contributions, 
which are expected from new titleholders in the community. Dayang Ali, Bai a Labi sa Didagun, 
explains:  
So, it is a form of community development. Because whenever there are new titles 
for the sultans and bai a labis, they have to make contributions. For the building of 
mosques, for the building of community projects, like a social hall. They try to 
make decorations along the way, beautification. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
The title, however, can also be granted in return for financial assistance. In the Sultanate of Toros, 
there were initially three titles for the sultan. When a mosque was built, two new titles were 
created as a reward for contributions to the building.  
  Another reason is that those who have the formal authority in a sultanate sometimes do 
not dare (or think it worthwhile) to recognize a certain person as a bai a labi or sultan among 
many candidates. In case of recognition, a clan conflict might erupt. In Bayang, seven datus, 
seven imams, and one kali had to choose one Sultan sa Bayang. However, since there were three 
candidates, they preferred not to choose one in order to avoid a rido. Thus, all three sultans were 
enthroned with the support of their respective clans. This, however, is considered as being against 
the taritib of the place. During my research I found that few sultans of the 16 were recognized by 
the entire domain and I could find at least one double for each. One way of remaining the only 
titleholder of a certain title is by being willing to defend it aggressively. A close relative can also The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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do this. A bai a labi from a minor place reported that a relative threatened to kill those who 
challenged her position, which helped her to remain the only bai a labi of the community where 
she was granted her title. 
Giving away honorary titles to non-Muslims, which happens frequently, is one way to 
show  appreciation  for  the  (actual  or  possible)  support  of  a  beneficiary.  Honorary  titles  are 
normally those of bai or datu, not bai a labi or sultan, which are both kept reserved for Muslims. 
Additionally, in case a bai a labi or sultan is connected to the name of a place, the titleholder has 
rights to the place and this can only be inherited; thus these titles are reserved for Maranaos. The 
honorary titleholder may, nevertheless, form his or her own realm. The non-Maranao Bai sa 
Pagabagatan (Queen of the South), who was granted several honorary titles (by Maranaos and 
some indigenous groups as well as German titles of nobility through her German husband), is one 
example of this. She bought land close to Iligan City and invited some indigenous people to stay 
there, becoming part of her newly-founded religious group. They worked the land, took part in 
the religious ceremonies and were provided with food and accommodation. As royal etiquette, 
they had to bow in front of her majesty and to chase away the flies around her.  
  In brief, the high number of titles in Lanao has manifold explanations. The first is that 
many agamas/barangays form their own sultanate with various titles. Since Lanao del Sur has 
more  than  a  thousand  barangays,  this  already  explains  the  largest  number  of  the  titles. 
Furthermore, there are male and corresponding female titles and titles can be created for various 
reasons without any sanction. This is also possible since no fixed obligations, advantages, and 
authority are connected to royal titles, being first and foremost a status symbol. Along with the 
high  number  of  titles  goes  a  high  number  of  claimants  because  of  bilateral  and  rotational 
inheritance, including not only one family but several descent lines, and an absence of fixed 
marriage rules, leading to all Maranaos being able to define themselves as royal. Another reason 
for the vast number of royal titles — what can be considered a resurgence of the sultanates — is 
the  recognition  by  the  government  and  NGOs  of  royal  titles,  underlining  their  functions  as 
peacekeepers. Possible claimants became interested in the traditional system again since it may 
be connected to financial support and recognition by the government, as the following section 
will show. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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III. Decline and Resurgence of the Sultanate System 
A. A Countermovement to the Rebellion 
  Saber (1979)  writes  that  during the time of the introduction of the new political  and 
administrative divisions, authority among Maranaos remained mainly with the elders of the clan. 
If a traditional leader from the supported (pagawidan) became a barrio captain, the community 
accepted him. If the person came from the supporters, he would be challenged. The author states: 
At the time of its introduction, Barrio government was relatively weak so that in 
general leadership rivalries, the “elders” maintained stronger influence than the 
barrio council. In fact, many communities do not take much interest in organizing 
their barrio governments. Others hold “ghost” elections on paper for the record, 
hence a barrio government is rarely a functional organization in the Maranao area. 
(p. 72) 
The new form of government, which was initially enforced by the military, could not be entirely 
prevented or ignored and most sultans who occupied a government office via appointment or 
elections  — who were labeled amigos by other Muslims, while the government was labeled 
gobierno a sarowang a tao (government of a foreign people) by those who remained with the old 
system  —  tried  to  perform  well.  In  exchange,  an  officeholder  “receive[s]  salary  and  other 
privileges for his collaborative service in the government” (ibid.: 80). A conflict between the 
traditional and the modern state systems is attested to by many authors. Among them, Warriner 
(1975a)  explains  mismanagement  in  Lanao  during  the  1970s  in  terms  of  superimposed 
administrative  structures,  which  ignored  the  traditional  lineage  and  agama  system.  The 
superimposition led to people being in office who had no authority in the community, since they 
were  not  related  to  community  members.  In  the  years  of  the  Commonwealth  and  after,  the 
national government under President Manuel Quezon, who claimed that titleholders would not be 
granted any more rights than every Filipino, officially discouraged the traditional title system. 
This encouraged counter-elites (see Kreuzer 2003) to find their way into politics, joining the 
traditional elites. 
  In 1954, three political leaders in Marawi City, one of them the Datu of Marawi, invited 
the 28 to a meeting at the torogan of the Sultan sa Marawi: “The purpose was to survey the 
possibility of reorganizing the ranking sultans and datus into an active group in order to revitalize 
their social power which was seen to be weakening” (Saber and Tamano 1986-87: 122). They 
organized the All-Sultans Association of Marawi. However, the group did not last since the datus 
feared that it would be used for politically motivated purposes, some leaders being from the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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political opposition. Other organizations in Lanao developed to revive the traditional system. The 
Marawi Sultanate League, founded in 1950 before the outbreak of the rebellion, had the goal of 
preserving the traditional sultanate system. As the son of  the first  chairman of the Sultanate 
League reports, the arguments of the founders were that “without the sultanate we cannot call 
ourselves Maranaos. That is our identity. In order to preserve it we have to organize it, to make it 
strong” (Interview, Marawi City, 2008). This task was achieved, according to the son, and had as 
a consequence the renaming of Dansalan as Marawi, which was done on 16 June 1956 by Senator 
“Domocao” Alonto in honor of the Marawi Sultanate Confederation.  
  In the 1970s, several Moro movements for self-determination sprouted, like the Muslim 
Independence Movement (MIM), the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) and the 
Moro  National  Liberation  Front  (MNLF).  Whereas  the  MNLF  started  an  open  rebellion, 
members  of  the  traditional  elites  of  the  BMLO  sought  to  revive  the  sultanate  system.  The 
chairman of the Bangsa Moro Army (the military wing of the BMLO), Rashid Lucman, was 
enthroned Paramount Sultan and received the support of the 19 Royal Houses of Mindanao and 
Sulu. President Marcos confirmed the confederation headed by Lucman on 8 May 1974. The 
sultanates voted to support the leadership of the president but demanded autonomy as a first step 
towards self-rule for the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao in lieu of independence as espoused by 
the  MNLF  (Yegar  2002:  280).  Marcos  recognized  the  Paramount  Sultan,  “in  an  attempt  to 
promote further divisions within the Moro leadership” (Che Man 1990: 79). The resurgence of 
the sultanate system as an alternative to the rebellion worked especially in  Lanao where the 
traditional  datu-ship  was  very  strong
256  and where the rebellion alienated some Muslims by 
rejecting the traditional system. McKenna comments that consequently among the rebel groups, 
the “existence of traditional, autocratic leadership was retained, at least implicitly, as an intrinsic 
component of Moro political culture” (1990: 286).  
 
                                                 
256 Saber writes in the 1970s that in many cases political offices were refused by traditional elites and that those posts 
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Picture 13: On 8 May 1974, President Marcos Confirmed the Royal Confederation in Malacañang 
From left to right: President Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Tarhata Alonto Lucman, and Sultan Rashid Lucman. Photo 
kindly provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman.  
 
The divide-and-rule tactic, however, did not work out entirely. Rashid Lucman, once in 
power, organized a government-financed conference at MSU Marawi (June 4-6, 1974), which 
resulted in a resolution for autonomy, signed by 20,000 Moros. Marcos, who did not give in to 
these demands, declared Lucman as his opponent, whereupon he left the country in September 
1974. Instead, Ali Dimaporo — Marcos’s closest Muslim ally who also became Lanao del Sur 
governor and MSU President during the period of martial law — was proclaimed sultan
257 in 
1982 and this validated his political role traditionally. McKenna argues that his claims on a 
traditional  title  were  only  “equivocal  at  best”
258  (1990:  455),  and  one  datu  recounts  that 
Dimaporo’s strategy for becoming a sultan was to appoint mayors who would recognize him as 
sultan: 
                                                 
257 According to Madale (1996), some Maranaos named Dimaporo Paramount Sultan of Lanao (p. 94). 
258 Mohammad Ali is the eldest of eight children of Datu Marahom Dimaporo and Potri-Maamor Borngao. His father 
was Sultan of Binidayan, one of the 28 in West Unayan. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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That legendary old man, Dimaporo, he has the power during the time of Marcos. 
He had the power to appoint mayors. He asks the people, you subscribe to me as a 
sultan I will appoint you as a mayor. (Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
Royalists appreciated his proclamation since this also elevated their own position: through the 
acquisition of royal titles by politicians, they “acquire some legitimacy, moral or otherwise . . . in 
which  approval  of  the  community  leaders  is  obtained”  (Madale  1996:  141). Additionally,  as 
sultan, Dimaporo supported the sultanate system through money he could acquire due to his 
governmental position. In one case, through his representation the national government gave PHP 
1.6 million to rebuild the Dayawan torogan (ibid: 89). Thus, Dimaporo was respected among 
royalty and invited to enthrone lower-ranking sultans, even after the Marcos regime. 
  Ali  Dimaporo’s  proclamation  followed  others,  and  during  the  martial  law  period,  the 
“frequency of proclamations of traditional titles” increased steadily, including in Maguindanao 
(McKenna  1990:  289).  Even  Christian  military  commanders  were  given  honorary  titles  by 
collaborating datus. Old titles were resurrected and new organizations of royal descendants were 
created between 1982 and 1986 (ibid.: 456). According to Madale (1996), the adoption of the title 
system by high-ranking politicians led to a revival of the whole system: 
The new development whereby Maranaw elective officials try to acquire native 
titles  or  ranks  has  brought  about  a  resurgence  and  a  revival  of  the  traditional 
government. Almost every week in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, a ranking 
government official, whether elective or appointive, is given a traditional title or 
rank. Successful businessmen have also opted to acquire traditional titles or ranks 
to legitimize the new important roles and positions they now play in their own 
communities. Royal houses or sultanates, which hibernated, are now being revived 
through the coronation of new sets  of titled  datus and baes who appear more 
aggressive and responsive to the needs and problems of the community. (p. 142) 
After the death of Ali Dimaporo, his successor in the pangampong of Masiu, the mayor of 
Tamparan (since 1992; previously, his father had held this position for more than 30 years) and 
Sultan  sa  Masiu  Topaan  “Toni”  Disomimba  re-established  political  connections  between  the 
Royal  Houses  and  Manila.  Former  Vice-Governor  Palawan  Disomimba  was  the  Datu  a 
Cabugatan sa Masiu and the father of  “Toni” Disomimba. Palawan accepted the title Datu a 
Cabugatan and allowed Governor Ali Dimaporo to take the title Sultan sa Masiu, even though it 
was the Disomimba family’s turn. Palawan Disomimba agreed because of political expediency. 
His son Topaan
259 accepted the title Cabugatan after his father’s death and later on assumed the 
                                                 
259 Topaan was married to Ali Dimaporo’s daughter, Okura, who passed away in the 1980s. They have one son, 
Johari. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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title Sultan sa Masiu. Stepping in the footsteps of his relative Ali Dimaporo, “Toni” Disomimba, 
as chairman of 16 Royal Houses, recently received an advisory status by the government. A bai 
recounts: 
Actually, Ali Dimaporo was a very close ally of President Marcos. At the time 
when Dimaporo was enthroned as the Sultan of Masiu, he was the governor of 
Lanao; he was also the acting President of MSU, appointed by the President of the 
Republic of the Philippines and he was the number one closest friend and ally of 
the former President Marcos. He is the little Marcos
260 of the Philippines. Because 
of this personal relationship, recognition was given to him.
261 Due recognition and 
respect for the title he was also holding. And that is why there may not be any role 
given to him as a sultan but he was using his title and his title was recognized. And 
it was after his death that Topaan also became the Sultan of Masiu. And Topaan, 
his father was the vice-governor of Ali Dimaporo and the Cabugatan of Masiu. As 
a young man, he already saw the progress his father and the governor were making 
during that time. So when he became the Sultan of Masiu he continued that. And 
he also explored new possibilities by which the traditional leadership can work 
with the government. That is why he got so close to Arroyo, even before Arroyo, 
all the Presidents, with Ramos, with Cory Aquino. There were always meetings. 
He was always bringing his title of sultan, and his being mayor second. So when 
there are gatherings he will be more recognized as sultan rather than the mayor of 
Tamparan. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
On 14 August 1999, President Arroyo was crowned Bai a Labi Dimasangkay sa Pilipinas by 
Topaan “Toni” Disomimba. Arroyo, even though a non-Muslim, could become a bai a labi since 
her ancestors are from the Iligan region, being a seventh-generation descendant of Sharief Alawi 
of the Sultanate of Tagoloan. Her father, the former President Macapagal, was already enthroned 
as Sultan Dimasangkay sa Pilipinas in the 1960s.
262 Arroyo was crowned when she was Vice -
President of the Philippines. Her coronation led Asgar Sani, Sultan sa Marawi, to remark that “the 
estimated 1,000 sultanates all over the Philippines will defend the President no matter what,” 
since she had royal blood. Certainly, this would not stop members of other clans from voting or 
acting against her nor from supporting another candidate for president if it would serve their own 
interests and those of their families.  
 
                                                 
260 On Mohamad Ali Dimaporo and his role in the Marcos government, see Bentley (1998: 243ff.); McKenna (1990: 
454ff.).  
261 McKenna commented that Ali Dimaporo was the “single gatekeeper between the Marcos regime and Mindanao 
Muslims” and “the only Muslim whom Marcos really trusted” (1990: 455). 
262 Dimasangkay means “who has no peers/equals.” Dimasangkay Adil was also a title that was given to a descendant 
of  Sharief  Kabungsoan  who  married  into  the  Pat  a  Pangampong.  Arroyo  thus  got  a  title,  which  was  highly 
appreciated since it was Dimasangkay Adil who was the most known genealogical link between Sharief Kabungsoan 
and the Pat a Pangampong. The title is more than honorary since Arroyo, even though she is Christian, was granted a 
title which is normally reserved for Muslims (bai a labi) and which confers rights to a place (sa), the Philippines. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 14: Sultan sa Masiu and President Arroyo 
Sultan “Toni” Disomimba (second seated from the left) and male and female members of the 16 Royal Houses with 
President Arroyo. Photo kindly provided by the sultan. 
 
 
 
Picture 15: Topaan “Toni” Disomimba, Sultan sa Marawi 
Photo kindly provided by the sultan, 2008.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  On August 27-28, 2003, the first Royal Sultanates Conference on Unified and Effective 
Governance at the Centennial Hall of the Manila Hotel took place; President Arroyo and “Toni” 
Disomimba  took  part.
263  It  was  the  first  time  that  Moro  royalt y  officially  gathered  with 
governmental functionaries to talk about governance. The intention of the conference was to 
“tackle important issues that could help secure an immediate, just and permanent peace in 
Mindanao.” The debate was important since, according to “Toni” Disomimba, “the empowerment 
and institutionalization of the sultanates as active participants in peace and development in 
Mindanao could be the key to the final solution of the complex Mindanao problem ” (Manila 
Bulletin, July 12, 2003). The role of the bai a labi and the participation of women participation in 
this process, as far as I was informed, was not part of the program. On the initiative of “Toni” 
Disomimba, representatives of the 16 Royal Houses applied for a partnership with the National 
Government. After the initial meeting, which took place on January 13, 2007, a schism occurred 
among the 16 Royal  Houses and a second set of the 16 Royal  Houses developed under the 
Cabugatan sa Masiu. 
On 9 February 2007, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 602, creating the Lanao Advisory 
Council, represented by the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao.
264 The task of the council is to advise the 
President about issues and problems in the area, to facilitate the settlement of conflicts, to assist 
in the implementation of government programs, and finally to submit a quarterly report. Each of 
the 16 royal sultanates is equally entitled to represent the  council. The government provides an 
annual funding of one million pesos for its administrative and operational expenses. Women are 
not officially included in this arrangement; bai a labis are just not mentioned. Thus, the chance to 
strengthen the already existing role of women in the sultanate was not taken into consideration. 
They remain in the background as supporters of the male representatives. 
 
                                                 
263 Present among others were President Arroyo, US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone Junior, Jamalul Kiram (Sultan 
of Sulu), Topaan “Toni” Disomimba as chairman of the Royal Houses in Lanao and president of the Philippine 
League of Municipalities, Manila Mayor Lito Atienza, ARMM Governor Parouk Hussin, and Presidential Advisor 
Jesus Dureza. Jamalul Kiram’s claim to the Sultanate of Sulu is not recognized by Sultan Fuad of Sulu and Sabah, 
who declared that Jamalul, Ismail, Aghbimuddin, Rodinood and Kudar Julaspi, were usurpers and fake sultans and 
that the only true and legitimate sultan is Sultan Muhammad Fuad Abdulla Kiram I. Sultan Fuad was proclaimed 
sultan on June 3, 2006 and Jamalul Kiram was proclaimed Sultan of Sulu in June 1986. Both sultans claim Sabah as 
part of their domain. 
264 Jesus Dureza, who inducted into office the 16 Royal Sultanates as officers and members of the Lanao Advisory 
Council, was conferred the traditional title Ayonen Datu sa Filipinas in August 2007 by Disomimba. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Graphic 16: Advisory Council under Chairman HRH (His Royal Highness) Datu Elias Mohammad, Datu a 
Cabugatan sa Masiu  
The  acronyms  stand  for  governmental  offices:  Department  of  Justice,  Department  of  Education,  Commission  on  Higher 
Education, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Transportation and Communications, Department of Public 
Works and Highways, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Agriculture, Department of Tourism, 
Department  of  Agrarian  Reform,  Department  of  the  Interior  and  Local  Government,  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
Department of Health. Information provided by the Council, 2008. 
 
Around the time of the Manila Hotel conference in 2003, the Federated Royal Sultanate 
League  of  the  Philippines  (ROSULPHIL),  under  the  guidance  of  Al-Sultan  Alim  Ibrahim 
Camama, Sultan of Iligan, was created. It came into existence on September 7 with the mass 
enthronement of 44 sultanates in Iligan City (one sultan and bai a labi for every barangay). 
While Baloi claims Iligan to be a part of its pangampong, the Iligan royalties trace themselves The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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back to the Sultanate of Tagoloan (and Sharief Alawi), which is seen as one of seven  aklim 
(sovereign states)
265 in the area. Other titleholders of the Iligan sultanate point out that their entity 
is a new one that does not need any genealogical justification or mother sultanate. For them, the 
only qualifications to become a sultan are that one has to reside in Iligan and be a Muslim . The 
group is thus more heterogeneous than sultanates of the  Pat a Pangampong, including also non-
Maranaos, like Tausugs. One of the goals of ROSULPHIL is to spread the sultanate system as far 
as possible in order to bring peace and order to the Muslim communities. The organization is 
seen as a nationwide federation since its ancestors were rulers all over the country. Thus, it refers 
to Raja Matanda, Raja Sulaiman, and Raja Lakandula, who ruled the area of today’s Manila 
before the arrival of the Spanish. In the Visayas, rulers like Raja Humabon and Datu Lapu-Lapu, 
known to have killed the explorer Ferdinand Magellan, are referred to as ancestors.  In Jolo, 
Sultan Makhdum is mentioned. In Mindanao, Sultan Qudarat, Sharief Kabungsoan, and Sharief 
Alawi are seen as forefathers. Contacts with Cebu City Mayor Tomas Osmeña
266 and other non-
Maranao politicians were established to strengthen the umbrella functions of the organization. 
ROSULPHIL claims that all sultanates in the Philippines are automatically members of their 
organization;  this  was,  however,  not  confirmed  by  members  of  the  Pat  a  Pangampong. 
Additionally, honorary titles are given to non-Muslims like Datu a Adil, given to the mayor of 
Iligan City, Lawrence Lluch Cruz, or to Europeans who are willing to support the foundation, like 
the German husband of the Bai sa Pagabagatan, Queen of the South, who became a datu in the 
sultanate. A  torogan is planned that would contain a royal academy, a library, a royal hall, a 
mosque,  and  a  royal  center  for  research  and  scientific  studies.  ROSULPHIL  is  primarily 
concerned with peace advocacy in support of the government, in particular regarding the unity of 
the three peoples of Mindanao (Bangsamoro Muslims, Lumads, and Christians). The aim of some 
group  members  is  to  become  sovereign  rulers  like  the  Sultan  of  Brunei  or  the  Sultan Yang 
Dipertuan Agung  of  Malaysia.  Women  are  included  as  counterparts  to  men. At  the  regular 
meetings,  both  genders  are  present,  seated  separately  but  in  hearing  range  of  each  other.  In 
addition,  members  of  indigenous  groups  and  Christians  take  part  in  the  meetings.  Public 
representatives of the group are usually male.  
The MSU Royalties are another example of Maranao royalty forming an organization in 
an attempt at peacekeeping and preservation of traditional leadership in the 2000s. The former 
                                                 
265 The seven aklim are: Brunei, Maguindanao, Maladaw, Maluko, Ranao, Sulug, and Tagoloan. 
266 Tomas Osmeña is a Balik Islam (a convert to Islam) who was also granted a sultanate title by the Maranao 
community in Cebu. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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interim President of MSU Marawi, Ricardo de Leon, supported the alliance. It consists of a group 
of bais and sultans working at MSU Marawi. In 2006, a month-long celebration of Cultural 
Heritage under the guidance of de Leon
267 took place. During this event, royalty employed at the 
university were recognized by the president as promoting the integration of cultural communities 
into the mainstream of national politics. This was seen as being part of the goal of the MSU 
Vision 2020: to gain recognition as  a “peace  university”  in the Philippines (MSU Royalties 
2007). Encouraged by this message, Bai a Labi a Noni sa Boribid, Amina Domato-Sarip, founded 
with the support of the Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao an association of bais at 
the university. One week later, the Vice-Chancellor for Research and Extension, Eilen Capal 
Guro, initiated the organization MSU Royalties, of which the Sultan sa Pualas and husband of 
Amina Domato-Sarip, Taha Sarip, became the founding president. The group includes women 
and men who usually act separately but communicate among each other. There are thus the male 
Founding Officers and the female Kalipha Bai (female Caliph), each with a president (in 2007 
they were Sultan Taha Sarip and his wife Bai a Labi Amina Domato-Sarip). In addition, the 
Board of Directors is divided into male and female sub-boards, each with a chair and vice-chair. 
During  my  stay,  the  female  MSU  Royalties  accommodated  me.  In  answer  to  my  frequent 
questions about the role of women in the sultanate, a conference at MSU was organized and three 
male representatives of the 16 Royal Houses and the 28 Lawmakers (not belonging to the MSU 
Royalties) were invited to speak about this issue. The sultans stated that they only accepted the 
invitation since their female relatives (members of the MSU Royalties) asked them to come. The 
conference participants were mainly women. In general, the women’s group seemed to be more 
active  than  the  male  group.  The  new  Maranao  university  president  (since  January  2008), 
Macapado A.  Muslim,  although  he  was  asked  to  become  keynote  speaker,  did  not  join  the 
conference. He follows a different policy than the previous President Ricardo de Leon, being 
more  focused  on  the  modernization  of  the  educational  system,  whereas  de  Leon  as  interim 
President supported traditional Maranao structures as important contributions to peace and order 
in the area. Muslim thus does not support the MSU Royalties to an equal extent and the group’s 
activities remain rather limited today.  
                                                 
267  The  MSU  Royalties  granted  him  the  honorary  title  Datu  a  Romapunut  of  Mindanao,  “Prince  of  Peace  of 
Mindanao.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 16: MSU Royalties 
Photo kindly provided by the organization. Program of the 1
st Founding Anniversary, 27 July 2007, Marawi City. 
The  sultanate  system  experienced  a  revival  in  the  1980s,  supported  by  a  government 
divide-and-rule policy; thus, President Marcos supported Maranao royalty in opposition to the 
MNLF rebels. This policy was further strengthened at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
under President Arroyo when the traditional system was perceived as a key factor in bringing 
peace  to  the  Mindanao  region  and  its  representatives  financed  as  presidential  advisers.  The 
recognition of traditional forms of conflict-solving was, however, also a grassroots policy as the 
following section will show.  
B. Support on the Grassroots Level: Conflict Settlement beyond the State 
Georg Klute (2004) notes that after the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), small-scale 
clashes moved into the focus of public attention. In particular, in development co-operations, an 
important issue was to find out how to contribute to the settlement of disputes not between but 
within states. After being criticized for ethnocentrism for not including traditional mechanisms of 
conflict settlement “beyond the state,” development agencies changed their strategy and began a The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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search  for traditional mechanisms  (p. 299). This  was  followed by  a debate on whether such 
traditions might be undemocratic, and raised the question of their usefulness since they could not 
prevent local escalations of conflicts (ibid., referring to the critiques of Mehler and Ribaux 2000). 
Searching for traditional structures that might help to solve local conflicts, Klute highlights two 
further problems as  a consequence of developmental strategies. The first is that strategies to 
support  traditional  settlement  mechanisms  are  induced  from  outside;  the  second,  that  these 
measures provide the possibility for an accumulation of power. Thus, traditional troubleshooters 
supported by foreign development agencies might undermine the legitimacy of the state. This 
poses  a  problem  since  Klute  supposes  that  governance  today  is  dependent  on  the  idea  of 
“generalized statehood” (“generalisierter Staatlichkeit”), which is dependent on sovereignty over 
a  certain  domain,  an  aspiration  to  a  monopoly  of  violence,  and  the  establishment  and 
implementation of norms (“Gebietsherrschaft, Streben nach dem Gewaltmonopol, Normsetzung 
und Normdurchsetzung”). Since even governance beyond the state, like sultanates, orients itself 
in terms of these characteristics of modern statehood, traditional measures to settle conflicts can 
only be seen as a secondary option, including by those implementing them (ibid. 300). Klute 
(2007) later developed this idea in a theory of heterarchy, which considers state structures as only 
one element of a complex power structure containing several elements, among them traditional 
systems, which permanently try to attain wider influence or legitimization. Generalized statehood 
in this context becomes a construction that can be questioned and leaves room for alternative 
state concepts and alternative conflict settlements as a possible first option. 
  Klute’s  writings,  among  others,  open  the  door  for  a  broader  analysis  in  which  the 
resurgence of the sultanate system must be judged not only as a countermovement to the rebellion 
that  was  fostered  by  the  government,  but  also  as  an  authority  system  that  strives  for  more 
influence  on  its  own  initiative.  The  basic  question  remains  whether  this  authority  can  be 
recognized besides or only within the state system and what role it can occupy when taken as the 
first option. Thus, concerning the revival of the sultanate system, not only are outer influences of 
importance but so are internal developments. This means, for example, that royalty search for 
more influence or the possibility to apply their abilities as peacekeepers in lieu of politicians, who 
are well-paid but do not necessarily have the qualities to solve local conflicts. One solution is to 
look for financial sources from outside.   The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  The NGO RIDO was founded in 2006 to solve ridos by using the traditional system.
268 
For this purpose, clans claiming titles within the Sultanate of Marawi were reorganized. RIDO is 
led by an aspirant to a sultanate title  in one of  the Alliance of Marawi sultanates. Under his 
initiative (being encouraged by a female elder of the clan), the genealogy of several clans was 
collected and the sultanate reorganized by writing down its  taritib. Based on this reorganization, 
RIDO aims to solve conflicts with the financial help of foreign donors. Before, clans within the 
sultanate were only loosely organized; active relationships were rather based on the family and 
close  relatives.  At  the  same  time,  traditional  knowledge  about  clan  membership  was  not 
widespread and was mainly of importance when needed, for example in case a neutral family had 
to be found to serve as mediators in a rido. Knowledge about clan structures and the salsila was 
usually kept by elders and specialists, and was not necessarily well-organized. Bamgbose writes 
that in some communities the people “could hardly distinguish the clans as there have been so 
many cross-clan marriages,” which were made “to strengthen community and familial ties, and 
prevent discord” (2003: 68). Madale (1996) relates that in the Sultanate of Dayawan there was no 
Council of Elders, and a new set of younger and more educated bais and datus (the last set was 
chosen about 60 years earlier) had first to be chosen
269 in several meetings by the heirs of the title 
(p. 94).  
RIDO  gathered  the  salsila  around  2007  and,  in  consensus  with  the  female  and  male 
elders, wrote down and thereby rearranged the taritib in accordance with the sharia law to ensure 
the  “promotion  and  recognition  of  traditional  honorable  titles  by  the  government  and  other 
institutions” (Atar 2007: 24). The clans take turns: one sub-clan carries the title Sultan, another 
                                                 
268 RIDO resolved a number of ridos. The major cases had the following causes: “reckless imprudence resulting to 
homicide; land disputes resulting to murder; sarcastic words and insults resulting to murder; political rivalry and vote 
buying resulting to frustrated murder; reckless imprudence and miscommunication resulting to serious injuries and 
grave threat; pornography resulting to public scandal; collision of two vehicles resulting to two consecutive riots and 
grave threats; political rivalry resulting to multiple murders; injuries and accidental shooting resulting to multiple 
injuries.”. Minor cases had been the consequence of “miscommunication resulting to grave threat; extortion and 
physical injuries; threat for the implementation of project at Poona Piagapo; elopement; forced marriage; reckless 
imprudence resulting to homicide; collision of two vehicles resulting to injuries; reckless imprudence resulting to 
serious injuries and shotgun marriage resulting to grave threat” (Atar 2007: 32). In both minor and major conflicts, 
20 people were killed and 28 injured. Before receiving the help of foreign sponsors, the Council of Elders had 
resolved  other  cases,  such  as  kidnapping  for  ransom,  murder,  and  fraternal  conflict.  The  organization  further 
enthroned the former Lanao del Sur governor (1988-1992), Saidamen Pangarungan, as Sultan sa Madaya, one of the 
five sultanates in Marawi City. The title had not been granted for about ten years since there had been a conflict 
about its distribution among the descendants who could claim the title. The enthronement of Pangarungan resolved a 
rido about the traditional title. 
269 The re-organization was initiated by Abdhulla Madale, who succeeded in attracting the royal heirs to rebuild their 
torogan  with  the  financial  help  of  the  National  Commission  on  Culture  and Arts,  community  enterprises,  and 
individual supporters like Ali Dimaporo. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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one Cabugatan and a third Mama sa Marawi. Whereas before the titles had been held for life 
terms, they are now
270 restricted to eight years. This arrangement serves two purposes: to be able 
to control the distribution of titles but also to give sub -clans and families the chance to gain the 
title through limited terms. An election takes place after each term, which lets the other sub-clans 
have their turn in case they have an appropriate candidate. Another arrangement of the NGO was 
to change the understanding of who belongs to the Council of Elders. Before it was composed of 
the parent’s generation, who could claim the title of and represent the descent line; the new 
arrangement states that elders represent the three sub-clans and are higher than average in status. 
As of 2008, there were about 80 male and female members of the Council of Elders. Also, the 
role of women in the sultanate was a point of discussion, and for each female title the elders of 
the clan defined special functions, which were written down.
271 The functions differ from title to 
title but also from clan to clan. While in one clan the bai a labi is a leader and decision-maker, in 
another her main focus is, besides religious obligations, which she has in every clan, to give 
support in conflict-solving. Finally, RIDO campaigns to maintain the curse against those who 
disregard  the  taritib,  since  its  use  may  eventually  prevent  conflicts  about  titles  or  double 
enthronements. No person can enforce any punishment against someone who has been enthroned. 
However, among those who remember the curse, which was first pronounced by the ancestors of 
the Pat a Pangampong, Pascan of Unayan, Amiyalongan Simban of Masiu, and Popawan of 
Bayabao, and the rule that one can only take a title when properly chosen, there are few attempts 
to occupy a title without the blessing of the community.  
  The salsila before never comprised every member of a clan and the choice of the next 
titleholder was made informally by clan elders. The new salsila written down by RIDO made the 
process of choosing someone for a title more transparent. Clan members nevertheless spoke of 
the danger of forgetting someone in the salsila. Another problem appeared: the salsila made it 
                                                 
270 According to Labay (1980), the movement to restrict terms started at the end of the 1970s (p. 119). 
271 The functions of the female titleholders are different in each clan. Among the Sidikadatu clan, the Bai a Labi sa 
Marawi, the Bai a Labi a Gaus and the Bai a Diamla sa Marawi have the following tasks: to be a role model 
(rawaten), leader, decision-maker, and financier; to lay the carpet at weddings; to collect pagayanan; to celebrate 
traditional religious festivities such as Eidl al-Adha and Eidl al-Fitr, and Morod (the celebration of the birth of 
Prophet Mohammad). She celebrates Rabi ul Awwal (Morod a Datu), Rabu ul Akhir (Morod a Bae), Jamad ul Ula 
(Morod for Travellers), and Jamad ul Akhir (Morod for the poor, miskin). In the Maruhom Sidik clan, the Poona Bai 
a Labi sa Marawi and the Bai a Labi sa Marawi have to practice Islamic tenets like Eid al-Fitre and Eid al-Adha. 
They  have  to  give  intelligent  and  full  support  to  resolving  problems  in  the  community,  including  ridos  and 
development problems,  and they have to practice Maranao traditions and support those  who  marry. Among the 
Balindong Jaman clan, the main task of the Bai sa Marawi, Potre Maamor sa Marawi, Pangianamapay sa Marawi, 
and the Bai a Waris sa Marawi is to support the sultan (Atar 2007). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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obvious that the land of the sultan had not been justly distributed and RIDO in order to avoid 
conflicts tried to compensate financially those members of the royal family who had a claim on 
land  that  was  occupied  by  other  families.  The  organization  of  the  clan  by  writing  down  a 
common  taritib  and  salsila  of  the  last  five  generations  thus  brought  more  transparency 
concerning rights and duties one can claim or has to fulfill, but also concerning lapses that had 
occurred in the past. On the one hand, the transparency diminishes the influence of elders. On the 
other hand, the whole Sultanate of Marawi is more structured and stronger not only in solving 
ridos but especially in preventing conflicts about titles. Also, women in the sultanate are better 
organized and a discussion about their roles and functions is part of the restructuring. However, 
whereas  the  sultanates  are  seen,  and  thus  supported,  by  the  government  and  international 
organizations as a countermovement to the rebellion, it has to be considered that they follow their 
own  agenda.  Traditionalists  are  eager  to  strengthen  their  influence,  not  necessarily  in  the 
framework of governmental positions. Moreover, their appeals for more autonomy and means in 
the  process  of  political  decision-making  are  not  hidden.  The  re-traditionalization  can  thus 
possibly appear as facilitating the “no war, no peace” environment, as a countermovement to the 
rebellion but also in the aspiration to establish an alternative form of governance. In Jolo, this 
manifested itself in an independence declaration of the Sulu sultanate on November 17, 2010.
272 
In February 2011, a businessman from Sab ah (with  a  Filipino background) was proclaimed 
Sultan of Sulu. The declaration led to a debate in the Malaysian media about his rightful claim 
but also about the possible problems that might  ensue, like the dual loyalty of former Filipino 
                                                 
272 The Declaration of Assertion of Independence reads partly as follows:  
“We, the United Tausug people hereby declare the Sultanate of Sulu Darul Islam’s assertion of her independence and 
sovereignty, as she has since 1405, from now exercise and will continuously exercise her very own sovereignty in 
running the de jure government within her legal territory as an independent and sovereign State.  
We are therefore, demanding the withdrawal of the Filipino neo-colonial and de facto government of the Republic of 
the Philippines from our beloved country — the State of Sulu sultanate Darul Islam, with due respect and humility.  
We welcome the international community’s recognition and support, both legal and/or political and humanitarian. We 
invite and welcome international peacekeeping and civilian presences to supervise our beloved country’s peace, 
security and development. 
We also request the governments of the world due respect and protection of our Tausug citizens sojourning within 
their respective territories. 
Let the copy of this Declaration be specifically furnished the United States of America, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. 
Further,  let  the  copy  of  this  Declaration  also  be  immediately  furnished  to  the  Republic  of  the  Philippines, 
Autonomous  Region  in  Muslim  Mindanao,  the  Local  Government  of  Sulu,  Tawi-Tawi,  Basilan,  Zamboanga 
Peninsula and Palawan.  
Lastly, let the copy also of this Declaration be furnished to the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front. 
Unanimously signed by the United Tausug on the scheduled ‘Assertion of Independence Day’ on the 11th day of 
Julgadji 1431 A.H., corresponding to 17 November 2010 C.E., which is also the 605th Centenary Commemoration of 
the State of Sulu sultanate Darul Islam, held at Plaza Tulay, Jolo, Sultanate of Sulu Darul Islam.” (Julkarnain 2010). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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citizens who have settled in Malaysia to the king of Malaysia and the Malaysian constitution on 
the one hand and the newly declared Sultan of Sulu on the other. Further, as the researcher Farish 
Noor comments, “this new development has . . . raised the political temperature in Sabah where 
opposition  leaders  and  parties  have  tried  in  recent  months  to  rekindle  feelings  of  Sabahan 
solidarity and opposition to the Federal government of West Malaysia.” He continues to pose the 
question how the Philippine government might react to the declaration of the sultan that the 
Sultanate of Sulu is not part of the Philippines and that it is a government in exile, hoping to 
bring the issue to the International Court of Justice and the United Nations (Noor 2011). 
C. A Local Alternative  
  Politics in Lanao is dominated by political clans, which mainly descend from the datu 
class, but not every sultan or bai a labi goes into politics and most politicians do not have a royal 
title. The new generation of Alontos and Adiongs does not carry royal titles because they do not 
feel the need to do so. They are “good people” descended from local rulers. Besides “the three 
Gs” (guns,  goons  and gold)
273 that are needed to stay in politics, they also have the fourth, 
genealogy. Many politicians see titles as meaningless, except for “showing off.” The sultanate 
system, however, remained functioning on the community level in its connection to community 
services, appreciation of royal titles, solving conflicts, and in particular giving importance to 
descent  lines  and  status.  Thus,  two  parallel  systems  developed:  a  political  system  that  is 
dominated by guns, goons, and gold, and to a lesser degree genealogy, a nd a second system that 
is based on community services and responsibilities, which are paid back by appreciation and 
status. There are those combining the two, such as “Toni” Disomimba, but traditionalists having 
no intentions to go into politics tend to define the national political system as a threat to their 
authority and to the social order. Thus, they glorify the time before colonization. The Sultan sa 
Butig emphasizes that the traditional authority of the  panoroganan equals the authority of the 
president  of  the  Philippines  in  his  respective  realm. The  new  political  system,  however,  has 
destructive effects on the Maranao system and society: 
That  is  why  when  I  became  the  Sultan  of  Butig,  I  did  not  allow  anybody  to 
represent me, not even my father because he does not possess this title, it is owned 
by the people. There was one time when somebody asked me to give him authority 
                                                 
273 The “three Gs” are mentioned frequently in the Philippines, referring to the general method of winning elections, 
signifying corruption, vote buying, violence to the point that the oppositional candidate will be killed, and the threat 
of violence to pressure people into writing their names on a ballot or avoid going to the polls to cast their votes 
(Madale 1996: 138). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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to represent me, being the Sultan of Butig. I answered him that cannot be done 
because of the power of the sultans of the 16 panoroganan, and the 28 and the 
four places, especially the 16 panoroganan because their word is the law in his 
jurisdiction. His power is parallel to that of the President of the Philippines. Not 
the mayor or the governor, who has to seek the approval of the regional governor 
and other higher officials. The Sultan of Butig does not need to ask the consent of 
any  ruler  in  the  eastern  part  of  Unayan.  Another  taritib  is  when  a  sultan 
(panoroganan) is going to make his speech, he does not need to seek permission 
from other people who are present in the gathering; that is the practice of our 
ancestors . . .  
To be frank, the concept of democracy has ruined our traditional system of 
leadership in the principalities of Lanao. The brothers, who were not fighting one 
another, are now fighting each other. Married couples were separated when their 
parents had different political affiliations during elections. If we can return the 
traditional power of our ancestors, the way they exercised their power, we can 
return  to  their  saying  that  their  community  was  likened  to  water  that  is  cool, 
undisturbed,  and  peaceful.  (Speech  given  in  2008,  Marawi  City,  translated  by 
Montia Jamilah D. Sarip, translation modified) 
The glorification of a past in which the sultan was the sole functional and respected leader in a 
unified  community  can  also  be  found  among  other  royalists.  They  are  trying  to  revive  the 
traditional system since they believe it to be more efficient and since they increase their own 
influence by doing so. The national  political  system is  judged as  corrupt  and without moral 
legitimacy and thus politicians are not chosen by the people, unlike the traditional datus and bais, 
who  gain  their  positions  without  corruption.  “Because  of  this  lack  the  elected  leaders  must 
continue to use money, force, and goons to carry out whatever programs they wish to purpose.” 
(Madale 1996: 141). 
Bai a Labi ko Shakba likewise connects negative attributes with the national political 
system and sees a way out of it by reviving the traditional system. According to her, politicians 
buy their positions whereas traditional titleholders are chosen by their community because of 
their  deeds,  their  character,  and  blood  line.  While  political  power  is  based  on  connections 
grounded  in  corruption  and  the  threat  of  violence,  traditional  power  is  built  on  connections 
derived from community services. Further, the bai a labi favors the traditional system because of 
its democratic elements, adding that the people accept this form of governance — as opposed to 
the national political system — since they are accustomed to it. She, however, does not mention 
that  the  sultanate  system  only  includes  Maranaos  since  it  is  based  on  descent  lines.  Non-
Maranaos are excluded from the start, leading to a strengthening of their ethnic group through the 
exclusion of outsiders, an approach that goes along well with the “no war, no peace” environment 
in which conflicts are institutionalized by cohesive groups. Bai a Labi ko Shakba explains: The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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[Because] traditionally they [royalty] function well, but with the coming in of the 
current political system it becomes just a titular . . . They are just there to wave, 
they acknowledge, but it is really the political government that runs the show . . . 
It is frustrating, because there could be a lot of things that they could probably do 
in partnership with the local government units. And it is what we will be trying to 
manage now . . .  
I like to personally believe that it is still the traditional political system that 
will work. It should be helped actually. The government should find a way to 
empower these traditional leaders rather than to suppress them. Because all the 
more that you suppress it [the traditional system] all the more the people become 
confused.  And  any  system  that  is  not,  we  call  it  tagalog  yan,  which  is  not 
accustomed to  them,  will really really find a way to  counteract  the prevailing 
system. (Interview, Iligan City, 2008) 
In order to strengthen the revival of the sultanate system the past is idealized, as can be seen in 
the following excerpt from an interview with another bai a labi: 
The  Muslims  survived  even  before  the  coming  of  the  Spaniards,  with  the 
sultanates and it was very efficient. No troubles at this time; people are very well 
disciplined. And  there  is  no  mass  poverty  during  this  time  because  the  sultan 
helped the poor. Not like at this time, the poor become poorer and the rich become 
richer. Because some of our government officials enrich themselves, they do not 
share with the people. But during the sultanate government, no problem, because 
the sultan is committed to look after the welfare of the masses . . . 
According to the old folk, during the time of the sultanate when there was 
no government, the people had been very cooperative. They helped one another; 
you cannot find somebody that is begging, because it is the responsibility of the 
datu and the bai to help. Especially when you suffer from a misfortune, there are a 
number of [titleholders] in the family so they contribute; the whole community 
contributes food, money . . . No corruption because people are willing to give. 
They believe that it is more blessing to give than to receive. So it is the opposite of 
what it is now. Everybody wants to make money for himself without considering 
the welfare of the community.  
That is why those belonging to the old are suggesting that we just return to 
the old system. Especially the ethic of the elections in our Muslim communities is 
very bad. It comes down to killing close relatives. Barangay elections, which was 
recently conducted, how many people died. Brother versus brother! There are even 
father  and  a  son  fighting  for  barangay  captain.  Cousins  and  they  killed  one 
another. This is actually here in Marawi City. And in the family, there are around 
seven people died during these elections, fighting for this really low position. So 
the spirit of loyalty and helpfulness was erased, in the minds of the people because 
they have developed this materialistic attitude. That is something that [happens] 
not only in this province but worldwide. Now leaders become corrupt. And they 
consider their own personal interest.  
Whereas  in  the  sultanate  it  is  more  on  service  to  humanity,  the  datus, 
sultans and bai a labis are happy to help. They are happy to do something for 
somebody. They are not after getting. That is the difference. That is the nature of 
it, more on giving than receiving. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The bai a labi is in opposition to the current political system and at the same time idealizes her 
own position in order to justify it. Criticized are the materialism and egocentrism of politicians as 
well as the democratic system, which is regarded as destroying family bonds by making descent 
lines and thus the support of the weak unimportant.  
Others  claim  that  traditional  leaders  are  the  ones  who  are  of  real  influence  in  the 
community and that politicians can only lead because they have the power of guns and money. 
They, however, cannot easily replace a sultan. A datu explains: 
Why not revert back to the situation that the sultanate has to lead the barangay? 
Because,  initially,  they  were  the  ones  [who  were]  influential.  Because  people 
leading the community by force of guns and money this is not really . . . That is 
something that has caused problem to the community. So if the leadership in the 
barangay  will  revert  back  to  the  sultan  meaning  that  the  sultan  will  lead  the 
barangay . . . become a leader in the barangay . . . aside of his [the politicians’] 
money he has many things to cope [with]. He is becoming rich; he has to kill 
somebody. He has to [shoot many folks] because he does not really have . . . he 
lacks many things that he has to cope [with] to be able to be [to replace the] sultan. 
(Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
The  role  of  the  traditional  leaders  in  conflict-solving  is  highlighted  as  an  argument  for  the 
recognition of the importance of the sultanate system. An NGO worker explains: 
Some traditional structures are still active. For example in settling conflicts. The 
responsibilities  of  those  bai  a  labis  [and  sultans]  had  been  corrupted  by  the 
government.  [A]  very  simple  example  is  the  barangay  structure.  There  is  the 
barangay  chairman;  he  appoints  a  body  composed  of  individuals  that  is 
responsible  to  solve  conflicts.  But  those  that  are  appointed  are  usually  [his] 
relatives who do not have any background in conflict resolution. So the people call 
the attention of the sultan when there is a conflict . . . (Interview, Marawi City, 
2008) 
Traditionalists are convinced that political positions can be more effective in a community when 
a sultan takes them, because it is also part of the maratabat of a titleholder to find an agreement 
between conflicting relatives. It is said that majority of the ridos are settled by local leaders. 
However, since authority oftentimes does not go beyond one’s own kin group, members of a 
higher-ranking descent line, sultan or not, still have to consult the elders, datus, bais, or sultans 
from a certain place. Thus, the argument that local conflicts are solved more efficiently when the 
national government or NGOs provide funding to sultanates is tenuous. In specific when one 
takes into consideration that there are more than thousand sultanates in Lanao del Sur alone. 
Hence, an alternative is to integrate the sultanate system into the governmental system, which 
was already partly done by creating the Advisory Council. Governmental funding can help to The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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solve certain ridos, especially those of the relatives of the titleholders receiving it. It, however, 
also led to the development of a second set of 16 Royal Houses and thus a split in authority and 
unity among Maranao sultanates. In addition, the 16 do not have access to each community and, 
in consequence, they still have to ask local leaders for their support. Madale (1997) explains:  
In Lanao where there are 15 sultanates, a minor sultan might exercise a more 
effective power or control over his local jurisdiction than a supposedly higher 
sultan having only a theoretical sovereignty over a larger territory. (1997: 115) 
The financial support of some sultanates and the neglect of others can increase local conflicts and 
stabilize a hierarchy that before existed only symbolically. One bai a labi, realizing that the 
government had recognized the 16 Royal Houses as an Advisory Council,
274 stated her fears that 
the money they received would stay with the 16 and only serve their communities: 
Maybe in your study, you can have a note there, regarding a leader thinking of 
helping this Maranao sultanates, it should involve all the sultanates of the area. So 
that his move to help the people will reach the people. If he will give only to the 
Panoroganans sa Maranao, this panoroganans will not care for everybody. So 
even if he will give millions, he will not care for everybody. If those millions will 
be divided into pesos, maybe everybody will be taken cared off. Going to Marawi 
City, having it sorted, who are those bai a labis and sultans of Marawi City and 
Mala a Bayabao? 
So, maybe he will be serving most of the people, not only one person of 
Mala a Bayabao. Mala a Bayabao covers Ramain Ditsaan, Marawi City, Marantao, 
Saguierang, Bubung, Tapai. And under one Pagawidan sa Ranao. So why only 
Ramain [the Sultan sa Ramain is one of the 16], that is only one municipality! 
(Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
The interview shows that there is jealousy among the sultanates and that the single sultanates are 
divided  regarding  material  prospects.  Financial  support  of  local  sultanates,  however,  is  not 
sufficient in solving ridos, in particular in a “no war, no peace” environment where ridos are 
triggered by elections and the proliferation of arms. Leaving these concerns aside, the traditional 
system is useful in solving ridos, the more so when the leaders have sufficient financial support 
in doing so. A one-sided distribution of financial resources, however, can lead to an increase of 
conflicts  and  the  stabilization  of  a  hierarchical  and  patriarchal  structure  that  was  previously 
largely symbolic. Regarding the Advisory Council in particular, only the leading sultans of the 16 
Royal Houses are financially and by position supported; women and minor sultanates are not 
included in the council. Further, it has to be considered that the approaches of governmental 
functionaries  and members of the sultanates  may  be different.  Royalty  have the tendency to 
                                                 
274 Generally, the 16 did not spread this knowledge and my interview partners were rather surprised by it.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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revive what they imagine to have been their system before colonization, in order to solve local 
conflicts and disharmony and to find a way out of the “no war, no peace” environment. This 
includes  the  strengthening  of  a  cohesive  ethnic  group  with  no  entry  for  foreigners  into  the 
leadership  hierarchy  except  through  intermarriage,  a  tendency  that  carries  the  potential  to 
exacerbate  the  national  conflict  when  not  properly  included  in  national  state  structures.  The 
governmental approach is rather a divide-and- rule policy by strengthening those groups that are 
willing to cooperate in lieu of the groups demanding increased autonomy or independence in 
order to solve the national conflict. This policy may also lead to the strengthening of a new 
oppositional group. 
Conclusion 
Although the 16 Royal Houses refer to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei as examples of 
how the government of the Philippines should support the sultanates, the developments in these 
neighboring  countries  cannot  serve  as  a  blueprint  for  the  revival  in  Lanao.  Rather,  these 
movements have to be judged within their own context. In Indonesia, for example,
275 the revival 
of the sultanates was described as a development of decentralization after the Suharto regime, as 
part of the political opposition (Klinken 2007), and as a form of reconciliation after the civil war 
between Christians and Muslims (Br￤uchler 2007). In Lanao, it should be predominantly defined 
as a consequence of a governmental attempt to integrate local structures in order to enforce 
central  authority  in  lieu  of  undermining  demands  for  stronger   autonomy  or  independence. 
However, it has also other causes. 
The  sultanate  system  has  experienced  a  revival  since  the  1980s  as  a  consequence  of 
several developments, mainly connected to the rebellion. The growth of the national Bangsamoro 
movement, especially in Lanao, is connected to the perception that the sultanate system is an 
expression of local Muslim identity. The revival can also be seen as part of an international 
movement since the 1990s supporting traditional structures in order to solve small-scale conflicts, 
especially on the grassroots level (Henley and Davidson 2007; Klute 2004). That the traditional 
system is useful in settling conflicts can be shown through the help of the datu system and the 
interventions of other intermediaries (RIDO). The interference of foreign donors or governmental 
                                                 
275 Indonesia is taken as an example because it has been host to an elaborate debate on the recent phenomena of re-
traditionalization.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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agents, however, can create jealousy among sultanates as well as schisms and a change in the 
hierarchy.  
The sultanate system is a self-sustaining structure beyond the state, looking for further 
obligations and authority. How it develops further will depend on future political decisions, of 
which  the  question  of  women  is  only  one  part.  So  far,  the  government  has  not  officially 
recognized  the  function  of  the  bai  a  labi.  Through  the  financial  support  of  primarily  male 
representatives of the 16 Royal Houses, the role of the sultan is strengthened but that of the bai a 
labi neglected. On the contrary, on the grassroots level, influenced through international NGOs, 
all clan members — male and female — are included in the decision-making and reorganization 
of the clan and sultanate, which remains a non-governmental structure. In the next chapter, I 
discuss the extent to which local women’s power and empowerment are based on traditional laws 
in the general framework of the “no war, no peace” environment, modern state politics, and 
Islamic influences.  
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Chapter  Three:  Between  Re-traditionalization  and  Islamic 
Resurgence: Gender Debates in a “No War, No Peace” Environment 
Introduction  
  The re-traditionalization movement that has taken place in Lanao del Sur through political 
agents has not included the empowerment of women, since hierarchical structures are nurtured 
instead of developing the potential to strengthen women’s participation in decision-making in 
general.  Further,  royal  women  complain  about  the  decline  of  traditional  women’s  rights, 
specifically in terms of the lack of respect for women in contemporary times. In pre-colonial 
times, female royalty were held in high esteem, but today they are more easily taken for granted.  
Traditional views and positions of women were partly replaced by national gender norms, 
above all concerning education and employment. Equal access to education for both sexes was 
provided and co-education was introduced in Lanao, whereas employment in well-paying and 
prestigious positions remained dominated by men (Eviota 1992). Certainly, the Muslim rebellion 
had effects on gender norms. Acting as an agent of change, the movement allowed Moro women 
to  develop  their  leadership  qualities  and  political  activism  (Angeles  1998).  The  Islamic 
resurgence movement finally partly strengthened conservative norms on female dress and public 
appearance but also provided well-defined public spaces for women, for example as madrasah 
teachers.  
Islamic narratives of justification assume critical importance in the “no war, no peace” 
environment since they are linked to the question of self-determination. Gender thus became a 
political issue connected to nationalism (Moghadam 1994). After the Maguindanao massacre on 
November  23,  2009  (see  chapter  one),  a  member  of  the  Philippine  Council  for  Islam  and 
Democracy (PCID) mentioned two great challenges for the ARMM LGUs at the nomination 
celebration of Nariman “Ina” Ambolodto as Maguindanao acting governor. The first one was to 
strengthen the Islamic moral code and the institutions to support it (against which the culprits of 
the massacre had acted), and the second was to show to the “West” that Mindanao has strong 
Muslim  women leaders who are empowered (in order to  show that  Islam  provides women’s 
rights, this being demonstrated by the nomination of a female acting governor) (Gutoc 2010). 
Seen by many as one of the young Maranao women leaders, Samira Gutoc-Tomawis notes that 
women’s  leadership  is  also  tested  from  inside  the  society,  despite  not  only  Islamic  but  also 
cultural norms which protect women. She thus sees the challenge to female leadership not only as The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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a false Western perception of Islam but also as corresponding to social reality which is not always 
in accordance with certain religious or cultural norms. The massacre and the connected debate 
demonstrate the tensions between norm and practice that women are confronted with in a “no 
war, no peace” environment in the Philippines.  
Both Islamization and re-traditionalization movements use Islamic narratives. One can 
find conservatives applying them to reduce the public space for women, as well as traditional 
elites who refer to them in order to justify female public participation in politics. Since the 1990s, 
new protagonists have also been participating in the power struggle for the definition of Islam. 
Islamic feminists specifically cite the Qur’an as the source of women’s rights while non-Muslim 
civil funding organizations provide space for Islamic definitions. In this chapter, different fields 
of female power are examined by setting them in relation to traditional and Islamic influences, 
with a special focus on counterhegemonic movements (Ong and Peletz 1995: 4). These can be 
detected  in  traditional  conceptions  and  in  the  framework  of  religion  being  shaped  through 
Muslim women’s movements and in particular Islamic feminism. Because of the “no war, no 
peace”  environment,  Islamic  narratives  of  justification  are  of  crucial  importance,  making  an 
argument for women’s rights in the Islamic framework more or less an obligation for women’s 
activists. In addition, the ongoing political re-traditionalization, a movement which is Muslim but 
syncretistic, taking the form of a revival of the ancient sultanates and the fortification of the 
traditional datu system, uses this angle and does not refer to adat laws. For a theoretical debate 
on feminism, this means that religious or post-secular movements (Braidotti 2008) have to be 
taken into consideration as a possible source of female agency (to be understood as the ability to 
empower a person).  
I. Traditional Spaces of Power 
A. Symbolic Equality and Male Hegemony: The Multifocality of Power 
  Gender debates on Southeast Asia often highlight a relatively high status of women in this 
region for various reasons. Karim (1995) points out that a researcher has to consider that, in 
opposition to “Western” gender concepts, those used in Southeast Asia are derived from 
the need to maintain social relationships through rules of complementarity and 
similarity rather than hierarchy and opposition, and the need to reduce imbalance 
in power through mutual responsibility and cooperation rather than oppression and 
force. (p. 16)  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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It is thus not surprising that in the Pat a Pangampong, a complementarity of male and female 
royal titles can be found, establishing a form of symbolic gender equality or parallelism as the 
following pictures demonstrate. The first one shows an enthronement ceremony at the Sultanate 
of Patani in Lanao del Sur. Seven men and seven women were enthroned at the same time (in the 
picture one woman is missing). As the second picture indicates, male and female titles correspond 
to each other; thus there is a Sultan a Pithi-ilan sa Patani and a Bai a Pithi-ilan sa Patani, and so 
on  and  so  forth.  The  pictures  raise  the  question  of  symbolic  equality. Apart  from  the  equal 
number of enthronements of men and women and the counterparts in male and female titles, it 
has  to  be  noticed  that  the  Sultan  a  Pithi-ilan  sa  Patani  is  seated  as  the  only  person  on  an 
outstanding chair referring to a superordinate position. 
 
 
Picture 17: Enthronement Ceremony, Sultanate of Patani, Lanao del Sur, Datus and Bais 
The sultanate enthrones seven men and seven women at the same time. In the picture, one woman is missing. Seating 
order from left to right: Sultan a Romapunut, Datu sa Patani, Sultan a Dimasangkay, Sultan a Samporna, Sultan a 
Cabugatan, Radia Moda, Sultan a Pithi-ilan sa Patani, Bai a Pithi-ilan sa Patani, Poona Bai, Bai a Cabugatan, Bai a 
Samporna, Bai a Dimasangkay, Bai a Patani, Bai a Romapunut. Photo taken by the author, 2008. 
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Picture 18: Sultan a Pithi-ilan sa Patani 
Photo taken by the author, 2008. 
 
 
Picture 19: Streamers Showing Counterpart-Titles of Men and Women in the Sultanate of Patani 
Photo taken by the author, 2008.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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One  can  ask  how  far  the  detected  symbolic  equality  in  Lanao  del  Sur  is  a  hint  of 
egalitarian structures, which are frequently referred to in studies of other ethnic groups in the 
Philippines (Burton 2004;
276 Hofmann 1997; Lauser 1997). Among other things, it has to be 
considered that parallel gender structures cannot easily be  reconciled with an egalitarian society 
in which both genders are equally powerful in their respective fields. One can only speak of a 
certain form of equality  when parallel structures are not hierarchical but complementary (see , 
e.g., Schröter 1997). 
The  cross-cultural  existence  of  gender  egalitarian  societies  was  most  prominently 
proposed by Eleanor Leacock (1981), who suggested that researchers so far have tended to follow 
the “myth” of male dominance in order to “take the universalist position”, thereby ignoring the 
existence of culturally-defined egalitarian societies (Ortner 1996: 142). Ilse Lenz (1990), in her 
research on power and gender in non-patriarchal societies, follows this argumentation but adopts 
a more nuanced definition of what egalitarian relationships are. She highlights the approach used 
by Leacock of multifocal qualities of power
277 instead of  the unilinear definition  of Weber.
278 
Based on this presumption, she defines various spaces or fields of power (Machtfelder) which can 
autonomously be regulated, controlled, and decided on by people of both genders. This can create 
a balance between relations of the sexes
279 on the whole when there is no hierarchical order of the 
fields  but complementary sources  that  are used as the basis for negotiating the social order 
(Röschenthaler 1997: 284). The balance between female economic and male political autonomy 
among  the  matrilineal  Hopi,  as  well  as  the  domestic  authority  of  the  woman  and  the 
                                                 
276 Burton specifically detects egalitarian structures among the Mamnua, who were initially nomadic hunters and 
gatherers in the northeast of Mindanao (2004: 190). Among neighboring agricultural groups (the Higaonon, the Bla-
an, and the Manobo), the man was the main decision-maker of the group. With the introduction of shifting cultivation 
from the neighboring Manobo, which provided men with greater control over production and distribution of goods as 
well as the datu-ship system, the Mamanua egalitarian gender structures were diminished. Among those groups, 
however which changed from shifting cultivation to cash crop economies, the relative power of the woman has 
increased since women take part in the production and do the selling of the products. The shared responsibilities with 
the men in contributing to the subsistence of the family in consequence give women more influence in decision-
making processes. 
277 Power in this context is defined as the influence, based on resources or skills, that a person can achieve in social 
relationships (Lenz 1997: 232). 
278 Weber (1980) defines power as any chance within a social relationship to assert one’s own will against resistance 
(p. 28). 
279 “I understand gender-symmetrical societies as a wide-ranging circle of groups with a balance between the sexes. 
This balance is the result of a symmetry of fields of power available to men and women: central fields of power are 
production, human reproduction, sexuality and the body, political processes, and the symbolic order of a society.” 
(“Unter geschlechtssymmetrischen Gesellschaften verstehe ich den breitgef￤cherten Kreis der Gruppen mit einer 
Balance zwischen den Geschlechtern. Diese ergibt sich aus einer Symmetrie der Machtfelder in der Verfügung von 
M￤nnern und Frauen: Zentrale Machtfelder sind Produktion, die menschliche Reproduktion, Sexualit￤t und Körper, 
politische Prozesse und die symbolische Ordnung einer Gesellschaft.”) (Luig 1990: 282) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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representation  of  the  matrilineage  in  public  through  the  man  among  the  Minangkabau  in 
Indonesia are taken as examples for such gender symmetry. The specific trait in these examples is 
that the spaces are not entirely gender-segregated. Instead, there is exchange, minor participation, 
and reference to the other sex (Lenz 1997: 233, 1995, 1995a; Metje 1997: 284; Schlegel 1997). 
Lenz  (1990)  argues  against  the  notion  of  egalitarian  societies,  since  in  using  it  the 
differences between men and women are not sufficiently pronounced. She instead suggests using 
the  notion  of  gender-symmetrical  societies  (Geschlechtssymmetrische  Gesellschaften).  This 
analytical tool serves to describe gender equality and differences of gender identity (Lenz 1995: 
56; 60). Ortner (1996) argues more vehemently against the egalitarian approach supported by 
Leacock and Rogers (1975). Concerning the mythical dominance of men referred to by Rogers, 
the  idea  that  male  dominance  is  only  mythically  constructed  but  that  in  reality  women  are 
powerful in society, she writes that when such an asymmetry of the sexes in favor of men is 
culturally accepted — even if it is only “mythical” — the society is still dominated by men. 
Women can have more and men lesser power than is mythically constructed but this does not 
mean that there is a balance of power and prestige between the sexes in general (for instance, the 
woman may have the power or the resources and the man the public prestige). Nevertheless, 
Ortner admits that she and Whitehead in their publication Sexual Meanings (1981), in which a 
worldwide male dominance is discussed, ignored or at least misread cases like those presented by 
Leacock (1996) “because they [the cases] fail to see that these societies are put together on quite 
different (‘egalitarian’) principles” (p. 142). Ortner (1996) accepts the problem of the existence of 
different forms of power and prestige in which women can become as powerful or prestigious as 
men or more so, thus questioning the theory of a general male dominance (quoted in Collier and 
Rosaldo 1981). She, however, does not start her argumentation on the supposition of equal or 
non-patriarchal  societies  in  order  to  explain  certain  symmetrical  phenomena.  Instead,  she 
suggests an approach using the concept of hegemony in Gramsci and Raymond Williams (1977). 
She proposes that in every society there is a hegemony of certain orders of prestige. This does not 
mean that they prevail in every respect: 
I have found that viewing prestige orders as hegemonies — that is, as culturally 
dominant and relatively deeply embedded but nonetheless historically emergent, 
politically  constructed,  and  nontotalistic  —  is  analytically  quite  liberating.  It 
means that all the pieces of a given ethnographic instance do not have either to fit 
together through heroic analytic efforts or to be explained away. The loose ends, 
the contradictory bits, the disconnected sections can be examined for their short- 
and long-term interactions with and implications for one another. This does not The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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mean that everything has equal analytic weight and plays the same sort of role in 
the overall dynamic. There is  an ordering  — a “hegemony” in  the sense of a 
relative dominance of some meanings and practices over others. (1996:147) 
This approach allows space for symmetrical as well as hierarchical male-female power relations 
in their historically, politically, and culturally constructed character; however, a general male 
hegemony is still regarded as predominant. Lenz (1997) instead departs from studies on non-
patriarchal gender relations, taking a multi-focality of power as a basis, and highlighting non-
hierarchical cooperative and complementary power relations between the sexes. She defines four 
fields of power in which women in non-patriarchal societies in most cases have strong positions: 
(1) Production: women have access to material resources, land and the products of their labor. 
(2) Reproduction: women as well as men can decide about relationships, which can easily be 
created or dissolved by both sides, and women also have a say in the number of children they 
want. (3) Sexuality and the body: women as well as men have autonomy concerning their body 
and sexuality; for example, pre-marital sexual relationships for both sexes are not a problem. 
(4) Symbolic order: shown in rituals, religion, or language in which women have an influential 
position. In  an article about the Minangkabau, Lenz (1995a) adds political participation as a 
possible source of balanced power.  In  Lanao del  Sur, according to  this  approach, influential 
positions of women can be found in the first and last two fields. Traditionally, women have the 
right to inherit equally with their male siblings and they can possess land and can keep the 
income from their labor. The equal inheritance law, however, was challenged by the Code of 
Muslim Personal Laws (CMPL) of the Philippines adopted in 1977, and female labor is often-
times not recognized as much as male labor. 
Regarding point #4 (the symbolic order), the traditional realm provides several influential 
roles for women like healers, witches, and being acquainted with black and white magic. Spirits 
and ancestors, who are believed to influence the daily life of the people, can be male or female. In 
folk tales like the Darangen, women have powerful positions as queens. Within a conservative 
Islamic framework, however, women are ideally secluded from the public. Islamic resurgence 
strengthens these purdah rules. At the same time, it also provides additional religious spaces for 
women, especially as teachers in madaris or in the form of women-only seminars, giving them 
the opportunity to develop and profess their religious expertise. Regarding political participation, 
specific female elders and titleholders have to be mentioned, having the right to take part in 
community discussions as representatives of their lineage. Women also have royal titles that are The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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the counterparts to male titles, while the public representation of the lineage usually rests with the 
sultan. Additional  fields  of  female  power  can  be  added  like  the  bilateral  (cognatic)  kinship 
system. Although to inherit a title one has to have ancestors from both lineages, more weight is 
given to the male lineage. In the other fields mentioned by Lenz, including the control of the 
body, a dominance of male elders can be found in Lanao del Sur, in many cases strengthened by 
conservative traditional and religious demands. One can conclude that mythical or real male-
dominance in Lanao del Sur is not a comprehensive structure and that certain spaces of power 
provide  women  with  a  separate  source  of  influence  in  society.  Re-traditionalization  and  re-
Islamization are of interest in this context, as well as the question of how far both movements 
offer  the  potential  to  enlarge,  restrict,  or  add  new  fields  of  power  for  women.  Whereas 
traditionalists emphasize the positive characteristics of adat laws regarding women, Islamists as 
well as Islamic feminists argue that they rest on an incorrect interpretation of Islam, highlighting 
its negative impact on women. In the following section, I consider the potential of adat laws to 
empower women, stressing that they empower not all women but favor those who come from 
illustrious family backgrounds, thus nurturing hierarchical structures.  
B. Traditional Fields of Power and their Hierarchical and Moral Character 
Elders, especially titleholders and their representatives, have the potential to resolve ridos 
in  their  area.  Solving  conflicts  involves  several  people.  The  women’s  role  is  nevertheless 
recognized as  particularly  useful in  negotiations. One reason  is  that they  can cross the lines 
between the parties without being attacked since women are honored and are not supposed to be 
the direct victims of retaliation (Gonzales 2000: 92). A male negotiator might be suspected and 
killed by the other side, but “the chance of a female kin being harmed in a dispute is remote. 
Therefore, women often make good negotiators” (Doro 2007: 219). Thus, a sultan or datu might 
send  his  wife  or  another  woman  of  influence  to  represent  him  when  needed.  A  female 
representative  could  also  be  involved  in  order  to  prevent  others  from  spoiling  the  sultan’s 
maratabat by refusing his request. They can reject his proposal when his female representative 
brings it, but they can “still count on the assistance of their male kin [the sultan] despite his 
displeasure” (ibid.). Further, a man does not lose his maratabat if he satisfies the request of a 
woman since there is a paramount demand to honor a woman. Correct behavior regarding women 
is mentioned in the taritib and thus becomes a matter of maratabat. Disrespect for a woman can The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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lead to an outbreak of a rido. A rido that breaks out because of a woman can become very violent 
and serious since to violate the honor of a woman is a great insult. 
  Several legal tools exist to solve conflicts. The taritib and igma are used on an agama 
level.  Religious  laws  are  partly  mixed  with  these  regulations  and  some  datus  say  that  it  is 
advisable that a mediator be knowledgeable about them or engage an alim for advice. Sharia laws 
concerning family and civil law are also executed in  sharia courts, but these are not visited 
frequently.
280 In Marawi City from 1995 to 2002, 211 cases were brought to the sharia court, the 
vast majority concerning divorce (60) and questions of support for children and/or a wife after 
divorce (83). Women filed all of these cases without exception, while more were dismissed than 
decided. One reason for the high percentage of dismissals is the lack of personnel and equipment 
at the courts (Solamo-Antonio 2003: 19, 28, 48-52). Recourse to the national law is applied when 
the offense is brought to the court, which is seldom the case. Sumaguina  (2000) writes that 
indigenous  institutions  among  Maranaos  exercise  a  high  degree  of  authority  because  the 
“indigenous methods of dispute settlement are in harmony with Islamic beliefs and values as well 
as within the Maranao indigenous beliefs and values.” Furthermore, manipulation of decisions 
“in favor of the rich, powerful and the relatives of the datus and political power holders” is seen 
as immanent in the legal system, which in addition is seen as too expensive. The proceedings 
remain “more likely to be understood only by the lawyers” (pp. 215). As a Maranao NGO worker 
states, there is a preference for the indigenous system:  
Most Maranaos do not submit their rido case to the Philippine court because it is a 
shame on their dignity that they cannot punish the killer with their own hands. 
Many  of  the  family  victims  had  bad  experiences  in  submitting  conflicts  for 
resolution in the Philippine court. They knew that without much funds they could 
not avail justice. Appeal to the Philippine court is only done to imprison the killer 
or offender but rido does not end because once the killer or offender is released 
from  the  prison,  he  could  still  be  killed  or  retaliated  by  the  other  party.  The 
possibility of retaliation is still at hand because of maratabat. (Atar 2007: 9) 
National  courts,  however,  including  sharia  courts,  may  be  consulted  in  case  “the  traditional 
settlement of disputes gets rejected or fails to make decisions on conflicts and disputes. The legal 
settlement of disputes is backed up by coercive legitimate power to make an outright decision or 
action on disputes that tend to be unmanageable by the traditional authorities” (Sumaguina 2000: 
216).  
                                                 
280 The sharia courts are responsible for the enforcement of the Code of Muslim Personal Law of the Philippines 
which was established under Marcos in 1977. The MILF labels these courts “fake Islamic Courts” (McKenna 1990: 
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When the traditional system is applied, people of influence and power are important in 
order to settle a rido. Besides local datus and royalty, members of the (Christian) military as well 
as the MILF help to resolve conflicts (Abreu 2002). The involvement of these two groups in local 
conflict negotiation depends on personal interests; for example, one might wish to win back 
maratabat against a strong datu with the help of armed forces.  
Conflicts seen as “family affairs” are resolved via kokoman a kambhatabata’a (the law of 
kinsmen), which means that minimal punishments are applied to the guilty party and that a few 
rituals and ceremonies conclude a settlement (Sumaguina 2000: 219). Serious conflicts known as 
rido-or-sesalakawa-a-tawo a miakaolika (which occur between Maranaos who are not directly 
related) usually involve mediators who are neutral relatives,
281 that is, a person who is related by 
blood or affinity to both parties. Mediators can also be influential relatives of the offended party 
(Bula 2000: 28). A mediator, in any case, has to have personal qualities  that are above average. 
These may be material wealth; traditional authority as a datu, bai, or sultan; political power as a 
military  officer  or  rebel  commander,  or  professional  or  religious  power  as  an  imam  or  alim 
(Sumaguina  2000:  217).  The  mediator  first  gathers  information  about  the  case;  then  gets  a 
commitment to the resolution (kitakhesen ko makambabala) from the conflicting parties, to insure 
that they do not retaliate during or after the mediation. During the negotiations, the mediator uses 
different  strategies:  pleading  (kapedi-pedi  na  kalimo-limo),  reminiscing 
(kapananadem/kapangangaloy),  threatening  (kapangangalek/  kapangalap),  or  imposing  of 
wisdom (kitegelen ko lalag). When the parties are convinced, he asks for a waiting period (taalik) 
until the resolution ceremony (kaphasada ko rido). That ceremony takes place at the house of the 
offended family or any other defined place. After the ritual speeches, both parties swear on the 
Qur’an to end the conflict and be brothers. A kandori (thanksgiving celebration) concludes the 
ceremony. In case the parties do not arrive at a compromise, the mediator withdraws and the 
conflict can break out again. As a consequence, there may be a search for a new mediator (Atar 
2007: 11).  
A mediator should have a high descent line status. For a female mediator or negotiator, it 
helps if she has already achieved a leading position in the clan or family. The main criteria for 
choosing  a  mediator  are  “socio-economic  status,  power/position  in  the  government, 
communication skill, and relation to one or both parties in conflict” (ibid.: 10). In addition, one is 
required to have mastered special skills, which are learned through socialization. Knowledge of 
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kambilang atao (decorum) is needed, which requires the mediator to observe strict impartiality 
and to choose an approach that will not to offend one side. The mediator should have a working 
knowledge of taritib, igma, and Islamic law. All sides should recognize him or her as mapia a tao 
(a good person), whose proven honesty and trustworthiness are known by the community. Cases 
are thus settled on the basis of kinship relations, which are stressed, and social contacts that are 
utilized. The descent line status is also important, because it provides the negotiator with the 
needed respect. This is joined by the influence of the person and family the mediator represents, 
which brings with it fear of and respect for the mediator. A mediator should be able to acquire the 
needed money to solve the conflict; he or she might even contribute his or her own money. Only 
selected men and women are able to master all these demands. A datu comments: 
Commoners cannot mediate in a Maranao conflict. Therefore, any decision to be 
arrived must be through a collective effort of the sultanates, datus and bais, in 
accordance with the provisions of the traditional laws and Islamic remedies like 
damm or diat, blood money in cases where murders are involved, or sala, penalty, 
when it involves transgressions, personal insults that led to physical injury, car 
accidents, etc. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
This quote underlines the importance of descent line status and hierarchy when a conflict is 
resolved in the traditional framework. Only members of the elite can be mediators. Tago (2003) 
states that in case of a rido “only male members of the clan are consulted” (p. 51) but several 
other  studies  show  that  women  are  also  involved;  an  idea  reinforced  by  the  roles  strong 
traditional female leaders play as mediators, like Tarhata Alonto Lucman. As a member of the 
influential Alonto/Alangadi/Adiong  family,  she  negotiated  and  mediated  several  ridos.  I  will 
discuss  two  of  them.  In  an  interview,  she  recalled,  together  with  her  son,  Norodin Alonto 
Lucman, an incident that happened in the 1960s, before her term of office as Lanao del Sur 
governor: 
A case of a persistent and violent clan war in Tugaya resulted in more than 30 
deaths. Governor Madki Alonto and Senator “Domocao” Alonto had a hard time 
pacifying the clan war. Congressman Rashid Lucman also expressed frustration in 
resolving it so he called on his wife Princess Tarhata Alonto Lucman to try and 
resolve it. After several weeks of mediation, the resolution of the clan war was 
narrowed down to one datu who was indignant and stood his ground as against the 
resolution of the case. Many families of Tugaya were frustrated with  his non-
conformist attitude.  
One day, Princess Tarhata went to the house of the datu and asked him for a 
private one-on-one conference inside a room. The datu agreed and entered the 
room  for  a  private  conference.  Princess  Tarhata,  escorted  by  aides  and  datus, 
closed the door behind her and pounced on the recalcitrant datu. She beat up the 
datu with a whip whereupon the datu cannot fight back because under Maranao The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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traditional law, it is forbidden to fight a woman, least of all a princess. The datu 
agreed to the resolution of the case because his maratabat was erased because of a 
woman’s intercession.  
Taritib and igma protocol always assert paramount respect to female gender 
as a sign of good leadership and understanding embodied in the Qur’an. The man 
did not lose his face in front of other people because the beating took place in 
private. The people outside thought that Princess Tarhata was able to persuade the 
datu  peacefully  to  agree  on  the  resolution  of  the  case.  Nobody  saw  Princess 
Tarhata Alonto Lucman actually beating him up. (Written abstract of the original 
Interview by Norodin Alonto Lucman, Manila, 2008. For the original interview, 
see Brecht [forthcoming]) 
In this case, a woman could batter a man in order to enforce a settlement of a rido. The man did 
not hit her back since she was a respected woman from a powerful family and he would have 
spoiled the maratabat of the family of Tarhata Alonto Lucman, resulting in another conflict. 
Instead, he could give in to her since he would not lose his maratabat by giving in to a woman. 
The incident was not made public to save the face of the participants. Even though traditional 
laws can be protective and empowering to Maranao women, the incident described remains a 
rather specific one. It could only be repeated by a woman having the same highly respected and 
influential family background, the same guts to beat up a man, and the same ability to rely on 
taritib and igma.  
According to  the taritib  and igma, men are not allowed to  touch or raise  their voice 
against a woman since either would spoil her maratabat and provoke a strong reaction of her 
whole clan against him. If a husband is not satisfied with his wife, instead of talking to her 
directly, he can talk to her close relatives or the datu of the community (Disoma 1999: 45). A 
complaint  against  a  man  accused  of  mischief  can  begin  an  investigation  and  lead  to  strong 
measures.
282 If a woman is beaten by her husband, she can complain on the basis of  the taritib 
and igma and the imam prescribes the penalties after an exhaustive investigation, which is made 
public to avoid a confrontation of the families. Since clans do not tolerate any humiliation of a 
female clan member, the death penalty is theoretically applied in cases of beating a woman. Local 
Muslim women’s organizations like Al-Mujadilah, however, estimate that actually no one would 
report battering because of the “stigma attached to being the wife-mother of a broken home, 
belief that women are supposed to be subservient to their husbands, lack of sensitivity of the 
authorities for victims, lack of support mechanisms and facilities for victims” (Anayatin et al. 
                                                 
282 The man is asked to marry the woman when she is single or at least to pay a fine if he refuses. During the 
reconciliation, he and his kin have to dress in white, holding a rope as a sign that they may get tied up and pleading 
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2003: 70). Some women do not report domestic violence because they might feel ashamed
283 or 
fear an outbreak of a rido. Sometimes, domestic spite turns into a clan war because the family of 
the husband considers the accusation of the woman as false and insulting. 
  Cases of women battering men, however, are talked about more openly by women, as the 
case of Tarhata Alonto Lucman shows. Other women also mentioned such cases, referring to 
traditional laws that protect the dignity of a woman, who cannot be touched if one does not want 
to provoke a rido. The problem of violence against women is thus traced back by one young 
royal Maranao woman leader to the decline of the taritib and igma and the fact that women of 
today  do  not  know  about  their  traditional  rights  and  not,  as  some  NGOs  are  claiming,  to  a 
traditional conception of shame, which hinders women from complaining: 
You cannot even raise your voice against a woman. You cannot even inflict some 
physical . . . Also, there might be some physical violence against women . . . Rido, 
the whole clan will go against you. But it is not women battering but husband 
battering in the area. I do not know . . . how they understand it from the outside. . . 
I am not battering my husband! But if the Muslim women, if they only knew it 
they would have a greater voice in their home and in their society. (Interview, 
Iligan City, 2007) 
  It is debatable to what extent the decline of the taritib and igma are responsible for the 
mistreatment of women. The issue of shame, which is also based on and nurtured by traditional 
and  Islamic  conceptions,  is  completely  neglected  in  this  argument.  It  is  important  to  note, 
nonetheless,  that  royal  women  believe  in  their  empowerment  through  traditional  laws. 
Traditionalists, however, complain that the influence of women based on the taritib and igma has 
lessened. It is said that in former times, a woman had just to show her panta (wig of long hair) to 
stop  a clan conflict  and that the men had to  be quiet and listen to  the woman. Today, their 
appearance is not enough to stop a clan conflict immediately. When Tarhata Alonto Lucman was 
asked if other Maranao women were involved in mediations, she answered that most of them 
today are scared to be, which was explained by the increasing existence of loose firearms since 
the rebellion, the decline of the sultanate, and the fact that people do not trust the army or the 
police to enforce the law. Martial law and the resulting proliferation of arms and questioning of 
the social hierarchy by younger community members in connection to the rebellion made it more 
difficult for traditional datus. Indeed, other members of the community might define ridos as a 
“method of oppression against them” and now have the means to defend themselves (Sumaguina 
2000:  221).  In  fact,  it  is  questionable  whether  women  ever  had  immense  influence  in  the 
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traditional system just because of their gender or whether this is only a privilege of the very few 
with  favored  positions  like  Tarhata  Alonto  Lucman.  Muslim  feminist  organizations  regard 
traditional conceptions as actually being a hindrance to women’s empowerment. They take into 
consideration how far the traditional rights of a woman are bound to status and lineage and the 
good will of the family to defend her, thus making the application of sanctions rather a family 
than a general matter, and one which can be hindered by moral conceptions such as shame.  
Descent line status plays an important role regarding the influence of a woman. This 
counts also for women who mediate in conflicts. Usually, women claim authority by referring to 
their descent and the position of a close male relative. In a bilateral lineage system, the power of 
a close male ancestor is shared by the female descendant who can represent him. Tarhata Alonto 
Lucman and her son related another incident: 
Norodin Alonto Lucman: She also pacified a rido in Tugaya. When she was a child, this 
rido was already raging.  
Tarhata Alonto Lucman: This was before I became a governor. 
NAL: She talked to both sides. 
TAL: Luckily, I am the daughter of my father. So I have the privilege to represent . . .  
NAL: The  privilege  is  that  she  is  the  daughter  of  the  Sultan  sa  Ramain  who  is  well 
respected  in  the  area.  So  both  sides  actually  recognized  her  intervention  as 
mediator in the conflict. So they were apparently receptive to her role to play for 
the rido to be pacified. She talked to the ordinary people and the important people, 
she explained to them the evil behind family wars and ridos, and she used her own 
money to pacify them. She talked to Datu Pacalna, one of the clans in Tugaya, and 
also to Pukunum, who is a rival of Pacalna. In fact they were killing each other; I 
think more than 30 people were killed in the 1960s because of this political rivalry 
. . . Here is the makeup of the families: Pacalna is the uncle of Sultan Rashid 
Lucman, of course she [Tarhata Alonto Lucman] is married to Rashid Lucman. 
And Pukunum is married to her niece from Ramain. That is why you could pacify 
because there are connections, blood connections and by affinity. How did she 
pacify it? She gave thanksgiving to the other side, kandori (food offering) to both 
sides.  
TAL: I can go freely to both sides. 
NAL: After so many days of going back and forth . . . she was able to bridge the gap 
between the two sides, because of this physical effort, persuasion and mediation 
and she was backed up by the people of Tugaya . . . she was able to bridge the gap 
between the Pacalna clan and the Pukunum  clan . . .  through  salsila, through 
common relatives. Through the recognition of the Sultanate of Ramain . . . The 
people gave diat, blood money . . . all through those years when the clan war was 
raging people could not go out of their houses, could not have normal lives. So 
when  she  came  to  pacify  the  rido  the  people  themselves,  other  clans  actually 
donated money to pacify them . . . Even though they were not really involved in 
the rido . . . The money involved had been more than PHP 300,000 . . . She 
divided  that  money  into  two,  one  part  for  the  Pacalna  clan  and  one  for  the The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Pukunum clan. And if I may add, after the resolution of the case, she also arranged 
marriages between the two clans to cement it. So now the kids are very big there is 
no rido after that. (Interview, Manila, 2008) 
As the case of Tarhata  shows, being related to  the conflicting parties  (by consanguinity and 
marriage) is a major condition, since trust, respect, and status are drawn from kinship relations. 
She is linked to the same royal houses as the protagonists (Ramain and Bayang) and thus, by 
birth and marriage, in a good position to be respected as a mediator. Coming from a high lineage 
and influential family, she was in a key position to pacify ridos among her relatives.  
  The daughter of Tarhata learned her mother’s techniques and settled a rido in the 1990s. 
When Normallah Alonto Lucman was the Lanao del Sur vice-governor (1995-1998), she was 
asked  to  resolve  a  conflict  and,  like  her  mother,  mediated  by  relying  on  the  respect  of  her 
relatives in Bayang towards her father, a descendant of the Sultan sa Bayang, and his family as 
leaders of the place: 
My first New Year as vice-governor. We planned a big party [in Marawi] so I 
invited  my  friends.  And  there  was  this  call  from  the  other  side  of  the  lake 
[Bayang], from my hometown. That there was fighting. And I told them to call the 
police. So they would stop the fighting. But even the police was not around. I 
talked to the leaders. So they told me, Vice-Governor, if you do not want your 
relatives to die you have to come over and stop them. So I had to go, because I do 
not want them to die. Especially not in my father’s hometown. So we took the 
very, very small banka [canoe]. All women. So I went to the other side. I talked to 
the negotiator. Then they did not want to stop fighting. And I told them that I go to 
the other side, and I led my cousins to the other side… Eventually I was able to… 
It took us how many hours? We were there 4 o’clock, until 10 pm I heard the 
fighting. Until I had to make, you know, drama. I told them on the radio:  
I have to leave, because you are not listening to me. It is very painful to 
realize, because my father is not around, that you do not have respect to me. You 
have completely forgotten my father. So I am leaving because I am [not being] 
heard. 
 Suddenly the fighting was gone. And they told me over the radio: Vice- 
Governor, Vice-Governor, please stay! We will go down and negotiate; you got 
your wish. Ceasefire for seven days. I had my New Year in this place. No food! 
They were partying in Marawi and we were there [in Bayang]. (Interview, Marawi 
City, 2007) 
The role of a bai a labi as mediator might go beyond solving conflicts between relatives. 
In applying her role as peacekeeper of the place, she can settle conflicts between people who are 
not from the area and locals in order to prevent an escalation. The basis of authority in front of 
her relatives, however, remains the same: as representative of the common lineage. The Bai a 
Labi sa Marawi, Nabila Bolawan Tobacan, narrated an example in which she was related not by The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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blood  but  only  by  friendship  to  the  people  asking  her  help.  Thus,  she  became  involved  by 
speaking on behalf of her friends to defend them in front of her relatives, performing the role of a 
peacemaker, which is generally reserved for titleholders:  
There was this incident which happened to a male settler.  [The word “settler” here 
means that this man came from another province and he was not a native of the 
place.]  He encountered a conflict in his province and brought this conflict in the 
city where he met his enemy, ridowai, and they exchanged fire shots.  It caught 
the attention of the mayor and he asked who these disputants were.   
When the residents knew that it was the settler who caused the tension in 
the area, they wanted to shoot him.  The bai a labi’s uncle was even angry and 
wanted to shoot the man for the disturbance he made in the community. Some of 
the bai a labi‘s friends are relatives of the settler. The friends requested her to stop 
her uncle from shooting the man so that the conflict will not escalate.   
It took courage for the bai a labi to ask favor from her uncle because of the 
thought that her request might be refused. As a bai a labi  she is supposed to help 
resolve conflicts in the area.  She is also conscious of her title as bai a labi and 
wanted to act upon her role as peacekeeper.  To value the request of her friends, 
the bai a labi immediately went to her uncle to plead not to kill the stranger. After 
uttering some calm statements she told her uncle about her concern.  [The uncle 
gave in to her request.]   It was decided by her uncle to let the settler and his 
relatives  move  out  from  the  place  in  exchange  of  the  favor  done. The  bai  a 
labi  then went to the relatives of her friends and advised them not to stay in the 
place because of the threat that her uncle might retaliate and shoot the settler on 
that night.  The settler’s relatives agreed and the settler and they moved out from 
the city the next day. (Interview, translated by Monalinda Doro, Marawi City, 
2008) 
However, in conflicts between locals, it is an advantage to have a mediator who is related to both 
parties. When a high-ranking person feeling responsible for a case lacks needed relations to one 
of the conflicting parties, the one who provides these relations will be chosen as mediator. A bai a 
labi describes such a situation. A woman leader of an influential family, which was involved in a 
murder case, asked her to help in negotiations. Superior to the bai a labi at her working place but 
also by status, she was related to the husband of the bai a labi, who was related to the bereaved 
family. In spite of the total involvement of the bai a labi in the case, the final settlement took 
place at the home of her brother, a relative of the deceased person, in order to show the ultimate 
surrender of the killer (see appendix 10  for the whole story). The  bai  a labi thus  displayed 
unofficial power in the background.  
International  civil  society  groups  lament  that  women  mediators  are  not  publicly 
appreciated for their work; instead, it is mainly men who arrange the final settlements (Bamgbose 
2003). The women themselves, however, often feel uncomfortable with the idea that they should The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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be more appreciated for their mediations, fearing that it will change traditional gender relations. 
One bai a labi, a professor at MSU, comments when asked if the role of women in settling ridos 
should be more publicly appreciated: “In Islam we are under the umbrella of men and we accept 
that; we cannot show that we are more powerful than men” (Interview, Marawi City, 2007). She 
argues further that women already feel empowered and do not need the public appreciation. This 
suggests Rogers’s (1975) “mythical male dominance” (1975), but as Ortner (1966) has argued, 
the acceptance of male dominance in a culture also signifies that it is a reality. The family and the 
clan provide social and emotional security for women in Lanao. When a woman questions the 
underlying  gender  relations,  the  support  for  her  in  the  community  may  be  in  jeopardy. 
Additionally, the traditional system holds certain fields and possibilities of empowerment for 
women, even though these might be behind closed doors, or unofficial (see Roces 1998). For 
royal elite women, the threat of the decline of the taritib and igma, and thus of the collapse of 
their source of influence, is of greater concern than the need to embrace different gender values. 
C. Public Decision-Making: “You Have to Fight for Your Rights!” 
Source materials on women in pre-Islamic times in Mindanao are relatively rare. Except 
for some written documents by merchants and Spanish colonial forces, the transmission of oral 
stories remains important, like the one about Bai Etha, known for having been a proven leader in 
war and peace supporting her uncle, the Sultan sa Marantao. Referring to her marriage to  a 
descendant of Sharief Kabungsoan, her descendants could later claim and gain the title Sultan sa 
Ramain. Apart from these oral transmissions, most of the families have their own version of the 
Darangen. In the 1970s, Mindanao State University (MSU) in Marawi City translated this epic 
poem into English. The process of transmission “Islamized” the Darangen, thus changing certain 
contents  to  make  it  fit  Islamic  teachings.  In  the  story,  the  male  hero  saves  his  people  from 
aggressors and wins the heart of many princesses, but in the end he and his kingdom Bumbaran 
become petrified “because all of them refused to accept Islam” (Coronel 1983: 2). However, the 
English translation still gives the impression of the gender relations which had been transmitted 
over the years; told to children in good night stories; and sung, danced, and played on special 
occasions, referred to as a moral codex and as an ideal to be achieved. 
  Female main characters in the story are either princesses, witches, powerful queens, or 
spirits in the sky world, who are also called diwatas, whom Saber describes as demi-goddesses or 
spirits who “corresponded to the gods called devas or devatas in the mythologies of India” (Saber The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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and Tamano 1985-86: 184). One chapter is devoted to the manner of how the hero Bantogen 
liberates his kingdom from Walain Pirimbangan, who reigns as queen together with her brother. 
During a fight with the help of spirits between her and the hero, she loses because the spirits 
decide that her deed, imprisoning the whole kingdom of Bumbaran in huge stones, is too cruel 
(Darangen, Vol. 1, Books 1-3: 226, 230). Women are thus not only objects in the story but make 
decisions  and  (co-)rule.  No  assembly  takes  place  without  consulting  them,  and  in  times  of 
conflict they are part of the decision-making process (Tabay 2003: 95). When the assembly of 
datus disapproves of a decision, the question is given to some male authorities first. When still no 
solution can be found, it is given to the women, whose decision the assembly binds itself to 
accept (ibid.: 87). The hero of the story nevertheless plays tricks on the invincible princess in the 
sky, and with the help of the spirits defeats the queen. The ideal female marriage partner in the 
Darangen is not the powerful queen or the witch, but the devoted princess who gives her consent 
when her husband wants to take other wives to strengthen the clan and who would rather die than 
to be a source of shame to her clan.  
Similar structures can be found in the sultanate system. Women as well as men of the datu 
class  have  a  claim  on  royal  titles.  This  means  that  beside  every  sultan  there  is  a  female 
counterpart. The first bai a labis were normally the sisters or daughters of a sultan.
284 However, 
since the female titles are inherited bilaterally, today the bai a labi and the sultan of one place can 
be relatives of any degree. Whereas regarding the distribution of titles a gender symmetrical 
structure is prevalent, the distribution of public decision-making is not symmetrical and gives 
priority to men. Female elders may be included and can take part more easily in the decision-
making process. Maranao women and men, particularly younger women, are restricted regarding 
their contacts with the other sex. However, Maranao women elders in their 50s are considered 
“morally trustworthy” and are therefore allowed to attend conferences, social gatherings, political 
rallies, meetings, and so forth on their own without escorts to look after them. Women in their 30s 
also attend gatherings without escorts; they, however, appear in groups.  
Madale  (1996)  describes  what  a  community  meeting  and  the  public  decision-making 
process of datus and bais in Marawi looks like:  
                                                 
284 For the importance of the sister and the higher status given to women via their kinship roles, rather than marriage 
roles, see Ortner (1996), writing about hierarchical societies in Polynesia. She argues that within marriage “women’s 
distinctive feminine . . . attributes . . . are highlighted, whereas in kinship roles they are not. Thus in marriage a 
woman is more open to being seen as a radically different type of human being, whereas in the context of kinship she 
is more easily seen as simply occupying different social roles. In all societies, of course, women (like men) are both 
kinspersons and spouses; what is at issue is the relative dominance of one or the other dimension.” (p. 111) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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In Maranaw social gatherings, men and women sit separately but not too far from 
one another so that they can hear one another as well as react. A woman leader 
can, if needed, stand up during a community meeting and air her stand on an issue 
or request a male relative to express her thoughts for her. This is permissible in the 
case of elderly or titled baes. Younger Maranaw women prefer to sit and listen. (p. 
105) 
As can be seen from this description, men in mixed-gendered groupings usually dominate the 
proceedings (see also Bamgbose 2003: 55). These groupings can have different characters, as 
shown  for  example  in  the  traditional  Provincial  Council  of  Elders,  which  is  not  as  strongly 
segregated as conservative religious organizations. The religious Provincial Ulama Council has a 
male and a female group. The groups are segregated; the women organize themselves, but they 
are under the umbrella of men. In traditional mixed-gendered groups, women do not necessarily 
have  a  large  part  in  decision-  or  speech-making,  but  they  are  usually  present  and  can  thus 
intervene when needed.  
 
Picture 20: The Provincial Council of Elders 
Men  and  women  stand  side  by  side,  the  women  in  the  front  and  the  men  in  the  back.  Source:  49
th  Founding 
Anniversary of the Province Lanao del Sur, June 28-July 4, 2008.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 21: The Provincial Ulama Council, Men 
Source: 49
th Founding Anniversary of the Province Lanao del Sur, June 28-July 4, 2008.  
 
 
Picture 22: The Provincial Ulama Council, Women 
Source: 49
th Founding Anniversary of the Province Lanao del Sur, June 28-July 4, 2008.  
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Through her gender research for the British NGO Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO)-
Toscadar in rural areas in Lanao del Sur in 2003, Bamgbose (2003) highlights that community 
meetings (maswarah) usually take place after the maghrib prayer at the mosque. Women are 
excluded from these meetings, except when especially invited and even then they are mainly “not 
made to feel part of the process” (p. 64). A Bai a Labi sa Marawi reports similar structures from 
the  Marawi  Sultanate  League.  Women  in  this  framework  rather  influence  the  community 
decisions  by  making  “informal  suggestions  to  their  husbands  or  other  male  relatives  about 
community issues” (ibid.: 64). In many cases, women do not want to change this arrangement 
since an “elevated role of women in decision-making embarrasses the women as they judge that 
this  undermines  the  role  of  men”  (ibid.:  66).  They  thus  prefer  to  have  an  indirect  and 
inconspicuous influence. However, this does not mean that they are not involved in community 
affairs or that they do not have the means to put their husbands under pressure in case they feel 
neglected or not informed. In the ideal case, this may trigger the maratabat of the man who has to 
show that he treats her well. Disoma reports that: 
my impression shows that the wife always interferes with the activities of the 
husband, and that she will be angry whenever she is not consulted on any venture 
made by her husband. An angry wife is always demanding for a divorce, or tells 
bad words to her husband even at the presence of other persons. (1999a: 35) 
The gender distribution involving a limited female public participation in the decision-making 
process is not always stringent and there are possibilities for women to take part when insisting 
on their traditional rights as representatives of the lineage. Those women who are more actively 
involved in such processes explain that they experienced appreciation by the community when 
doing so. Influence on public activities is usually connected to age, social standing, illustrious 
family background, personal achievements, education, or profession/position. If based on these 
characteristics a woman would also take part in public policymaking. She, however, has to be 
adamant,  as  the  Bai  a  Labi  of  Bayasungan  and  professor  at  MSU  Marawi  explained  when 
describing ad hoc meetings in her community. In the agama Bayasungan, Lumbatan in Unayan, 
the bais and datus with responsibility (who may or may not be titleholders) meet on occasion; for 
example, when a conflict erupts. The meeting can be called, mainly through text messages, by 
any person of responsibility. It usually takes place wherever is convenient, like at a fast food 
restaurant. The person who called the meeting explains the situation, ideas are exchanged, and 
suggestions made. In the case of the Bai a Labi of Bayasungan, she was the only woman who 
participated. She explained that most of the time, men take women “for granted,” meaning to say The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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that they do not necessarily expect that a woman would want to take part in public decision-
making. Thus, a woman who would like to be consulted has to assert herself and “fight for her 
rights.” The bai a labi, hence, insisted on being invited; if she had not been invited, she would 
have investigated the reasons for the neglect.  
It is easier for female titleholders or elders to press a point in traditional mixed-gendered 
groupings  than  it  is  for  younger  Maranaos.  Today’s  educated  married  youth,  however, 
transgresses these barriers in order to participate in community decision-making. During clan 
meetings organized by RIDO, women — even though there were fewer women than men — were 
especially invited to speak in front of the group. Among them were Samira Ali Gutoc-Tomawis, a 
young  journalist  for  the  Manila  Times,  daughter  of  late  Ambassador  to  Saudi  Arabia  Datu 
Candidato Gutoc and granddaughter of Vice-Governor Sheikh Ibrahim Miro-Ato Ali, the Sultan 
Dimasangkay of Dansalan. Gutoc-Tomawis also helped to organize the women’s sector of the 
clan. Additionally, she is the membership convener of the Young Moro Professional Network 
(YMPN). This group was founded in 2000 and consists of about 200 highly-educated young 
Muslims who have spent years in the country’s best schools or overseas. The YMPN is a mixed-
gendered organization where women as well as men speak out equally. Its goal is to improve the 
socio-economic situation of Mindanao through peaceful means. The members are well-connected 
to other Moro organizations like the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID) with its 
Tausug director Amina Rasul, and to international organizations, like the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
(Friedrich Ebert Foundation). Local elders and the MILF also recognize the YMPN members as 
youth representatives.  
Whereas the young professionals found a way to break with traditional conventions by 
establishing  their  own  group,  other  Maranao  women  leaders  remain  within  the  traditional 
framework. One young professional from a major descent line who was granted a royal title some 
months after the interview explained how education helped her to overcome traditional roles and 
to participate more actively in public decision-making:  
One of the indicators of education is being able to express yourself. This is very 
Maranao, that if you are able to express yourself you are easily noticed. So: “Why 
do not we choose him, why do not we choose her?” And it is very rare for the 
ladies to be talking that much. To say: “Excuse me, I have a point here!” 
It’s usually a male dominated . . . they have the monopoly. It is not to 
prevent women but there is a tendency for women to just agree with what men say. 
Because it is like saying, anyway they will be the one[s] to implement whatever it 
is being planned, so just let them talk. It is not because you are being prevented to 
do so. Because for me I do not really feel that I am prevented to do so. It is The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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probably because of the national order of Filipino patriarchal society. And it is 
added to the Maranao culture [we have], where it is not actually preventing the 
women, it is dignifying the women, but it becomes over-dignifying the women to 
the point of preventing them. (Interview, Iligan City, 2007) 
Men are obligated by Islam, taritib, and igma to protect their women and to treat them like a 
treasure. Young and especially unmarried women before the introduction of general and mixed-
gendered education were very much secluded from public life and were only seldom seen by 
men. This is judged as one reason why they were highly regarded by men and sometimes referred 
to as a montiya, a precious stone (Tawano 1979: 119). Some bai a labis are saying that since 
women can be seen everywhere today, they  have lost some of this regard. Muslim activists, 
however, criticize this seclusion as a way of controlling “women's freedom of movement under 
the smokescreen of admiration” (Bamgbose 2003: 60). According to traditional conceptions of 
gender, a woman should feel appreciated as long as she does not violate the limitations set by the 
society. A datu explains: “She might virtually be carried on hands. Everything she wishes to 
purchase, as long as the budget is there, will be bought: diamonds, cloth, furniture, cars, etc.” 
These are things a woman may also demand from her husband in order to be able to participate in 
the acquisition of status symbols. Then again, her freedom of movement may be restricted with 
the argument of protecting her morality and dignity, a protection that young educated women 
sometimes regard as “over-dignification.” 
A datu explains the extensive forms this protection may develop in a religious framework, 
where  women  have  to  be  guarded  from  everything  that  might  be  perceived  as  immoral; 
otherwise, God will curse the homeland: 
Maranao  traditional  and  religious  leaders,  speaking  on  pulpits  during  Friday 
prayers, always remind their congregation not to neglect their duty to Islam and 
their  womenfolk  and  communities.  Which  means  that  women  should  be 
“protected”  and  sheltered  from  all  temptations  in  the  e-media  (Internet, 
cellphones, sexy movies on cable TV, etc.) and immorality. Otherwise, God will 
put a curse on those who fail in this sacred duty. Worse, a collective neglect in the 
performance  of  this  sacred  duty  will  bring  famine,  hunger  and  curse  to  the 
Maranao tribe and homeland. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
The moral pressure on women under the cover of protection can thus be overwhelming whether 
in  the traditional or religious  context.  However, both  systems  leave women several  fields of 
power from which they might negotiate in society. Among the first this is the chance to take 
direct  part in  public decision-making,  particularly  if the women are ready to  “fight  for their 
rights” on the basis of their descent line status, traditional rights, and personal achievements. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Among  the  latter,  Muslim  activists  are  empowered  by  referring  to  the  Qur’an  and  by 
strengthening their opposition to traditional elites. 
D. Gender Roles and Economic Realities: Non-Recognition of Female Labor 
In the 1920s, the Muslim regions experienced an educational boom (Tabay 2003), as well 
as the introduction of media, industrialization, a new political system, private land ownership, 
and taxes. Marawi City was “Americanized” or “Westernized”. The goal of the colonial officers 
had been to assimilate the Moros into the Filipino state. Since Moro elite women were considered 
to  be  influential  in  their  society,  their  education  in  modern  schools  and  even  in American 
universities was promoted (Angeles 1998: 213). Conversion of Muslim women to Christianity 
was nevertheless not part of the program, since this would have destroyed their status and value 
among their people (ibid.: 213). Elite women made the first steps toward changing the woman’s 
role  by  becoming  educated  and  later  on,  becoming  professionals.  In  following  the  elite’s 
example, more and more women were sent to school and education brought a general change for 
women  in  the  southern  Philippines  (Angeles  1998;  Lacar  1992;  Usodan-Sumagayan  1988). 
Before colonization, adolescent girls did not leave the house, except on special occasions. With 
the introduction of public schools they were enrolled in co-educational institutions. Saber writes 
that with the introduction of democracy and Western education women could become teachers 
and politicians, which “both were not sanctioned by tradition” (Saber 1979: 117).  
 
Picture 23: Co-Education in the 1930s 
Maranao Students, 1938. The girls and boys wear “western-style” clothes. 
Photo kindly provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Over time, typically male occupations, such as lawyer, turned out to be appreciated occupations 
for women. There are Maranao female lawyers dealing with the national law as well as female 
sharia lawyers, though there is presently no sitting Maranao woman judge in an Islamic sharia 
court. It is, however, assumed that they can become sharia court judges, following the example 
of Nurkarhati Salapuddin Sahibbil from Jolo. After some controversy, she became the first female 
Muslim judge of the sharia court system in the Philippines in 1994.  
 There  is  a  difference  between  what  is  perceived  as  male  and  female  labor.  Besides 
assisting on the farm and taking care of sari-sari stores (convenience stores), teaching is one of 
the occupations that is most sought after by women. Bamgbose (2003) reports that a majority of 
teachers in Lanao del Sur are female and that this occupation is considered to be “women's work” 
and a source of status for the women who hold it. It additionally increases their chances of getting 
married since men “would like to marry a teacher as she has a stable income” and can provide 
loans to relatives (2003: 59). Teaching as a preferred profession by women is followed by nursing 
and midwifery, both of which are most often connected with the desire to go abroad to study or 
work in America, Europe, or the Middle East. Nevertheless, a woman's first duties remain in the 
household and the family. This means that she is doubly burdened.  
That the household is the woman’s terrain but also her responsibility is often stated by 
men: in the house, the woman is the “boss.” Some men would even define the whole society as a 
matriarchal society in considering the context of the household. Muslim feminists report that men 
only think that women are powerful since they are doing all the work in the household, but that 
one has to differentiate between responsibilities and decision-making: the women have a lot of 
responsibilities in the house but the men are the decision-makers (Tan 2001: 77).  
Maranao men are perceived as the primary breadwinners, but the wife is said to hold the 
“family's purse strings” (Doro 2007: 219; see also Umpa 1981: 6), as she is responsible for the 
fund management, whereas the husband remains the head of the family. Maranao women thus 
keep the income of their husbands to manage the household and some would state that by doing 
so,  they  can control  their husband’s  actions.
285 Hadja  Tawano wrote in  the 1970s  that,  even 
though the husband is responsible for providing for the family, the “disposition of properties by 
the husband, his social activities outside, and the family income are under close scrutiny of the 
wife. The domestic situation described in Tagalog  as  ‘under the  saya’  (skirt) is  prevalent in 
                                                 
285  For  a  debate  on  women  in  Southeast Asia  controlling  the  household  budget,  see  Karim  (1995);  Li  (1989); 
Reese/Hardillo (2006); Sullivan (1994). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Maranao society.” (1979b: 120). Madale (1996) writes that if a sultan is asked for a donation or 
contribution, he first consults his wife. She then goes and gets the money, and gives it to the 
husband, who is the one to donate it (1996: 118). Bamgbose reduces the power of the purse to the 
domestic sphere; the husband mainly decides about matters of land and farm equipment whereas 
the wife decides about those of the household. She adds that in the rural Maranao community of 
Gata, men usually keep their income and decide how it will be used and that “women had to ask 
for money little by little to meet the household expenses” (2003: 75, 66, 99). Also Sarip (1985-
86) in her study on Marawi City, and Reese and Hardillo (2006) on the Philippines in general, 
write that the female power of the purse is mainly restricted to decisions on what food to buy or 
household expenditures to spend; other decisions may be taken as a couple or by the man, no 
matter who is earning more (Sarip 1985-86). Reese and Hardillo add that when the family is poor, 
the power of the purse means that the wife controls the funds in order that the husband will not 
spend it for his leisure, since it is the wife who is responsible for the financial management of the 
household. However, the wife will have to deal with accusations of mismanagement if she runs 
out of money, and is then held responsible to get the needed money. Thus, the control can become 
a burden. A Maranao woman activist who defines herself a Muslim feminist recounts how she 
changed this traditional gender conception in order to empower herself as well as her husband:  
In my case, I earn more than my husband. My husband is just a wage earner. But 
in fairness to him . . . What I am doing is, ok we are Muslims, in Islam, the man is 
the provider of the family, it is given, so he has to provide us. So he has to provide 
the food. But in my case I provide the non-[food] . . . for example the gas of my 
car, the allowance of my children. That is me. For him, he provides. But we will 
never get hungry. We have a tradition that we have to control our man. So in our 
first  year  of  marriage  that  is  what  I  did.  I  really  have  to  control  my  man. 
Controlling means, getting all his salary and you do the budgeting. Most of the 
women are doing until now. But I have this grandmother who is very observant. 
My husband is always, he cannot go out, because he has got no money. Then my 
grandmother would say — that old woman is gender-sensitive: Don’t you know 
that if your husband will meet a relative in the street or he will break a glass along 
the way he cannot pay for it because he has no money? 
   And my husband was sulking all the time because he has no money . . . I 
arrange. He gives me the money, all his earning, then he asks for transportation. 
Then me, I have to budget it. But when I run short of the budget, he will say: I 
give you the money it is up to you! 
Then I realized — I think only after 10 years, I think 1990, we got married 
in 1977, more than 10 years — I realized that this is not good. So he has his own 
earnings and I have my own earnings. I do not know his he also does not know my 
earnings. But he is providing the food. He always buys all the groceries for one 
month. You will see oil, sugar, rice. And in my case, I provide extras. That's the, so The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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I am also getting away with other things, in marketing, no more. When I was 
holding the money, I do the marketing, I do the budgeting, when I run short of the 
money, he got angry with me. That is our culture. But now I am freer and he is 
also free. He cannot run short of the money, because he is providing a family . . . It 
is one way of empowering me and empowering others, or enslaving me . . . That is 
our experience in our family. It is very hard. When you do the budgeting and you 
run short because of emergency or there is an illness. One of your children, all of a 
sudden . . . And you run to the hospital and you run short of the money. I realized 
then that it is not good. But until now, most of our women are doing this. Because 
they control their men. I said: These men have no balls! Because they are under 
control. Because of my personality, the people are saying: Oh! You have a very 
strong personality! 
But in fairness to my husband, I am afraid of my husband. Because in our 
community here, in MSU, they saw me as very strong, as very authoritative, or 
what. But no, I still seek advice. At the end of the day, he also seeks my ideas. 
(Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
The activist was able to change the monetary regulations since she had her own income. For 
women who are financially dependent on their husbands, this is not a possible solution. In doing 
this, she followed the Qur’anic “notion of mutuality of spousal support,” highlighted by Islamic 
feminists and which, according to Badran (2007), becomes “increasingly operative in the middle 
classes” (p. 39). In explaining this phenomenon, Badran emphasizes that the Muslim feminist 
interpretation takes into consideration changing social and economic realities.  In Morocco in 
2004, the mutual protection of the spouses found its way into the sharia-grounded family law, 
Mudawwana, which recognizes husband and wife as heads of the family: the wife can travel and 
work without the consent of her husband, her rights to divorce were revised, and polygamy and 
marriage under 18 are only allowed when fulfilling certain conditions
286 (Badran 2007: 40; Ende 
and Steinbach 2005: 670).  
These social realities have not yet been taken into consideration by the Code of Muslim 
Personal Laws (CMPL) in the Philippines. The CMPL was enacted under President Marcos in 
1977.
287 It is sharia-based, and is enforced in sharia courts, which handle matters concerning 
family law. National law deals with cases involving criminal law. In the CMPL, the norm is that 
women  are  taken  care  of  financially  by  the  husband.  The  obligation  of  the  wife  is  the 
management of the household, but everything she spends for the maintenance of the family has to 
                                                 
286 Eddouada (2008) mentions that there is opposition of the judges to the amended text and that in many cases the 
exception to a law became the rule, as for example regarding the authorization of girls to marry under the age of 18, 
which is “alarmingly” high (p. 43). 
287 The first judges of the court were appointed in 1983 (Barra 1993: 80). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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be paid or reimbursed by the husband.
288 This demand, when confronted with a different reality 
(in which the wife earns more than the husband) can lead to a regulation, in which the husband is 
more or less only the symbolic head of the household. It can however, also strengthen  the 
economic restrictions on women. 
In the 1960s Maranao women from the datu class would refrain “from being seen selling 
inside shops or marketplaces” (Saber and Tamano 1985-86: 129); they were mainly secluded 
from the public. If a woman worked, it was predominantly family-based employment, as a mat-
weaver or as a hired onor (singer) at weddings, enthronements,  etc. (Sarip 1985-86). Today, 
Maranao women, including those from the royalty, are in many cases professionals, even though 
this, according to conservative religious and traditional standpoints, is not always perceived as 
the ideal, especially when there is a non-segregated work environment. Many Maranao women, 
however,  need  to  work  in  order  to  make  ends  meet  and  would  do  so  in  a  non-segregated 
environment despite religious demands, as one Maranao merchant in Manila (Greenhills) stated: 
Actually if you follow Islam we are not allowed to mix with people like men, we 
are not allowed, but because of crisis, because we have to survive in our living, we 
have to do that. Anyway, Allah knows what is in your heart. (Interview, Manila, 
2008) 
Social realities have led to there being Maranao female breadwinners all over the country and 
even abroad.
289 Their husbands are in some cases relegated to the role of househusbands. This 
phenomenon has provoked a reassessment of the women’s role in cases where the Islamic norm 
of a husband providing  for the family does not apply. Because of strong cultural role models, 
which  are  strengthened  by  the  CMPL,  the  two  sexes  handle  this  situation  with  difficulty. 
Bamgbose  writes  that  women  in  the  Maranao  community  Dansalan  are  ashamed  when  their 
husbands  cannot  fulfill their role as the main providers, since they are laughed about in the 
community (Bamgbose 2003: 87). A Maranao man being a yayo (variant of yaya, a female baby-
sitter), in a male-dominated environment where men pride themselves as warriors in a martial 
society, is thus not wished for by either gender. However, to make ends meet, many women work 
to add something to the income. Sometimes they are the main or sole providers of the family.  
According to Islamic law, the money earned by the woman belongs to her since the man is 
the provider. This right, though, is not granted often; instead, it may even strengthen gender 
                                                 
288 She can exercise a profession,  with the consent of the  husband,  who can object if he considers his income 
sufficient for the needs of the family. 
289 According to the National Statistics Office, in the year 2000, 2% of the ARMM population worked abroad. The 
majority (56%) were women, with a median age of 24; the median age of the male overseas worker is 27. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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discrimination in the economic sphere in the form of non-recognition of women’s work. Nisa Ul-
Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro  (Women  for  Truth  and  Justice  in  the  Bangsamoro),  a  Moro  Women’s 
organization  that  constitutes  the  Filipino  section  of  the  transnational  Musawah  movement, 
comments on this paradox and thus criticizes the CMPL: 
This delineation of the rights and obligations [of the wife in the CMPL] springs 
from the notion that the husband is the head and provider of the family and the 
wife is primarily responsible for reproductive functions. This stereotyping puts 
unnecessary  burden  and  restrictions  on  both  women  and  men,  and  should  be 
reviewed. It is also not in keeping with the reality on the ground, where more and 
more Muslim women are taking on productive work and/or heading the family. 
(Homepage of Musawah, National Profiles: The Philippines, 2010) 
The employment rates by gender in the ARMM in 2008 shows that there are only slightly more 
men being employed than women. Nisa Ul-Haqq fi Bangsamoro specifies that women in the 
ARMM dominate the non- or low-income fields of employment. In the region, comparable to 
national accounts,
290 more females work as laborers, unskilled workers, and unpaid family labor, 
especially on the farm (see also Fianza 2003), than males: 
Women’s contribution to agriculture is invisible. As pointed out earlier, female 
participation in agriculture is largely as laborers and unskilled farm workers or 
unpaid family labor. This signifies women’s lack of recognition as agricultural 
workers and their limited absorption into the paid sector. And when they do get 
into the paid sector, their daily nominal wages are still lower than men’s, implying 
continuing  invisibility  and  undervaluation  of  female  labor  and  lack  of 
institutionalization of equal pay in agriculture. (Homepage of Musawah, National 
Profiles: The Philippines, 2010) 
Women are not supposed to be the main providers of their families according to Islam, but the 
reality is that women work nevertheless in order to make ends meet. It remains an exception that 
they are the main breadwinners of the family, not necessarily because they are hindered in this 
regard but because their work is not equally recognized. The traditional and religious demand that 
the man be the main source of income of the family thus supports the non-recognition of female 
labor that is inherent in the national economic structure. 
E. A Gender-blind Reward System in a Lineage Society 
There is a reward system among Maranaos: if a person proves himself or herself to be an 
asset to the clan, he or she will earn respect and admiration, material comfort, and protection by 
the clan. The gender-blind pride in the success of a kin member and thus the appreciation of one’s 
                                                 
290 In the Philippines, about 48% of women 15 to 49 years in 2000 were engaged in gainful activities (NSO).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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lineage is most obviously shown in the streamers hanging all over Marawi City. Relatives in this 
status-observant society celebrate in public a success in final exams, the occupation of a political 
position, a royal title, or a return from the hadj. People will also be welcomed by flattering them, 
thus giving them more credit than is actually due; for example, in treating them as a PhD even 
though they are only a candidate. Flattering people is one way to avoid a possible insult, which 
can lead to violence, but it also helps the person excel in a certain activity. If the importance of a 
person is taken for granted, he or she may act indifferent and dull (Disoma 1999: 186). Streamers 
and posters usually show veiled women, but their faces remain visible. In most cases, they are 
dressed  up  and  wear  make-up  and  the  pictures  are  as  prominent  as  those  of  their  male 
counterparts. 
 
 
Picture 24: Marawi City: City of Streamers 
Photo taken by Monalinda Doro, 2008. 
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Picture 25: Relatives congratulate the governor  
Photo taken by the author, 2008. 
 
 
Picture 26: Posters Showing Sultan and Bai a Labi sa Pagalamatan 
Mr. and Mrs. Cairon Mangurun Macala Domato announce Hadji Jawhar Romuros Domato as the new Sultan of 
Pagalamatan. To his left (the traditional place for a woman), the new Bai a Labi sa Pagalamatan, Hadja Sittie Hosnia 
Pithailan Romapunut Ala Blangan Romoros Bala, is praised by her daughter Dayanzaman Bala Ala. Photo taken by 
the author, 2008.  
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Besides the public display of pride, the clan can elevate  a woman to a high political 
position as a government official or the like as long as it abides by the collective wishes of the kin 
community. Tarhata Alonto Lucman recounts how she was asked by her clan to run for governor 
in 1971: 
I did not want to be governor; it was my brother [Domocao Alonto]. The people 
told me my brother said: “Make her the one to lead the province. She can handle 
it.  
My brother was the governor [Abdul Gafur Madki Alonto, 1957-1967]. But 
he was weak, he was a soft-spoken man and he is soft in moving . . . “Why do you 
want her to be the governor?” “Oh, she is 100 times better than the governor 
[Linang D. Mandangan, 1968-1971] now!” 
My brother called me up: “You have to run for governor!” “No, I am tired 
with politics! I do not like politics.” Very early in the morning I ran away to 
Manila, I took the plane. But then after I left . . . my nephew in-law . . . knows my 
signature, so he was the one to sign for me. So they called me up in Manila: “Do 
not say anything . . . (says [the nephew] on the phone), I am the one who signed 
for you. Do not send me to jail. Please come home. I will go to jail if you do not 
come.”  
When I arrived at the airport I did not know that this people go to the airport 
to welcome me. I said: “Why are so many people here?” And then when I got 
down  from  the  airplane,  I  said:  “Why?  What  happened?”  “You  are  now  the 
candidate for governor!” “Who told you that?” “Yes, it is already there, from here 
you are going to the platform (in a school in Marawi). Please do not refuse, do not 
refuse!” 
When I went there, I said: “I am hesitant to address all of you because I am 
not willing to run.” They said: “No! You have to run!” So I said: “I am forced by 
circumstances; someone will go to jail if I will not run for governor. So in behalf 
of someone I accept the challenge, I am running for governor.” “Ah!” the people 
were  saying,  “so  what  is  the  challenge?”  “When  I  become  a  governor,  I  will 
punish all of you that will not believe me!” “Ha ha!” Because I was just joking on 
them. Up to the ending of my speech, it is all jokes. That is why they liked me so 
much. “You can make us laugh and why don’t you make us cry?” “Suppose I will 
tell you that I am not going to run!” “Ahhhh!” (Interview, Manila, 2008) 
Princess Tarhata  was  the  only  female  governor  in  the  history  of  Lanao  del  Sur. This 
leadership shift was largely due to the influence and power of the political clans that supported 
her candidacy since no male candidate was seen as fit for the position. Maranao women who had 
been successful in politics, in most cases, had a royal background and were from prominent clans 
and political dynasties. The Alontos are one example but there are several others (see appendix 
4), of which the most popular are the Dimaporos in Lanao del Norte. In the 2010 elections, the 
Dimaporos could occupy five political posts, among them the governorship. Thus, the highest 
elective posts in the province are occupied by Dimaporos: the mother, the son, and the daughter, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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nurturing  a  dynastic  rule  which  has  lasted  for  50  years,  being  initiated  by  Mohamad  Ali 
Dimaporo.
291  
Bamgbose  writes  in  2003  that  there  are  “increasing  numbers  of  Maranao  women  in 
politics from the barangay to the congress level” (2003: 67). This evolution is not reflected on 
the mayoral level. In 2001, nine cities were headed by women; in 2004 there were four, and four 
in 2007. In the 2010 elections, five women were (re-)elected. No Maranao congresswoman, or 
female provincial board member, senator, governor, or vice-governor was elected in 2010 in 
Lanao del  Sur. However,  a steady increase of  female vice-mayors from  2001 (two) to  2013 
(seven) can be observed and after the 2008 ARMM elections there were two female Maranao 
assemblywomen, as there had been from 2005 to 2008. However, despite this relative success, 
most of the women being elected were part of family dynasties. The majority of women who 
were  elected  followed  their  male  relatives,  who  concluded  their  third  term  as  mayor  before 
them,
292  or  replaced  them  in  case s  of political  violence  (one  woman  became  mayor  after 
opponents shot her brother). Since 1998, no local elective official can serve for more than three 
consecutive terms in the same position, which explains the increase of women in political offices. 
To keep the position within the family, the wife, the daughter, or the son will follow— whoever is 
considered an effective leader of the clan or the family. This situation is known all over the 
Philippines;  Hega  (2003)  from  Friedrich  Eb ert  Stiftung  calls  these  family  members 
“benchwarmers.” Whereas men are preferred as leaders, women get their turn in case there is no 
man available to keep the position within the family. Besides genealogical connections, the other 
“three Gs” (guns, goons and gold) also have their effects on who  is elected. One female mayor, 
the wife of a known drug lord, is said to have bought her post for up to PHP 15,000 per vote. She 
also bought herself a royal title,  giving herself the needed descent line status to be  an effective 
leader. Genealogy, however, seems to be the most important factor for female public leadership, 
as well as the introduction of limited terms. 
                                                 
291 Iligan City nevertheless is not headed by a Dimaporo since it became a lone congressional district in 2010. The 
division of Lanao del Norte and Iligan City helped the Dimaporos to occupy the two other congressional districts. 
Before, Iligan accounted for more than half of the total congressional voters, while the remaining seven towns of the 
1
st District, to which  were  added five more  municipalities to comprise the new  district, are the  territory of the 
Dimaporos. In 2007, Imelda “Angging” Quibranza Dimaporo ran for the 1
st District but lost against Iligan City 
businessperson Vicente Belmonte, among other reasons due to the anti-Muslim campaign angle of her opponents. 
Belmonte was re-elected as congressman in the 2010 elections, this time for the lone Iligan City District. 
292 The most popular example is Topaan “Toni” Disomimba and his wife “Jan Jan” Alangadi Pundato Disomimba 
who both occupied the mayorship of Tamparan for a number of years. “Toni” Disomimba was elected in the 2010 
elections after his wife finished her third term.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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   Family support for some positions is, however, not sufficient and additionally “political 
clout,”  especially  in  the  “no  war,  no  peace”  area  of  Lanao  del  Sur,  is  needed. This  can  be 
established in the unofficial “female” domain (see Roces 1998). Dr. Hadja Sittie Nurlaylah Emily 
M.  Marohombsar, MSU President  in  1993,  was  supported in  her career by President  Ramos 
(1992-1998) and his sister. Holding the office of the MSU President is dependent not only on 
academic  qualities  but  also  on  political  connections,  since  the  President  of  the  Philippines 
appoints  the  university  president.  Emily  Marohombsar  possessed  both  since  she  was  highly 
educated (in the Philippines and abroad) and grew up in a political family.
293 She recounts how 
she traded a position in congress that had been offered to her for the MSU presidency, for which 
she felt more qualified, with the influence of the sister of the president: 
I grew up actually in the university. I started as an ordinary professor. And then 
later on I became an assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and then 
later Dean of that same College, and then Vice-President of Academic Affairs and 
then  later  on  when  Governor  Dimaporo  became  Officer  in  Charge  of  the 
University  he  appointed  me Vice-President  for  External  Studies. And  as Vice-
President  for  External  Studies,  I  supervised  all  the  external  campuses  of  the 
University . . . So when we conducted a search for MSU President, I did the search 
and I was number one in the list. And it is very difficult. Because many people 
said to President Marcos, because he was the president then: Oh, do not appoint 
Emily because the Muslims will go against you because a woman is not supposed 
to be holding an effective position. So later on, when Ramos became president, he 
sent somebody to me and he said: Would you like to go to congress?  
Because, he said, instead of being appointed president of the university, 
which he had promised to a politician. Because when Ramos was  running for 
president of the country, ambassador [Lindy Pangandaman], they are very, very 
close, he asks him to run for congress under his party. And Lindy told him: “Mr. 
President, I am not interested in running for congress. But I will support you under 
the condition that if you win, you will appoint me President of MSU.” 
Which he agreed to. So when he won Lindy approached him about it and 
he wrote a marginal note on the letter to the search committee. But he was told by 
somebody that Dr. Marohombsar is first one on the list. So he sent somebody to 
me and he said  the president  is  offering me to be a member of the congress. 
Because at that time there were appointed members. So I said: “Please tell the 
president that I cannot accept. He is making a very wrong decision,” I said. “Why 
send me to congress when I am not in politics? And he appointed someone that is 
in politics to . . . I am an academic and Lindy is a politician. So this is a very 
wrong decision.”  
So I went to the sister of the president (Leticia Ramos-Shahani), who is 
very close to me. And I said the president is offering me to be in congress. And she 
                                                 
293 Her father, a military officer, was Lanao provincial governor (1946-1949) and her husband, Attorney Abdul Gani 
Marohombsar,  became  Lanao  del  Sur  vice-governor  and  an  assemblyman  of  the ARMM. Additionally  she  had 
contacts with the sister of President Ramos. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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said this cannot be. “I will see him, Emily. I tell him to choose between politics 
and academe. And he should give preference to the academe.” So she went to 
Malacañang  Palace  and  talked  to  the  brother.  But  then  the  president  had  a 
problem. What  to  do  with  the  promise  to  Lindy?  So  he  sends  for  Lindy,  and 
Shahani told him: “Why don’t you make him run for governor of the ARMM?” 
So he sends for Lindy and offered him the official position. But Lindy was 
rejecting it. Because according to him he was not sure of winning. But anyway, he 
said: “I think you stick better in there.”  
So a member of the board sends a private lunch for Lindy and me, he 
invited us. And he said, during this lunch: “I think Dr. Marohombsar should be in 
MSU and you should be in the ARMM.” 
And Lindy was hesitating, I said: “Now, we will all vote for your victory.” 
So he said: “I will accept under the condition that you and your husband will 
support me.” I said: “We will!” And I said: “The president and his sister also 
promised that they will put all their resources for the administration, so you will 
win.” So he accepted. And I was appointed. (Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
A woman leader from an influential family can achieve quite a lot among her people; she can 
occupy a public leadership position based on her personal skills and the family dynasty’s political 
clout in the unofficial realm. In the case of the Alonto clan, it is said that there are leaders for the 
men and leaders for the women. In order to keep the clan in power and away from the humiliation 
of poverty, women may become clan leaders in the absence of strong, authoritative male heirs. 
Besides Tarhata Alonto Lucman, Soraya Alonto Adiong, daughter of the late Congressman and 
Senator Ahmad “Domocao” Alonto and widow of the former Lanao del Sur Governor Mamintal 
“Mike” Adiong  can  be  mentioned.  Her  two  prominent  sons  work  with  the  government.  Her 
brothers  are  ineffective  as  leaders  of  the  family  and  therefore  cannot  be  relied  on  for  hard 
decisions and guidance for the rest of the clan. Soraya Alonto Adiong provides the logistics and 
employment needed by the clan to cover their domestic expenses and other financial needs in 
return for their loyalty. When there is a community gathering, the women of the clan gather 
around her and the men around the male leaders. Soraya is said to be the kingmaker of the clan 
by providing the connections and financial support of her late father and husband.  
The rather lax restrictions on women becoming clan leaders or politicians — in case there 
is no male candidate — can partly be traced back to the bilateral lineage arrangement. Dube 
(1997)  described  the  possible  positive  effects  of  this  system  in  Southeast  Asia  on  gender 
relations. Likewise, in Lanao, clan membership and rights are transferred via both the male and 
female lines. These gender-blind pre-Islamic and pre-Western family arrangements become, to a 
certain degree, more important than restrictions on women’s leadership. In general, however, 
women are seen as the counterparts of men, establishing their own social networks, which might The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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also include political clout through the female relatives of leading politicians. These unofficial 
connections, as Roces (1998) demonstrates in her work on female power in the Philippines, are in 
a lot of cases even more effective than the power of women occupying political positions. When 
inhabiting  a  political  post,  women  have  to  abide  by  the  rules  of  the  male-dominated  public 
environment. In the unofficial space as relatives of politicians, they can act more freely to a 
certain degree. 
   Traditional  fields  of  power  with  symbolic  equality  for  women  are  predominantly 
unofficial  and  have  a  moral  and  hierarchical  character. Thus,  women  have  theoretical  rights 
according  to  the  taritib  and  igma  but  in  some  cases,  they  are  not  used  because  of  moral 
conceptions of submissiveness and shame, or due to the lack of support by the clan and family, or 
maybe because a woman is considered still too young for some issues. On the basis of a certain 
descent line status, age, and personal achievements, a woman has the possibility to take part in 
public decision-making, especially if she insists on her rights to do so. In order to keep power 
positions in the family, women, when considered able, will even be pushed by the clan to take 
public positions. It can be concluded that tradition provides the potential to empower women in 
the official as well as in the unofficial spaces. The possibility of displaying their potential in 
public is, however, limited by moral and hierarchical restrictions, and service to the family and 
clan.  
II. Family Arrangements 
In the Constitution of the Philippines, it is written, “The State recognizes the Filipino 
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively 
promote its total development.” (Art. 15). To support family structures is thus a national goal. 
Mulder (2000) writes that the dominant role of the family in the private and public spheres in the 
Philippines that is often mentioned by scholars can be traced back to rather negative images that 
Filipinos have of themselves and of the larger society. The overshadowing of the public by the 
private sphere can also be found in Lanao, with state structures that are dominated by family 
politics. In this context, the strict regulations on family arrangements in Lanao have to be seen 
not as neutral but as constituting a space for the institutionalization of a specific gender politics in 
order to regulate not only the private but also the public sphere (see Foucault 1998). The gender 
norms that are applied are influenced by the “no war, no peace” environment in the form of The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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strengthening  ethnic  groups  through  marriage  politics  or  by  re-Islamization  through  the 
implementation of conservative religious ideas on family planning. 
A. Marriage and Divorce 
1. Arranged Marriages: Neo-Traditional Arrangements 
Traditionally, the elders and parents arrange marriages even without the consent of the 
future couple. Islamic feminists argue that this is against Islam since the girl has to be consulted. 
Among Maranaos, Islam became an authoritative source of narratives of justification. In practice, 
however,  traditional  syncretism  remains  predominant.  In  the  following  example  a  wedding 
involving a powerful Maranao political clan that took place in a hotel in Cagayan de Oro is 
described more in detail, displaying a mix of Islamic, Christian, and Maranao cultural settings,
294 
demonstrating the sometimes paradoxical gender norms Maranaos are confronted with. Solutions 
to these paradoxes are mainly found in  neo-traditions (modified to fit social realities) and re-
Islamization (in applying Islamic narratives of justification). 
A wedding normally starts with a gathering wherein the families debate about the bride 
price. This is followed by another meeting, at which they finally announce the wedding, without 
the couple being involved. The wedding ceremony itself then varies. The one described here is 
vastly influenced by Western and Filipino practices concerning dress, decoration, and food. The 
bride wears a white wedding gown and the groom a white suit. The room is decorated and the 
bridesmaids and groom’s men are dressed according to a theme, as can be observed in Christian 
Filipino marriages. The bride  and  her bridesmaids  do not  wear veils  whereas  women in  the 
audience  do.  Instead,  they  wear  modern  dresses  while  the  men  wear  barong  tagalog,  the 
traditional Filipino attire. While this seems to be a rather Western and Filipino influence, the 
public display of unmarried women in front of an audience is also a traditional feature, as was 
explained in chapter two. The most obvious traditional feature is the display of the genealogies of 
the couple as a PowerPoint presentation in the background. Many marriages are strategic, not 
only  concerning  political  connections  but  also  concerning  descent  lines  and  the  possible 
inheritance of a royal title. The display of the salsila at marriages shows not only how the future 
couple  and  their  families  are  related  but  also  their  royal  backgrounds.  Royalty  say  that 
commoners avoid this ritual.  
                                                 
294 For an extensive description of courting and marriage practices as well as their changes because of Islamic, 
Western, or Filipino influences, see Disoma (1999).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 27: Alonto-Adiong-Taha-Wedding: PowerPoint Presentation of Genealogical Background of the Bride 
Photo taken by the author, Cagayan de Oro, Lanao del Norte, 2008. 
 
 
Picture 28: Alonto-Adiong-Taha-Wedding: The Wali and the Groom Pressing Their Thumbs 
During the wedding ceremony, the bride is absent and is represented by the wali. She is only fetched after the ritual. 
Photo taken by the author, Cagayan de Oro, Lanao del Norte, 2008.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Pieture 29: Alonto-Adiong-Taha-Wedding: Bride and Groom and the Groom’s Men and Bridesmaids Present 
Themselves on a Platform After the Wedding Ceremony 
Photo taken by the author, Cagayan de Oro, Lanao del Norte 2008.  
 
 
Picture 30: Alonto-Adiong-Taha-Wedding: Female Relatives of the Groom 
The women in the audience are veiled whereas the bride is not. The tables are gender segregated. Photo taken by the 
author, Cagayan de Oro, Lanao del Norte, 2008.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The ritual itself is a mixture of Islamic and traditional features. The wali (guardian) of the 
bride (most likely her father) has the task of facilitating the marriage, which is done without the 
future wife but with the groom, under the supervision of an imam. The groom and the wali press 
the thumbs of one hand together, covered by a white cloth, symbol of purity. The imam restates 
the condition under which the groom can marry the bride (no alcohol, no gambling, etc.), and the 
groom has to answer yes, thus affirming what is considered as an Islamic lifestyle. Then the wali 
is asked to give his rights and duties pertaining to the girl to the groom (Disoma 1999: 38). The 
groom  then  goes  to  a  nearby  house  or  room  where  other  girls  hide  the  bride.  Before  being 
allowed to enter and touch his wife, the groom pays her relatives to get the key to the bride’s 
quarters (leka sa gibbon). After that, he touches the forehead of the bride with his thumb, which 
he pressed against the one of the wali before, or kisses her. This batal or touch that makes the 
bride his is traditionally seen as “surrender of her chastity” (Alonto 1980: 78; Macaraya 1987: 
188; Pumbaya 2003: 220). 
  After the groom fetches the girl, they may come back to join the guests. At the observed 
wedding they sat on a stage while the guests took pictures and ate Western food, which is thought 
to be prestigious. Rings are also exchanged. The representatives of the clans are present and 
seated left and right (usually the side of the bride is to the left of the groom), and the groups are 
sexual segregated. Speeches are given in a certain order; men and high representatives of the 
eight families involved give most of them.
295 The wedding ceremony excludes the future wife 
and the arrangement is made between the wali and the future husband. The bride price is largely a 
deal among the relatives of the couple.
296 There are, however, arrangements that empower the 
bride. After or during the wedding, a gift h as to be given to the bride ( sayat or let a igaan); 
otherwise, she can refuse the husband. Further, before colonization, the couple had to stay at the 
place of the wife until the payment of a gift to the bride (kalaawi), about one year after the 
wedding.
297 The family of the husband then invites the wife and her arrival has to be celebrated. 
After that, the couple might stay at either place. These traditions show a tendency to strengthen 
the status and influence of the wife and the matriline, in particular the practice that the couple has 
to stay with the family of the woman first before mov ing to the husband’s place. The  kalaawi, 
                                                 
295 The eight families involved are from side of the bride (mother’s mother, mother’s father, father’s mother, and 
father’s father) and likely the side of the groom.  
296 There are traditionally several other occasions where money has to be given; otherwise the wedding will not take 
place. For example, this is the case if the girl has an unmarried elder sister; see Disoma (1999). 
297 The first child is expected after one year: this will increase the status of the woman, including “a tendency for her 
views and suggestions to prevail over those of their spouses” (Fianza 2004: 15). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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however, has become, according to Tawano (1979), obsolete since the new Civil Code does not 
demand it (p. 120). Disoma (1999) explains its decline by the fact that it is considered un-Islamic 
(p. 171). In some families, kalaawi is still practiced but the waiting period is shortened from one 
year to several days, after which the couple moves to the husband’s house if kapugad has been 
done. Three days after the wedding, the groom’s relatives visit the bride and give her sacks of 
rice, live chickens, and other goods, as well as some cash for herself and for expenses for food 
(which will be served to the groom’s family). When the couple is closely related by blood and 
lives in the same barangay or municipality no kalaawi follows since the purpose of it is that the 
groom’s  relatives  know  the  lineage  of  the  bride.
298  It can be concluded that the favorable 
tendencies for the bride have lessened .  The decision where  and when to move is mainly 
influenced  by  economic  realities:  the  couple  choses  a  place  where  they  have  access  to 
employment, making the  kalaawi dispensable, thus giving economic considerations a priority 
rather than the logic of kinship-relations and descent line connections. 
Besides tendencies in adat laws that reinforce the position of the wife, arranged marriages 
are predominant in Lanao del Sur, thus denying women the free choice of a marriage partner. 
However, arranged marriages strengthen descent line rights and political possibilities. This counts 
especially among political clans, since they are eager to establish connections with other families 
and clans, which are the basic source of power in the traditional sense. The bigger a clan is, the 
more affiliations it will have and the more influential it may be. Marriages outside of the descent 
line (but preferably ethnically endogamous) are thus encouraged to strengthen the existing social 
connections, the number of possible supporters, and the number of possible claims to royal titles. 
Bamgbose observes an increase in the number of marriages but also of divorces, in order to 
renegotiate political ties, during the run-up to an election (2003: 68, 73). For elites, marriage is 
first  a  political  issue.  Disoma  (1999)  writes  that  generally  clan  exogamous  marriages  are 
preferred but that most marriages are nevertheless clan endogamous since they are less physically 
and financially burdensome (p. 185).
299 
                                                 
298 In some cases, the kalaawi is also performed for the groom’s relatives so they can know if the marriage has been 
consummated. Because of arranged marriages, this is not always be the case. Information provided by Monalinda 
Doro and Amer Hassan E. Doro. 
299 For a debate on exogamy in lineage societies that define themselves predominantly as endogamous, see Ortner 
(1996): “It should be noted for future reference that even the export of chiefly daughters to other groups for purposes 
of foreign political alliances has significance different from that of the exogamy typically practiced in unilineal 
systems. Given the cultural emphasis on descent group endogamy in Polynesia, even exogamous  marriages are 
viewed as ‘incorporative’, or at least centripetal” (p. 70). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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  Marriages to non-Maranaos can be a source of problems for the children of the couple. 
The first choice in marriage partner is generally a full-blooded Maranao since status, rights, and 
support derive in large part from descent lines. Thus, non- or half-Maranaos have fewer (birth-) 
rights and less support within the Pat a Pangampong. This may become a handicap for those 
children wanting to serve as politicians and public servants in Lanao del Sur, or aspiring  to 
traditional titles. The preference for marrying a Maranao can, though, be broken with if the clan 
sees an advantage in doing so. In Lanao del Norte, the intermarriage between a Muslim and a 
Christian political family solved a rido and helped the Dimaporo family stay in power. Further, in 
a  status-oriented  society  people  might  overcome  a  lack  of  blood  status  by  achieving  status 
through other means, for example education (one MSU President was a half-Maranao). 
  Marrying Christian men may be acceptable for Maranao families if they convert (at least 
officially) to Islam and pay a proper bride price. However, it is generally easier for a man than for 
a woman to marry a non-Maranao since he is considered the head of the family and thus the wife 
has  to  follow  his  religion.  Such  intermarriages  increasingly  occur  among  male  Maranao 
merchants, seen by some as part of “bringing Islam to non-Muslim communities” (Madale 1997: 
111).
300 To remedy the problem of a lack of descent line for the children, a man might be asked 
by his clan to additionally marry a Maranao woman in order to remain legitimate in the eyes of 
Maranao society and in consequence to keep the claim to a certain title within his family. 
Marriages are usually arranged by the elders and often without asking the future couple. 
Some young girls stated that they prefer this, since the family knows best who will be a good 
partner. Respect towards the parents and elders of the clan and their decisions is rampant and is 
not easily questioned publicly, even though the child might disagree. Some women have been 
warned by their families not to bring their beloved, if he is Muslim but non-Maranao, to the 
house. These women finally have to decide between the wishes of their family and their beloved, 
with whom they would have to leave their home community. A bai a labi gives in an interview a 
concrete  example  of  being  pressured  into  an  arranged  marriage;  after  she  at  first  refused  to 
cooperate, she was “tricked” into agreeing by being presented with faits accomplis:  
I am a victim of young love. Parental marriage. Imagine I was only third year high 
school when I got married [approximately between 16 and 17 years old].
301 And 
                                                 
300 For a further debate on religiously mixed marriages in North Cotabato, see Lacar (1980). 
301 According to NSO statistics, the average age of newly-married Maranaos in the year 2000 was 25 in Marawi City, 
21 in Lanao del Sur, and 20 in the ARMM. In another survey concentrating on women in the Philippines, released in 
2005 but also based on the 2000 census, the average age to marry in the ARMM was 16. This statistic is confirmed 
by  the  Moro  women’s  organization  Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro  and  by  Bamgbose  (2003),  who  studied  three The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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when I graduated in the fourth year, I already have one daughter. Because my 
grandmother and the father of my husband were first cousins. So they were the 
one[s] who negotiated our marriage without our knowledge. We were not even 
consulted. And during our wedding, I did not know. Because we were in school 
and they were the one[s] having the wedding ceremony. But not  yet wedding, 
because I did not attend, they did not formally conduct the wedding ceremony. But 
they assembled together and they made the celebration.  
So after that they just dismissed without wedding because I was not there 
and I expressed already my refusal. So they have a technique that they told me that 
the marriage was postponed until I have finished my degree. So they told me you 
can  have  your  vacation  in  our  native  place  because  the  man  is  in  Manila 
continuing his study and waiting for you until you graduated. So I went home. 
That  was  vacation  time;  I  was  thinking  that  this  was  true.  So  that  was  their 
technique. Because when I arrived there, they sent someone to the family of the 
man to come and perform the wedding ceremony. So I cannot go out because I do 
not know where to go. During that time [in the 1970s], I did not know how to go 
to Iligan. Because we were not permitted to go out. We seldom go out. So I have 
nothing to do but follow their decision.  
How did I continue [my studies]? The reason why I was able to finish was 
my mother. She really supported me. My mother promised to me, as long as you 
cooperate with our decision you have no problem with your children. We will be 
the one to take care. So my mother took care of our children. And even fed us.  
We did not separate [from my parents] until we had five children. And we 
were still sharing with our parents. We shared with them, they gave us food, they 
gave us cloth[ing]. So they wait until I have a job and my husband also has a job. 
That is the time that we separated from them. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
Whereas  arranged  marriages  have  remained  the  norm,  procedures  have  changed,  especially 
concerning  courtship  regulations.  In  a  traditional  context,  courting  proper  starts  after  the 
wedding. Before, it takes place mainly between the families or between the future groom and the 
family of the future wife, via a go-between, or within certain formal structures. Abdulcal Alonto 
(1980a: 62-3) as well as Madale (1996: 21) mention the game kanggogorowa, playing teacher.
302 
Other forms of courtship were reported in the 1970s, showing a minimal form of choice (the man 
would choose his future partner). A woman from a royal family  whom I interviewed  related a 
meeting with her  future husband at the age of 14 . In 1974, a camp of the MNLF open ed in 
Tubaran, called Ranonun. The girl was talented  at  reciting the Qur’an and so was asked to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Maranao rural barangays (p. 69). 
302 In this game, ten women and ten men sit opposite each other in the yard of the torogan and in the middle there is a 
teacher, a guru. One woman goes to the guru and whispers the name of a man from the other group. If this man is the 
one who comes to the guru to whisper the next choice, he is caught and stays in the middle. The game ends when a 
group loses all its members. In case the women lose, they can ask for another game. Traditionally the loser — which 
will normally be the men since the game is played, even for several days, until the women win — gives gifts to the 
women and a carabao is slaughtered, making it a ceremonial offering. Today the game can be played without the 
gifts, when it is played at all. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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perform. Qur’an reading contests take place frequently and women as well as men will read the 
verses. This is also seen as one possibility to prove ones abilities and present oneself in front of 
the other sex, as was the case with royal women playing the kolintang in pre-martial law times.  
A commander of the MNLF noticed the girl reading the Qur’an and asked who she was. 
This was followed by a brief courtship. The man started bringing her gifts. Among others, he 
gave her half a piece of money on which a sura of the Qur’an was written and he kept the other 
half. Then, he asked his brother to be a go-between and she was given a bird. The bird carried the 
name of the suitor, symbolizing that the girl would take care of him. The parents of the two were 
satisfied with the choice since they wanted to strengthen the ties between the two families and the 
marriage was pushed through.  
With  the  introduction  of  co-education  and  non-segregated  working  places,  it  became 
easier for future couples to get to know each other without the supervision of the parents. In one 
case, members of two different clans fell in love at their work place. The family, which wanted 
the girl to marry someone else, refused the man’s proposal. However, the man would not stop 
courting the parents. After two other attempts, the family asked the girl whom she would like to 
marry. She answered that she would follow the decision of the elders. Since the suitor had a good 
family background and seemed to be very serious in his attempt, the family finally decided that 
the two could marry.  
Especially in (co-educated) non-Islamic schools and universities, young girls and boys 
might have (sometimes in secret) a boy- or girlfriend. Emails and mobile phones are one way to 
communicate without the supervision of the family. A young woman might be snobbish about 
such advances since it is the maratabat of women to behave with integrity and they are supposed 
to appear as “hard to get” whereas the man can plead with a woman to be with him. Women will 
show their interest more indirectly; thus it may be the sisters of a man who is a potential marriage 
candidate who tell him that there are women interested in him. Other women, however, may write 
secret love letters or give away their phone numbers. In some cases in Iligan, young Muslim 
women take off their veils and go to nightclubs. This is possible if they study and live in the city 
without  the  direct  supervision  of  their  parents.  Some  young  professionals  emphasized  that  a 
certain time of “rebellion” is not unusual among the youth. After that, they may discover the 
value of Islam. Non-Muslim NGO workers in Iligan City remarked that these actions sometimes 
lead to trouble among Christian and Maranao men when the latter want to defend the maratabat 
of their female relatives. As the murder case reported by the bai a labi in this chapter shows (see The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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appendix  10),  love  affairs  and  the  transgression  of  traditional  gender  roles  can  have  severe 
consequences. These lie within the realm of the body and family arrangements in which young 
women do not have any say. Moro Islamic feminists campaign for more rights for young women 
in the choice of marriage partners and thus against the traditional practice of arranging marriages 
against the will of the girl. To underscore their argument, they highlight the fact that “the consent 
of the girl [to marry a certain person] is indispensable,” quoting several hadith to back up their 
claim within the Islamic context, giving them more authority against traditionalists, since adat is 
supposed to be derived from the Qur’an (Anayatin et al. 2003: 73). 
  Parents whose marriages were arranged sometimes fear that such a marriage may not 
work out, among others because they themselves had bad experiences with it or maybe because, 
in contact with Filipino mainstream culture, they have lost belief in it. A Maranao woman, by 
now an elder, gave one example of such changing marriage patterns. She is the daughter of a 
Western-educated  Miss  Lanao  and  of  the  first  Muslim  graduate  of  the  Philippine  Military 
Academy (then appointed Lanao military governor). She reports that her father gave the couple a 
chance to get to know each other before marriage and refused to arrange her marriage entirely. He 
even encouraged her to entertain possible suitors: 
My father did not believe in arranged marriages. Whenever there were men that 
were interested in us, he said: go and court! You know he was a very educated 
man. He was so advanced. Whenever we had male visitors and we did not like to 
entertain, he gets very angry and he said, you should not have this attitude, even if 
you do not like this person you should entertain [which was traditionally the task 
of the family since the daughter stayed hidden], because when a man take[s] court 
to you they are doing you the highest honor. Because among all the women that he 
has seen, he has chosen you. You need not accept him, but to entertain, and you 
can turn him down politely. (Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
However, it is questionable how broad her choices really were. She finally married a relative of 
hers who had been a lawyer and who later on became Lanao del Sur vice-governor. This was a 
choice  that,  even  though  not  arranged,  does  somehow  fit  into  the  usual  pattern  of  marriage 
partners.  
Other families will still arrange marriages but allow their child to meet his or her partner 
before the marriage is finalized. The children thus have the possibility to get to know each other 
as well as their families as possible future in-laws. This change in the way marriages are arranged 
does not mean that one can easily refuse the chosen candidate. A Bai explains: 
Bai: Marriage, there is now a change. Before marriage was prearranged. My marriage is 
of same kind, but it worked. There are always advantages and disadvantages. One The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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disadvantage is for instance: what if the marriage will not work? Second will be 
the  maturity  of  both.  That  is  why  currently,  what  is  being  done  actually  — 
probably  also  because of the change of the  culture  — is  that, it is  still being 
prearranged . . . but at the same time, the parents of the woman will say: “Oh, you 
let  your son  be there.  So that they  will know each other.” So it is not  like a 
surprise. . .  
Birte Brecht: What will happen, if the couple meets and does not like each other? 
Bai: There is actually a tendency that it will be ok. In most cases, around 90%. And the 
only reason will be that the marriage will not work, if one of them is also having 
an eye on somebody else. But also, this has changed because of the influence of 
Islam [which discourages divorce]. (Interview, Marawi City, 2007) 
This means that marriages, even though the couple has the chance to get to know each other 
before, remain arranged and the moral pressure to stay married is high through the influence of 
conservative Islam. Islamic feminists, on the other hand, propagate the Muslim family code in 
order to emphasize that women in the framework of Islam have the right to divorce, which is, 
according to them, not widely known. They also emphasize that, if the two do not like each other, 
they  might  not  get  married  if  there  are  severe  reasons.  Disregarding  these  rather  modern 
developments,  the  couple  might  still  be  “tricked”  into  marriage  by  traditional  parents.  The 
woman (or the man) then might refuse sexual intercourse; officially, the marriage is thus not yet 
finalized. This may lead to an annulment of the marriage, or the husband demanding his rights 
before a court, or the elders or the parents might convince the husband or the wife to fulfill their 
duty towards their family. When the woman rejects the proposal, it also may happen that the time 
of getting to know each other and thus of official courting before the wedding is lengthened until 
she agrees to the marriage. A Maranao NGO worker explains this form of procrastination:  
For instance in my case, our family . . . He [the husband] is actually my uncle by 
second degree, but at the same time it was his decision [to marry me]. So it was 
his decision and the parents were the ones to arrange it. And so my parents said: 
“You let your son come here and you will see.” 
 I was trying to escape from that, I was trying to really avoid that. Probably, 
no, not that I had someone else in mind, but my problem at that time was, we 
worked  together  in  some  youth  activities.  That  only  I  really  preserved  my 
integrity,  my  dignity,  because  I  was  always  going  out,  because  I  see  that  my 
parents would say: “Oh, that's why you were always going there!” So for me, to 
prevent that, I also have to prove that: Well I know him, and I probably met him, 
but we really did not have any relationship. So it took him, I think, four years.  
We were engaged in 1992, but the marriage . . . I cannot explain it, the 
engagement was broken sometimes three, twice, and then again. But the marriage 
finally happened in 1996. (Interview, Iligan City, 2007) The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Despite the general statement that arranged marriages work out well since the couple learns to 
love each other, this is not always the case and many have suffered from being forced to marry a 
person they did not want. Some arranged marriages end in divorce; others cannot divorce since 
the clan does not agree or since the marriage was linked to settling a rido and a divorce would 
lead to another outbreak. Hilsdon (2003) describes the tremendous pressure on women regarding 
arranged marriages, which are often connected with the threat of a potential violent conflict, 
defining the situation as one of violence against women. Some women and men who have been 
married off by their parents without their consent say that their children will not go through the 
same hardship and that they will not arrange their marriages. However, even if one parent or both 
refuse to arrange the marriage of their children, the extended family might still do so. Thus, 
arranged marriages, being deeply connected to the achievement of power and influence, have 
remained the norm in order to strengthen family politics. Modern neo-traditional conditions have, 
however, brought a new version of arranged marriages in which the future couple is consulted 
and has time to get to know each other.  
2. Bride Price: Between Security and Sellout 
Betang  (bride price) is  defined by  Disoma  (1999) as “property sought of  a man (the 
groom) by the guardian of the woman (bride) as a requisite for marriage” (p. 40). This might 
include money and a piece of land that can be tilled by the couple or a relative of the bride. The 
main part of the bride price is usually given to the bride’s parents, close relatives, and friends. 
Madale (1996) describes how during a traditional wedding the relatives of the bride demand their 
share of the dowry (a term commonly used in place of the word betang): 
Long speeches extolling the virtues of the bride are delivered by relatives who 
desire a big share in the dowry. Through it all, the groom's parents shell out money 
and more money until they can no longer give. (p. 136) 
In addition to the dowry, a share (adat) is given to the datus, sultans, bais, and the imam who help 
to prepare the wedding (Benitez-Barcenas 1984-85). The bride receives a gift. Disoma (1999) 
notes that let a igaan/sayat (gift to the bride) for royalties was before colonization a bed with an 
okir design
303 and sets of dishes (p. 39). With the introduction of modern kitchen equipment, 
                                                 
303 Okir is a Maranao artistic design. Madale writes that “Maranaw men use flowing scroll signs suggestive of 
femininity, while the opposite is true of the female” who use zigzag geometric male designs, which are predominant 
on mats or malongs. The designs of men are named okir a dato and those of women okir a bae (1997: 95). An okir 
design is associated with social rank since “only the sultan has the monopoly to display the different okir motifs” 
(Madale 1996: 3). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
333 
instead of dishes the bride might get a washing machine or electronic appliances (Madale 1997: 
41); the gift can also be a house or a car. In case the husband fails to give this gift, she can refuse 
to be with him (Disoma 1999: 39).  
A Muslim bride has according to the CMPL (Art. 36, 4) and the Qur’an (4:4)
304 the right 
to a gift which is sometimes called a dowry, sometimes mahr. The husband gives this gift to the 
bride; the amount and even the time when the wife receives it depend upon the regulations of the 
families.  The  Moro  Islamic  feminist  group  Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro  criticizes  cultural 
practices whereby nothing is left to the wife and everything is spent for the wedding or on the 
relatives: 
the mahr pertains to the bride, and not to anyone else. It is not a “bride price” that 
is given to the parents or guardians of the bride. It should also not be used for the 
payment  of  expenses  incurred  in  the  celebration  of  the  marriage.  Yet,  these 
erroneous beliefs are observed in many instances, to the detriment of the bride. 
(Homepage of Musawah, National Profiles: The Philippines, 2010) 
Some families, in explaining their actions through reference to Islam or other reasons, do not give 
an  expensive  celebration  but  the  betang  is  given  to  the  couple.  The  amount  of  the  betang 
formerly depended on the class rank and the potential claims a woman could be heir to as well as 
the rank of the man and the relations between the families. After colonialization other elements of 
importance were introduced: for example education or profession, and thus ability to contribute 
to the family income. However, a low ranking half-Maranao woman would not get as much 
betang as a full-blooded Maranao woman coming from a high-ranking clan, even though they 
have the same education or profession. A high betang is also paid because it can be expected that 
a Maranao woman with extensive clan connections will become a high-ranking government or 
political figure because of her clan affiliation. One example was a female lawyer from the Alonto 
clan: another clan offered large sums of money for her hand and the family of the groom, also a 
lawyer, spent hundreds of thousands of pesos for thanksgiving (kandori) parties in Marawi City 
and Cotabato City. The groom may have had some political ambitions in proposing to the woman 
and spending such a large amount of money. Marriage and bride price are thus among other 
things  connected to access  to political  influence, not  only because the wife  could  become a 
                                                 
304 “And give to the women (whom you marry) their mahr (obligatory bridal-money given by the husband to his wife 
at the time of marriage) with a good heart; but if they, of their own good pleasure, remit any part of it to you, take it, 
and enjoy it without fear of any harm (as All￢h has made it lawful)” (The Qur’an, in an English version that is used 
in Lanao del Sur). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
334 
politician but also because the chances for the groom to be supported by the clan of the wife in 
his political ambitions increases.  
Today’s  betang,  especially  among  political  clans,  can  hit  PHP  1  million  (about  EUR 
17,000), but this might just be the sum being announced publicly as a means to represent the rank 
of the family rather than the actual amount being given. An average betang might be about PHP 
500,000 (about EUR 8,500) and a low one about PHP 100,000 (about EUR 1,700). There are 
cases when it is set very high to prevent a candidate from marrying the person of his choice. 
However, it is possible for women to contribute secretly to the betang in order to be able to marry 
the man of her choice; this is an option that may annoy the elders of the community and which 
thus may be kept secret. In other cases, the betang is reasonable since the family is more practical 
or has Islamic motives. Traditionally, the whole community of the groom contributed financially 
(tabang) to the bride price, seeing it as money that is borrowed and is expected to be repaid in 
future. If a family is rich, the assistance of others might not be asked and thus the family is not 
obligated towards them (Madale 1996: 135).  
A well-educated Maranao woman recounted her problems with the idea of a bride price 
and how her perception changed when she started to understand it as dower (morning gift, in an 
Islamic context, mahr), which would make it difficult for the husband to divorce her or marry 
another woman. Her main argument was that it would be hard for him to spend that much money 
a second time. Additionally, if there is a mahr that was not already given to the wife but can be 
demanded by her in case of trouble,
305 this can, especially if the  mahr is high, be seen as a 
protection of her rights. In case of a possible divorce initiated by the wife a high mahr may, 
however, present a difficulty. In the framework of the CMPL, when a woman is demanding the 
divorce according to khul (release), she has to give back the dower/mahr, or part of the dowry to 
the husband. In case she has to give back money when seeking a divorce and it has already been 
spent, this might become a financial problem for the wife, since this form of divorce is the only 
possibility for a Muslim woman to initiate a separation without having severe reasons for it.
306  
That  the  bai  in  the  following  interview  emphasized  that  the  high  dowry  provides 
protection  against  divorce  or  a  second  wife  by  the  husband,  and  is  not  a  hindrance  to  her 
                                                 
305 According to Madale (1997) the wife can, in times of trouble, ask for the sela sa adat, which is part of the dowry 
but which is not demanded by the wife except in times of discontent between the couple (p. 43). In case the sela sa 
adat is very high, this might prevent the husband from divorcing his wife. 
306 Other forms of divorce can only be demanded if there are severe reasons according to Islamic law, like impotence. 
Dissolving the marriage (divorce according to faskh), or the right to talaq (repudiation) cannot be initiated by the 
wife herself unless this right was delegated to the wife by her spouse. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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divorcing him, can partly be explained by the fact that only men can take a second wife and 
because it is easier for men to get a divorce in the Islamic framework (Disoma 1999: 46). The 
bride price and/or gift, however, make it more difficult for a man to remarry, not only because of 
the financial burden but also because of community pressure: 
the dowry is a gift actually, it’s supposedly a dower, a gift to the woman. But in 
the culture of the Maranaos . . . if you are educated your dowry becomes higher. 
Before I really did not appreciate, it is like I'm being sold. But it is only afterwards 
that I realized that, you can actually consider it as a safeness. You can prevent any 
broken family, not good relationships between the two. Because for instance, even 
on the money alone, the man will realize that: “I cannot afford to give another 
dowry again. So I might as well give [everything] for this marriage. 
[Divorce,  especially  since  the  influence  of  Islamic  revival,  or  taking  a 
second wife is prevented] because you are not only marrying a woman alone but 
you are marrying a whole clan. You are guarded by the whole clan and your clan is 
also guarding your man, he is also guarded by the whole clan. Because they will 
say: “Oh! I contributed something so it is going to be a shame for the family if you 
do not do good!” Because all of them went there [to the wedding] all of them 
became responsible for your action. So it becomes not just a marriage of the two 
but a marriage actually between the clans. (Interview, Iligan City, 2007) 
A marriage is not only an individual commitment but a community affair in order to connect 
certain families and clans. This is especially important in case of political clans, which arrange 
their affinal relationships strategically in order to gain support from as many persons as possible. 
The clans thus have influence on marriages and divorces, not only for financial but also for 
social-political  reasons.  This  can  be  understood  as  an  advantage  and  a  form  of  security. 
Nevertheless, it can be a disadvantage in case one would like to divorce (or stay married) and is 
hindered in doing so through community pressure or a financial burden. Such situations might 
turn into violent conflicts such as that described in chapter two where a cousin-in-law kidnapped 
the wife and the husband retaliated by shooting the kidnapper in the back.  
3. Polygyny and Divorce: The Importance of Family Politics 
Mednick wrote in the 1960s that high social pressure from the relatives of the wives’ 
descent lines (which is normally higher than or equal to that of the husband) to treat the wives 
equally resulted in a low number of polygynous marriages. In case one wife is treated differently 
from the other, the one being disadvantaged would be backed up by her relatives in demanding 
equal status since it would be a blow to their maratabat to be treated below their status. From the 
start and because it is connected with a status of inferiority, a family does not willingly give its 
women as second wives (Mednick 1965: 158; see also Disoma 1999: 50). According to custom, a The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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man can take a second wife if the first one allows him to do so, in case she is sterile, physically 
infirm or unfit, or in  case of avoidance of a decree of restitution of marital acts or insanity 
(Tawano 1979: 123). However, a fine has to be paid to the family of the first wife to appease their 
maratabat (Cayongcat 1984: 54). To marry more than one Maranao wife is thus expensive but it 
is also a gain to the husband and prestige-laden since it means he can afford to have more than 
one wife and since he is now connected to more families who will help to support him in certain 
respects, for example elections or ridos, concerning the kin group. To avoid asking someone 
outside of the clan for help, it is useful to have a large number of relatives who are culturally 
encouraged to support each other. 
  Polygamous marriages are not the norm but there are some, in addition there are those 
which remain only temporary (mut’ah)
307, when Shia law
308 is applied (Madale 1997: 44). Those 
in favor of polygamy argue that the right to marry several women was given by Allah  “in an 
understanding of the nature of men. ” A woman should not be selfish and  should  share the 
husband since there are more women than men in the society because of war, which is accepted 
as a valid Islamic reason. Further, according to a global  Islamic narrative of justification, 
polygyny was established to take care of widows and orphans, and because of polygyny, there are 
no outcasts in a Muslim society since there are no secret girlfriends or illicit children. Finally, by 
accepting a polygynous marriage the woman will get the blessings from Allah and “a sure ticket 
to heaven” (ibid.). 
  Maranao  politicians  and  traditional  leaders  are  known  to  practice  polygyny  for  many 
reasons: to broaden their political base, to acquire certain descent lines, or for pecuniary reasons, 
as when a clan leader marries a relative who is a government employee and thus can help to 
increase the financial status of the man. One famous example of a recent polygynous marriage 
involved a man of high political and religious influence who married six wives (the majority of 
them non-Maranaos) and justified his situation by saying that a man can marry four wives, and, 
as reported by a bai a labi commenting on the marriages, “one plus two plus three plus four is 
even more than six.”  
 
                                                 
307 The duration of this marriage depends on the contract the couple has made. A mahr can be given.  
308 The exact differentiation between Shia and Sunni doctrines is not always observed in everyday life. The majority 
of Maranao are Sunni and the Shia community remains small, sometimes sharing mosques with Sunnis. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 31: A Datu and His Wives, 1930s 
Datu Dagalangit and some of his 13 wives, about 1930s, Lanao, Lumba Bayabao. Most women wear the malong and 
the kumbung. Photo kindly provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman. 
 
In the 1960s, high-ranking men preferred to divorce their first wife before marrying a 
second. One datu had 15 wives, one after the other, and he was said to have been the most 
powerful datu of his time since he had the most connections (Mednick 1965: 160). Bamgbose 
(2003) notes that divorce rates in Lanao del Sur, as estimated by Maranao women, were about 
70% in the 1970s. Since then they have decreased to about an estimated 20%. Some women 
argued that this decrease can be attributed to the influence of Islam, which allows divorce but 
discourages it (p. 72). 
A divorced woman according to Islamic law should not remarry for three months after 
divorce, in case she is pregnant, so as to establish paternity of the baby. Maranaos do not follow 
this law. Instead, “her guardians or close relatives ‘marry her off’ to another person, preferably 
from within the kinship, who cannot easily refuse the marriage, or he will be branded as a kin 
who has no maratabat” (Disoma 1999a: 47). A divorcee is said to have lost status and the bride 
price for the second marriage is lower than that of her first (ibid.: 41). Muslim men and women 
can demand divorce at a sharia court: a study on divorce cases filed in Basilan and Marawi found 
that the majority of those filing cases are women but that “very few of the cases are decided,” 
since the husband, despite many summonses, just does not appear in court (Abdulkarim 2001: 24; 
see also Solamo-Antonio 2003: 17, 43).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
338 
  Islam  regulated  polygyny  by  reducing  the  number  of  wives  to  four,  but  it  also 
strengthened the right to marry more than one woman. It remains an advantage to have several 
wives because of an increase in political connections and prestige. Traditional features, such as 
marrying  numerous  wives  by  divorcing  one  after  the  other,  were  limited.  Divorce  patterns 
changed according to Bamgbose (2003) because of Islamic influence, which discouraged divorce. 
Sharia courts grant women the right to divorce but they often do not have enough authority to 
enforce these laws before the clan and the families. Generally, it can be said that the influence of 
a conservative Islamic resurgence is huge regarding family structures and that the rights (for 
example to divorce) provided by it are diminished. 
B. Gender Norms and Sanctions 
1. Illicit Sexual Relations: A Strong Conservative Traditional and Islamic Moral Code 
Disoma (1999: 68), Hilsdon (2003: 25), and Madale (1997: 37) report cases of female 
circumcision among Maranaos but do not explain which form is practiced. A publication by the 
Pilipina Legal Resources Center, Inc. (PLRC) described the procedure as done in Mindanao in 
the following manner:  
The circumcision may range from mere touching of the girl’s vagina with a cotton 
swab to the light scraping of the vagina with the sharp edge of a bamboo stick. In 
some cases, the swab hides from the child the end of a knife that is actually used 
for the scraping. (Anayatin et al. 2003: 66)  
Even though the Qur’an does not demand female circumcision, traditionally Maranao women 
were  considered  pious  if  circumcised.  Sagola  Tago,  a  member  of  the  Muslim  Feminist Al-
Mujadilah Foundation, writes that circumcision is not practiced anymore and that this is seen by 
elders as a reason why young Maranao girls of today are “more wild and hot” (2003: 51). The 
moral code of women “snobbing away” in case of courtship, however, generally remained. A 
Maranao woman should not show any interest in sexual activity or sexual gratification. The wife 
is not supposed to expose her body to the husband but to show reserve towards him. Women 
should be:  
demure, reserved, refined. A wife should not refuse her husband when he wants to 
have sex because of the hadith that women will be cursed.
309 Women have also 
been taught to be submissive to the husband at all times. (ibid: 50)  
                                                 
309 If a husband calls his wife to his bed [i.e. to have sexual relations] and she refuses and causes him to sleep in 
anger, the angels will curse her till morning (Bukhari 4.54.460). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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As a Maranao Muslim feminist states, the husband or the family decide in most of the cases how 
many children will be born, while the wife is not supposed to use family planning without the 
consent of her husband and the family (Lao 2001: 77). Women have no control over their bodies 
since birth control and abortion are frowned upon. Unmarried women are expected to keep their 
virginity until marriage. For married women, family planning is more likely to be accepted, for 
example,  when  the  wife’s  health  would  be  in  danger.  In  such  cases,  natural  measures  like 
withdrawal  or  rhythm  are  used  predominantly.  This  trend  corresponds  to  the  national 
developments; thus the UN reports that 47% of married Filipino women who used contraceptive 
methods  in  2000  applied  traditional  methods  whereas  only  28%  opted  for  modern  methods 
(Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat).
310  
  Women's rights groups emphasize that contraceptive methods are not prohibited by Islam 
and that during the Prophet’s time, Muslims practiced al az’l (coitus interruptus). They argue that 
some  ulama  claim  that  contraceptive  practices  that  do  not  destroy  the  ability  to  procreate 
permanently are permissible and that the aversion against family planning “is based on the belief 
that they should propagate Islam by reproducing as many children as possible” (Anayatin et al. 
2003: 75). This, however, they note, is negated by the Qur’an itself which emphasizes that it is 
not the (number of) children who will bring the believer nearer to Allah (Saba 34:37).
311 The 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reports that in the ARMM a special project was 
designed in the 1990s to target a community with higher maternal and infant mortality rates than 
the national average. Ulama were included in this project to advocate the advantages of family 
planning. They went on a study tour to  Indonesia and Egypt to discuss the issue with other 
religious leaders. On this basis, literature promoting family planning was published and, as a 
consequence, an increased number of Muslim Filipinos using contraception was reported in 1999 
                                                 
310 Family planning in the Philippines is partly dependent on the decisions of the local government units. There are 
areas where family planning is especially discouraged, as for example in the City of Manila. In 2000, Mayor Lito 
Atienza issued an order effectively banning birth control from city-funded clinics; birth control can thus only be 
bought at private clinics or received freely from local or international NGOs.  The UNFPA (2005) describes the 
general politics of the Philippines towards family planning as “retrogressive” with regard to funding of modern 
methods. Instead,  “natural” family planning is promoted (p. 49). In 2009 a bill, authored by, among others, by 
“Noynoy” Aquino, was blocked in Congress that would have required municipal health centers to provide free birth 
control services and products. Representatives of the Catholic Church in particular lobbied against the bill. A survey 
conducted by the Social Weather Station in March 2010, however, showed that seven in ten Filipinos would defy the 
Roman Catholic Church and elect a president who supported the use of condoms and pills for birth control. 
311 “And it is not your wealth, nor your children that bring you nearer to Us [i.e., pleases All￢h], but only he who 
believes [in Islamic Monotheism], and does righteous deeds [will please Us]; as for such, there will be twofold 
reward for what they did, and they will reside in the high dwellings [Paradise] in peace and security” (The Qu’ran, in 
an English translation (with comments/explanations in brackets) of the Qur’an that is widely used in Lanao del Sur). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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(UNFPA  2005:  41).  Later  on,  a  Special  Committee  on  Reproductive  Health  and  Family 
Management was established, headed by the House of Islamic Opinion of Central Mindanao. It 
drafted a religious fatwah “stating that contraceptive methods were acceptable as long as they 
were safe, legal, in accordance with the Islamic sharia, and approved by a credible physician 
(preferably Muslim) for the benefit of both the mother and the child” (ibid.). The Grand Mufti of 
Egypt endorsed the fatwah, which was publicly pronounced in the Philippines in March 2004 
“with two hundred Muslim religious leaders from all over the country in attendance” (ibid.). The 
fatwah, however, is rather vague and the question remains what is safe and legal according to the 
sharia.  
  Among the urban middle class in Iligan and Marawi, the contraceptive pill is used, often 
without the knowledge of the husband, since women can easily purchase them in Iligan City 
(Bamgbose 2003: 76). The PLRC, however, reports that Muslim women in the Philippines often 
reject the contraceptive pill because they are afraid of the side effects, “sometimes even without 
basis.” The behavior is explained by the lack of education and information on family planning. 
Thus, the fertility rate continues to rise (Anayatin et al. 2003: 69). 
Muslim  women’s  activists  emphasize  that  Islam  allows  family  planning.  Muslim 
conservatives instead defend a contra-family planning politics with the argument that the nature 
of women is to have children and that contraception is incompatible with Islam since it goes 
against “the divine plan.” Children are generally perceived as a blessing and a pregnant woman 
as being blessed by Allah. She should ideally be treated like the queen of the house. In case her 
family and husband fail to do so and she loses the child, this “would be blamed on the person 
displeasing her and not on the woman for not taking care of herself” (Madale 1997: 31). Clans 
usually want to keep their bloodlines, and children are seen as tools for establishing connections 
with powerful families. Children also help in keeping or increasing the size of the clan and as a 
possible source of support of clan members. The social pressure on a couple to have children 
immediately after marriage is tremendous. Likewise, the status of parents is dependent on the 
number of children, with those having more children having higher status. It does not matter if 
the child is a girl or a boy.
312 The average number of children born to married women 15 to 49 
years old in the year 2000 was 3.24 in the ARMM (3.7 in Lanao del Sur). Though this is not the 
                                                 
312 In the 1970s, a ritual “brought about by Islam” was introduced that demanded the slaughter of one goat if the 
child is female, and two if a male child is born (Plawan 1979: 79). It is unknown to me whether this ritual is still 
practiced.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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highest birth rate per region in the Philippines
313, the highest unmet need for family planning is 
documented for the ARMM (33%), followed closely by Region V (32%) (NSO 2000/2008). This 
shows  the  dominance  of  conservative  Filipino   religious  agents  advocating  strategic  family 
politics in their opposition to family planning against public demands for access to it.  
When  a  Maranao  woman  gets  pregnant  before  marriage,  the  man  has  to  give  a  high 
monetary  contribution  to  the  family  of  the  woman  and  an  arrangement  is  made  to  hide  the 
incident
314 (like marrying the woman to a relative). Sometimes,  a secret abortion becomes an 
option (Kanti 2003: 49).
315 In the worst case, the woman or the man, or both  — in contradiction 
to Islamic demands, where for illicit sex in which no adultery is involved the punishment is 
hundred lashes (which can also lead to death)  —  are  killed by relatives because they  have 
besmirched the honor of the family, with greater “embarrassment on the girl’s kinsmen” than  to 
the boy’s kinsmen (Pumbaya 2003: 210). Some couples choose to elope in order to hide at  the 
place of an authority of the clan who will mediate. They  may be forgiven and get married. In 
other cases, they would have to leave the area or hide their identity.  If the marriage of an eloped 
couple is arranged, it might be mediated by a bai a labi, a sultan, or a datu.  
  In the event of adultery, the husband may kill his wife. In some cases, he cannot retaliate 
because the woman comes from a higher-ranking clan or descent line. Sometimes, a divorce and 
a new marriage take place because the adultery is seen as resulting from the “force of nature.”
316 
If the wife is killed because of adultery, her family does not consistently take revenge:  this 
depends also on personal considerations about the guilt of the victim. A datu recounts: 
In the case of one prominent leader in Marawi City, his wife, a member of a big 
clan  in  Malabang,  was  involved  in  an  amorous  affair  with  a  soldier  based  in 
Malabang. After finding out that his wife is really involved with the soldier, a 
shameful predicament in the eyes of the Maranao society, the man caused the 
death of his wife by hiring a killer. The killer ambushed the woman on her way to 
Malabang. She was killed instantly. The soldier was reassigned to another posting. 
                                                 
313 The highest birth rate can be found in Region V (Bicol) and Caraga with 3.4 children per mother. 
314 The marrying off even of victims of rape can also be found as a solution in the national law of the Philippines 
which states that in case a rapist marries his victim, he is absolved of the charges. Article 89 of the Revised Penal 
Code of the Philippines, in relation to Article 344 and Article 266-C, holds that “marriage of the offended woman 
and the offender in crimes against chastity shall extinguish criminal liability.” 
315 Local Muslim women's activists note that abortion is not prohibited by Islam when the life of the mother is in 
danger. For some schools of Islamic law, abortion is permissible during the first three months (Anayatin et al. 2003: 
75). Filipino laws (which prohibit abortion except when the life of the woman is in danger) are thus even stricter than 
some Islamic interpretations. Nevertheless, illegal abortion is relatively easily available in the Philippines. According 
to a United Nations Population Fund report, half of the Philippines’ 3.1 million annual pregnancies are unwanted or 
unintended, and 400,000 of them end in abortion (UNFPA 2005: 31). 
316 For an example, see in this chapter, III.B.2, “The Executive Rights of the Family: Norm and Sanction.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The family of the woman did not contemplate revenge because the accusation was 
true. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
Women as well as men can get into trouble for having sex outside of their marriage. In reality, the 
man’s position is privileged, with the legal possibility of having several wives and availing of the 
right to temporary marriages under the Shia tradition. Additionally, like in the Philippines in 
general,
317 it is more commonly accepted  for married men to have secret affairs outside of the 
community than for women. It is the maratabat of the woman that is spoiled; the man involved is 
seen  as  the  aggressor  who  has  spoiled  it.  The  family  might  banish  a  woman  because  of 
promiscuity (Gutoc 2003: 52). Women are also more restricted concerning sex before marriage; 
thus the state of virginity becomes crucial. In arranged marriages, the bride’s family is asked 
privately about the bride’s status as a single woman. The bride’s family guarantees the virginity 
and purity of the woman; failure would entail great dishonor. In addition, there is a move to 
duplicate the tradition in Egypt, which requires the groom to use a handkerchief after coitus to 
extract blood from the bride’s vagina as proof that the woman was a virgin.  
Human trafficking is another issue that Maranao women’s activists are concerned about. 
“Due to lack of choices and opportunities within the country, many girls choose to engage in 
high-risk  occupations  abroad,  including  being  trafficked  in  prostitution,”  domestically  or 
internationally  (Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro,  quoted  on  the  homepage  of  Musawah,  2010). 
Women who are caught being prostitutes risk being killed by their families since this spoils the 
family maratabat. A datu remembers one case among a related clan: 
A member of a well-to-do Maranao family, a girl, fell in love with a Maranao boy 
who comes from a not so prominent family and was reprimanded by her clan. She 
was not allowed to see her boyfriend again whereupon she was sent to Manila to 
further her studies under the care of her aunt. In the years that followed, the clan 
did not know what she was doing outside her school. One day, she was caught 
engaged in prostitution in Manila and this revelation shamed her clan especially 
her brother. Her mother fell ill and she has to go back to Marawi City to see her 
ailing mother. A day after her arrival, the family confronted her whereupon she 
denied their accusations but her brother has enough evidence to prove that she 
                                                 
317 In the Philippines, definitions of what constitutes adultery are different for men and women. A woman commits 
adultery if she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband. A married man is considered to commit adultery 
“only when he keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, has sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with 
a woman not his wife, or cohabits with a concubine in any other place.” Senator Richard J. Gordon commented on 
this:  “Thus,  if  the  husband's  sexual  relations  with  a  woman  not  his  wife  does  not  fall  in  any  one  of  these 
circumstances, he is not criminally liable, unlike the wife where all it takes for her to be criminally liable is one 
sexual intercourse  with a  man not  her husband.” (Proposed Act to Change  the Crime of Adultery Into Marital 
Infidelity, Amending Article 333 and Article 334 of Act No. 3815). In addition, the Penal Code on extra-marital 
sexual relations provides “that women should have a maximum penalty of six years imprisonment, and men four 
years — thereby reinforcing the double standards regarding sexual infidelity” (UNFPA 2005: 11). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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prostituted herself in Manila. Later, her brother pulled out a gun and his mother 
was trying to shield her from him but the man lunged at her and shot her in the 
head.  She  died  instantly.  She  was  buried  in  an  undisclosed  grave  to  hide  the 
family’s shame. (Written statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
Bamgbose  reports  that  pregnancy  from  rape  is  not  usually  talked  about  since  the 
maratabat of the woman and her family is spoiled. Rape, among other things, was part of the 
Philippines’ Muslim war in the 1970s when soldiers raped women in the communities. Today it is 
said that most women are immediately evacuated in case of conflict and thus removed from the 
risk of being sexually violated (2003: 89). However, the risk of being raped during war time 
remains an issue. A woman who has become pregnant from a rape may be brought to a large city 
like Cebu or Manila to give birth in an unmarried mothers’ institution. She may then return home 
without the baby (2003: 79). Bamgbose concludes that the threat of retaliation by the family of 
the violated woman creates a culture of silence since the “victims do not want their assault to 
result  in  further  violence”  (ibid.:  79;  Maruhom  2003:  52).  Rape  (kapelolobed)  counts  as  an 
offense, like murder (bono), elopement (katengaga), abduction (kapalagoy sa babay), mauling 
(kaperaraneg), and false accusation (katongkir sa di benar), which can be cause for a rido (Intuas 
1996: 95). Cases of Maranao women being sexually violated while being in prison do not end up 
in rido since their families feel ashamed and keep it a secret. In a report on Internally Displaced 
People (IDPs) in Lanao, Dela Torre and Gloria (2007) state that women are particularly in danger 
of sexual abuse and slavery in times of refuge but that they usually will not talk about the abuse:  
Cases of sexual abuse and slavery in the hinterland municipality of Butig were 
told  by  the  IDPs  to  NGO  workers  in  Marawi  City  in  hush-hush  tones  as  the 
prevailing culture prevents them from saying it openly for fear of shaming the 
concerned women and their families. In Muslim communities, it is difficult to get 
a  documentation  of  serious  violations  of  human  rights  perpetrated  against 
displaced  men  and  women  during  and  as  an  aftermath  of  the  war.  Cultural 
concepts of pride and shame prevented families of the victims to surface, tell their 
stories and file cases in appropriate courts. Only anecdotal stories from service 
providers and some IDPs serve as telltale signs of the abuses. (p. 34) 
Considering the problem that sexual violence could not be addressed openly because of cultural 
norms, the Mindanao People’s Caucus included problems related to the issue in their national 
peace agenda. The conflict produces high numbers of refugees, while the “no war, no peace” 
environment, in which datus and warlords are dominant, increases the possibility of abuses of 
power. Deviance is common, as shown in the cases of gang rapes in Sulu of which scions of 
influential families were accused (Alipala 2009). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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2. The Executive Rights of the Family: Norm and Sanction 
According to Elwert (2004), “self-help” (Selbsthilfe) is one way to sanction the violation 
of a norm (p. 32). In relation to local conflicts, it is mainly up to the families or clans involved to 
decide  how  to  solve  them,  rather  than  through  a  centralized  state  power.  Interestingly,  the 
profession of lawyer is one of those associated with high status among Maranaos, since “he can 
represent  his  kin’s  interest  especially  in  disputes  and  conflicts  that  characterize  our  society” 
(Disoma 1999a: 26). However, apart from the prestige of the lawyer-title, there is actually a low 
demand for the profession, “due to the scarcity of cases submitted for adjudication in the justice 
system” (ibid.: 27). Instead, actors outside the state (rebel groups, warlords, religious leaders, and 
strongmen as well as clan elders, datus, bais, and sultans) have more influence on the definition 
of norms as well as the form and execution of sanctions in case they are broken (Fianza 2004: 
36). A datu, as part of the sultanate system, has to follow certain regulations, based on the taritib 
and  igma.  However,  since  leadership  is  permanently  being  challenged,  rules  are  open  to 
interpretation and depend on the power of the group enforcing them. It is finally the datu himself 
who decides what a datu has to do and not do. Beckett (quoted in Gutierrez and Vitug 2000) 
writes about datu-ship in Mindanao: “Thus finally, a datu is what a datu did” (p. 206).  
Since the elders, datus, and bais generally sanction the disregard of cultural norms, they 
might apply the tools that serve their own interests the most in order to sanction a violation. Thus, 
Vice-Governor Bai Monera Dimakuta Macabangon (2004-2007) applied the national law and 
filed administrative and criminal cases against Governor Basher “Mustaqbal” Manalao from the 
OMPIA  Party.  She  succeeded  and  assumed  the  position  of  governor  for  three  months  when 
Manalao was suspended by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) based 
on the complaints filed against him by the Provincial Board. The prevalence of the traditional 
system in national regulations can best be seen in relation to the authority of police officers. The 
police in some cases do not dare to interfere in a rido and just follow the advice of some elders. 
In one case, after a conflict, one family required police or military help to escort the culprits 
safely home. In other cases, elders decide to put the culprit in prison without a charge: he may be 
freed after they make a judgment according to the taritib, igma and Islamic law. Civil justice does 
not replace traditional laws: a person sent to national prison for a deed might still be shot down 
by the other party when released. 
Norms  can  be  enforced  by  the  family,  the  clan  or  by  state  agents  (who  might  be 
“privatized” by a political dynasty, see Kreuzer 2009). Depending on the context, different norms The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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are considered important. Thus in one family, a woman might not have problems if she wants to 
marry a Christian; in another family she might be threatened with ostracism by the community. In 
determining sanctions according to the taritib and igma, the descent line status has to be taken 
into consideration. Because of the law of the family and the importance of their position within 
the lineage system, sanctions and norms are, in practice, debatable to a certain degree, depending 
on the rank, position, attitude, and relations that the involved clans and persons have in society. 
This means that murder, for example, will not automatically follow adultery. The act might also 
be accepted as an expression of a law of nature, especially if the partner is from a higher ranking 
lineage and a marriage that follows will be to the advantage of the clan (see also Hilsdon 2003: 
27). Descent line status can thus overrule Islamic laws and has an influence on sanctions and 
normative decisions. There was a case of a woman from an influential clan who was having a 
secret love affair with a high-ranking politician. The husband found out and tried to shoot her 
(not the man) but failed. The affair could have been resolved if the male lover had divorced his 
first wife and married his mistress; her family would have accepted this as a “law of nature,” 
seeing an advantage in the connection. The divorce from the first wife, also from a high-ranking 
clan, was however refused by the politician since it might have disturbed the relationship between 
him and his wife’s clan. The option to take the mistress as a second wife was not accepted by her 
family since this is seen as a degradation of status (only lower-ranking women would agree to be 
a second wife) (Disoma 1999a: 39). Currently, she is secretly the second wife and she remains an 
outcast from her family who has to stay in Manila.  
Descent line status is important in relation to sanctions. If the family or clan sees an 
advantage  in  a  connection  to  another  person  via  marriage,  adultery  can  then  be  acceptable. 
Sanctions are thus to a certain degree debatable, depending on rank, status, and the attitude of the 
family and the persons involved. In this context, gender norms are also debatable since they 
become less important than the lineage system.  
III. Islam and Gender Norms 
A. Islamic Resurgence  
The global Islamic resurgence movement manifested itself in Mindanao in the late 1970s. 
Among other things,  this  resurgence can be seen in  the introduction of  sharia  laws  into  the 
national  constitution.  The  predominantly  conservative  Islamic  movement  had  particular 
consequences for gender relations. Most obviously, the impact of Islamic resurgence on the role The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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of women in society can be seen in the widespread adoption of an Islamic dress code for women. 
Wearing a veil even became obligatory for women in Marawi City under Mayor Mahid Mutilan 
of the Islamic OMPIA Party.  
Since the 1990s, civil society organizations have prospered, demanding rights for women, 
peace, and inter-religious dialogue in an Islamic framework, partly counterpoising conservative 
claims by reinterpretation of the Qur’an from a woman’s perspective. Since the 2000s, Islamic 
parties  have  lost  influence  in  Lanao,  and  are  being  replaced  by  traditional  elites.  Islamic 
feminism instead has had an impact on the recently developed ARMM Gender and Development 
(GAD) Code (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 280), on which the Moro feminist group 
Nisa Ul-Haqq Fi Bangsamoro collaborated with the provincial government. Islamic resurgence, 
often accused of having disastrous consequences for women, in the context of Islamic feminism 
has a positive character for women. This can be explained by its openness to igtihad (Arabic: 
rationality) meaning, the use of reason in interpreting the Qur’an rather than being satisfied with 
the mere quoting of it (see Schröter 2007). The development of Islamic feminism is not the 
consequence  of  secular  feminism  but  rather  the  outcome  of  a  countermovement  initiated  by 
Muslims, based on religious premises. The separation of secular and religious feminisms poses 
the problem of a gap among women’s activists according to their creed or approach. Then again, 
it offers a chance to Muslim women to be empowered in a context that is acceptable in a “no war, 
no peace” environment in which gender has become a political issue.  
The ARMM GAD Code, the regional translation of the Magna Carta for Women (RA No. 
9710), was signed into law at the beginning of 2011. It was regionally interpreted in order to fit 
into  an  Islamic  framework,  which  did  not  prevent  it  from  adopting  the  definition  of 
discrimination  against  women  by  the  UN  Committee  on  the  Elimination  of  Discrimination 
against  Women  (CEDAW).  The  impact  of  this  law  on  women’s  political  and  economic 
participation  and  the  possible  flexibility  of  its  definition  according  to  conservative  religious 
interpretations has yet to be seen. It is also of interest what future impact the code will have on 
religious laws already put in place under the OMPIA Party but also on traditional gender relations 
and restrictions. Meanwhile it has  to  be seen as  a positive political  development  concerning 
women’s rights in the ARMM. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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1. Islamic Parties: Success and Decline 
Lanao was Islamized via Maguindanao in the sixteenth century. The Maranaos were the 
last major Muslim group in the southern Philippines to convert to Islam. This may be due to the 
rather isolated area around Lake Lanao that they inhabit. According to Majul, the datus accepted 
the new religion first and only later did the whole population become Muslim (1999). A sultanate 
system and a syncretistic form of Islam finally covered the whole area. American colonization did 
not affect religion to a large extent; nonetheless, in the 1950s, Maranaos describe Marawi City (at 
that time it was still Dansalan City) as having been “Americanized.”
318 By 1959, there were 
nightclubs, three movie theaters, and only five organized madrasah schools (Saber and Tamano 
1985-86:  103-4).  After  World  War  II,  Islamic  missionaries  came  from  the  Middle  East  and 
Indonesia, thus increasing the local knowledge of Islam. The first Filipino Muslim students were 
sent to the Middle East to receive scholarships, with a peak in the 1970s, and Islamic literature in 
Arabic and English reached the Philippine Muslim communities (ibid: 20-21).  
 
Picture 32: Bitiara Club, Muslim and Christian Professionals in Dansalan, 1954. 
Photo kindly provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman. 
                                                 
318 From 1907 (when Dansalan became a municipality) to 1940 (when it became a city) the municipal president of 
Dansalan was a lieutenant of the American army. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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One  of  the  major  promoters  of  an  Islamic  revival  movement  was  Senator  Ahmad 
“Domocao”  Alonto  (1914-2002).  He  established  scholarships  for  Maranao  Muslims  to  be 
educated in Egypt.
319 The students came back from the Middle East to Mindanao and spread their 
knowledge. Maranao women who returned from Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well as member s of 
the Tabligh movement helped to popularize the niqab and the abaya,
320 especially in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Maruhom and Allian 2005: 146). More madaris were founded under the authority of 
the communities. Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the Office of the Islamic Conferences of Foreign 
Ministers financially supported them. Through them, the understanding of Arabic and exegesis of 
the  Qur’an  were  emphasized.  In  addition,  Islamic  institutions  of  higher  education  were 
established, integrating women and men alike, as students and teachers.
321  
One  outcome  of  the  increasing  Islamic  resurgence  movement,  since  the  1950s  but 
especially as a result of the democratic wave after the downfall of the Marcos government, was 
the emergence of Islamic parties in Mindanao (McKenna 1990; Maruhom and Allian 2005: 143). 
The  involvement  of  ulama  in  politics  was,  according  to  Maruhom  and  Allian,  a  new 
phenomenon, since the religious sector had previously been separated from the worldly sector. 
Ulama, beside their religious functions, operated as advisors of political leaders but not as leaders 
themselves (p. 143). Founded in 1986 by Mahid Mutilan, the OMPIA Party, one of the biggest 
Islamic  parties  in  the  Philippines,  reached  its  height  in  the  1990s.  Its  members  are  mostly 
Maranao preachers trained at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, the World Islamic Call University in 
Libya, and Islamic schools in Pakistan. It started as a movement against a hydroelectric project 
on Lake Lanao. Vitug and Gloria (2000) describe Mutilan as representing a moderate form of 
Islam.  He  was  supported  by  the  government  to  curb  the  MILF  and  the  threat  of  an  ulama 
                                                 
319 Because of his commitment to the Islamic religion and his campaigns for constitutional rights of Filipino Muslims 
in the Philippines, he is mentioned by Alam as one of the 100 great Muslim leaders of the twentieth century (2005: 
359). 
320 The niqab is a face-covering veil; the abaya is an outer garment that covers the whole body. 
321 One example is the Jamie’o Mindanao Al-Islamia Matampay, which was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Bashir, 
former president of the Agama Islam Society in Marawi City. Today the school is managed by ulama and the heirs of 
the late Sheikh Bashir. It comprises about 2,000 pupils (66% male and 34% female). Of 121 faculty members, over 
70 are women. The tuition fee is PHP 1,000 per year and those pupils that do not come from Lanao del Sur only have 
to pay half. Poor students do not have to pay any. There are English courses in addition to the Arabic curriculum. The 
school  provides  bachelor’s  degrees  in  sharia  law,  education  and  da’wah  (literally  “call  to  faith,”  meaning  the 
peaching of Islam). One of their goals is to recommend qualified pupils for scholarships to the Middle East to study 
Islamic Studies (in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt). In 2007, four pupils received a 
scholarship. It was reported that the number of scholarships was higher when Rashid Lucman was in Saudi Arabia. 
While in exile, he recommended more than 400 Maranao students with the approval of Dr. Omar Abdullah Naseef 
and Prince Sultan. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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unification under its authority. Thus, Mutilan founded the Ulama League in 1996, which was 
open to dialogues with the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) (Vitug and 
Gloria  2000:  151).  The  formation  of  the  Kuwaiti-sponsored  Ummah  Party,  headed  by Abu 
Mohammad Sarangani, followed that of Mutilan’s OMPIA Party in 1998. The party was founded 
by the conservative da’wah (call to faith) movement Sabaab, which spread in Marawi City under 
the  leadership  of  ulama  who  had  studied  in  Kuwait.  This  movement  is  involved  in  socio-
economic community activities and gives seminars on Islam for men and women. It favors plural 
marriages but is less strict on purdah (segregation of the sexes and seclusion of women) than the 
Tabligh (Madale 1997: 110; Maruhom and Allian 2005: 141). A coalition of Islamic political 
parties and organizations earned the OMPIA and Ummah parties a number of political victories 
in municipal elections. Mayor of the Islamic City of Marawi from 1988 to 1992, Mutilan then ran 
on  a  platform  of  reform  and  honest  government  in  the  provincial  elections  and  won 
overwhelmingly against the incumbent governor despite meager campaign funds. The OMPIA 
Party governed the province of Lanao del Sur for the next nine years, until 2001.  
The political experiment of a religious party in power did not turn out to change much, 
and by the end of his nine-year stint as Lanao del Sur governor, Mutilan was said to have been 
caught in the familiar Filipino maelstrom of money politics.
322 Charges of official corruption 
were filed against Mutilan
323 and the coalition Islamic partner, the Ummah Party, denounced the 
OMPIA Party as un-Islamic in character. Later, alim Basher “Mustaqbal” Manalao, member of 
the OMPIA Party and Lanao del Sur governor (2004-2007),
324 was suspended for six months in 
2006
325 by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) because of administrative 
and criminal cases filed by Vice-Governor Monera Dimakuta Macabangon together with most of 
the provincial board members. The internal and external political power struggles finally led to a 
loss  of  power  of  religious  parties  and  in  2007,  the  elder  brother  of Ansaruddin-Abdulmalik 
“Hooky” Alonto Adiong, “Bombit,” became Lanao del Sur governor. Thus, traditional political 
elites, in the instance the Alonto-Adiong families, returned to positions of power. Since 2007, the 
religious OMPIA Party lost contests for every major political position available in the ARMM 
                                                 
322 Nonetheless, in 2001 Mutilan became ARMM vice-governor for one term. Four years later, “Hooky” Alonto 
Adiong (Lakas-CMD) replaced him. 
323 According to the files of the Office of the Ombudsman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, 1997. 
324 Vice-Governor alim Basher “Mustaqbal” Manalao succeeded Hooky’s father, Mamintal “Mike” Adiong (Lakas-
CMD 2001-2004) as governor when the latter died in office. 
325 Vice-Governor Monera Dimakuta Macabangon during this time became acting governor.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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regional elections. Power reverted to clans and traditional politics, under the influence of Filipino 
government officials in Manila.  
In 2007, Ustadz Elias Abdulsalam, also known for his links to the Ulama League of the 
Philippines (ULP), became the figurehead of the OMPIA Party after Mutilan’s death in a car 
accident  (on  December  6,  2007).  In  June  2008,  Mindanao’s  pioneer  Islamic  political  party 
entered the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD) while remaining an autonomous entity. 
By doing so, it announced its support for President Arroyo in the August elections in the ARMM 
and  thus  for  the  candidates  of  the  Lakas-CMD  party,  Governor  Zaldy Ampatuan  and  Vice-
Governor Adiong.
326  
An electoral  failure of  Islamic parties in  Lanao does  not mean the  failure of  Islamic 
philosophy per se, or the lack of influence of Islamic morals on the society. During the time of 
the religious parties, Marawi City was increasingly influenced by Islam and those who  were 
successful in politics were often ulama. Taking the case of Mutilan, it is said that he was not rich 
and did not even have his own car. His political success was due to his status as an alim. As 
Marawi City mayor, he and his supporting ulama passed laws to prohibit drinking and gambling 
and to make the wearing of the veil in public obligatory. The suggestion to introduce the abaya as 
dress  for  women  was  however  refused  because  women  complained  that  it  would  be  too 
expensive. Whereas no public police was founded to enforce the Islamic laws, some used them as 
a basis to act against women. Before Mutilan’s election, this violence reached its climax:  
In 1987, several bodies of women were found floating in a river in Marawi City. 
The police retrieved the bodies but there are no claimants. Days later, the bodies 
were identified by people but their families did not claim them. It was found out 
that these women were snatched in Cagayan de Oro City by their relatives and 
executed  in  Marawi  City.  They  were  accused  of  engaging  in  prostitution  in 
Cagayan de Oro City. Thereupon the Imams made pleas during Friday prayers that 
wayward Maranao women committing acts of lasciviousness will be dealt with 
harshly by their irate families. The police did not charge anyone but nevertheless 
                                                 
326 A majority of the traditional elites during the Arroyo administration  who occupied a leading position in the 
ARMM or in the provincial government of Lanao del Sur were members of the Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats. 
However, during the 2010 national elections the Adiong-Alontos supported Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino of the Liberal 
Party,  showing  the  importance  of  “patron-client”  relationships  that  surpass  party  politics.  Beside  these  national 
parties, there are several regional or provincial parties in Lanao del Sur that have their headquarters in Marawi City 
but that are only partly following a religious agenda and have only a marginal influence, like the Muslim Reform 
Party in Lanao, of which Kamar Mindalano is the president and Mandangan Decampong the secretary. The People’s 
Consultative (Mushawara) Party covers Basilan, and the provinces of Lanao, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and 
Zamboanga del Sur. Basher Calauto Edris is the president and Zain Ali Sharif the secretary-general. The Lanao 
People’s Party covers Lanao del Sur; the attorney Casan Macabanding is its secretary-general. The Siap Party covers 
the ARMM; Alim Abdul Matabalo Amerol is the president and Mohamad Haris Tanog the secretary-general. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
351 
filed  the  cases  under  “unsolved  murders”  file.  (Written  statement  by  a  datu, 
Marawi City, 2008) 
 
McKenna reports alike that during that time in Maguindanao Islamic laws were austerely applied 
by some clerics: 
 
During the latter part of the rebellion and in the years following the ceasefire, dead 
bodies (most often female) would regularly be found floating down the Pulangi 
River from liberated areas. [But the] majority of the MILF adjudicators reportedly 
do  not  dispense  legal  decisions  resulting  in  penalties  which  are  significantly 
different from those traditionally imposed. The reason most often given for their 
leniency is that local Muslims are not yet true Muslims so do not deserve strict 
Islamic sanctions. (1990: 468-9) 
In 2002, under the governorship of Mamintal “Mike” Adiong, women were again harassed by 
some Islamic preachers, spraying liquid paint in their faces because of improper dress. The ULP 
confirmed  the  incidents  by  stating  that  the  women  had  been  punished.  The  Philippine  Star 
(Unson 2002) wrote that “[t]wo alimas [sic] or women preachers, who belong to the ULP, said 
the ulamas [sic] (Muslim religious leaders) are also ‘punishing’ women who wear tight jeans.” 
Facing a public outcry against those practices, physical violence changed into symbolic violence. 
In 2008, for example the faces of women on streamers were painted black. The aim remains the 
same: an attempt to enforce the Islamic dress code on women. It is interesting to notice that 
violence against women in Lanao del Sur on the basis of Islamic laws is mostly reported from 
times  when  Islamic  parties  did  not  govern  the  province  and  the  city;
327  it  might  thus  be 
understood as opposition by extremists (not necessarily members of the Islamic parties) against 
traditionalists. Local datus accuse not the OMPIA Party of such extreme actions but members of 
the MILF: 
In fact, the MILF ordered such defamation against women [painting the faces of 
women on streamers black] to be carried out . . . Commander Bravo made the 
operation as part of MILF’s effort to force Muslim women to dress modestly or 
the like. Muslim women being displayed in public is frowned upon by their clans. 
He explained to me that women should not be displayed in public wearing thick 
make up and extravagant clothing. (Email correspondence, 2009) 
These forms of symbolic violence, however, find only minor appreciation among inhabitants of 
Marawi City. It is more striking that normally the faces of women and men are shown proudly 
and that their kin appreciate them.  
                                                 
327 The mayor of Marawi in 2008 was not an alim but a sultan, Sultan Fahad Salic, who has two wives, of which the 
second is Parañaque City councilor Alma Moreno, a Christian and former actress. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 33: Symbolic Violence Against Women 
Photo taken by the author, Marawi City, 2008. 
In the end, traditional elites and the datu-ship system remain predominant alongside the 
Islamic influence. The two ideologies cannot, however, be separated. It does not seem that with 
the return of the traditional elites Islamic laws in Marawi City were abandoned. For instance, 
Islamic rhetoric remains important in justifying the leadership of men and women and also a 
certain dress code (at least to cover their head), whether obligatory or not, remains the usual 
practice by female politicians. Conversely, as Gonzales noted in 1997, like “the datus and the 
sultans, the alims [sic], ustads [teachers], and imams tell believers whom to vote for. They exploit 
the culture of patronage and the clan system that reinforce Islam and partisan politics.” (2000: 
132). Both camps do not hesitate to enter into strategic relationships. Thus, “Bombit” financially 
supports the ulama group which was founded by Mutilan, though he does not enforce Islamic 
laws  in  Lanao  del  Sur.  A  certain  form  of  Islamization  remains  ongoing,  even  though 
marginalized.  
Violent incidents in Marawi City against  women on the basis of religion seem rather 
limited. In addition, neither the Islamic nor the traditional parties officially support these actions. 
McKenna and Abdula (2009) write that generally the position of Muslim women has not been 
tremendously affected by the Islamic resurgence movement (p. 233). Islam among the majority in The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
353 
the Pat a Pangampong is an Islam in its “Maranoized” version, which is a syncretistic form of 
Islam that is judged by conservatives and extremists as un-Islamic. For traditionalists, however, 
to be a Maranao means to be a Muslim. Adat and the taritib are based on Islam and the sharia. 
The  descent  lines  are  sacred  since  they  go  back  to  Prophet  Mohammad  and  ridos  about 
maratabat are thus justified. For them, bai a labis as well as sultans are representatives of the 
descent  line.  Modern  Muslim  activists  like  Norma  Maruhom  do  not  follow  the  traditionalist 
gender approach of symbolic equality but strive for a reinterpretation of the Qur’an in order to 
achieve a more gender sensitive Islam. Equality of the sexes is then based on Islamic sources, not 
on tradition,  giving the  Muslim activists  a more authoritative basis of  argumentation against 
extremists.  Maruhom  and  Fatima Allian  (2005)  thus  state  in  a  publication  of  the  Malaysian 
Sisters in Islam that: 
Unfortunately,  it  is  the  radical  and  extremist  Muslim  groups  [referring  to  the 
MNLF,  MILF,  and ASG]  who  are  defining  which  Islam  is  to  prevail  among 
Muslims in the country . . . To counter this trend, there is a need to encourage and 
develop a new interpretation of the Qur’an that is gender sensitive, progressive, 
and contemporary, and to make this a global advocacy among concerned Muslim 
individuals and organizations from different parts of the world. (p. 155)  
According to the authors, in the Philippines the Islamic resurgence movement includes different 
groups: the conservatives (the Tabligh movement and the Islamic parties), the extremists (the 
MNLF, MILF, and ASG) and the modernists (only recently organized in the Muslim group Al-
Mujadilah). The  extremists  favor  or  use  violence  “or  force  to  attain  goals  including,  among 
others, the establishment of an Islamic state where the Shari’ah or Islamic Law shall be strictly 
observed” (ibid.: 134). The conservatives campaign “for the return to the ways and practices of 
early Muslims during the time of the Prophet Mohammad and often assert . . . the liberal and 
textual interpretations of the  Islamic teachings  as  enshrined in  the Qur’an and the Prophetic 
Sunnah” (ibid.). The modern, or liberal, Muslims in the Philippines espouse  
the reinterpretation of the Islamic doctrines according to modern times, without 
necessarily deviating from the fundamental teachings of Islam, to be able to meet 
the challenges of modernism and secularism with the belief that only this can be 
the solution to existing problems confronting the Muslim world . . . Most of them 
are  professionals  who  are  schooled  in  the  Western  system  of  education,  the 
educational system that is adopted in the Philippines . . . Their liberal views are 
heard only occasionally when they are invited by the media to speak on issues 
related to Islamic teachings. (ibid.: 134-5)  
The dominant Islamic parties in Lanao, OMPIA and Ummah, are thus defined as conservative. 
They  are  not  secular  but  integrate  women  in  their  dynamics,  mainly  in  the  framework  of The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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unofficial  power.  The  wife  of  Mutilan  campaigned  for  the  OMPIA  party  and  organized  its 
women’s  sector.  There  is,  however  another  direction  of  Islam,  followed  by  traditionalists:  a 
syncretistic form. Traditionalists are less religiously organized but have tremendous social and 
also political impact. 
2. Syncretism versus Islamic Resurgence: “I am a Maranao and thus a Muslim” 
The clan society in the “no war, no peace” environment is in a state of insurgence which is 
aimed partly at the protection of its culture in opposition to the mainstream culture, which is 
perceived as Christian. In a state of rebellion men and women have to be united; thus, internal 
critique  is  seen  as  inappropriate  and  any  change  of  norms  through  the  non-Muslim  Filipino 
culture is a difficult issue, particularly if this goes along with a change of power from traditional 
to modern agents. Islam is seen as part of the clans’ culture and as reinforcing their position, but, 
again, the question of agency in the sense of who is to specify what Islam is
328 should be asked.  
The strength of normative structures, as Zitelmann explains, is marked by their ability to 
endure conflicts (2004: 43). Islam had its effects on the traditional system. Rituals that were 
thought to be Islamic but contained cultural elements were partly changed by Muslim scholars. 
Whereas before kandidiyaga (crying or rhythmic crying over the dead) in some parts of Lanao 
was part of the death ritual, it was found to be un-Islamic and abolished with the argument that 
everything  is  only  borrowed  from  God  and  thus  a  person  has  to  thank  the  Creator,  while 
lamenting is rebellion against him (Tawano 1979a: 83). However, not all cultural habits were 
changed  according  to  Islamic  teachings.  Disoma  (1999)  writes  that  Maranaos  are  confused 
concerning their rituals, which may contain many elements said to be un-Islamic and thus that 
should be abandoned, but which are still kept in place because of habit or remaining belief in the 
old  system  (p.  107).  In  addition,  ulama  are  not  necessarily  united  regarding  the  changes  in 
tradition (ibid.: 169). Islamic resurgence, which brought a change to rituals, is actively pursued 
by Islamic groups, including women’s groups and individual women who give seminars on the 
role of Muslim women, take part in the da’wah movement or lead torils,
329 stay-in madaris, etc. 
Whereas this movement had its high point in Marawi City, especially under the leadership of 
                                                 
328 See Foucault (1998) on the power of definition. 
329 As mentioned above, a toril school is a residential school where children from three years old and above are 
confined in one place and taught the Islamic religion and the Qur’an. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Mutilan  and  the  Islamic  OMPIA  Party,  Disoma  states  that  a  majority  of  Maranaos  remain 
“marginal” between tradition and (Islamic) modernity (ibid.: 181).
330 
Local culture was in many ways Islamized when Islam was introduced to the region; for 
example, the Darangen. The Islamic resurgence movement led to an increase in local narratives 
of justification based on Islam. In the 1980s, some ulama in Marawi City forbade the singing of 
the  Darangen  since  it  was  considered  to  be  un-Islamic  (Lawa  1980:  11).  Old  folks  and 
traditionalists, however, did not cease to sing and refer to it. Another example is djinns, which are 
mentioned in the Qur'an as existing side by side with human beings (Wieland-Karimi 1997: 216). 
In  Lanao  del  Sur,  djinns  are  sometimes  equated  with  local  spirits  (tonong),
331  becoming a 
syncretistic phenomenon. They can possess people, especially those who are socially or bodily 
vulnerable, like unmarried or pregnant women. Wieland -Karimi writes that among Muslims in 
general more women are possessed than men, explaining this by the male dominance of the 
religion,  and  the  exclusion  of  women  from  public  social  and  religious  space.  Possession  by 
djinns, however, is cured through the help of folk Islam professed by women, providing them 
with social and religious space (1997: 215-16). Anne-Marie Hilsdon notes (2003) that in Lanao 
del Sur “those in precarious social positions and subject to stress are thought to be more prone to 
spirit possession,” and in most of the cases these are women. Their possession, she concludes, 
can thus “be regarded as a protest or an unconscious retaliation against their inhuman treatment” 
(p. 27). Possession through tonong/djinn thus can provide space for women’s protests, which they 
may not be able to articulate otherwise. 
Among local healers, there are also women who can evoke a tonong in order to ask it for 
help, for example in curing a person. In other cases, the spirit medium comes to a certain person 
because a tonong has a message for him or her. The tonong-concept, being justified via Islam, can 
thus  broaden  the  space  of  traditional  female  healers.  Spirits  can  be  male  or  female.  In  the 
Darangen, clans had spirits, which could be called upon for help, and still today communities 
                                                 
330A similar process was observed in Cotabato by McKenna (1990), who writes that “[t]hese popular traditions 
[referring to the first touch by the groom of the bride after the wedding ceremony] have in no way been eliminated 
by the objections of the ustadez, but clerical disapproval has clearly had a dampening effect on them in terms of 
lessening their incidence and social intensity” (p. 466).  
331 They can be the  spirits of  ancestors or  unseen beings (tonong),  which are  usually  known as  helpers of the 
Maranaos. They can talk to people through a spirit medium (pendarpaan) and manifest themselves in almost any 
creature. Spirits can also be the twin spirit of a person (inikadowa), an angel or an evil spirit (saytan) (Disoma 1999: 
84; 111). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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have certain spirits or ancestors who protect people or the rights of a descent line, to which are 
attached a curse.
332 
Apart from spirits and ancestors, who are all-present, Maranaos also use white and black 
magic, many times with the help of the spirits. Hilsdon (2003) describes Maranao women who 
can use love magic to win over their sweethearts or prevent violence against them. A man can 
also use love-charms (kakasi) and, if his maratabat is injured, “resort to black magic to inflict 
pain and sickness on his unresponsive object of love” (Madale 1997: 62). Amulets (adimat) to 
protect a person from spirits may contain a phrase out of the Qur’an or, traditionally, an object 
that is believed to be provided by a tonong. If a person becomes possessed, he or she might be 
helped by an imam or pamomolong (a person who can heal, also called a spiritual healer; it can be 
a  man  or  a  woman)  who  prays  for  him  or  her  and  appeases  the  spirit  with  certain  rituals 
(Dirampatan 1979).
333 The belief in spirits has become partly neglected through the influence of 
“Western” modernity and Islam and some rituals are not practiced anymore. Disoma especially 
refers to the dysfunctional effects martial law had on Lanao when people refused to hold rituals 
for a better harvest because it was wartime. Beside the effects of martial law on traditional rituals, 
the Islamic resurgence movement has played a part in the decline or, at least, reinterpretation of 
traditional features. The solidarity of Muslims towards the Islamic religion grew especially 
during the time of the rebellion. Maruhom and Allian (2005) report: 
It was in the early 1970s, when many of the students in the Middle East began 
coming  home  after  finishing  their  studies  and  were  employed  by  Muslim 
institutions  abroad  as  da’wa  workers  in  their  hometowns,  that  there  was  the 
establishment of many madaris and the increase in their enrollment. That was also 
at the height of the trouble in Mindanao when martial law was proclaimed and 
many young Muslims joined the ranks of the Moro National Liberation Front. 
Those who did not join the movement enrolled in the madaris so that they could 
help maintain their religion, which was then, in the mind of the Muslims, under 
siege. (p. 145) 
As described previously, the Islamic resurgence movement was additionally supported by the 
state in order to appease Mindanao Muslims. The result was a decline of traditional rituals and 
habits.  They  however  remain  popular  even  though  they  are  reinterpreted  in  an  Islamic 
framework, and are linked to what is defined as Maranao identity. Traditionalists may state that 
                                                 
332 In some cases, people offer something to certain tonong or ancestors before doing particular tasks, like on the 
field or carvings, etc. since it was a certain ancestor who first invented or practiced this work. Without seeking the 
support of this ancestor the harvest might be spoiled or the artist get ill (Orogan 1980). 
333 If a ritual is not successful, it is explained by saying that it was not properly done, that the spirits were offended, 
or that it was fate. To believe in spirits does not prevent people from working hard or going to a doctor, since spirits 
are powerful but a person must also “do his own part” (Disoma 1999: 144). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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God has cursed Lanao, which is the reason for poverty and conflict, because its inhabitants did 
not follow Islam and thus their ancestors. A datu explains: 
But then due to the general apathy of the people in practicing Islam and refusal to 
follow its tenets — unity, harmony, honesty in leadership, etc., people fear that 
God’s curse is upon the Maranaos for not being truthful as Muslims. And that our 
ancestral spirits are not happy, ragaor o mga apo, with their descendants. As a 
matter of fact, some people believe that Muslim Mindanao as a whole is suffering 
from  this  pathetic  curse  .  .  .  in  this  “age  of  jahiliya”  (ignorance).  (Written 
statement, Marawi City, 2008) 
A general apathy of the people in practicing Islam and a refusal to follow its tenets are lamented 
by religious people. Arguments based on Islam are not necessarily heeded. Community activists 
campaign against gambling (especially cockfighting) on the basis of Islam but they apply this 
verdict  with  the more successful  argument that gambling spoils  the  maratabat  of the family 
(Bamgbose  2003:  103).  Islam  is  thus  important  in  the  framework  of  identity  (Maranaos  are 
Muslims), but the interpretation of what  Islam is remains largely syncretistic and traditional, 
providing women with space, expertise, and a tool of protest in a spiritual framework in which 
they otherwise would be marginalized. 
3. Religious Organizations: The Ulama League of the Philippines, the National Ulama 
Conference of the Philippines, and the Tabligh Movement 
Conceptualized by Mutilan in 1992, the Ulama League of the Philippines (ULP) is one of 
the most popular ulama organizations in Lanao del Sur. It is known to act as an advocate for 
peace and interfaith dialogue. Its president was automatically a co-convener of the 1996 Bishop-
Ulama Conference, a gathering of members from different religious congregations and a place for 
interfaith dialogue to promote peace and development in Mindanao under the support of the 
Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP) (Rood 2005: 22).  
The members of the ULP board are male. Alima Khadijah Mutilan, the first wife and 
widow  of  the  founder  of  the  organization,  thus  could  not  rise  in  the  hierarchy,  despite  her 
graduation from Al-Azhar, Cairo, and her personal supervision of the political participation of 
women in the OMPIA Party. She also organized the Nisa Ul-Islam, a group of alimat (female 
graduates  of  Islamic  theology).  “The  group  was  vital  in  pushing  for  the  Islamization  of  the 
communities  as  it  started  holding  Islamic  seminars  in  public  places,  involving  more 
professionals,  who  were  schooled  in  Western  education.”  After  the  death  of  her  husband, 
Khadijah was “seen as a quiet force keeping the OMPIA together to pursue the vision of her late The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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husband” (Moro Times, March 28, 2008). Also at the First National Ulama Summit in 2008, those 
25 alimat who participated from Mindanao were under Khadijah’s leadership with regard to the 
discussion of how they could help to establish peace and development in Mindanao (Moro Times, 
March 28, 2008). Despite her activities, Khadijah did not become a member of the board of the 
ULP. Instead, in 2009, she became a member of the mixed-gendered board (12 men, including the 
ULP  President,  and  three  women)  of  the  newly-formed  National  Ulama  Conference  of  the 
Philippines (NUCP). The NUCP is the first ulama organization in the Philippines that provides 
representation for women. Financially supported by the embassies of the United Kingdom and 
the  Netherlands,  it  was  founded  by,  among  others,  former  Senator  Santanina  Rasul  and  her 
daughter, Amina,  from  Jolo.  On  January  26-29,  2009,  the  Philippine  Council  for  Islam  and 
Democracy  (PCID)  and  the  Magbassa  Kita  Foundation,  Inc.  (MKFI)  organized  the  Second 
National Summit of Ulama in the Philippines, gathering about 200 leading ulama of the country 
and 30 alimat.
334 The NUCP was formed to serve as a vehicle for unity among thousands of 
ulama in the country. It was founded during a time when the ULP was said to have lost influence 
after the death of Mutilan and the political opposition in Manila was looking for an adequate 
substitute to connect with; thus NUCP could use the power gap to become influential.  
The NUCP elects 14 members of the board, coming from the different sectors of the 
Muslim  communities,  to  the  15-member  interim  board  of  trustees.  Currently,  there  are  three 
female board members, including Alima Khadijah Mutilan (Marawi City) and Ustadza Albaya 
Badrodin (Education Supervisor at the Department of Education in Cotabato City). The third 
woman, former Senator Santanina Rasul (chair of MKFI), was given the 15
th seat due to her 
status as advisor of the PCID, the initiating organization. The three women represent the three 
major Muslim groups, Maranaos, Maguindanaos, and Tausugs, and they are not only religious 
women under a male authority but also professional political actors. The men elected to the board 
of  NUCP  likewise  represent  various  ethnic  groups  and  provinces  (including  all  ARMM 
provinces,  and  Manila  and  Cebu).  At  least  a  third  of  them  are  politically  active,  without 
necessarily being involved in religious parties.
335 
                                                 
334 Invited to the summit were the secretary-general of Nadhlatul Ulama and Anwar Abbas of Muhammadiyah, both 
from Indonesia; Prof. Dr. Abdullah Saeed of the University of Melbourne; and the Briton Dr. Hisham Hellyer, a 
principal  fellow  at  the  International  Institute  of  Advanced  Islamic  Studies.  Among  the  guest  speakers  were 
Ambassador Rafael Seguis, the newly appointed chief government negotiator; the attorney Leila de Lima of the 
Commission on Human Rights; the attorney Nasser Marohomsalic, former Human Rights Commissioner; and former 
President Ramos. 
335 The  members  are:  Dr.  Hamid  Barra  from  Marawi  City  (Department  of  Education  secretary  of  the ARMM, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The claim of the NUCP to be an umbrella organization of all ulama in the Philippines (in 
fact the head of the ULP is a member of the board of NUCP) led some ulama to maintain that this 
new platform would undermine the existence and contributions of the ULP itself. The statement 
of NUCPs founding organization, the PCID, in its declaration of principles, that the only solution 
to the peace problem in Mindanao is meaningful democracy, is also lamented by some ulama. In 
a counter-proposal, they affirm Islam as the solution to the peace problem in Mindanao, saying 
that the PCID declaration has invoked a parameter of dialogue not acceptable to Muslim rebels. 
They emphasize that Muslims are not against the rule of democracy in the Philippines but that 
Islam enriches the democratic system (Mindanao Examiner, January 28, 2009). The NUCP has a 
different approach than the ULP, not only in its attempt to include women as well as men as 
representatives  but  also  in  locating  their  attempts  more  eagerly  within  the  framework  of 
democratization, which is  seen by some as  a countermovement  to the MILF rebellion. This, 
however, does not necessarily mean that the MILF (publicly) shares this critique, as the example 
of the Bangsamoro Supreme Council of Ulama of the Philippines (BSCUP) shows. Grand Imam 
Sheikh Jamil Datu Haron Yahya from Marawi City heads the organization. In March 2010, the 
imam issued a fatwah that declared former President Estrada, Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas II, 
and Franklin Drilon, vice-presidential and senatorial candidates respectively of the Liberal Party, 
as enemies of Islam and the Bangsamoro people. Estrada was declared guilty of having launched 
an all-out war against the Bangsamoro in 2000 and having threatened to do so again if he were 
re-elected in 2010. For their part, Roxas and Drilon were accused of opposing the 2008 MILF-
GRP Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) and reproached with having 
filed a petition before the Philippine Supreme Court against the signing of this agreement, which, 
according to them, would have brought the conflict in Mindanao to near closure. The fatwah 
finally declared that all Muslims in the Philippines who voted for Estrada, “Mar” Roxas, or 
Drilon were committing an act that is haram (forbidden). The fatwah was emphasized by the 
Concerned Muslim Citizens of the Philippines, which organized a prayer rally in Iligan City in 
                                                                                                                                                              
February 1, 2010); Abhoulkhair Tarason from Basilan (chairman of the Basilan Ulama Supreme Council); Sulu Mufti 
Sharif  Jul Asiri Abirin  (councilor  of  Jolo); Tawi-Tawi  Mufti Abdulwahid  Inju  (Division  Coordinator  on Arabic 
Language and Islamic Values Education of the Department of Education in the ARMM); Alim Abdul Majid Said 
from Cebu; Alim Ahmad Darping Nooh from Davao (president of the Filipino chapter of the Libya-based World 
Islamic  People’s  Leadership);  Dr. Abdussalam  Disomimba  from  Lanao  del  Norte;  Prof.  Moner  Bajunaid  from 
General Santos City (chancellor of MSU-General Santos in 1995); sharia court Judge Aboali Cali from Marawi City 
(President of the ULP); Alim Jaafar Ali from Cotabato City (coordinator of the World Islamic Call Society Cotabato 
chapter); Alim Abdulhadi Daguit from Manila (vice-chairman for internal affairs of the National Halal Accreditation 
Board of the Philippines, Inc.); and Hassan Garcia (of the Balik Islam community). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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April 2010 to support it. The MILF, however, dissociated itself from the supposition that its 
members were the authors of the fatwah and argued that its own policy was motivated by the 
refusal to participate in elections organized by the central government (MILF Central Committee 
on Information official website).  
Government  functionaries  are  directly  involved  in  the  support  of  religious  groups, 
recognizing their role in supporting and establishing peace in Mindanao. Under the leadership of 
Maranao Secretary Bai Omera Dianalan-Lucman, the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos 
(formerly  Office  on  Muslim  Affairs,  OMA)  recently  supported  religious  representatives, 
recognizing  their  “potential  source  of  unity  and  agents  for  social  change  within  the  Muslim 
society.” It sponsored a meeting of 32 ulama in Cebu City on February 18, 2011. During this 
First National Ulama Consultative Conference, issues like the peace process, halal, reproductive 
health,  madari  curricula, moon-sighting  (Ramadan synchronization),  sharia courts, and  zakat 
(obligatory Islamic charity) were discussed. Among other things, the ulama requested that the 
Aquino government grant them a representative status at the MILF-GRP and MNLF-GRP peace 
talks (MILF Central Committee on Information official website; Jannaral 2011). The active role 
of Bai Lucman in this context may partly have been a reaction to the fact that the Maranao Hamid 
Barra, a member of the board of the newly founded NUCP, contested her position in court. This 
however  does  not  diminish  the  recognition  by  the  government  of  Muslim  religious 
representatives as advisers in political affairs concerning Islam, further supporting a Islamization 
initiated by President Marcos. 
Besides politically active ulama organizations and Islamic parties, Marawi City became a 
center  for  the  conservative  Tabligh,
336  which,  because  of  its  high  number  of  participants, 
influenced the social life and role of women more broadly than ulama organizations supported by 
the government. The organization was founded in British India in the 1930s (Azra 2006: 190) and 
came to the Philippines in the 1960s through immigrant workers from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
India (Maruhom and Allian 2005: 140). It was introduced in Marawi City in the 1980s. By the 
end of this decade, about 20 jama'ah (teams) of Tablighi could be found in the whole of the 
Philippines. By 2000, about 20,000 members were in Basilan alone and even more in Lanao del 
Norte  (Milligan  2005:  121).  Milligan  notes  that  the  Tabligh  movement  redefined  “Muslim 
Filipino identity as a rejection of integration with the Filipino mainstream in favor of integration 
                                                 
336 In 1997, the informal leader was Dr. Faisal Abdullah, “an unassuming aleem who graduated from Saudi Arabia” 
(Madale 1997: 106). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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into  the  more  fundamentalist  manifestations  of  dar-ul-Islam”  (2005:  122).  He  adds  that  one 
reason why the Tabligh movement is successful in Mindanao is the belief that if Muslims were 
pious, the Mindanao conflict could be solved (ibid.: 126). The Tabligh played a predominant role 
in the strengthening of gender segregation in Lanao. In the Tabligh, purdah is of importance and 
can be seen for example when practicing the annual and obligatory kuruj (journey from place to 
place to  re-Islamize Muslims).
337 There are cases of couples going together on  kuruj,  which 
might be for 3 days, 40 days, or four months. During the 3 day kuruj, the couple normally does 
not see each other and avoids physical contact. They are housed separately and no man can enter 
the women’s quarters. In case a private house is used as such, all men from this house have to 
move to the mosque, where they will stay. The husbands can briefly visit their wives (Madale 
1997: 109).  
Maranaos, especially those with a traditional or Islamic background, usually grow up in a 
sexually segregated environment (Fianza 2004: 14). Whereas unmarried boys can roam around 
more freely to visit public places, unmarried girls are more restricted by their parents, and later 
on by their husbands, and are mainly confined to the house.
 338 Boys thus get “more exposed to 
community affairs” (ibid.). Usodan-Sumagayan (1988) notes that there was a change for Maranao 
women from the beginning of the twentieth century to the 1980s concerning larger possibilities 
regarding education but not concerning family and marriage. Both sexes are still advised not to 
mix with the other gender outside of the common rules. Traditionally, a man would be fined if he 
entered a house where a woman he was not closely related to was alone. Girls are advised not to 
converse or to be alone with a man outside of Islamic rules, which would be considered shameful 
for the girl since that would show that she is interested in marrying him (Disoma 1980: 65). If a 
girl and a boy are seen going to the movies without a chaperone, this can mean trouble for both of 
                                                 
337 In a paper based on research among female Tablighi in Southeast Asia, F￩o (2009) writes: “According to the 
wishes of the founder Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944) and the rules established by his son Muhammad Yusuf (1917-
1965), second leader of the movement, women are encouraged to get involved in da’wah. They started participating 
in the mission in the 60s . . . Including women in the da’wah process gives them a new role in society, an escape 
from  the  daily  routine  and  domestic  labour.  Shorn  of  their  daily  burden,  women  obtain  the  responsibility  for 
teaching, explaining, discussing, reading, and concentrating on intellectual and spiritual activities. They have learned 
how to preach to women, how to use gentle behaviour to convince the sisters to strengthen their faith. They are not 
only mothers and housewives, they spend their time in a more valued activity: preaching to other women to follow 
the  path  of Allah.”  But  women  and  men  are  not  completely  equal  during  the  kuruj:  women  remain  under  the 
authority of men. F￩o adds: “Nevertheless, women do not really get free from their husband, as they need their full 
supervision on kuruj. No woman can go outside by herself, she must be accompanied by a male relative. And for any 
wish expressed by a woman, a mashwara (male meeting) must be held to establish whether they can grant her 
satisfaction or not.” (F￩o 2009). 
338 The NGO Kapamagogopa Inc. is breaking with this convention by sending unmarried girls and boys as volunteers 
to Maranao and Christian communities.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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them.
339 Whereas in the traditional system penalties for the breaking of purdah norms (in the 
sense of gender segregation) are set for the boy/man as well as the girl/woman, the woman is 
thought to be mainly responsible for observing these norms. She is secluded from the public, 
advised not to roam around, and required to wear the veil. Sexual segregation cannot be found in 
the working place outside of a religious framework, and is not found at secular schools and 
universities, except in dormitories. In the market, women and men sell their products. However, 
gender  segregation  is  found  in  community  gatherings,  celebrations,  and  such  places  as 
restaurants. Samira Ali Gutoc-Tomawis (2003) emphasizes that separate seating arrangements at 
weddings  and  bigger  social  gatherings  are  encouraged  by  “big  religious  movements  (e.g., 
Tabligh)  where  the  Islamic  seminars  have  penetrated  homes  and  school  campuses”  (p.  51). 
Muslim women activists, especially women elders whose field of action in public is wider than 
that of unmarried girls, are not generally against segregation, and consider it as part of their 
religion.  Some emphasize that they  enjoy  life,  sing,  and dance, but  only  at  home  or  among 
women. One Muslim feminist was more open to mixed-gendered public arrangements, justifying 
this on religious grounds by taking as a model the common prayer during the hadj in Mecca 
where women and men pray side by side without being separated from each other by a curtain or 
being seated upstairs, as it is common in Lanao mosques (see, on the mosque movement, Badran 
2007: 40, 156; 2009: 335). She rejected, however, the idea of a woman leading a mixed-gendered 
congregational prayer, as the popular Muslim women’s activist and scholar Amina Wadud did 
(see Schröter 2008).
340  
 
                                                 
339 The family of the girl can publicly penalize the boy. Several options exist: to demand that he puts up a dowry for 
marriage, to clothe him in white and parade him in public, or to penalize him with monetary compensation. In 
extreme  cases  where  there  is  evidence  of  sex  or  the  woman  was  impregnated,  marriage  is  the  most  common 
alternative to avoid execution or public flogging. 
340 Muslim women in Lanao are not allowed to lead a prayer in front of men. However, an alima can lead the women 
in prayer in case no man is available.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Picture 34: Groundbreaking Ceremony 
Women and men are seated separated from each other at this public gathering and all women are veiled. Some wear 
the traditional malong; others wear Muslim dresses like those in Indonesia. The men in the picture wear an Islamic 
dress, which, however, is not dominant in Marawi where the majority of men wear Western-style dress, sometimes in 
combination with an Islamic (kufi) or traditional (sangkok) hat. Photo taken by the author, Marawi City, 2008. 
 
 
Picture 35: Clan meeting. 
Women and men are seated separated at this clan meeting in Poblacion, Poona Piagapo, Lanao del Norte. 
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Besides  the  introduction  of  a  Muslim  dress  and  moral  code,  the  Islamic  resurgence 
movement also played its part in improving the status and social mobility of women. There are, 
for example, religious seminars for women on proper female behavior in the Islamic context, like 
those organized by OMPIA or the Sabaab movements. The increasing number of madaris led to 
more employment possibilities for women. Bamgbose (2003) comments: “While women cannot 
lead prayers in mixed sex groups, they can lead Islamic seminars, and take a lead in the madaris  
.  .  .  The  fact  that  it  allows  women  time  for  social  contact  and  support  should  not  be 
underestimated” (p. 63). The access to a wider field of public action in a religious framework is 
however in many cases connected to purdah rules and, as in the case of the Tabligh, described by 
F￩o, women acquired a new role as preachers and seminar leaders for other women, but they are 
under the authority of men. A rather interesting development can be observed in the organization 
of  the  NUCP,  which  has  a  mixed-gendered  board,  placing  women  and  men  side  by  side  in 
decision-making. This organization is challenged by conservative Muslims as not being able to 
bring peace to Mindanao since it does not consider the wishes of the MILF. It is thus indirectly 
suspected to be linked to the politics of the national government.  
B. Muslim Women Leaders and Muslim Feminism 
1. Political Leadership between Re-traditionalization and Re-Islamization 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Islamic missionaries from the Middle East increasingly came to 
Mindanao (Lacar 1992: 84) and the ongoing Westernization and Filipinization, initiated by the 
American  colonial  forces,  were  counteracted  by  an  Islamic  resurgence  movement. Although 
Islamic narratives of justification were already important before this resurgence, the content of 
the narratives changed as knowledge about the religion increased.  
The change of mode of dress remains one of the obvious effects on society. In the 1970s, 
women in Marawi City could be seen wearing mini-skirts (Siapno 1994: 195; 2002: 321). Since 
then the Islamic movement has succeeded in making the hijab more popular and (to a lesser 
degree) also the niqab (face-covering veil) and the abaya (an outer garment that covers the whole 
body). In case of political ascension to leadership positions, women in Lanao del Sur usually 
follow a minimal version of the Islamic dress code. However, this situation seems too liberal in 
the eyes of some religious conservatives who desire their exclusion from public offices. A female 
civil society leader explains the religious argument against the occupation of head offices by 
women, referring to the fact that a leader in the Islamic framework also has to be a religious The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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leader  of  men  and  women. This  is  a  task  that  cannot  be  fulfilled  by  women  since  they  are 
prohibited from leading mixed-gendered congregational prayers. To enable women to take such 
leadership  positions  is  defined  as  non-Muslim,  neglecting  arguments  within  the  Islamic 
framework for such an empowerment (see Brecht 2008): 
And now the prevention of women from joining politics  as  top  officials,  it is 
because of some of their critical realities, what is expected of a top leader. Because 
in Islam you must not be a leader only, but you also lead the religious ummah. So 
that means you are a religious leader and a community leader as well. So you lead 
a prayer, like jack of all trades. And no excuses, if you are a leader . . . Even if you 
have a fever, because you have committed to say yes, to do something and to 
deliver, you really have to do this. But if you are a woman for instance, there are 
critical  realities.  Do  not  expect  me  to  go  to  China  if  it  is  already  my  due 
[childbirth].  
But  for  me,  I  understand  this.  I  will  not  insist.  But  for  some  feminists 
because the context, the way they understand women empowerment, is the context 
of the Western world, which some other women cannot simply agree with. They 
want empowerment of women as sitting in for instance as head of the state, as the 
mayor. For me personally, I do not mind to be just a staff as long as my voice is 
heard. What will be the benefit of sitting there as a local executive if you are not 
[listened to]. I rather be a simple woman but [listened to]. (Interview, Iligan City, 
2007) 
The woman thus prefers the access to decision-making provided within the traditional framework 
in the form of unofficial power, agreeing with the conservative Islamic interpretation of women 
and leadership. Powerful clans, however, pay no attention to the Islamic critiques and campaign 
defiantly for their wives, sisters, and cousins to keep the political office within the family. Lacar 
(1997: 202) writes that such women simply ignore the animosity of some ulama towards female 
claims to leadership. This opposition between traditional politicians and religious conservatives is 
not based on religious issues, since Islam remains at the center of each side’s argumentation and 
justification, as the following examples will show, but on political issues and, last but not least, 
on gender questions. In the traditional framework, women are even pushed by their relatives to 
join politics. Thus a board member of the ARMM, coming from a political family, reports that her 
relatives always wanted her to join politics,  
although I am a bit limited because I am a woman. [Because in] Islam, they are 
not actually prohibited, but they shy away, because a woman is not to be exposed. 
But there is another saying in hadith, “If there is one woman who can do better 
than thousand men then it is better to appoint that woman who is working better 
than the other men.” 
I  have  also  support  from  the  ulama.  Because  before  I  filed  I  already 
consulted  some  ulama  .  .  .  they  are  not  against  [my  candidacy].  Only  those The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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extreme believers [are against women leaders in politics], who killed this woman 
leader [Benazir Bhutto] in Pakistan. Although we are not allowed to join in the 
highest positions, like the mayor, like governor. But vice-governor can. And also 
representatives, like us, board members, we are allowed. Or in the congress, to 
represent also women. Because we are already allowed to . . . Not in Saudi they 
are not allowed to be employed except in schools and hospitals where women and 
men are separated. (Interview, Marawi City, 2008) 
The board member justifies her position through an Islamic narrative of justification, referring 
not only to religious authorities but also to a hadith. This position thus derives not, as Lacar 
argued, only from ignorance of the arguments of Muslim extremists and conservatives, but from a 
counter-argumentation based on Islam. The example thus highlights an intra-Islamic debate on 
the issue, which can also be found in other Muslim countries, like Indonesia and Pakistan (Brecht 
2008). Tarhata Alonto Lucman also uses an argument for female leadership based on Islam: 
In Islam, women are not so much allowed to participate in politics. But if a woman 
is 100 times better than man, she is accepted in politics. Like me, firstly I said I 
am a Muslim, I said I do not want to run because I might violate the rule of God. 
My brother [“Domocao” Alonto] said: “No, women are better than men if they are 
stronger and trusted, women are better than men.” . . . The ulama want women to 
be kept at home, but I said: “If women cannot do something for the community 
and to the people, they are right, keep them at home. But if she is better than 
anyone of you, she has to go!” I fight for the women. For their rights! (Interview, 
Manila, 2008) 
Tarhata is referring to Islam in order to elevate the condition of women in society in general and 
in politics in particular. She, however, speaks on the basis of a traditional field of power, her 
descent lines status and family backing. This means that tradition and thus re-traditionalization 
have the potential, notwithstanding the political motivations, to reinforce the position of (certain) 
women  —  within  and  despite  Islam.  The  following  example  illustrates  how  traditional 
conceptions, like maratabat and descent line status, can empower women in leadership positions. 
When Tarhata Alonto Lucman ran for governor in 1971, a male candidate campaigned against 
her,  taking  a  misogynistic  angle. This  involved  a  blow  of  maratabat  against Tarhata,  which 
outraged many women in the province who, the following day, went out and campaigned for her. 
The opponent finally had to support Tarhata after she was elected. 
Normallah Alonto Lucman: You know when she [Tarhata Alonto Lucman] ran, one 
point why she won over the opponents, was, because there was this board member 
and he spoke over the radio and he said: “Do not vote for women, because women 
are only good in bed!” And you know the following day all women in Lanao del 
Sur went out and were campaigning. That is what elected her . . . 
Emily Marohombsar: The women were very angry about that. Maratabat! The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Tarhata Alonto Lucman: When they were talking on the radio, I was going to the radio 
[and] I pushed the other man: “Don’t you know that I am the one running? You 
should respect me! You know my father, you know everybody in the family!” The 
vice-governor had to run to take me from the radio station. Because that was why 
there was no one fighting . . . Instead of going on fighting me, he has to support 
me. You have to be brave; otherwise, they will step on you. (Interview, Marawi 
City, 2007) 
Tarhata presented her candidacy based on her descent line, giving her authority and providing her 
with a huge maratabat. When this was spoiled by the other candidate and she had the guts to 
confront  him in  public, an obvious conflict  erupted in  which people  had to  take sides. This 
mobilized female voters, who allied themselves with Tarhata.  
 
 
Picture 36: Female Political Power 
Former Governor Tarhata Alonto Lucman (seated to the left); her daughter, former Vice-Governor Normallah Alonto 
Lucman (standing); and former MSU President Emily Marohombsar. Photo taken by the author, Marawi City, Resort 
Hotel, 2007. 
 
Normallah Alonto Lucman reports that she herself had to deal with critiques of her gender 
role when the OMPIA Party was in power. She nevertheless won the election for vice-governor 
on the basis of her descent line status and the support of her family, applying a more liberal The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Islamic definition of women in leadership. She regards the ulama who tried to prevent her from 
running as conservatives who are losing their ground because of a return of traditional politicians: 
When  I  first  ran  [for  vice-governor  in  1995,  when  the  OMPIA  Party  was  in 
power], there were these religious leaders, ulama, they said that I am a woman, so 
I am not supposed to shake hands with men, and my picture is not supposed to be 
shown everywhere. It is against Islam. I ask my uncle, Senator Alonto. And he 
said: “No, women are not prohibited from running.”  
In fact, it was his idea for my mother to run. There are these kinds of 
Muslims, very strict, conservative. But now [2007] it is changing [referring to the 
fact that the Islamic parties lost the elections and the office of the governor and 
vice-governor  went  back  to  the  traditional  elites  from  her  clan].  (Interview, 
Marawi City, 2007) 
There is thus opposition between traditional politicians and Islamists concerning the participation 
of women in politics. Both, however, apply an Islamic narrative of justification, even though the 
former are accused by the latter of being un-Islamic.  
Whereas tradition helps women to be successful in politics, when already in office, they 
might meet other challenges. Being the only female board member of the ARMM, a woman 
explained that she found that, as a consequence of isolation, subjects like polygamy were either 
not an issue to be discussed by the male majority, or her suggestions would be outvoted.
341 The 
question thus arises if the number of women in politics is of importance when women’s issues are 
being discussed. A study of female politicians in the Philippines found that women in  public 
leadership do not necessarily become agents of change  on gender issues. They enter politics by 
following the same rules than men, meaning party p olitics, which often do not include gender 
issues. Instead, women’s groups and organizations are the driving force behind proposals related 
to gender themes (Iwanaga and Loresk￤r 2009: 12).  Although there are exceptions,  such as the 
campaign for Muslim women’s rights led by the Tausug Senator Santanina Rasul , most bills 
concerning women’s issues in the Philippines are introduced by men (Roces 1998: 99).  Above 
mentioned examples from Lanao confirm that some female politicians would l ike to include 
certain gender issues in politics, but they are hindered from doing so. The recent gender  and 
development (GAD)  bill concerning women in the ARMM  was  introduced by a man, even 
though it was in large parts prepared and initiated by women.
342 Roces rejects the conclusion that 
                                                 
341 On the debate on evaluating the impact of a greater number of women in politics (with a focus on Asia) on a 
women’s specific policy agenda and the importance of a critical mass, see Fleschenberg (2009: 17); Iwanaga and 
Loresk￤r (2009). 
342 Notably by the Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women and the Regional Sub-Committee on Gender and 
Development. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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women are thus powerless. On the contrary, she argues that the Western conception that political 
power is connected to office cannot be applied in the Philippines: men do not dominate political 
power  even  though  they  occupy  most  political  positions.  Instead,  power  is  differentiated 
according to  gender: men have official power  via positions and women unofficial power via 
kinship relations and marriages to politicians (ibid: 7).
343 She further argues that women would 
even lose their power when occupying a political office in a patriarchal system. Roces ’s critique 
of the Western conception that women without an office would be politically powerless should be 
taken into consideration. When unofficial power is defined as another po ssibility of exercising 
power, the fact that women occupy only few political offices then  appears as  not only the 
outcome of conservative (Islamic) rhetoric against women in political lead ership positions but 
also as the outcome of a local gender conception, which already provides women with unofficial 
political power. This remains critical since there are cases when  neither form of power changes 
the actual situation, as the example of polygamy shows.
344 One alternative is the establishment of 
a critical mass (which is internationally often set at 30%) in the form of quotas. However, to rely 
on unofficial power, thus on women’s organizations and open -minded men (and their wives) to 
include a proper women’s agenda, may be as problematic as the view that a critical mass of 
women in official power positions would necessarily increase the chances for that agenda (see, 
e.g., Childs and Krook 2008).  
The restless “no war, no peace” environment has to be borne in mind also. Gender in this 
region became a political issue connected to nationalism (see Moghadam 1994). This can be seen 
in the da’wah movement of the MILF (Abreu 2002) and in anti-Muslim polemics ￠ la Locsin (see 
chapter one), which had the opposite effect and strengthened an Islamist agenda (Alojamiento 
2004, 2007). In these circumstances, the introduction of quotas might be defined as “Western” 
and perceived with suspicion by conservative Muslims. So far, the issue of quotas has not been 
debated locally. In this situation, it might be important to recognize and strengthen the already 
existing but unofficial power of Muslim women, be they clan elders, relatives of politicians, or in 
the framework of NGOs, instead of enforcing laws (quotas), which may not lead to a needed 
general consciousness about gender issues but instead generate conflicts. Alojamiento’s (2004) 
concerns about political campaigns against Islamic symbols and their possible effect on gender 
relations have in any case to be accounted for: 
                                                 
343 For example, Imelda Marcos had tremendous political influence by being the wife of President Marcos. 
344 Besides female politicians, there are also local Muslim women’s organizations which — so far fruitlessly —
campaign against polygamy by following the example of the Indonesian activist Prof. Dr. Siti Musdah Mulia. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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feminist  critique  about  Islamic  states’  construction  of  women  as  repository  of 
national-traditional values is becoming moot as the heightened campaigns against 
Islamic symbols has backfired. In Mindanao, it made many Moro women turn to 
the veil as an ultimate expression of solidarity with the assaulted Muslim world.  
The support of unofficial power positions, however, poses the problem that, when looking at the 
literature  on  the  region,  it  becomes  apparent  that  apart  from  Islamic  extremism,  the  biggest 
obstacles faced by women aspiring to leadership positions remain poverty and feudal structures 
(Abubakar 1998;  Brecht forthcoming; Rasul  2003). Women activists  who do not  come from 
political families have few chances of getting into politics. Thus, the question arises as to whether 
women who do not belong to the traditional elite but still want to gain political influence lobby 
more strongly for Islamic influences in order to find a possible way out of the feudal structures. 
The authority of religion, where all people are said to be equal before God, is a factor that can 
potentially undermine the leadership claims of the traditional elite, which are based on heredity 
and wealth. Warina Sushil Jukuy illustrates how women apply Islamic values, in the sense that 
everyone is equal before Allah, to justify their participation in politics. As a Tausug who ran for 
the position of ARMM governor as an independent candidate in the Sulu region, she is a member 
of various organizations, such as the Jihad-al Akbar, that represent an Islamic point of view. 
Although she abstained from any political campaigning, giving as reasons her wish to leave the 
decision to God and her disapproval of vote buying, she received 836 votes in 2005.
345 This is a 
relatively  high number for a person  who  did not campaign but   certainly it is almost  nil  in 
comparison to candidates being supported by their political families. Political Islam alone will 
hardly provide a sufficient ground for women to occupy political posts. However, it can give 
them a platform to become politically active despite their family background. A woman leader 
without connections to powerful political clans has few chances of gaining access to the circle of 
political power, given the dysfunctional democratic system that sustains  it. It is clear that non-
elite  women  leaders  cannot  avail  themselves  of  the  current  system,  as  they  would  need  the 
support of the traditional elites who usually prefer to patronize their own clan members. The 
female members of the leading clans are able to use the system for the advantage of their clan and 
family, as is expected in “patron-client” relationships. The use of it for the general purpose of 
promoting women's rights, however, is rather difficult.  
 
                                                 
345  The  winner  of  the  election,  Zaldy  Ampatuan  from  Lakas-CMD,  received  549,480  votes  (Commission  on 
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  It can be concluded that the Islamic resurgence movement is opposed by a traditional 
resurgence. The opposition is not about  Islam as such but rather about how to define Islam. 
Generally, there is a tendency for the poor to be in favor of Islamization, giving them a platform 
for arguments against local hierarchies. The elites and their supporters who might also be poor 
instead prefer traditional family politics.  
The  confrontation  between  re-Islamization  and  re-traditionalization  involves  a  social 
struggle,  the  poor  against  the  elites;  a  national  struggle,  since  the  government  supports 
traditionalists; and a gender struggle. Women have more chances of occupying and expressing 
official power in the traditional framework but for those who are excluded from a dominant 
position  in  clans  and  who  have  political  ambitions,  the  main  possibility  of  expressing  their 
opinion is through Islam. Some women campaign using an Islamic angle; nevertheless they are 
not largely supported by other Muslims, including Islamists as well as those elites who refuse to 
support women who do not belong to their clan or family.  
2. Muslim Women's Movements: Muslim Feminism 
Women’s organizations in the Philippines in the form of women’s clubs already existed 
from the American period up until the late 1960s. They were involved in charity work, social and 
civil activities in which mainly the wives of government officials and the upper- and middle 
classes took part. Whereas a majority of the members were Christians, Muslim women from the 
aristocracy also participated (Angeles 1998: 214, 218). They were supported by and supportive of 
government programs.  
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Picture 37: Muslim Women’s Association of the Philippines, Lanao Provincial Chapter, 1952 
Photo kindly provided by Norodin Alonto Lucman. 
 
In  the  1970s,  there  were  Muslim  women  associated  with  and  organized  within  the 
framework of the national liberation movement. During the rebellion, women supported their 
male relatives mainly through spying, cooking, and giving first aid, but also in combat. Women 
were also officially integrated into the Central Committee with a chairwoman representing the 
women’s committee (Siapno 1994: 192; Angeles 1998: 225, 1996). According to Siapno, the 
active participation of women in the struggle for independence was an exception; she asserts that 
“in  reality  most  of  the  conventional  ideas  of  patriarchal  control  have  remained  untouched” 
(Siapno 2002: 317), and that women returned to everyday life after the MNLF rebellion. As seen 
in other nationalist movements, women are welcomed to participate “for the larger good,” but 
when the goal is achieved they are expected to return to the domestic sphere (Badran 2007: 109). 
As noticed by Angeles (1998), the MNLF however acted as  an agent of change for Muslim 
women: “Membership in women’s groups, as well as participation in the [MNLF] revolution, 
have  politicized  and  raised  the  consciousness  of  [Moro]  women  and  have  given  them  the 
opportunity to rediscover and believe in themselves” (p. 228). Her argument is, among other 
things,  based  on  the  foundation  (1986)  and  development  of  the  BangsaMoro  Women’s 
Professional and Employment Association. During the war, the main goal of this organization, The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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which gathered together professional women, was to support financially and ideologically the 
national liberation. In the absence of combat, they started to debate about women’s rights. Nur 
Misuari himself encouraged the women “to read the Qur’an and to learn about the rights of 
women as provided for in Islam” (Angeles 1998: 227, 225).  
Besides  these  effects  of  the  rebellion,  the  Islamic  resurgence  movement  had  its 
consequences on women’s activism. In the 1980s, several women’s organizations were founded 
to spread Islamic values. Their initial successes were due to their attempt to connect these values 
with activities like the foundation of an orphan’s house. Also, the national movement against 
Marcos  led  many  Muslim  women  to  be  more  politically  active,  taking  part  in  the  protest 
movement of national women’s organizations (Alojamiento 2004: 207). After the downfall of 
Marcos, a “democratic wave” overran the Philippines and in 1991 the government recognized the 
important role of NGOs in the Philippines (RA No. 7160) (Cagoco-Guiam 2002). Not all NGOs 
registered, especially not those occupied with da’wah, which constituted the majority in Lanao in 
2002 (ibid.). Those that registered in Lanao del Sur were mainly funded by international Western 
sources and led by members of the datu class. One main point of the sponsored activities at the 
time of the study was gender programs, which according to Alojamiento had been popularized in 
Mindanao mainly through international donor agencies since the early 1990s (2004; 2007), as 
was also Islamic feminism, which campaigned for the empowerment of women by turning to 
Islam as a reference point.  
To  Badran  (2008),  gendered  Islamism  or  Muslim  secular  feminism  both  seem  to  be 
Muslim women’s movements arguing for a complementary empowerment of women. The latter 
is defined by Badran as the heir of early Muslim feminist movements, like those in Egypt in the 
late twentieth century. It was shaped together with compatriots from other religions before the 
1970s, thus during a time when secularism was not yet defined by Islamists as “Western” or anti-
Islamic  (p.  29).  Instead,  it  was  predominantly  connected  with  nationalistic  movements  for 
equality, no matter what race, gender, or religion. Secularism in this context is not the absence of 
religion from public space but the freedom of religions within a national collective space (Badran 
2009: 328). Unlike gendered Islamism, secular feminism goes one step further and insists on full 
equality  of  the  sexes  in  the  public  sphere,  while  maintaining  acceptance  of  gender 
complementarity in the private sphere. It was only second wave Muslim secular feminists
346, 
                                                 
346 The first wave of Muslim secular feminists followed the understanding of secularism as involving not the absence 
of religion but freedom of religion in the public sphere, including for patriarchal conceptions of Islam. The second The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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feminists  active  at  a  time  when  Islamists  defined  secularism  as  anti-Islamic,  who  started 
questioning the notion of the patriarchal family (Badran 2008: 33; 2009: 308). This movement 
went along with and merged with the development of what Badran defines as Islamic feminism. 
Among Islamic feminists,
347 the concept of equality between men and women  — in both  the 
private and public spheres  — is paramount. To justify this claim, these groups are particularly 
involved in the re-reading of the Qur’an from a woman’s perspective and basing their arguments 
on Islamic sources (Badran 2009: 234).
348  
In Mindanao, all three concepts can be found; sometimes they merge or are not clearly 
developed. Whereas in most cases gender programs follow the conception of equity, the issue of 
gender equality in public and private spaces is also debated. However, the “no war, no peace” 
environment, which increased a certain sensitivity about gender conceptions, has to be considered 
when debating about local current Muslim women’s movements. This is of particular importance 
in cases where gender programs are sponsored by international non-Muslim organizations. Two 
Muslim NGOs founded in 1997 and 1998, Al-Mujadilah Development Foundation, Inc. (AMDF) 
and Maranao People Development Center, Inc. (MARADECA), were among the most popular 
organizations in Marawi City around 2005, campaigning for women’s rights within an Islamic 
framework. MARADECA has a gender focus, among other programs,
349 and was initiated and 
financed by a British organization, Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO)-Toscadar. Sponsored by 
the Asia Foundation and USAID, AMDF is a Maranao women’s organization with the goal of 
raising consciousness about women’s rights in an Islamic context. Both organizations have as one 
of their major goals gender equity, a concept that highlights the supposedly different natures of 
the sexes on which gender roles in society are based. MARADECA declared in its 2005 program 
it would  support “gender equity with  particular  consideration to  cultural  background and [to 
empower] both women and men for decision-making in the community towards achieving lasting 
peace.” By doing so, the organization also follows the aim of the funding organization not to 
propagate  Western  values,  which  could  lead,  according  to  the  Program  Manager  of  VSO-
Toscadar, “to a division of communities.” The British supervision is especially careful concerning 
                                                                                                                                                              
wave of Muslim secular feminists started questioning the utility of these conceptions in the public sphere, demanding 
equality of the sexes.  
347 The label of Islamic feminism is one given from the outside; women being defined as such would partly not agree 
to this, preferring for example to be called believing woman. The reasons for such a rejection are manifold; as one of 
the main reasons the avoidance of a connection to “Western” feminism has to be mentioned (Barlas 2008).  
348 For Muslim secular feminism, see Badran 2007: 36 167; 2009: 308; 2008: 28. 
349 Programs by Maradeca in 2005 concerned such things as helping women and their families to become financially 
more independent (micro-credits), education, livelihood, and opposition to gambling.  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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gender issues “since gender is usually equated with Western culture and way of life” (Program 
Manager of VSO-Toscadar 2003). Members of Maradeca state their fear that a gender-profiling 
program that is initiated by a non-Maranao organization might not be accepted locally, “fearing a 
process  of  indoctrination,  not  a  process  of  exploration,  in  rural  Maranao  communities” 
(Bamgbose 2003: 109). The Islamic framework of an NGO is thus in many ways of advantage. It 
can more easily fit into the demands of the funding organization and of the local NGOs, as well 
as certain perceptions of the communities, which show a high degree of mistrust (ibid.: 56). A 
member of an NGO that was concerned with IDPs after the all-out war explains:  
Religion in leading an NGO? I think it matters. Because for instance, even if you 
are so educated, but if they know that you do not have the faith they may regard 
you as educated but they may not give you that respect . . . In relation to the public 
acceptance of an NGO? It is very crucial. I know of some women leaders who are 
maybe  very,  very  famous  outside  and  effective  also  in  ways.  But  may  not  be 
necessarily effective locally. She may be known outside doing a good, effective 
perception at the national level, even outside she is able to deliver. But if you go at 
the  local  level,  they  even  fear  her.  They  are  even  afraid  of  being  linked  or 
connected to her because of that lack of faith . . . she is rejecting . . .  
Second,  the  orientation  of  the  NGO  where  you  are  in  is  crucial  to  the 
community. You may not, even if your NGO is not able to deliver, but they still 
consider what NGO you are in, the goals and the background of the NGO. It is 
probably because the community has suffered so much. There is so much mistrust 
and because of the realities, they are going through . . . And speaking of religion 
also, your public acceptance, who you are, physical appearance to them. Not only 
on how you talk. Because for instance you keep talking, you are saying this is your 
message. But after talking they will look at you or even during your discussion, 
they  will  look  at  you. And  if  they  do  not  see  you  in  the  Islamic  lens,  your 
discussion  will  be  [in  vain].  That  is  the  Maranao  culture,  the  Moro  culture. 
(Interview, Iligan City, 2007) 
Angeles (1998) writes that Moro women’s groups that are supported by the government and 
integrated  into  the  National  Council  of Women  of  the  Philippines  are  sometimes  diplomatic 
regarding what they want to implement, in order not to lose male support. Gender programs 
funded through non-Muslim sources are thus more easily implemented when brought within an 
Islamic framework. Alojamiento (2004, 2007) explains that the “venue for political articulation” 
of those groups that campaign for an empowerment of Moro women outside of Islam “is very 
narrow,  if  at  all  available.”  Conservatives  in  Lanao  del  Sur  nevertheless  reject  some  ideas 
presented by Islamic feminists, like those of Siti Musdah Mulia from Indonesia who campaigned 
against  polygyny.
350 When she was invited by a mix ture  of Christian and Muslim women ’s 
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organizations  in  Davao  in  2008  to  give  a  speech  on  her  campaign,  some  male  participants 
reminded the group of the Qur’anic verses allowing polygyny out of an understanding of the 
nature of men. This shows the internal Islamic debate taking place in Lanao: not everything will 
be accepted just because it is claimed to be Islamic. 
That  the  gender  issue  has  become  a  political  issue  in  Mindanao  has  also  affected 
relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim organizations. Contacts are maintained, but in 
many cases, Muslim NGOs try to establish themselves independently. A Kapamagogopa, Inc. 
(KI)  founding  member  tries  to  explain  the  reason  why  recent  Muslim  NGOs  stayed 
predominantly Muslim. Her NGO was developed with the help of professors from MSU, ulama, 
and Christians, but the non-Maranaos left the organization to make it a pure Muslim one:  
Actually, KI started after 9/11
th when Muslims were always called terrorists and 
our youth were never spared from that stereotyping. So, why not prove to the 
world that we are not terrorists but that we are peace-loving people. But when we 
have Christians, we cannot prove this. But when we are a pure 100% Muslim 
organization and you do these things, these good things, you can prove something. 
(Interview, Iligan City, 2007) 
KI’s  main  issues  are  peace-building,  sustainable  agriculture,  livelihood,  health  and  literacy, 
gender, emotional recovery, capacity building, micro enterprises, and the environment. They train 
young adult Muslim professionals to become “peace weaver” volunteers. These volunteers have 
to be single, since the allowance is not enough for a family and because women traditionally 
cannot go out and travel without the permission of the husband. Thus, a married woman might be 
hindered in doing her work. Minors have to have parental permission to join KI, which organized 
a one-day workshop to convince parents of the importance of the work of the volunteers. The 
organization also demands a certain commitment to Islam:  
It is stated on the requirements that [the volunteers] have a minimum knowledge 
on the fundamentals of Islam. And one way is that especially women, when they 
go outside they have to wear this minimum code of dress. If you are not going to 
subscribe this minimum way of dress, you are not going to be a volunteer. And 
also, you have to subscribe to pray for five times a day. How can you show that 
you are a good Muslim if you do not practice? This is how religion plays [a role] 
in our organization . . . 
Actually, the parents are very happy about the volunteering because they 
saw the transformation of their children. Before they do not practice Islam and 
when they become volunteers, they practice, they subscribe to the Islamic values. 
Actually,  we  get  several  feedbacks  from  the  parents.  The  first  is  change  of 
behavior and attitude. Because like . . . happy go lucky. Then children are like, ok, 
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good to pray . . . And sometimes the ladies, they are not going to wear this one 
[veil] and go here in Iligan without wearing this one. But now it is like, oh, I have 
to  wear  this  one  .  .  .  So  it  is  like  the  program  is  appreciated  by  the  parents. 
(Interview, Iligan City, 2007) 
Non-Muslim funding organizations thus support a certain form of Islamization, which goes along 
with “peace weaving,” women's empowerment, and livelihood programs. The critiques presented 
in debates on post-secularism
351 lament the gap being created between Muslim and non-Muslim 
organizations  (and  feminisms).  However,  even  though  there  are  separate  women’s  groups, 
relations and exchanges remain. Further, the religious approach of an organization provides more 
public  social  mobility  and  exchange  between  Christians  and  Muslims  for  unmarried  girls 
(through the religious approach the organization receives support by the parents and the girls are 
assigned  to  non-Muslim  communities  where  they  are  forced  into  contact  with  the  Christian 
inhabitants)  than  in  the  traditional  context  in  which  they  are  under  the  supervision  of  their 
parents.  However,  the  extended  liberties  of  greater  mobility  are  connected  to  a  religious 
framework, restricting those women who would like to live outside this context. 
The women’s group Al-Mujadilah was co-founded by Yasmin Busran-Lao, who comes 
from a prominent clan. She ran under the Liberal Party for senator in the 2010 elections but lost. 
Formerly, she was a member of the national women’s group PILIPINA. Motivated by the Fourth 
World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (Cruz 2005), Busran-Lao established her 
own women’s group within the context of Islam in 1997. In an interview, she comments: 
In Beijing, I was able to interact with Muslim women from other countries . . . I 
realized  that  much  of  the  Islamic  teachings  we  adhered  to,  particularly  those 
pertaining  to  women,  are  not  really  what  is  in  the  Qur’an,  but  rather  cultural 
interpretations of Islam. (ibid.) 
Busran-Lao realized the main barrier with which women in Mindanao have to struggle with is not 
Islam as such but its cultural interpretation. Thus, she founded a women’s organization within the 
Islamic framework in order to empower women. Its founding was also a “response to allegations 
that gender issues are Western issues that have no resonance in Muslim Moro communities” 
(ibid.). The vision of the organization follows common concepts being used by Muslim feminists 
worldwide since the 1990s: “an Islamized society operating within the principles of Tawhid [one-
                                                 
351 On the debate on post-secularism and feminism, see Braidotti (2008), who argues for the acceptance of the 
challenge to link subjectivity to religious agency and to disengage the debate about post-secular movements from 
oppositional consciousness and “critique defined as negativity” in order to be able to draw on the affirmative power 
of critical theory (p. 1). 
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ness of God] where women and men are accorded the status of Khilafah (God’s vice-regents) to 
serve as moral agents towards the attainment of Sakeena (Tranquility or enduring peace) and 
human development.” Khilafah is the trusteeship of God on earth, given to men and women alike, 
which cannot be “de-equalized”. Tawhid states the uniqueness of God, who is the only one a 
human being has to obey. In a patriarchal society, women have to obey men; this is thus against 
the principle of tawhid (Badran 2007: 38).
352 
Besides  the  establishment  of  community-based  health  clinics  and  pharmacies  and  the 
construction of shelters for IDPs from the 2000 all-out-war, one project of AMDF, sponsored by 
USAID and the Asia Foundation, was to translate extracts from the Code of Muslim Personal 
Laws (CMPL) in 2005. It was made more public because it contains the rights and duties of 
Muslim women, which are not known by many Muslim Filipinos. Comprising family and civil 
laws on topics including personal status, marriage and divorce, paternity and filiations, paternal 
authority,  succession  and  inheritance,  support  and  maintenance,  rights  and  obligations  and 
property relations between husband and wife, it is enforced by sharia courts.
353  
  The fact that the Code includes regulations that, when compared to adat law or the Civil 
Code of the Philippines, partly weaken women’s position led to discussions among Moro women 
activists (Fianza 2004: 34-35), and the most progressive of them called for a revision of the 
CMPL (Rasul 2003)
354 on legal succession. Article 112 of the CMPL  states that the  surviving 
wife together with a legitimate child or a child of the decedent ’s son shall be entitled to one -
eighth of the hereditary estate. A  husband who inherits from his deceased wife, according to 
Article 117, is entitled to one-fourth. In case there are no such descendants, he inherits one-half 
of the estate while the woman gets  only one-fourth. According to  adat law, men as  well as 
women have a right to equal shares (Fianza 2004: 32). AMDF handled the situation by ignoring 
articles that state gender inequalities in relation to inheritance and only popularized Article 110, 
concerning  legal  succession,  which  lists  the  sharers  without  stating  their  particular  share. 
However, other articles under critique, notably by the Pilipina Legal Resources Center (PLRC), 
                                                 
352 For a further debate on the differences between an Islamic feminist and a patriarchal interpretation of the Qur’an, 
see Badran (2007: 39 et. seq.); Wadud (1999). 
353 There are five  special juridical districts in the southern  Philippines, including also areas that  are  not in the 
ARMM. The provinces of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, and the cities of Marawi and Iligan form one district 
which has a mandate on 12 sharia circuit courts, of which by 2003 eleven had been organized (Solamo-Antonio 
2003: 14). 
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were published in their original version without reservations. Thus for example, Article 27 in 
both versions (“When is a husband allowed to have more than one wife?”) states:  
By husband. Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have 
more than one wife but not more than four at a time, no Muslim male can have 
more than one wife unless he can deal with them with equal companionship and 
just treatment as enjoined by Islamic law and only in exceptional cases.  
The revised version of the PLRC suggests changing this Article to add several points:  
By husband. Notwithstanding the rule of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have 
more than one wife but not more than four at a time, no Muslim male can have 
more than one wife unless 
a)  He  can  deal  with  them  with  equal  companionship  and  just  treatment  as 
enjoined by Islamic law and only in exceptional cases; 
b)  He  has  discussed  the  matter  diligently  with  his  current  family/lies  before 
serving notice to the court; 
c)  The pre-nuptial agreement allows him; and 
d)  The court finds him capable. 
  The broadcasting of an unrevised version of the CMPL by the AMDF shows the balancing 
act of the organization between local demands in a “no war, no peace” environment, in which the 
CMPL became a symbol of the success of a Muslim minority in the face of the state (see Barra 
1993:  88).  AMDF  solved  the  conflict  by  joining  the  Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro 
confederation,
355 which is part of a transnational Muslim women’s movement .
356 Founded in 
2007 by the Sisters in Islam, the Musawah  group is composed of  individuals and NGOs from 
about 50 countries around the world,  advocating women’s rights in the context of Islam. Its 
specific goal is to advance equality in the family. Nisa Ul -Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro reports  that 
amendments to the CMPL were already drafted by Muslim women and submitted to the Lower 
House of Congress in 2000, though the endeavor was not successful. The proposed amendments 
included: the requirement of pre-marriage counseling to emphasize the rights of women and the 
obligations of husbands; pre-nuptial agreements that can contain an option for monogamy; and an 
                                                 
355  Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro  includes  the  following  organizations:  Alternative  Legal  Assistance  Center, 
Bangsamoro  Lawyers’  Network,  Neighbors  PopDev,  Al-Mujadilah  Development  Foundation,  Inc.,  Tarbilang 
Foundation, Inc., and Basilan Muslim Women’s Association.  
356 Transnational feminist movements — meaning movements in which the citizens of different states collaborate, in 
opposition to international movements, in which the relations are between the states — are not a new phenomenon in 
the Islamic context. Moghadam (2005) reports about such activities in the 1980s (p. 143). These networks got a boost 
during the 1993 UN Human Rights Conference in which women’s rights were declared human rights. Moghadam 
describes movements including believing and non-believing women. The Sisters in Islam, constituting a group of 
believing women, were part of the transnational network Women Living under Muslim Laws, but formed their own 
transnational network, Musawah. Its main focus is to take Islam as the foundation for demanding equality in the 
family, stating that: “We, as Muslims and citizens, declare that equality and justice in the family are both necessary 
and possible. We hold the principles of Islam to be a source of justice and equality, fairness and dignity for all human 
beings. The time for realising these values in our laws and practices is now.” (Musawah homepage).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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increase in the minimum age of marriage to 18 years (in the CMPL, it is 15). Recently, Nisa Ul-
Haqq fi Bangsamoro demanded that polygyny be discouraged, if not forbidden, on the basis of 
the Qur’anic verse An-Nisa 4:3, where it is written that a man should only marry more than one 
woman in case he can treat them justly, which should be read together with the verse An-Nisa 
4:129, stating that it is impossible for a man to do perfect justice to several wives. Both should be 
understood within the context in which the Qur’an was revealed (historical understanding) and 
not taken in general terms, providing room for modern reinterpretations. By using this approach 
Nisa  Ul-Haqq  fi  Bangsamoro  applied  international  discourses  which  are  used  by  Islamic 
feminists. The proponents of the amendment of the CMPL continue their work by using different 
disciplines and approaches, including religious, rights-based, scientific, and even evidence-based 
research: “A research on early marriage is part of the building up of evidence-based advocacy, 
using lived realities  of  women in  the ARMM”  (Musawah, the Philippine Report 2010). The 
CMPL should further be amended on the basis of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of  Discrimination  against  Women  (CEDAW).  The  Concluding  Comments  of  the  CEDAW 
Committee  to  the  Philippines’  5
th  and  6
th  Country  Reports  are  seen  as  a  “good  take-off  for 
advocacy for gender equality among Muslim women,” since: 
In the Concluding Comments, Muslim women were among the identified sub-
section  of  women  who  need  intensified  initiatives,  including  in  the  area  of 
discriminatory  provisions  of  the  CMPL.  This  has  made  the  issue  of  Muslim 
women visible to the Philippine government. However, there is a need to sensitize 
interventions that are only concerned with obligation compliance, without giving 
due regard to the peculiarities and nuances of the Muslim communities’ context.  
Some programs in the ARMM have tapped Muslim religious leaders . . . as 
a sector for advocacy, including that of women’s rights. There is still a lot of 
resistance in this area, but some progressive interpretations of Islamic teachings 
have gained some headway, with the help of women’s rights advocates.  
(Homepage of Musawah, the Philippine Report 2010) 
On April 7-8, 2010, the Technical Working Group of the Regional Sub-committee on Gender and 
Development in the ARMM met to work on a draft on GAD.
357 The task was to develop  a 
regional translation of RA No. 9710 (Magna Carta of Women, MCW) which was signed into law 
on August  14, 2009. The MCW is considered by Filipino women's groups like  the Gabriela 
Women’s Party (GWP) and Isis as a national framework for the implementation of the provisions 
of  the  United  Nations  CEDAW.  However,  like  many  other  very  progressive  laws  in  the 
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Philippines
358  the law often lack s  enforcement regarding “the rich and powerful, including 
political cronies and state functionaries, who commit crimes” (hom epage of Gabriela Women’s 
Party). Further, members of  the Gabriela Women’s Party criticized the  use of the expression 
“ethical family planning” in the Magna Carta in relation to reproductive health (Section 17 (b) 
(3)); due to the pressure of a cardinal a more secular reproductive health bill remains pending in 
Congress. Besides approaches that were appreciated by the national NGOs, like the provision of 
equal access of Moro and indigenous female children to  madaris,
359 the GWP complained that 
the family law of the Philippines had not been revised and thus still contained certain loopholes, 
including the Code of Muslim Personal Laws which permits marriage of girls under 18 (men can 
marry at 15 and women with the consent of the wali at 12), polygamy, and arranged marriages.  
The main goal of the Technical Working Group in the ARMM was to bring the MCW into 
alignment with the official position of the Muslim  religious leaders in the ARMM. Like the 
MCW, the ARMM Gender and Development (GAD) Code affirms the role of women in nation-
building  and  guarantees  the  substantive  equality  of  gender,  for  young  and  old  alike.  It  also 
promotes the empowerment of women, pursues equal opportunities for women and men, and 
boys and girls, and ensures equal access to resources, development results, and outcomes in the 
region.  However,  as  observed  by Tarhata  Maglangit,  Commissioner  of  the ARMM  Regional 
Commission on Bangsamoro Women for Maguindanao province, the meeting of the Technical 
Working Group was held with the goal of re-inventing initiatives and policies which are “suitable 
to  our  ‘Muslimness’  and  to  our  region’s  geographical  configuration”  (ARMM  official 
homepage).
360 Considering that the MCW left the CMPL untouched, it has yet to be seen what 
impact the GAD Code will have on gender relations and discrimination according to age in the 
area. 
Conclusion 
Lanao politics lay at the intersection of re-traditionalization, re-Islamization, and modern 
structures. Regarding religion, there are various influences of different forms of Islam, ranging 
                                                 
358 See the debate on the implementation of human rights in Castellino and Redondo (2006: 32). 
359 This provision is in many cases obsolete since females often constitute the majority of Islamic school students at 
the primary level. Only at the higher levels do male students outnumber them (McKenna and Abdula 2009: 222). 
360 Sponsored by Maguindanao 1
st District Assemblyman Abdulradzak Tomawis (Shariff Kabunsuan, Lakas-CMD), 
and  co-sponsored  notably  by  the  first  woman ARMM  Regional  Legislative Assembly  speaker,  Reggie  Sahali-
Generale of Tawi-Tawi, Assemblyman Ziaur Rahman Alonto Adiong of the 1
st District of Lanao del Sur, Cahar Ibay 
of the 1
st District of Maguindanao, and speaker Datu Roonie Sinsuat, the Code was launched as Muslim Mindanao 
Autonomy Act No. 280 on March 8, 2011 (PIA, 26 February 2011). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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from extremist (MILF/MNLF/ASG) to conservative (traditional Islam and da’wah movements) 
and modern/liberal (secularists and Muslim feminists). Most religious politics are, even under the 
religious OMPIA Party, conservative but not extremist. When taking the high number of royal 
titles and sultanates as an indicator, it can be concluded that the traditional form of Islam remains 
influential  against  conservative  impacts  of  the Tabligh  movement  and  the  like.  Even  though 
religious agents would opt against female titles, they remain and have increased since the 1960s. 
These  titles  and  traditional  adat  laws  have  the  potential  to  provide  participation  in  public 
decision-making; however, it depends on the woman and her personal qualities, ambitions, and 
environment as to how far she can use this potential. In addition, hierarchical structures influence 
traditional women’s empowerment. If a woman is not from the traditional elite, she will have 
difficulty in occupying a political position and relying on adat laws to give her priority over male 
candidates. In this context, Islam becomes in many cases the only platform for expressing her 
opinion, but in the conservative (religious) context this would restrict her to the unofficial power 
realm.  
Maranao women have a variety of possibilities to strengthen their rights. Adat rights are 
strongly  connected  to  Maranao  identity.  Traditionally,  this  includes  the  public  praising  of 
relatives, no matter which sex, or the support of female politicians. However, ridos and the threat 
of  physical  violence  that  they  pose  to  women  are  also  part  of  traditional  settings.  Several 
religious women emphasize that if Maranaos were real Muslims, they would not practice ridos. 
Thus, whereas women might feel the pressure of religious duties and some stated that women 
would  “shy  away”  from  politics  —  even  though  the  number  of  female  mayors  has  not 
dramatically decreased since the 1970s — they also feel the pressure of threatening clan feuds, a 
corrupt  government,  and  a  hierarchical  and  ethnocentric  society. A  religion  in  which  all  are 
presumed to be equal and which is perceived as peaceful is thus seen as one remedy to the 
maladies of present times. Furthermore, religion provides a certain kind of authority in the “no 
war, no peace” environment and it is more easily accepted by locals than “Western” feminism. 
Similar to what Karim (1992) described about Malaysia in the beginning of the 1990s, in Lanao 
traditional women refer to adat when claiming their rights. Adat, however, is based on the Qur’an 
and was partly modified when knowledge about Islam grew in the region. Gender became a 
political  issue,  strongly  connected  to  nationalism  and  religion.  On  this  basis,  politicians  and 
women’s groups in the 2000s would rather claim their rights in an Islamic framework than in a 
traditional or non-religious one. The controversial academic debate on post-secular movements The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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neglecting Islam as a basis of female agency in this context is thus out of place in ignoring local 
realities. A more inclusive feminist approach in the context of a critical theory (Braidotti 2008) 
should be considered.  
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Conclusion 
  The definition of the Muslim Philippines as a conflict area has proven to be limited, but 
the notion of a “no war, no peace” environment has turned out to be useful in labeling the times 
in-between violent conflicts. This is of significance since these times are longer and in some areas 
more dominant than times of violent conflict between the AFP and rebel groups. The environment 
thus  defined  has  characteristics  of  war  but  also  of  peace  efforts.  War  and  peace  are  the 
consequence of decisions made in this period. Daily life hence often becomes political, making 
the description of the “in-between” even more important.  
A historical summary of the conflict and the “no war, no peace” situation in Mindanao has 
shown that the main question is the one of national sovereignty, which is still unresolved. Since 
the  2000s,  the  “war  on  terror”  strategy  that  has  increasingly  been  applied  by  the  national 
government  has  strengthened  already  existing  nationalisms  based  on  cultural  and  religious 
identity,  but  could  not  bring  about  a  solution,  because  the  key  source  of  the  problem  was 
perceived to be poverty and not self-determination. A divide-and-rule policy had already been 
applied since the Marcos years. Movements of re-traditionalization in the form of recognition of 
sultans  were  supported  in  order  to  nourish  a  counter-agency  to  the  rebellion.  Cooperating 
political families, mostly with a royal background, are supported by and support the national 
government. After a decade-long dominance of Islamic parties, they returned to power in the 
2000s.  
Several  sultanate  titles  were  acknowledged  by  the  government,  and  President Arroyo 
finally recognized and funded the 16 Royal Houses as a tool to bring “peace and order” to the 
area. Interviews with local royalty, however, indicate that they follow their own agenda and form 
a potential opposition to the government, identifying themselves via ethnicity and religion rather 
than with a national Filipino identity. Muslim rebel movements and re-traditionalization are thus 
two sides of the same coin in their defense of ethnic identity. The former claims that the solution 
to the national question lies outside the state, while the second sees the possibility of their claims 
being met within the framework of the Republic of the Philippines. 
Gender  issues  are  debated  in  both  models  and  are  also  connected  to  the  question  of 
national sovereignty and thus of nationalism. While violent conflicts on the national level have a 
destabilizing effect on traditional society, putting in question the hierarchical system, ridos have 
the opposite impact, serving to stabilize local orders within the prevailing datu system, which is The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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characterized by competitive equality. Both forms of violence serve as a basis to define gender 
relations in which men are the warriors and protectors of women, who are seen as the carriers of 
culture. This might be through the broadcast of an Islamic lifestyle or through the protection of 
lineage  in  a  traditional  context.  The  gender  stereotypes  are  nonetheless  abandoned  in  an 
emergency, when nationalism becomes more important than idealized conceptions. Women have 
the possibility to be trained and actively take part in combat for the “larger cause” and in this way 
to  transgress  gender  norms.  According  to  Vivienne  Angeles,  these  transgressions  in  the 
framework  of  the  MNLF  have  led  to  an  empowerment  of  women,  having  given  them  the 
possibility to discover their leadership possibilities. 
In the predominantly traditional Maranao society, national identity is interwoven with 
ethnicity and religion and strengthens a “Maranaoized” version of Islam. This syncretistic version 
of Islam has been confronted with the outcomes of an ongoing Islamic resurgence movement in 
the form of conservative interpretations of Islam but also recently with more liberal versions, as 
for example Islamic feminism. Women can develop fields of power on  this basis, which are 
however  connected  with  corresponding  restrictions.  Islam  can  serve  as  an  argument  against 
hierarchies and local violence (ridos), but the public playing field for women in the context of a 
conservative  interpretation  is  limited  as  a  result  of  gender  segregation.  In  the  framework  of 
traditional syncretistic Islam, women are seen as counterparts of men in a form of symbolic 
equality which might be defined in the context of equity. They are present but in most cases 
remain in the background. Only outstanding female clan members having the requisite social 
network, funds, and personality demand their traditional rights based on lineage to participate in 
public  decision-making.  Political  dynasties  can  even  pressure  their  women  to  take  leading 
positions  in  order  to  keep  the  position  in  the  family.  This  tendency  increased  after  the 
introduction of limited terms for public office. 
Another source of possible restrictions in the syncretistic context is maratabat, which is 
deeply connected to ridos, resulting in frequent honor killings of people of both genders. The 
concept is explained by a hierarchical interpretation of Islam, giving priority to those lineages 
that are thought to be closely connected to the Prophet Mohammad. The pressure maratabat puts 
on women in case the strict limitations which are set on the female body are crossed can be 
defined  as  violence  against  women.  In  other  circumstances,  women  gain  prestige  and  can 
themselves  pressure  others  based  on  maratabat. As  a  consequence,  they  are  able  to  use  the 
system  to  their own advantage, especially when they are from a high-ranking  family or can The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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provide  a  gainful  connection  for  the  own  lineage  through  their  trespassing.  The  traditional 
bilateral lineage system provides women with fields of power, such as equal inheritance, royal 
titles, and prestige independent of their husbands and with the possibility of transferring rights to 
titles in the sultanate to their male and female children. Uxori- as well as neo-localities
361 provide 
the option to stay close to the matriline. It remains to be seen if conservative Islam  will bring 
increasingly  patrilineal structures. So far the  salsila  and  also  inheritance  and  residence  are 
bilateral, with potential modifications in the one or the other direction, as the family sees fit. 
As  an  outcome  of  the  Islamic  resurgence  movement,  which  influenced  the  national 
movement  by  strengthening  the  already  important  religious  identity,  female  royalty  and  also 
Islamic  conservatives  predominantly  use  an  Islamic  rhetoric.  The  latter  may  however  be 
interpreted differently by both sides in order to serve their respective goals. For traditionalists 
being Maranao is already to be a Muslim. Conservative Muslims may define Islam based on 
movements like the Tabligh. The more liberal Islamic feminists who established themselves in 
the 1990s as part of a global movement argue against traditions, which according to them have 
misinterpreted Islamic creed, but also against Islamic conservatives, who favor polygyny and a 
general patriarchal interpretation of Islam. The political dimension of everyday life in the “no 
war,  no  peace”  environment  is  connected  to  the  question  of  sovereignty,  which  is  based  on 
ethnicity  and  (thus)  religion.  Therefore,  Islamic  narratives  of  justification  became  of  crucial 
importance  in  the  area,  especially  since  they  were  influenced  by  the  Islamic  resurgence 
movement in the 1980s. This has given Islamic feminism an argumentative authority traditional 
women lack. The latter, in case they are from the elite, instead have the backup of their clan and 
family, which can push them into official or unofficial leadership as long as they abide by the will 
of the clan. In consequence, women achieving public leadership positions through the help of the 
clan are not necessarily precursors of general female emancipation or gender mainstreaming. The 
acquisition of leadership is a hierarchical matter. Islam, which claims that all human beings are 
equal before Allah, has an argument against such traditional features but not the means to enforce 
it. In general, the society is largely traditional in the sense of being based on clan and family 
arrangements.  This  feature,  which  is  directly  and  indirectly  supported  by  the  national 
government, is characterized by the rule of political families. Additionally, strategic relationships 
between the traditional elites and the national government are crucial in order to counteract the 
                                                 
361 A married couple lives either near the wife’s parents place (uxorilocality) or away from both the husband’s and the 
wife’s natal household (neolocality).  The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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rebellion.  This  means  that  in  Lanao  del  Sur  Islamic  feminism  has  the  most  convincing 
argumentative basis for the implementation of a gender equality. However, Islamic feminists are 
positioned  between  tradition  and  conservative  Islam,  both  of  which  have  their  own  gender 
politics.  The  national  government  will  support  either  direction  as  long  as  it  is  within  the 
boundaries of formal national politics, whether in the shape of traditional political families or an 
Islamic Party. An alliance between Islamic feminism and, since the 2000s, politically dominant 
traditionalists may turn out to be symbolic if the issue of family dynasties and feudalism is not 
solved at the same time. A follow-up study on the ARMM definition of the newly implemented 
GAD program might give further hints regarding this matter. 
It  can be  concluded that  re-traditionalization in the form  of sultanates  and traditional 
political elites being supported by the national government is, from an emic point of view, not a 
direct countermovement to political Islamization or the rebellion. In all these movements Islam 
remains one of the most authoritative source for narratives of justification but it is carried out by 
different  agents  with  their  respective  goals.  Local  counter-hegemonic  movements  of  female 
empowerment thus have to be analyzed critically in their historical and political settings, which 
are dominated by various forms of Islam. Anything defined as “Western” feminism cannot find a 
foothold in the area. This leads to a separation of gender movements into Muslim and non-
Muslim ones, which may, nevertheless, cooperate. The gap thus created is not a sign of increased 
religious hostility but again points to the unsolved national question. Islam in this context serves 
as a vector for a national movement, which is predominantly connected to ethnic and cultural 
identity and not to Islamic resurgence as such. As a result, violence on the national level will 
remain  until  a  proper  solution  is  found. The  government  support  of  re-traditionalization  has 
grown to be an additional problem since it seems rather unlikely that rebels will lay down their 
weapons and be overruled by traditionalists. However, the recent offer by the MILF to solve the 
conflict  through  a  state-sub-state  arrangement  may  have  been  an  outcome  of  the  re-
traditionalization movement.  
In the framework of tradition, women can become powerful mainly in the background or 
in public by abiding by the wishes of the clan. Governmental influences have not changed this, as 
can be seen in the recognition of the 16 Royal Houses where no formal arrangements were made 
to include bai a labis. On the level of NGOs, women are involved as representatives of the clan 
system. The gender issue in the peace talks is not solved yet. Only recently have some women, 
most of them Christian, demanded more participation of women in the decision-making process. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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The MILF showed its good intentions by including for the first time female representatives, thus 
demonstrating their general line regarding the issue. Islamic feminists are a minority and have to 
struggle on two fronts: against conservative Islamists and conservative traditionalists. The gender 
issue is thus strongly connected to the national question and its resolution, there being no strong 
power base to enforce an alternative approach. Until then, it will remain subject to the debate 
between re-Islamization and re-traditionalization. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Timeline of Conflict and Peace Pacts 
 
 
Presidency 
 
Situation in 
Mindanao  Rebel Movements  “No war, no peace” 
environment  Violent Conflicts 
Ferdinand 
Marcos 
 
1965-1986 
   
  1972-1975: War 
1975-1977: Tripoli 
Agreement   
1979: Presidential 
Decree 1618 creating 
two autonomous 
governments including 
ten provinces and seven 
cities 
1977: Split of 
leadership in the 
MNLF   
1979: Guerrilla war in 
reaction to the fact that the 
autonomous government 
comprised only 10 
Provinces and not 13 as 
the Tripoli Agreement 
demanded and that the 
implementation was 
connected to a 
referendum. 
 
1984: MILF’s official 
founding under Hashim 
Salamat 
 
Corazon 
‘Cory’ Aquino 
 
1986-1992 
   
1986: Ceasefire between 
MNLF and government 
 
1986: Clashes between 
government and MNLF-
RG, and between MNLF 
and MILF 
1989: Aquino’s bill 
granting autonomy to 13 
provinces and 9 cities 
under the condition that 
those areas ratify it in a 
referendum. Four 
Provinces finally joined 
the ARMM in 1990. 
End of 1980s: founding 
of ASG    1989: Guerrilla war by 
MNLF. 
    1992: MNLF’s return to 
peace negotiations 
1992: guerilla attacks by 
ASG and MILF. 
Fidel 
Ramos 
 
1992-1998 
 
1996-2001: Nur 
Misuari’s ARMM 
governance and 
defection in MNLF’s 
ranks benefitting the 
MILF 
9/2/1996: Final Peace 
Agreement between the 
MNLF and the GRP.   
Creation of a Special 
Zone for Peace and 
Development under the 
SPCPD. 
 
 
1997: Ceasefire between 
MILF and government, 
despite military clashes 
 
Joseph 
Estrada 
 
1998-2001 
   
8/1998: General 
Framework of Agreement 
of Intent between GRP 
and MILF signed in 
Maguindanao 
 
 
2/1999: Acknowledgment 
of main camps as 
development and peace 
zones signed in 
Maguindanao. 
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2000: AFP’s attacks 
against “criminals and 
terrorists” in the Muslim 
areas 
8/2000: All-out war and 
breakdown of peace talks 
Gloria 
Macapagal 
Arroyo 
 
 
2001-2010 
3/31/2001: RA No. 
9054 (amending RA No. 
6734) to strengthen and 
expand the ARMM 
2001.04: Nur Misuari 
made chairman 
emeritus by the 15 
members of the MNLF 
Executive Council 
3/24/2001: Agreement on 
the General Framework 
for the Resumption of 
Peace Talks between the 
GRP and MILF in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia 
2001: All-out peace and 
back to peace negotiations 
(including OIC members) 
8/2/2001: Lanao del 
Norte municipalities of 
Baloi, Munai, 
Nunungan, Pantar, 
Tagoloan, and Tangkol 
vote for their inclusion 
in the ARMM. 
10/29/2001: Unity talks 
between MILF and 
MNLF 
6/22/2001: Agreement on 
peace between the 
government of the 
Republic of the 
Philippines and the MILF 
in Tripoli (consensus 
found on security and aid 
and development, issue of 
ancestral domain to be 
included in the BJE still 
in discussion) 
 
10/12/2001: 
Memorandum Order No. 
37 provided for a 14-
pillar anti-terrorism 
policy. 
8/14/2001: Plebiscite: 
Marawi City and 
Basilan join the ARMM 
11/26/2001: Arrest of 
Nur Misuari for having 
led the rebellion after 
his ouster from MNLF 
leadership 
11/20/2001: Joint 
statement by Presidents 
Arroyo and Bush 
reaffirming bilateral 
relations and the need for 
economic growth and 
development, since 
poverty is a contributing 
factor to terrorism 
 
6/2/2002: Creation of 
the BDA 
 
2002: Official suspension 
of peace talks by the 
government 
2002-2003: 1,257 clashes 
between the MILF and the 
AFP 
 
 
2/11/2003: Buliok 
offensive by the AFP over 
the new headquarters of 
the MILF in North 
Cotabato. Ceasefire is 
enforced three weeks later. 
7/13/2003: Death of 
Hashim Salamat. Al-
Hadji Murad Ebrahim 
becomes chairman of 
the MILF. 
7/19/2003: Agreement to 
ceasefire and a mutual 
cessation of hostilities 
4/2003: Davao bombings; 
government accuses MILF 
of involvement. 
1/18/2004: Creation of 
IMT based on the 
agreement of June 22, 
2001 
 
2-12/2005: Peace panels 
in Malaysia on the 
ancestral domain 
2004-2008: 46 clashes 
between the MILF and the 
AFP 
2/6/2006: Founding of 
the BLMI 
2/24-3/3/2006: State of 
emergency 
1/2005: Guerrillas led by 
MILF chief Abdulrahman 
Bnago 
 
9/3/2006: Deadlock in 
peace talks about 
ancestral domain 
 
2007: Resignation of 
Silvestre Afable from the 
7/10/2007: Clashes 
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GRP peace panel in 
protest over the lack of 
support from the 
government 
resulting in the 
displacement of up to 
85,000 people 
12/15/2007: Peace talks 
over the issue of the 
scope of the Moros’ 
ancestral domain  
 
6/18/2008: The National 
Security Council 
approved the final 
agreement draft on the 
ancestral domain 
agenda, leading to the 
inclusion of about 600 
Muslim-populated 
villages on top of the 
already existing ARMM 
area in the proposed 
homeland of the MILF. 
4/25/2008: Release of 
MNLF leader Nur 
Misuari 
 
6/25/2008:  MILF  “lost 
commands”  attack  in 
Maitum, Sarangani. Other 
attacks in North Cotabato 
and Maguindanao follow. 
 
7/21/2008: Resolution 
of the Provincial Board 
of North Cotabato in 
opposition to inclusion 
in the Moro territory 
8/14/2008: Formal 
approval of the creation 
of the BSC by leaders 
of the MNLF and 
MILF 
6/28/2008: Mass rallies in 
several cities in 
Mindanao organized by 
civil organizations in 
favor of peace 
negotiations 
 
7/24/2008: peace talks 
between GRP and MILF 
in Kuala Lumpur 
7/27/2008: Joint 
Communiqu￩ stating 
that the MOA provides 
that about 700 villages 
in Mindanao will hold a 
referendum within 12 
months to determine if 
they want to join the 
Muslim homeland 
 
   
8/2008: Petitions from 
North Cotabato, 
Mindanao and Palawan, 
asking the Supreme 
Court to block the 
signing of the 
agreement between the 
GRP and the MILF. On 
June 5, the Supreme 
Court issued a 
temporary restraining 
order. 
8/21/2008: Introduction 
by the government of the 
concept of negotiations 
based on DDR 
(demobilization, 
disarmament, and 
reintegration) 
8/2008: Break of a five 
year ceasefire between 
AFP and MILF, leading to 
about 700,000 IDPs and 
400 deaths 
11-12/2008: Departure 
of the IMT 
9/3/2008: Dissolution of 
governmental peace panel   
1/19/2009: Creation of 
the expanded ARMM 
9/15/2009: Signature of a 
framework agreement on 
the formation of an ICG 
7/2009: Announcement of 
government’s SOMO and 
then of the MILF’s SOMA 
2/2010: Return of the 
IMT members to 
Mindanao 
5/23/2010: Constitution 
of a coordination 
committee between 
MILF and MNLF 
12/8-9/2009: Restart of 
the negotiations in Kuala 
Lumpur 
 
Benigno Aquino 
III 
2010 
     
2/9-10/2011: new peace 
panels between GRP and 
MILF meets in Malaysia. 
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2. ARMM Administration 
 
  Governor  Vice-Governor 
1990-1993  Zacaria Candao  IPP  Maguindanao  Benjamin Loong  Tausug 
1993-1996  Lininding Pangandaman    Maranao  Nabil Tan  Tausug 
 
1996-2001 
 
Nurallaj Misuari 
MNLF  Tausug  Guimid P. Matalam  Maguindanao 
2001  Alvarez Isnaji (acting)  Ex-MNLF  Tausug     
2001-2005  Parouk Hussin  MNLF  Tausug  Mahid M. Mutilan  Maranao 
2005-2008 
Zaldy Ampatuan  LAKAS-
CMD 
Maguindanao 
Ansaruddin-Abdulmalik 
Alonto Adiong 
Maranao 
2008-2009  Maguindanao  Maranao 
2009  Ansaruddin-Abdulmalik 
Alonto Adiong (acting) 
LAKAS-
CMD  Maranao  Reggie Sahali-Generale  Maguindanao 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
423 
 
3. Lanao del Sur Governors 
 
1942-1945  Domocao Alonto  Japanese rule 
1945-1949  Luis R. Marohombsar  Acting 
1949-1954 
Hadji Alawi Mandangan Dimakuta 
 
Shiek Cosain Usman (1954) 
 
Jorge Sanchez (1954) 
Appointed 
Acting 
Appointed 
1954-1959  Salvador T. Lluch  Appointed 
1959-1963 
Abdul Gafur Madki Alonto  Elected 
1963-1967 
1968-1971  Linang D. Mandangan  Elected 
1971-1975  Tarhata Alonto Lucman  Elected 
1975-1976  Mamarinta B. Lao  Appointed 
1976-1986  Mohamad Ali Dimaporo  Appointed 
Elected 
1986-1987  Tarhata Alonto Lucman  Appointed 
1988-1992  Saidamen B. Pangarungan  Appointed 
Elected (1988) 
1992-1995 
Mahid Mutilan  Elected  1995-1998 
1998-2001 
2001-2004  Mamintal “Mike” Adiong Senior  Elected 
2004-2007 
Mamintal “Mike” Adiong Senior 
 
Alim Basher ‘Mustaqbal’ Manalao (2004) 
 
Bae Monera Dimakuta Macabangon (2006) 
Elected 
Acting 
Acting 
2007-2010  Mamintal “Bombit” Alonto Adiong Junior  Elected 
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4. Maranao Women in Political Positions in Lanao 
 
    Lanao del Norte  Lanao del Sur  sum 
Vice-Mayor 
1998-2001 
2001-2004 
2004-2007 
2007-2010 
2010-2013 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
5 
7 
1 
3 
2 
6 
8 
Total  3  17  20 
Mayor 
1983 
1985 
1998-2001 
2001-2004 
2004-2007 
2007-2010 
2010-2013 
1 
0 
2 
4 
0 
3 
4 
0 
1 
6 
9 
4 
4 
5 
1 
1 
8 
13 
4 
7 
9 
Total  14  29  43 
Vice-Governor 
 
1995-1998 
2004-2007 
2007-2010 
2010-2013 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 (acting) 
0 
0 
1 
2 
1 
1 
Total  3  2  5 
Governor 
1971-1975 
1986-1987 
1998-2001 
2001-2004 
2004-2007 
0 
0 
1 (non-Maranao) 
1 (non-Maranao) 
1 (non-Maranao) 
1 
1 (appointed) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total  3  2  5 
Provincial Board 
Member 
1980s 
1992-1994 
1994-1997 
1997-2000 
2007-2010 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total  3  2  5 
Congresswomen 
2001-2004 
2004-2007 
2007-2010 
2010-2013 
0 
0 
0 
2 (1 non-Maranao) 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Total  2  3  5 
Assemblywomen 
1978 
1993-1996 
1996 
2005-2008 
2008-2011 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
Total  2  5  7 
 
Grand Total  
 
30  60  90 
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5. Female Politicians in Lanao del Norte 
 
Term  Vice-Mayor  Place   
2001-
2004 
Sittie Aisha A. 
Palao  Tagoloan   
2007-
2010 
Muslima Pacalna 
Macol 
Poona 
Piagapo 
 
2010-
2013 
Rocma 
Macatoman Maba 
Poona 
Piagapo 
 
Term  Mayor  Place 
1983 
 
1998-
2001 
Hadja Rasmia 
Monatao Ali 
Campong 
Tagoloan 
  Daughter of mayor of Tagoloan (1978-82). 
  Her brothers Palao and Dayangcorop Ali died early.  
  Pushed to run for mayor after her father’s death. 
  Sister of the incumbent mayor of Baoi, Hanifa A. Ali. 
1998-
2001 
 
 
2007-
2010 
 
 
2010-
2013 
Hanifa Ali  Baloi 
  First female mayor of the province. 
  Municipality ruled by the husband-and-wife team of Madid Elias Lope 
and Hanifa Ali. 
  Madid Elias served as three-term mayor (1988-1992; 1992-1995; 1995-
1998). After his third term, Hanifa replaced him. In 2001, he took over 
again for two terms. 
  Madid Elias Ali’s father, Hadji Gomampang Ali, also served as mayor 
for five terms from 1949 until 1971. He was replaced by his brother, 
Sheik Bzar Daud Ali (1971-1974; 1974-1978; 1982-1986). 
2001-
2004 
Mohmina M. 
Usman 
Poona 
Piagapo 
 
2001-
2004 
Raida L. Tawan-
tawan  Salvador   
2001-
2004 
Sobaida A. 
Tamama-
Balindong 
Tagoloan 
 
2001-
2004  Babai M. Daluma  Pantar   
2007-
2010 
Norlainie Mitmug 
Limbona  Pantar   
2007-
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010-
2013 
Eleanor 
Dimaporo Lantud 
Pantao 
Ragat 
  First cousin of Representative Abdullah Dimaporo. 
  Niece of the late Muhammad Ali Dimaporo. 
  Mayor  in  2007,  replacing  her  husband  (Lacson)  who  became  vice-
mayor after serving three terms as mayor before her. 
  Lacson is the son of Inorak Lantud, former mayor (1965-1987; 1990-
1999).  
  On  his  mother’s  side,  Lacson  is  related  to  Abdullah  Mangotara,  a 
gubernatorial rival of Dimaporo in the 1990s.  
  The Dimaporos are trying to unseat Eleanor and her husband because 
Lacson kept a private army.  
  In 2006, Martial Law was almost declared because of a rido between 
Lacson and his brother-in-law’s relative who ran for mayor in 2004. 
Lacson’s sister is married to the cousin of his political rival. Lacson 
with his “private army” attacked Walo a Datu, a barangay in Pantao 
Ragat where his sister and political rival live. Since Lacson’s sister took 
the side of her husband’s cousin, Lacson did not spare his sister as a 
target of revenge, but he failed to kill her. At one point, Lacson’s army 
held  a  grenade  intended  for  their  enemy  but  the  grenade  exploded 
before they could throw it to the enemy, thus killing Lacson’s army. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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This angered Lacson and the rido became intense until it was resolved 
in 2009. 
2010-
2013 
Farhana Racmat 
Palawan 
Poona 
Piagapo 
 
2010-
2013 
Aisha Diro 
Ambola 
Batingolo 
Tangkal 
 
Vice-Governor 
2004-
2013  Irma Umpa Ali   
  Provincial board member in Lanao del Norte (1991-2004). 
  Vice-governor (2004-2013). 
  Daughter  of  long-term  Dimaporo  ally  Vice-Governor  and  Mayor 
Malamit Umpa. 
Governor 
1998-
2001 
 
 
2001-
2004 
 
 
2004-
2007 
Imelda 
“Angging” 
Quibranza 
Dimaporo
362 
    Non-Maranao. 
  Representative of the 1
st District of Lanao del Norte (2010-2013). 
  Wife of Abdullah Dimakuta Dimaporo, former three-term governor. 
  Her eldest son is Mohammad Khalid Quibranza Dimaporo, incumbent 
governor (2007-2013). 
  Her daughter Fatima Aliah Quibranza Dimaporo is the representative 
for the 2
nd District in Lanao del Norte (2010-2013). 
Representative/Congress 
2010-
2013 
Imelda 
“Angging” 
Quibranza 
Dimaporo 
1
st 
District 
 
2010-
2013 
Fatima Aliah 
Quibranza 
Dimaporo 
2
nd 
District 
 
Assemblywoman 
1978-
1984  Porti Ali Pacasum   
  Sectoral  assemblywoman  for  Industrial  Labor  in  Mindanao  in  the 
Interim Batasang Pambansa. 
  Bai a Labi a Gaus sa Baloi, sister of the Sultan sa Baloi.  
  Related to Dean Salam Pacasum Naga Pangadapun.  
  Graduate  of  Political  Sciences  in  Manila  and  receiver  of  several 
“outstanding” awards. 
1993-
1996 
Johayrah 
Diamond Ali 
Pacasum 
Pangarungan 
ARMM 
  Bai a Labi a Gaus sa Ranao. 
  Wife of Saidamen B. Pangarungan, governor of Lanao del Sur (1988-
1992). 
 
   
                                                 
362 The Christian Quibranzas and the Muslim Dimaporos are two families who claimed the governorship of Lanao 
del  Norte.  The  political  rivalry  between  Arsenio  Quibranza  and  Mohamad  Ali  Dimaporo  heightened  Muslim-
Christian tension in the 1970s. It ended when Malacañang brokered a settlement of the two warring clans capped by 
the marriage of their children, Imelda (after Imelda Marcos) and “Bobby.” The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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6. Female Politicians in Lanao del Sur 
 
Term  Vice-Mayor
363  Place   
1998-
2001 
2001-
2004 
Ara M. 
Mindalano 
Macabalang 
Kapatagan   
2001-
2004 
2004-
2007 
Fatima A. Sultan  Bumbaran   
2004-
2007 
2007-
2010 
Minda Rasuman 
Bato Lamping  Lumba-Bayabao   
2007-
2010 
Isnaira 
Panandigan K. 
Al-Macaraya 
Sultan 
Dumalondong   
2007-
2010 
 
2010-
2013 
Bai Noryasmen 
A. B. Calandada  Marawi City 
  Scion of one of 12 agama clans. 
  Married to a prominent family in Marawi City 
  Cousin of Congressman Faysah Maniri Racman-Pimping 
Dumarpa. 
2007-
2010 
2010-
2013 
Mary Ruth 
Catalan  Wao
364    The mayor of Wao is Elvino Balicao, a Christian. 
2010-
2013 
Anna Mahlyne 
A. Macarampat  Ditsaan-Ramain    Previously was municipal councilor. 
2010-
2013 
Noraimah A. 
Hadji Ali  Kapai   
2010-
2013 
Minda B. 
Laming 
Lumba-Bayabao 
(Maguing)   
2010-
2013 
Khalida A. 
Benito  Pagayawan   
Mayor 
1985  Pascum Naga 
Pangadapun  Marawi City 
  Only child of Datu Cosain Naga, scion of the 12 agama clans, 
former mayor of Marawi City. 
  Public school teacher. 
  Wife of the late Judge Yusop Pangadapun (Alonto clan). 
  Belongs to the Baloi sultanate through the Ali and Pacasum 
clans. 
  First Maranao woman to be elected City Councillor (at the age 
of 17) in Marawi City in 1962. Awarded “Most Outstanding 
                                                 
363 There are 39 municipalities and one city in Lanao del Sur. 
364 Muslims comprise 20% of the population of the municipality of Wao. The mixed community was established 
under the guidance of the Maranao Datu Busran Kalaw. Apart from problems in the 1970s, when there were conflicts 
between the Barracudas and the Ilagas, the community is said to live in peaceful co-existence (Madale 1997: 146). 
Wao was also not part of the attacks by the MILF on Christian villages in 2009 after the failure of the signing of the 
MOA-AD. As early as 2006, Wao was one of four local government units in the ARMM that showed an interest in 
GAD. The Local Governance Support Program in ARMM noted its potential and initiated the mainstreaming of 
gender equality at the municipal and barangay levels of governance. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
428 
City Councillor” in 1965 by the Lanao del Sur Professionals, 
“chosen for her significant contribution to the welfare of her 
community” (Asis in Mindanao Art and Culture 9:22). 
  First Maranao woman to become a city mayor, succeeding 
Attorney Mahid Pimpimg (1984-1985). Awarded as “Most 
Outstanding Lady City Mayor.”
365 
  Chairwoman of the Philippine Muslim Women Professionals 
and Leaders, Manila Chapter (1981). 
  Chairwoman of the Philippine Muslim Women’s Association 
(1982). 
  Chairwoman of the Lanao del Sur Women's Association 
(1972). 
  Group leader in the yearly Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Awarded the “Most Outstanding Group Leader” by the 
Ministry of Muslim Affairs (1983). 
  Her son, Popoy Pangadapun, was a three-term elected vice-
mayor of Marawi City. 
1998-
2001 
Maimona Hadja 
Norhainie Muto 
S. Dungka 
Ganassi   
1998-
2001 
Bai Omel 
Pesique 
Hasabando 
Basman 
Marawi City    Followed her husband Abbas Basman. 
1998-
2001 
2001-
2004 
Bai Johaira 
“Marimar“ 
Abinal 
Maguing
366    Wife of Johari Abinal. 
1990s  Adelaida 
Arimao  Lumbayanague 
  Wife of a superintendent of schools. 
  She won against her male counterparts in a hotly-contested 
election which ended in violence. 
  Her success as elected mayor was due to her blood ties to a 
number of major clans in her town. 
  She served for three terms and her young son succeeded her as 
mayor. 
1998-
2001 
 
2001-
2004 
 
2004-
2007 
Edna Ogka 
Benito  Balabagan
367 
  Daughter of Datu Ogka Sampiano, former vice-mayor, and a 
Christian woman from Cebu. 
  Sister of Hadji Murad Sampiano, an incumbent mayor who 
was assassinated in 1992 by her opponents. 
  Elected after her clan decided to put her up as replacement to 
her fallen brother. 
1998-
2001  Fahida P. Balt  Tubaran   
2001-
2004 
 
 
 
Bai Raida Bansil 
Maglangit  Kapatagan 
Noted Koran reader, she was married to a prominent member of a 
clan in the town and won as mayor. She is known as a progressive 
mayor of one of the most violent towns in the province. After the 
all-out war in 2000 her community was declared a zone of peace, a 
project being pushed by leaders in the local government, military, 
                                                 
365 In 1986, the attorney Abbas Basman succeeded her (appointed 1986-1987). He became mayor again after his 
victorious protest against Mahid Mutilan, who had been mayor from 1988 to 1992. 
366 The current mayor (2001-2013) is Hakim P. Abinal. 
367  The  current  mayor  (2007-2010)  is  Hadji  Amer  Ragodotan  Sampiano;  the  vice-mayor  Quirino  Ragodotan 
Sampiano. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
 
429 
2004-
2007 
 
 
 
2007-
2010 
and MILF, as well as peace advocates to follow the signing of a 
local security agreement. After that the government and NGOs 
helped to provide infrastructure like roads and buildings, 
livelihood, and basic services – “projects that were sorely lacking 
in this former no man’s land” (Uy 2008). Her husband served as 
mayor before her for three terms. In 2010 Nhazruddin B. Maglangit 
was elected as the new mayor. 
2001-
2004 
2004-
2007 
Hedjarah Lydia 
E. Manabilang  Bumbaran
368   
2001-
2004 
Rasmia Usman 
Salic Romato  Butig   
2001-
2004 
Salamona L. 
Asum  Lumbayanague    Followed by Mayor Jamal Langlang Asum (2007-2013). 
  The vice-mayor was Simpan Asum Gunting. 
1998-
2001 
2001-
2004 
Soraida M. 
Sarangani  Madalum    Followed by Usman Jr. Mindalano Sarangani (2007-2010). 
2007-
2010 
Jan Jan Alangadi 
Pundato 
Disomimba 
Tamparan 
  Wife of Sultan Topaan “Toni” Disomimba, three-term mayor 
(1998-2007), then reelected (2010). 
  Member of the Royal clan of Mala Bayabao. 
  Wife of the former mayor. In 2010 after she finished her third 
term, her husband became mayor again. 
2001-
2004 
2004-
2007 
2007-
2010 
Minda 
Pandapatan 
Dagalangit 
Lumba-
Bayabao
369 
  Member of the Uato royalty. 
  Wife of Aminola Mangurun, a three-term mayor. 
2001-
2004 
Bae Jalilah 
Umpa-
Mindalano 
Madamba
370    Wife of former mayor (1992-2001) 
2007-
2010 
Rasmia 
Bandrang-
Macabago 
Saguiaran    Wife of Sabdullah Tempo Macabago, former mayor (1997-
2007). 
2010-
2013 
Raida Dimaporo 
Papandayan  Tubaran    Wife of the previous mayor. 
2010-
2013 
Raysalam M. 
Bagul-
Mangondato 
Balindong    Sister of the previous mayor. 
2010-
2013 
Umohanie M. 
Bato-
Macatanong 
Piagapo    Wife of the previous mayor. 
2010-
2013 
Omensalam S. 
Balindong  Malabang    Wife of the previous mayor. 
2010-
2013 
Raquemah A. 
Benito-Taha  Calanogas    Daughter of the previous mayor. 
ARMM Assembly
371 
1996 
 
Bai Zenaida P. 
Bubong  MNLF    Head of the Bangsa Moro Women's Committee. 
  Veteran field official of the MNLF. 
                                                 
368 The current mayor (2010-2013) is Mastura C. Manabilang; the vice-mayor Jamal E. Manabilang. 
369 The current mayor (2010-2013) is Gambai Rasuman Dagalangit.   
370 The current mayor (2004-2007; 2010-2013) is Dagoroan Amol Mindalano. 
371 In the ARMM Assembly, there are six positions for assemblymen/women. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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2005-
2008 
  Wife of Commander Narra, a legendary guerrilla chief who 
commanded one of the largest MNLF camps in mainland 
Mindanao. 
  Related to the Alontos.  
2005-
2008 
2008-
2011 
Suhaylah 
Racman-
Pimping Maniri 
Salic 
1
st District 
LAKAS CMD 
  Sister of Congresswoman Faysah Maniri Racman-Pimping 
Dumarpa. 
2008-
2011 
Bai Rasmia 
Salic Romato 
2
nd District 
LAKAS 
CMD
372 
 
Provincial Board Members
373 
  Hadja Fatima 
Masinger Guro   
  First female Maranao provincial board member.  
  BA of Science in Elementary Education.  
  Wife of Director Itomama B. Guro. Wedding arranged by 
Mastura Guro, ex-mayor of Lumbatan. 
2007-
2010 
Bai Aisha 
Dianalan 
Munder 
1
st District 
  Daughter of a political family. 
  Only female board member during her time. 
 
 
Vice-Governor 
1995-
1998 
Normallah 
Alonto Lucman     
2004-
2007 
Bai Monera 
Dimakuta 
Macabangon 
 
  Provincial board member, promoted after Governor Mamintal 
“Mike” Adiong Senior’s death. 
  Vice-governors are expected to step up to the governorship.  
  Together with most of the provincial board members, she filed 
administrative and criminal cases against Governor Mostaqbal 
in 2006.  
  Acting governor after Mostaqbal’s suspension by the DILG 
(three months). 
Governor 
1971-
1975 
 
1986-
1987 
Tarhata Alonto 
Lucman 
Elected 
 
Appointed 
  Resignation after President Marcos’ s accusation of abetting 
rebellion (1975). 
  Appointed governor of Lanao del Sur after the downfall of 
Marcos (1986).  
  In 1995, her daughter followed in her footsteps as vice-
governor of Lanao del Sur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
372 Other Salics currently holding a political position are Samer Umpar Makil Salic (2008, ARMM assemblyman) 
and Fahad Panarigan Umpar Salic, the recently (2010) re-elected mayor of Marawi City.  Bai Noryasmen A. B. 
Calandada, the vice-mayor of Marawi City, is a scion of one of 12 Agama clans, married to a prominent family in 
Marawi City and a cousin of Congressman Faysah Maniri Racman-Pimping Dumarpa.  
373 There are ten positions for board members. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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7. Representatives of Lanao 
 
Situation after Second World War 
1946-1949  Datu Amer Manalao 
Mindalano 
Member of the guerilla forces against the Japanese occupation, then 
elected congressman. 
1949-1953  Mohamad Ali B. 
Dimaporo  War hero during Japanese occupation. 
1954-1957  Domocao Alonto  Known to have defended principle of independence against American 
sovereignty.  
1958-1961  Laurentino Ll. Badelles   
1962-1965 
Rashid Lucman  Husband of Tarhata Alonto Lucman. 
1966-1969 
1970-1972  Macacuna Dimaporo  Brother of Ali Dimaporo. 
Martial Law under the Marcos regime 
1978-1984 
Interim  
Batasang Pambansa   
 
Regional Assemblymen of Region XII, Central Mindanao: 
Jesus P. Amparo, Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., Tomas B. Baga, Jr., Abdullah 
D. Dimaporo, Ahdel S.T. Pangandaman, Ernesto F. Roldan, Datu Blah 
T. Sinsuat, Estanislao V. Valdez 
 
Sectoral assemblymen for Mindanao: 
Industrial Labor: Princess Porti A. Pacasum  
Agricultural Labor: Jiamil Ismael Dianalan 
1984-1986  Regular  
Batasang Pambansa 
Members of the Parliament for Lanao del Sur: 
Omar M. Dianalan, Macacuna B. Dimaporo 
Since the division of Lanao
374 
  1
st District  2
nd District 
1987-1992  Sultan Omar M. 
Dianalan 
Mohamad Ali B. Dimaporo  1992-1995 
Mamintal M. Adiong  1995-1998 
1998-2001 
Benasing O. Macarambon, Jr.  2001-2004 
Faysah Maniri-Racman 
Dumarpa  2004-2007 
2007-2010 
Pangalian M. Balindong 
2010-2013  Salic B.Dumarpa 
 
                                                 
374 Lanao del Sur is divided into two congressional districts: the 1
st District, representing Basak, and the 2
nd District, 
representing the Unayan region. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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Congresswoman Faysah Maniri Racman Pimping Dumarpa from Lakas-CMD is an example of a 
political family dynasty becoming very successful through a woman. She is a relative of the late attorney 
Mahadi  “Dante”  P.  Pimping,  former  Marawi  City  mayor  (1984-1985)  and  vice-mayor  (1980-1984). 
Promoted  schoolteacher  at  the  Pangarungan  Islamic  College  in Marawi  City,  she  worked  as  Cultural 
Research Writer and Information Officer at MSU Marawi. In 1990, she served as Undersecretary at the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development until her election to the ARMM Legislative Assembly 
(1993-2001).  
She was the second Maranao woman elected to this office, besides Princess Johayrah Diamond Ali 
Pacasum Pangarungan. She became Congresswoman when Congressman Mamintal “Mike” Adiong ran as 
governor of Lanao del Sur. She won in the 1
st congressional district over male candidates in a hotly-
contested election. She sponsored bills focusing on the establishment of a Moro Cultural Heritage Center, 
the expansion of the Shari’ah Court System in the ARMM and the prohibition of religious and radical 
profiling of indigenous cultural communities (Gutoc 2008a).  
In the first congressional district, Rep. Faysah Dumarpa ended her three terms in office in 2010. 
Her  husband  Salic  Biston,  a  commissioner  assigned  to  a  government-owned  agency,  Dumarpa 
(Nacionalista Party, NP), ran for her post against Abul Khayr Alonto (Independent), Salic Ayo Mundir 
(Pwersa  ng  Masang  Pilipino,  Forces  of  the  Filipino  Masses,  PMP),  Mohammed  Hussein  Pacasum 
Pangandaman  (Luntiang  Kabataan,  LK)  and  Princess  Johayra  Diamond  Pacasum  Pangarungan 
(Independent).  Pangandaman  is  the  son  of  Agrarian  Reform  Secretary  Nasser  Pagandaman  and  the 
grandson of former ARMM Governor Lininding Pangandaman, while Diamond is the wife of former 
Lanao  del  Sur  Governor  Saidamen  Pangarungan.  Salic  Biston  Dumarpa  lost  against  an Adiong  ally, 
Hussein Pangandaman
375. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
375 The final results of the elections were partly delayed in Lanao del Sur and elections had to be repeated in several 
barangays, especially in the 1
st District. Shortly after, the son of a Comelec commissioner was abducted with the 
demand  to  nullify  election  results  in  the  towns  of  Taraka,  Masiu  (1
st  District),  and  Malabang  and  Picong  (2
nd 
District). Leading politicians accused the Dumarpas of having masterminded the kidnapping in order not to lose their 
congressional seat to Hussein Pangandaman. By that time, complete election results had not yet been published, but 
according to unofficial results Salic Dumarpa had a head start over Pangandaman in the contest for representative of 
the 1
st District (71,007 votes over 66,038). The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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8. How Umpas and Sandab got to Mindanao: A Story Related by the Masiricampo sa 
Butig 
  
It is about a bullfight. The Sultan [of Johor] is the eldest. Umpas is the daughter [and] 
Sandab is the youngest. The Sultan of Johor was the master of all traits. He was telling that he has 
this carabao who won all the fights. And Sandab thought that it was a joke. He told him: “Oh! 
Sultan has not met my carabao yet!” “You have a carabao? If you want, they could fight.” Sandab 
said: “Ok.”  
But Sandab did not have a carabao. And the sultan said to him: “Just make sure you do 
not make a fool out of me. Do not make me lie to people. If I tell the people that there will be a 
bullfight and there will be none . . . ” Sandab asked some people to look for a small carabao (we 
call it nati): “You have to get it from its mother. Look for one!” So the people said: “Ok.”  
Then he asks the ladies to make armor for the young carabao. It is like a coat. So . . . he 
asks someone to go to confirm the fight, the sultan and Sandab informed his own people with the 
agong [brass gong] that the fight will push through. And he asks them to accompany him and the 
nati. Along the way, he asks his people to gather around the nati so that it could not see anything.  
When they arrived in the place the sultan asked Sandab: “Sandab where is your carabao?” 
He said: “It is there. Who will go first to present his carabao?” And the sultan said: “It is you: you 
go first.” Sandab said: “No, I suggest you go first, because if my carabao will beat your carabao 
you might say that because my carabao went first, it had a good position.” “Ok,” said the sultan, 
“ok.” 
So the carabao of the sultan went first and he was looking for his opponent; he was 
rotating, but he could not see it. The sultan shouted: “Sandab, where is your carabao?” “Ok, ok.”  
But the young carabao was very hungry because it had not eaten for a long time. So 
instead of fighting, the carabao went under the big carabao to look for milk. Instead of fighting, it 
was looking for milk. So they went around, not fighting, just going under. So Sandab shouted: 
“All the people will be the judge, who is the winner, the one who is chasing or the one who is 
being chased?”  
And then the sultan really got mad: “If I only knew that he would do this, he should have 
just asked me for money rather to destroy my carabao and humiliate me in front of my people. 
From now on, I do not want to see your face.” And Sandab answered: “Ok, but you know, Sultan, 
I ask you for one thing, we are brothers, we have the same mother and the same father.” “Ok, you 
can ask me for anything except for my throne.” “I ask for my sister, I cannot imagine to live 
without my sister, because I love her so much. I should see her once in a while.” And the sultan 
said: “Ok, why not?” Umpas was hurt, because it was so easy for him to give away his sister. She 
even suggested her brother: “You should have scolded our brother but not expelled him.” And 
now he gave her away.  
So they went in a small boat. And they did not know where to go. So they arrived in 
Maguindanao. It was called Iranon [land] then, the whole Mindanao was Iranon. And they arrived 
and everyone was talking about those two. And then Dimasangkay [a Adil sa Maguindanao] was 
informed that there was such a beautiful woman . . . 
Dimasangkay Adil had 39 wives but when he married Umpas, he stopped visiting the 
others. The other wives agreed this had to change.
376 If this was not going to change, they would 
have to kill Umpas. When they were talking, the brother from Umpas, Sandab, was with her. And 
                                                 
376 Noron is the name of the favorite wife of Dimasangkay a Adil sa Maguindanao before he married Umpas. She 
was the one who started the plan to assassinate Umpas by convincing the other wives of Dimasangkay, because since 
he married Umpas, he had very little time for them. The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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he told his sister: “You have to be careful because they are planning to kill you.” So she asked: 
“What is your plan?” And he said: “I ask you to leave.”  
So they went to Liamin.
377 They had a small house there. And the Punduma went there to 
hunt and he was asking his boy to look for water so they could eat their lunch. And the boy was 
looking for water and he saw the little house where a very beautiful lady was sitting beside the 
window. They talked and he told Umpas that his boss was looking for water. Then Umpas gave 
him k’ndi [kettle], and he brought it to Punduma. And he asks: “Where did you get this?” And the 
boy told him about this beautiful lady. “We eat later and we go to the lady.”  
And Punduma asked: “Why are you here?” because they were not Maranaos. And they 
explained why. And he said: “You come with me to my place. Because there are no people in 
Lanao,  it  is  a  hunting  place.”  So  the  brother  asks  Punduma:  “Can  you  take  the  anger  of 
Dimasangkay? Because they are still married.” And the Punduma said: “Make it ten times, I can 
still protect you.”  
They went to Butig . . . In Pagalongan Umpas asked her women to rest some time so she 
could wash her face in the river. Punduma said from this time on this river should be called 
Pagalongan [mirror] because her beauty [was shown there]. On their way, Punduma asked his 
boy to go ahead “and when you arrive in our place, you use my agong to inform the people.” He 
told him: “If they will ask why, you tell them that I found a girl,” because he was the leader but 
did not have a wife yet. The boy did so and the people from Ragayan were running to meet them 
and said: “Punduma is marrying and we almost live along the way.”  
And the people from Timbab, they ran, stumbled, and hit their heads to make sure that 
when the people from Malalis announced the arrival of Punduma, they got to play the native 
drums  to  welcome  him  before  they  proceeded  to  Dolangan. And  then  they  had  to  meet  the 
Punduma and so they prepared food in Dolangan, sweet food, and they ask the people ahead of 
them, in Malalis: “If you see the Punduma, shout so we can prepare.”  
But before they reached Butig, they passed through Macadar, the place of the uncle of the 
Punduma (the brother of his mother). The uncle would not allow the Punduma to continue unless 
they proved to Umpas that the Punduma is their friend, so they should not worry, because the guy 
who found her was the leader. So they continued to Butig, when they arrived they had kind of an 
engagement party.  
And the people in the place told him about what happened, he said: “You people from 
Ragayan,  you were there,  you were running very fast;  your place should  be called Ragayan 
[running in a rush]. People from Timbab, you stumbled and you hit your head; your place should 
be called Timbab. The place where you prepared the food shall be called Dolangan [native tray]. 
And the people ahead of me who were shouting when I was arriving should be called Malalis, 
because  in  Maranao  lalis  is  shouting.”  So  the  people  asked  him:  “From  now  on,  you  are 
confirming that we have these places; what power do we have?” “The one who will be sultan 
here in Unayan has to pass through you; [you] should be the one . . . to check with the applicants 
[for] sultan . . . who is in line.”  
There was no sultanate yet, Punduma was the leader. So they asked him: “You have to 
become panoroganan.” He asked his uncle who escorted him from Makada to Butig if it was ok 
with him: “I want to be the sultan.” Some of them [his uncles] said no, because, what about their 
children? Punduma explained: “I am different from your children, because your race and my race 
are the same from my mother’s side. But your children do not have the race of my father, who 
came from Sharief Alawi.” So they agreed to enthrone him as the sultan, the first panoroganan. 
Out of pride, Dalangit went to Poona Bayabao and Mamintal went to Lumba Bayabao and [they] 
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started their own sultanates. But it all started from Butig. Then the others followed . . .  
When Sandab left Brunei, they ask for a salsila: “So that we can trace us, back here when 
we marry people over there.” So he got a salsila. Eventually when they arrived in Butig and 
Umpas married Punduma, Sandab felt very lonely. He was very sad, because he has no wife. So 
Punduma suggested that he should marry his sister. So Umpas married Punduma and Sandab 
married his sister. And he [Punduma] was saying that the descendants of Umpas and Sandab now 
are  the  ones  who  occupy  the  title  of  Sultan  sa  Butig.  (Interview  given  in  two  parts  by  the 
Masiricampo sa Butig, later modified by the translator Amer Rashid Mindalano, further modified 
by the author, Marawi City, 2008) 
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9. Lineage involving Arab Ancestors of the Sultanate of Butig 
 
Abdul Hasim is the basis of our Arab lineage. Abdul Mutalib is the son of Abdul Hasim. 
Abdul Mutalib begot his son Abu Talib, the uncle of Prophet Mohammad, and Abdullah, the 
father of our Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him. Our Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) is the 
father of Fatima Sohra, who was married to Baguinda Ali; that is how our parents called him . . . 
Ali and Fatima Sohra begot two sons, namely Amer Hassan and Amer Hussain. Amer Hussain’s 
great-great-grandchild was Sharief Ali Saenal Abidin. Sharief Ali Sainal Abidin begot a child, 
Sharief Mohammad Baker, whose descendants include Sharief Japar Sedik. The latter begot a 
child named Sharief Morsal Khan, who begot a son, Sharief Ali Riban, who begot a son named 
Sharief Muhammad del Awwal, who begot a son Sarip Aliol Hoda, who begot a son Sheik Ali 
Hassan, who begot a son Hassanol Mohdil, who begot a child Sheik Ya Hassan, who begot a 
child named Sharief Ahmad, who begot a son, Sharief Muhammad Akil, who begot a son Sharief 
Alawi, whose descendants include Sharief Muhammad Sharifuden, who was identified as having 
written the salsila or genealogy. Sharief Muhammad Sharifuden had two sons, namely Sharief Ali 
Zainal Abedin (named after his ancestors) and Abdul Rahman. 
Sharief Ali Zainal Abedin begot seven sons known as the Shariefs. The first was Sharief 
Kabonsuan, who landed in Maguindanao. He stayed in Maguindanao and the four principalities 
of Lanao where he had his offspring. The second was Sharief Alauya, who stayed in Tagoloan. 
Tagoloan  comprises  Kapai  and  extends  up  to  Cagayan  de  Oro  City.  The  third  was  Sharief 
Alioden, who resided in Jolo. Maranaos call it Solog. The fourth was Sharief Alnao, who stayed 
in Tampasok. The fifth was Sharief Maguinando, who stayed in Maloko. He was the one who 
remained in Malaysia. Sharief Bong stayed in Brunei. Sharief Mangindar stayed in Maladao. 
These are the Shariefs who went to the east for the purpose of preaching Islam and they were the 
ones who introduced the sultanate system of leadership.
378 
The second son of Sharief Muhammad Sharifuden, who wrote the genealogy, was Abdul 
Rahman, who begot a son named Radia Bandar, who stayed in Johore. Radia Bandar begot Sultan 
sa Johore, Sandab, and Umpas. Sandab and Umpas lived and stayed in Lanao.  
One line of genealogy is that of Umpas. She was married to Datu Punduma sa Butig. 
Umpas was first married to Dimasangkay a Adil of Maguindanao. During that time, the rulers 
were on equal footing, when there was no sultanate. Dimasangkay a Adil sa Maguindanao ruled 
the entire region of Maguindanao, which was later divided into five provinces. Umpas came to 
Lanao from Johor with her brother Sandab. When Umpas divorced her first husband, she was 
married to Punduma of Butig. Punduma sa Butig was the first panoroganan [literally “decision 
maker,” also translated as “executive” and later as Royal House] in Lanao, whose power was 
respected, during the time when there was no sultanate yet in the four principalities of Lanao, 
because the Shariefs had not introduced yet the sultanate leadership. 
When Punduma married Umpas, leadership started, but during this time, their leadership 
was not sultanate but datu. The legislature supporting the leadership of Punduma were his uncles. 
(Speech given by the Sultan sa Butig in 2008, Marawi City, translated by Montia Jamilah D. 
Sarip, translation modified) 
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10. A Murder Case Related to the Author by a Bai a Labi, 2008 
 
There is a specific case, which is actually murder. Its background is that: 
A man and a woman [are] loving each other for some time. The woman is a pure Muslim 
(Maranao), belonging to a big family or clan. The man has Maranao blood on his father[’s] side, 
but his mother is a pure Christian. After being engaged for some time, the woman invited the man 
to go with her to her hometown, which is actually not accepted in the Maranao culture. The man 
being not a full-blooded Maranao did not know much about the culture. He thought all the while 
that they were mere sweethearts, and that they were just enjoying. The man was actually taken by 
the relatives and parents of the woman. He was tied up with a rope for 3 days while the woman 
was placed and locked up in a room. The woman's relatives were asking him many questions. He 
speaks a minimal Maranao language but he could not [explain] to the relatives of the woman who 
are his relatives in Lanao. Had he mentioned names from prominent citizens in Lanao, he would 
have been saved. But without any relations, the relatives of the woman concluded that he was not 
a real Maranao.  
Four days after, the father of the man went to the place with some military men. The 
father suspected that his son had been killed already. So, he opted to seek the help of relatives. 
The relatives went to see the leaders/datus of the community to seek their help to locate the man 
and perhaps the dead body. Making the story short, it was a day later the man was killed by the 
family of the woman. While the negotiations were made, the leaders of the place said that the 
man was already dead. The sultan of the place did not allow the man's relatives to enter the 
community and fully identify who are the actual people concerned. The sultan was playing safe, 
it would not be good for him to directly say, there are the people, because his life too would be at 
risk. Much more that he is doing his mandate as a sultan; he has to protect his life. The last thing 
requested by the man's relative was to get the dead body. It was dismay that it was not given. It 
was a very serious case. It touches the maratabat (pride) of all the relatives. Much so [sic], that 
the relatives knew that the women's family thought that the man was not a Muslim.  
Few days after the man’s relatives accepted that he was already dead. The woman ran 
away, she went to the man's family. She spoke on television, that she was married to that man. 
Then there was a negotiation done. A woman known to be a highly [high ranking] professional, 
negotiated . . . According to her, their family is really peace loving and they are all professionals. 
She was trying to clear this connection to one person who had participated in killing the man. He 
is a distant relative known to be very notorious and they do not want to be a part of the dispute. 
The female professional had negotiated with  another woman, a titled woman, who is  also  a 
professional like her. The titled woman [the bai a labi telling the story] had a hard time because 
she was actually close to the professional woman who was a former superior of her[s]. On this 
basis, the titled woman thought about refusing.  
The first step done by the titled woman is to talk to an uncle who served as head of the 
family. She made a series of visits to relatives which [sic] were influential in the family. Another 
step was to convince the bereaved family about the fault of the man in going to the place of the 
woman where all her relatives stay and live. In the Maranao culture, illegal stay with a woman is 
definitely punishable by death. After they are convinced and accepted the fault of their son, they 
seem to agree. It took some time to convince them because they had contacted some policemen to 
do revenge. The female negotiator asked them not to do revenge later because if they do, it is 
useless for her to have amicable settlement. The bereaved family accepted that he is already dead, 
and whatever action they would do, he will not be alive again.  
Finally,  they  have  subscribed  to  the  settlement  the  negotiator  took  responsible  of  the 
man’s family, and the professional woman committed to take charge of the other family. Both The Influence of the National Question and the Revival of Tradition on Gender Issues among Maranaos 
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families  agreed  to  have  a  kandori  [food  offering],  there  was  food  preparation  and  a  certain 
amount  (PHP  100,000)  was  given  as  kandori  on  a  scheduled  date.  The  professional  lady 
requested the titled woman that it would be at her residence. They feel safe if it will be at her 
residence because they are somehow related to the husband [they feel safe from being subject to 
the revenge of the bereaved family when they are at the house of a relative]. Much that it is her 
pleasure that the settlement will be held in her residence, she [the titled woman] explained that it 
would be better if it will be at the residence of her brother, who is a military man. It would also 
be easier for the bereaved family to come. (In the Maranao culture, entering the house of the 
family whom you made a mistake [sic], even if it is murder, there is a very big possibility of 
making a pardon. It is because it is a principal requirement, because you surrender more or less. 
Thus, it has to be honored, especially if a woman with high rank in the society [meaning the 
female family leader] will enter. If the killer himself would surrender to the house of the family 
of the bereaved, he must be covered with white cloth. This means complete surrender. But he 
should not enter the house unless both parties agreed for his presence.) Much that the bai a labi is 
honored in the family, she wants also to honor her brother. This is a part of the implementation of 
the  taritib,  which  is  honoring  elders,  honoring  a  male  member  of  the  family  by  the  female 
member. Finally, time came when all the brothers and sisters of the professional woman came and 
for the bereaved family, that is something that they would honor. There were several speeches, it 
was  emphasized  that  the  presence  of  the  women  and  men  are  so  valuable.  It  was  well 
acknowledged and so there was agreement from both sides. (Written statement, Marawi City, 
2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 